Hi,
On 18-10-15 19:26, Julien Cristau wrote:
When the server is privileged, we shouldn't be passing the user's
environment directly.
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcris...@debian.org>
I've no real objections against this, and I can see this being a good
thing from a security pov, but I'm afraid this may cause regressions.
Before we had the wrapper the server itself used to be suid-root,
and none of the code for dealing with that has been removed (the server
can still be build that way). So I would expect the server to sanitize
its environment itself...
So I've 2 questions:
1) Is there any concrete reason why this is necessary ?
2) Does anyone know of any use-cases this may break ?
Regards,
Hans
---
hw/xfree86/xorg-wrapper.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
It's possible some variables should be passed, in which case we could
use a whitelist; in my testing this patch seemed to work, though.
diff --git a/hw/xfree86/xorg-wrapper.c b/hw/xfree86/xorg-wrapper.c
index 22e97ad..d6efb23 100644
--- a/hw/xfree86/xorg-wrapper.c
+++ b/hw/xfree86/xorg-wrapper.c
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int total_cards = 0;
int allowed = CONSOLE_ONLY;
int needs_root_rights = -1;
+ char *const envp[1] = { NULL, };
progname = argv[0];
@@ -265,7 +266,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
argv[0] = buf;
- (void) execv(argv[0], argv);
+ if (getuid() == geteuid())
+ (void) execv(argv[0], argv);
+ else
+ (void) execve(argv[0], argv, envp);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Failed to execute %s: %s\n",
progname, buf, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
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