On Thu, Jun 07, 2012 at 07:03:25AM -0500, Mike Mestnik wrote: > Hello, > I just got done slamming, perhaps as a troll, a lwn.net article. I > may have gone too far and I don't believe you can go to far when it > comes to security. I'm not the type to give up, you've attached with a > keylogger to my X... Well now your keylogger is attached to my > sub-server and I'm going send you about a dozen fortunes, then I'll try > and backhack some arbitrary code your way. Get off my server or the > hunter will become the hunted. > > What bothers me the most is that I'm finding out about this by reading a > news article. When did X developers stop caring about clients after > they had connected? I don't believe that malicious clients can never > connect to an X server or that it would be "absolutely" possible to > prevent malicious clients from connecting. So why is it that Security > in X has fallen to this level, if it has and this article basically > admits that it has or will? When did this change occur and why wasn't I > told? > > I hope that at least a handful of you are at least mildly concerned that > X might become an open playground for keyloggers and other malicious > software once a client connection has been authenticated. Is it really > then intention of the X community to forgo any security post client > authentication? I hope you can at least understand where I'm coming > from, to have to find out about this in a news article not related to a > change in security. > > In shore, I believe that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of > cure. Users should fill that ounce with there bets effort to try and > keep malicious clients off the X server. I don't believe that's enough, > there has to be a cure for when this fails. A great offense that when > combined with the Users defense forms a complete team that's not only > the best, but unbeatable. I know that if keyloggers are prevented from > reading anything useful that there won't be any keyloagers that break > past X's authentication security. However I also know that if there is > something to be gained from forging an xauth, that hackers will be > tempted and eventually success in penetrating the outer defense. > > Another related issue is that if it is indeed the case where an > authenticated client might have free reign into all user input(where > multi-touch devices are open regardless of the keyboard-focus-lock).
the "keyboard focus lock" doesn't work as you think it does. short story: there isn't really any, a malicious app can get around it and this has been the case since approx 1994. > This IMHO would disable(or at least render so insecure it's unthinkable) > the feature of X that allows for remote clients. I don't think a remote > root should ever be trusted, even if that is you. The simple matter is > that a remote box could have been powned. > > http://lwn.net/Articles/485484/ > > Please join my cause to keep xinput secure, even when malicious clients s/keep/make/ :) Cheers, Peter > are connected. Actually I'd be looking for some one with more political > savvy then myself, I know that I'm actually the worst person you want > speaking on your behalf. > Please read some of my comments on the lwn.net forum, I stand by what > I've said. _______________________________________________ [email protected]: X.Org development Archives: http://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-devel Info: http://lists.x.org/mailman/listinfo/xorg-devel
