[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7197?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16241014#comment-16241014
]
Jason Lowe commented on YARN-7197:
----------------------------------
bq. I see that I missed a key point about mounting above parent directory. When
the target location is set to another location, the blacklist addictive does
not enforce blacklisted path relative to target location.
If I'm understanding properly, we need to be worried not only about what host
path the user is trying to mount but also _where_ they are trying to mount it
within the image? I was under the impression the contents of the image were
user-provided. If that's the case then I do not see why the user needs a
bind-mount from the host to clobber some path in the image. They could just
create the nefarious contents in the image directly. Am I misunderstanding, or
do you have an example where it is necessary?
bq. Do you agree that by tracking blacklisted path relative location to target
location, we can satisfy the original motive of preventing jail break out of
container?
I thought the point of this JIRA was to prevent exposing sensitive paths on the
host to the container so it's inaccessible even if the user gains privilege
within the container. It sounds like you're proposing that the blacklist
should also prevent those paths in the image from being clobbered by mounts
from the host. If the user controls the image contents then I'm not sure that
protects us from much. Apologies if I'm misunderstanding what is meant by
"relative location to target location."
> Add support for a volume blacklist for docker containers
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: YARN-7197
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7197
> Project: Hadoop YARN
> Issue Type: Sub-task
> Components: yarn
> Reporter: Shane Kumpf
> Assignee: Eric Yang
> Attachments: YARN-7197.001.patch, YARN-7197.002.patch,
> YARN-7197.003.patch, YARN-7197.004.patch, YARN-7197.005.patch
>
>
> Docker supports bind mounting host directories into containers. Work is
> underway to allow admins to configure a whilelist of volume mounts. While
> this is a much needed and useful feature, it opens the door for
> misconfiguration that may lead to users being able to compromise or crash the
> system.
> One example would be allowing users to mount /run from a host running
> systemd, and then running systemd in that container, rendering the host
> mostly unusable.
> This issue is to add support for a default blacklist. The default blacklist
> would be where we put files and directories that if mounted into a container,
> are likely to have negative consequences. Users are encouraged not to remove
> items from the default blacklist, but may do so if necessary.
--
This message was sent by Atlassian JIRA
(v6.4.14#64029)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected]
For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
