Reviewed: https://review.openstack.org/371927 Committed: https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/rally/commit/?id=2259b17384c0eb7da9325123e6f4041c5b317c79 Submitter: Jenkins Branch: master
commit 2259b17384c0eb7da9325123e6f4041c5b317c79 Author: Iswarya_Vakati <[email protected]> Date: Sat Sep 17 18:19:22 2016 +0530 Don't attempt to escalate rally-manage privileges Remove code which allowed rally-manage to attempt to escalate privileges so that configuration files can be read by users who normally wouldn't have access, but do have sudo access. Change-Id: Iff352e463189738d3f371c819edfeb0664fd7684 Closes-Bug:#1611171 ** Changed in: rally Status: In Progress => Fix Released -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Yahoo! Engineering Team, which is subscribed to OpenStack Compute (nova). https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1611171 Title: re-runs self via sudo Status in Cinder: Fix Released Status in Designate: In Progress Status in ec2-api: In Progress Status in gce-api: Fix Released Status in Manila: In Progress Status in masakari: Fix Released Status in OpenStack Compute (nova): Fix Released Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) newton series: Fix Committed Status in OpenStack Security Advisory: Won't Fix Status in Rally: Fix Released Bug description: Hello, I'm looking through Designate source code to determine if is appropriate to include in Ubuntu Main. This isn't a full security audit. This looks like trouble: ./designate/cmd/manage.py def main(): CONF.register_cli_opt(category_opt) try: utils.read_config('designate', sys.argv) logging.setup(CONF, 'designate') except cfg.ConfigFilesNotFoundError: cfgfile = CONF.config_file[-1] if CONF.config_file else None if cfgfile and not os.access(cfgfile, os.R_OK): st = os.stat(cfgfile) print(_("Could not read %s. Re-running with sudo") % cfgfile) try: os.execvp('sudo', ['sudo', '-u', '#%s' % st.st_uid] + sys.argv) except Exception: print(_('sudo failed, continuing as if nothing happened')) print(_('Please re-run designate-manage as root.')) sys.exit(2) This is an interesting decision -- if the configuration file is _not_ readable by the user in question, give the executing user complete privileges of the user that owns the unreadable file. I'm not a fan of hiding privilege escalation / modifications in programs -- if a user had recently used sudo and thus had the authentication token already stored for their terminal, this 'hidden' use of sudo may be unexpected and unwelcome, especially since it appears that argv from the first call leaks through to the sudo call. Is this intentional OpenStack style? Or unexpected for you guys too? (Feel free to make this public at your convenience.) Thanks To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1611171/+subscriptions -- Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~yahoo-eng-team Post to : [email protected] Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~yahoo-eng-team More help : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
