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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16310344#comment-16310344
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Eric Badger commented on YARN-7516:
-----------------------------------
{quote}
+ public static final String TRUSTED_DOCKER_REGISTRY = YARN_PREFIX +
+ "docker.trusted.registry";
{quote}
Is there a reason this doesn't use {{DOCKER_CONTAINER_RUNTIME_PREFIX}}?
I'm also wondering if this approach is consistent with what we went through
with YARN-6623. In that JIRA we moved all sensitive configs into
container-executor.cfg so that they could only be modified by root. By putting
this property in yarn-site.xml, it is modifiable if the yarn user is
compromised. So, if we assume a compromised yarn user, then this property won't
stop an attacker from running arbitrary untrusted images. I think we should add
this config to container-executor.cfg so that the property is guaranteed to be
safe unless the attacker has gained root access.
[[email protected]], [~vvasudev], [[email protected]], thoughts
on this?
> Security check for untrusted docker image
> -----------------------------------------
>
> Key: YARN-7516
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/YARN-7516
> Project: Hadoop YARN
> Issue Type: Sub-task
> Reporter: Eric Yang
> Assignee: Eric Yang
> Attachments: YARN-7516.001.patch, YARN-7516.002.patch,
> YARN-7516.003.patch, YARN-7516.004.patch
>
>
> Hadoop YARN Services can support using private docker registry image or
> docker image from docker hub. In current implementation, Hadoop security is
> enforced through username and group membership, and enforce uid:gid
> consistency in docker container and distributed file system. There is cloud
> use case for having ability to run untrusted docker image on the same cluster
> for testing.
> The basic requirement for untrusted container is to ensure all kernel and
> root privileges are dropped, and there is no interaction with distributed
> file system to avoid contamination. We can probably enforce detection of
> untrusted docker image by checking the following:
> # If docker image is from public docker hub repository, the container is
> automatically flagged as insecure, and disk volume mount are disabled
> automatically, and drop all kernel capabilities.
> # If docker image is from private repository in docker hub, and there is a
> white list to allow the private repository, disk volume mount is allowed,
> kernel capabilities follows the allowed list.
> # If docker image is from private trusted registry with image name like
> "private.registry.local:5000/centos", and white list allows this private
> trusted repository. Disk volume mount is allowed, kernel capabilities
> follows the allowed list.
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