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Subject: Why the US Left is Weak - and What to Do About It
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Why the US Left is Weak - and What to Do About It

by Barbara Epstein
(With thanks to John Sanbonmatsu for helpful criticisms
and suggestions.)

Z Mag / ZNet.org - July 14, 2009

http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/21992

Contribution to the Reimagining Society Project hosted
by ZCommunications
<http://www.zcommunications.org/zparecon/reimaginingsoc
iety.htm>

The topic of my essay is the current weakness of the US
left, by which I mean those of us who want a democratic
and egalitarian society, a demilitarized world, and a
respectful relationship between humans, other
creatures, and the natural environment, those of us who
are convinced that this will require a massive
redistribution of power and wealth, within the US and
internationally.  This is hardly the only possible
definition of the left.  Some on the right use the term
in a way that includes all Democratic office holders,
and anyone who votes for them.  Some use the term to
include anyone who favors a firmer challenge to
corporate interests than the Obama administration is
willing to countenance.  Those who fit this description
might be called left liberals, or progressives, and
they are like leftists in many ways:  they support
changes that leftists also support, and collectively,
like the left, they are fragmented, disorganized, and
have less impact than their numbers would warrant. The
difference is that they tend not to see the need for
fundamental, structural social change.  My essay is
concerned with those of us who do see such a need.

I believe that as long as capitalism holds sway our
ability to achieve the social order described above
will be at best partial and tenuous.  The profit motive
is not a basis for a society that could be counted on
to promote peace, demoracy, equality, or a viable
relationship between humans and the rest of the planet.
The neo-liberal form of capitalism is more destructive
of human society, other species, and the environment
than any previous form of capitalism.  It would be
difficult to consider anyone who is not critical of
capitalism part of the left.  But hardly anyone, even
among those of us who consider ourselves socialists,
thinks that socialism can be achieved any time soon. If
we were to pose the quest for socialism as the most
urgent aim of the left, or, worse, to pose it against
reforms short of socialism, we would find ourselves
ignored, by progressives as well as the mainstream and
the right.  Probably the best we can hope for, for the
foreseeable future, is a form of democratic socialism
in which capitalism is severely regulated, and some
redistribution of wealth and power is achieved through
regulation of corporations, the expansion of state
spending on social programs, and a dramatic increase in
popular participation in politics.  If such a shift
could be achieved, it would alter the balance of power
between the corporate elite and the rest of us, and
would constitute a step toward socialism. But making
socialism the most immediate issue on our agenda would
be self-defeating.

Another reason not to make socialism our central issue
is that there is a large sector of the left that
rejects capitalism but is at least ambivalent about
socialism.  Anarchism is the dominant orientation among
young radical activists, and while the vast majority is
anti-capitalist, many look forward to a decentralized
and stateless society that they would not describe as
socialist.  While I can't see how a society can
function without some governing structure, the question
of what form that might take in a post-capitalist
society seems to me a legitimate question.  One legacy
of the left's past that I think we need to avoid is
readiness to define those whom one disagrees with out
of the left.  I envision a left that includes
anarchists, Marxists, and everyone in between, or
perhaps approaching the left with a different
vocabulary altogether. There remain ethical boundaries:
Stalinism should have been rejected in the past, and
support for repressive and authoritarian movements, or
states, remains alien to a democratic left.  But it
seems to me that there should be room for debate about
the relationship of the left to the state.

The problem with debating the fine points of a left
vision is that, in the US, we barely have a left.  The
first question, it seems to me, is, why is the left so
weak, and what can we do about it?  The movements of
the sixties had a great impact on American society,
shifting many people to the left, and leaving a legacy
that has shaped the views of large numbers of young
people.  But most of the left organizations of the
sixties collapsed as the movements that they had
sustained lost their impetus.  The central ideas of
those movements were social equality at home and an end
to US wars of aggression and the aim of US world
domination that lies behind them.  These ideas drew a
large sector of a generation into political activity;
they were, and remain, enormously compelling.  But they
came to be intertwined with other ideas that were
considerably less persuasive, most of them connected
with the illusion, widespread among left activists of
the late sixties and early seventies, that revolution
was around the corner.  Though hardly anyone on the
left still thinks that revolution is imminent, many of
the ideas that arose in connection with this view
continue to plague the left, and to narrow its appeal.
Perhaps these ideas hung on in part because the mass
participation organizations of the movements of the
sixties disappeared, and with them any arena for
collective reconsideration of which of the ideas of the
movements of the sixties were valid and should be
carried forward, and which had done damage and should
be abandoned.

The left organizations of the sixties and early
seventies were, on the whole, not designed to last.
This was partly because the movements of the time were
youth movements, and thought of themselves as such.
Very little thought was put into the question of what
the left would look like when we ceased to be young.
For many of us, our left politics and our youth were so
intertwined that we avoided confronting the possibility
that one day we would no longer be young.  For some
left activity may have been a youthful fling, to be
abandoned, ultimately, with a certain relief.  The
Communist Party, and other organizations of the Old
Left, were founded on the view that social change was a
lifetime commitment.  The movements of the sixties for
the most part did not address this issue.

The Old Left was built on the assumption that strong
organizations were the foundation for a strong and
effective left, and in the early years of the New Left
the same assumption held.  Members of SNCC, SDS, and
other organizations of the Civil Rights movement and
the northern student movement were dedicated to
building and strengthening those organizations.  But
there was also a widespread view, especially in the
northern student movement, that the enemy was "the
system" and the bureaucracy entailed in it, that the
movement represented spontaneity against structure. In
many of the organizations of the early sixties there
was enough internal agreement and willingness to
compromise that a spirit of spontaneity was more a
strength than a weakness.  In the latter part of the
sixties spontaneity remained a strength:  the "let a
hundred flowers bloom" mentality created room for the
young people, pouring into the movement, to express
their rage at the war and at the system as a whole in
myriad ways.

 Spontaneity and the suspicion of organization also
 became a weakness for the movements of the sixties.
 These principles were taken to extremes, as in cases
 of radical feminist groups in which those who took on
 leadership roles might be attacked simply for
 occupying those roles.  It was also a factor in the
 collapse of organizations that held the movement
 together and that might have provided the basis for a
 continuation of the left beyond the end of the war. In
 the last years of the sixties the leadership of SDS
 became consumed by bitter conflicts among several
 ideological tendencies, each arguing on behalf of a
 particular path toward the revolution.  SDS was by
 this time very large:  it had hundreds of chapters and
 perhaps 100,000 members.  But most chapters functioned
 largely autonomously and paid little attention to the
 debates taking place in leading circles. When the
 battle among the sectarian groupings at the center
 tore the organization apart, there was no one to point
 out that keeping the organization alive was more
 important.  In some parts of the US, as in the Bay
 Area, for the most part organizations of the left
 didn't even take hold.  In Berkeley each new crisis
 prompted the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee,
 consisting of self-appointed leaders, which would call
 demonstrations and issue statements.  Between crises
 movement activity would subside.   Many, perhaps most
 of those who considered themselves part of the
 movement belonged to no ongoing organizations, except
 perhaps households consisting of movement supporters.
 As long as the war lasted, and especially as long as
 the draft was in effect, the movement remained strong.
 But once the war was over the movement dissipated,
 with few structures remaining to sustain left
 influence in a different period.

Suspicion of organization was not universal in the
movements of the late sixties.  The Marxist-
Leninist/Maoist/New Communist current, often called the
party building movement, took the opposite approach and
constructed hierarchical, tightly disciplined
organizations modeled on revolutionary organizations in
China and elsewhere in the Third World, intended as
vanguard parties that would lead the revolution.  The
Black Panther Party and some other radical
organizations of people of color adopted similar
organizational styles.  This sector of the movement had
considerable influence on the thinking of activists
throughout the movement, but more for their confidence
that the revolution was imminent, their focus on anti-
imperialism, and their identification with Third World
movements, than for the structure of their
organizations, which were hierarchical and often
authoritarian, were at odds with the spirit of the
movement and appealed to only a minority of activists.
But Maoism, the dominant ideological current in the
party-building movement, had a profound impact on the
movement as a whole.  Maoism introduced a theory of
anti-imperialism that made sense in the context of the
war in Vietnam:  that the "main contradiction" was no
longer capitalism versus socialism, but US imperialism
versus the anti-imperialist movement.  The view that a
revolution could take place, soon, in the US, was also
promoted by Maoism, along with the idea that the
prospects for revolution had more to do with the
discipline and dedication of a revolutionary movement
than with conditions external to the movement.  Maoism
encouraged the view that "Third World people" in the US
would lead the revolution.  And it encouraged a
dismissive view of democracy and human rights.

The movements of the late sixties and the early
seventies undermined themselves not only through their
ambivalence toward organization but also by adopting
perspectives that were not very credible at the time
(and, to the extent that these perspectives have
persisted, they are considerably less credible now). In
the late sixties and early seventies it was widely
assumed, among radical activists, that the revolution
was around the corner.  The word "revolution" meant
different things in different sectors of the movement:
to those in the radical core of the anti-war movement,
who generally identified with one or another version of
Marxism, it meant the overthrow of capitalism and the
establishment of socialism; to radical feminists it
meant a restructuring of gender relations; to many
activists of color it meant an end to racism and
whatever changes in the social order might be necessary
to bring that about.  To virtually everyone who adopted
it, the idea of revolution was intoxicating, and few
looked closely into what it meant or how it would come
about.  In fact there was no basis for revolution. Only
a very small sector of young activists was committed to
revolution.  A much larger number used the word, but
more to indicate the depth of their anger than out of
any intention of overthrowing either the state or the
capitalist system.  Very few outside the radical youth
movement had any interest in revolution.

The belief that revolution was possible took hold
partly due to the example of Third World revolutions
and revolutionary movements, and partly because the
approach of "working within the system," trying to
induce the government to adhere to the espoused
liberal, d

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