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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-5836?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Botong Huang updated YARN-5836:
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Description:
When AM calls NM via stopContainers() in ContainerManagementProtocol, the
NMToken (generated by RM) is passed along via the user ugi. However currently
ContainerManagerImpl is not validating this token correctly, specifically in
authorizeGetAndStopContainerRequest() in ContainerManagerImpl. Basically it
blindly trusts the content in the NMTokenIdentifier without verifying the
password (RM generated signature) in the NMToken, so that malicious AM can just
fake the content in the NMTokenIdentifier and pass it to NMs. Moreover,
currently even for plain text checking, when the appId doesn’t match, all it
does is log it as a warning and continues to kill the container…
For startContainers the NMToken is not checked correctly in authorizeUser() as
well, however the ContainerToken is verified properly by regenerating and
comparing the password in verifyAndGetContainerTokenIdentifier(), so that
malicious AM cannot launch containers at will.
was:
When AM calls NM via stopContainers in ContainerManagementProtocol, the NMToken
(generated by RM) is passed along via the user ugi. However currently
ContainerManagerImpl is not validating this token correctly, specifically in
authorizeGetAndStopContainerRequest in ContainerManagerImpl. Basically it
blindly trusts the content in the NMTokenIdentifier without verifying the
password (RM generated signature) in the NMToken, so that malicious AM can just
fake the content in the NMTokenIdentifier and pass it to NMs. Moreover,
currently even for plain text checking, when the appId doesn’t match, all it
does is log it as a warning and continues to kill the container…
For startContainers the NMToken is not checked correctly in authorizeUser as
well, however the ContainerToken is verified properly by regenerating and
comparing the password in verifyAndGetContainerTokenIdentifier, so that
malicious AM cannot launch containers at will.
> NMToken passwd not checked in ContainerManagerImpl, malicious AM can fake the
> Token and kill containers of other apps at will
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: YARN-5836
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-5836
> Project: Hadoop YARN
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: nodemanager
> Reporter: Botong Huang
> Assignee: Botong Huang
> Priority: Minor
> Original Estimate: 5h
> Remaining Estimate: 5h
>
> When AM calls NM via stopContainers() in ContainerManagementProtocol, the
> NMToken (generated by RM) is passed along via the user ugi. However currently
> ContainerManagerImpl is not validating this token correctly, specifically in
> authorizeGetAndStopContainerRequest() in ContainerManagerImpl. Basically it
> blindly trusts the content in the NMTokenIdentifier without verifying the
> password (RM generated signature) in the NMToken, so that malicious AM can
> just fake the content in the NMTokenIdentifier and pass it to NMs. Moreover,
> currently even for plain text checking, when the appId doesn’t match, all it
> does is log it as a warning and continues to kill the container…
> For startContainers the NMToken is not checked correctly in authorizeUser()
> as well, however the ContainerToken is verified properly by regenerating and
> comparing the password in verifyAndGetContainerTokenIdentifier(), so that
> malicious AM cannot launch containers at will.
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