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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-5836?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15651095#comment-15651095
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Jason Lowe commented on YARN-5836:
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So have you verified that a faked NM token "works" or was this theoretical?  If 
there's a case on a secure cluster where a faked NM token allowed an 
application master (or other agent) to connect to the NM then that's serious 
and needs to be fixed.  Otherwise we should update the JIRA headline to reflect 
this is tracking the missing exception for the invalid stop container request.

> NMToken passwd not checked in ContainerManagerImpl, malicious AM can fake the 
> Token and kill containers of other apps at will
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: YARN-5836
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-5836
>             Project: Hadoop YARN
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: nodemanager
>            Reporter: Botong Huang
>            Assignee: Botong Huang
>            Priority: Minor
>   Original Estimate: 5h
>  Remaining Estimate: 5h
>
> When AM calls NM via stopContainers() in ContainerManagementProtocol, the 
> NMToken (generated by RM) is passed along via the user ugi. However currently 
> ContainerManagerImpl is not validating this token correctly, specifically in 
> authorizeGetAndStopContainerRequest() in ContainerManagerImpl. Basically it 
> blindly trusts the content in the NMTokenIdentifier without verifying the 
> password (RM generated signature) in the NMToken, so that malicious AM can 
> just fake the content in the NMTokenIdentifier and pass it to NMs. Moreover, 
> currently even for plain text checking, when the appId doesn’t match, all it 
> does is log it as a warning and continues to kill the container…
> For startContainers the NMToken is not checked correctly in authorizeUser() 
> as well, however the ContainerToken is verified properly by regenerating and 
> comparing the password in verifyAndGetContainerTokenIdentifier(), so that 
> malicious AM cannot launch containers at will. 



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