The Communist University

debates the SACP Special National Congress Discussion Document on:
 
“Building working class hegemony on the terrain of a national democratic struggle”
 
  • Date: 4 October 2009 (Sunday)
  • Time: 10h00
  • Venue: University of Johannesburg, Doornfontein Campus
 
This is intended to be the first of a series of discussions, organised by the Communist University, in preparation for the SACP Special National Congress to be held at the Turfloop Campus, Polokwane, Limpopo Province, in December 2009.
 
To assist our initial discussion, we provide here two extracts from the recent CU series on the National Democratic Revolution (below). One is from Lenin’s report to the 2CCI in 1920. The other is sections 2.4 and 3 from the discussion document. The full texts of both of these documents are attached, in MS-word format.
 
Further SACP discussion documents are to follow on the following topics:
  • The State and the Future of Local and Provincial Government
  • Industrial Strategy and Rural Development
 
 
Extract 1
 
From the Report on the National & Colonial Question, 2CCI, Lenin, 4 pages
 
We have discussed whether it would be right or wrong, in principle and in theory, to state that the Communist International and the Communist parties must support the bourgeois-democratic movement in backward countries. As a result of our discussion, we have arrived at the unanimous decision to speak of the national-revolutionary movement rather than of the ‘bourgeois-democratic’ movement. It is beyond doubt that any national movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, since the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consist of peasants who represent bourgeois-capitalist relationships…
 
However, the objections have been raised that, if we speak of the bourgeois-democratic movement, we shall be obliterating all distinctions between the reformist and the revolutionary movements. Yet that distinction has been very clearly revealed of late in the backward and colonial countries…
 
 
Extract 2
 
From SACP 2nd Special National Congress, CC Discussion Document
 
2.4 The politics of working class hegemony...versus the politics of a multi-class balancing act
 
The essence of reformist centrism in our present conjuncture is the attempt to disqualify the struggle for working class hegemony in the state and society by seeking, variously, to present such a struggle as:
 
  • “Undermining constitutional stability and national reconciliation”;
  • “Compromising the imperative of economic recovery in the midst of a global recession”; and
  • “Misunderstanding the multi-class character of the ANC”, and therefore disrupting its unity.
 
The first argument tends to be put forward by liberal forces outside of the ranks of our movement (Alistair Sparks, Moeletsi Mbeki, Ivan Fallon, etc.). They do this by deliberately conflating the important difference between the left and a narrow (right-wing) demagogic Africanist tendency within the movement. They seek to paint all of us with the same brush – “hot-headed radicals”, “populist leftists”, etc.
 
Alternatively, the working class hegemonic struggle is portrayed as a “discredited”, “state-centred” politics that disappeared from the agenda with the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
 
By contrast with our supposed divisive factionalism, reformist centrism (both within and beyond our movement) advances a vision of “class peace”, of a “multi-class accord”, to be achieved by way of a “balancing” act of the political and economic interests of different classes. This is why, when our general secretary, quite truthfully says that the implementation of the National Health Insurance will require a class “war” – there is such an outcry of horror from some quarters (see Max du Preez, for instance). These kinds of truths are not meant to be spoken out aloud in polite society.
 
A more sophisticated version of essentially disqualifying a working class hegemonic struggle in key sites of power can be found in the Dinokeng Scenarios (prepared in the run-up to the elections, but eventually published in May 2009 in their immediate aftermath). The following is a brief summary (by one of the key coordinators of the project) of the three possible scenarios of what SA might look like in 2020:
 
“The first scenario, Walk Apart, depicts a story of a weakening state and social coherence that unravels into unrest and leads to disintegration and decline.
 
“The second scenario, Walk Behind, depicts a story of a strong state that intervenes in the economy and society…The ruling party argues that strong state intervention in the economy is in accordance with global trends, and the electorate, concerned about the impact of the global economic crisis, gives the ruling party a powerful mandate. Strong state intervention crowds out private initiative by business and civil society…but breeds dependency and complacency among the citizenry, leading to disengagement and declining investment and a debt crisis.
 
“The third scenario, Walk Together, narrates the story of an actively engaged citizenry that holds government accountable and a responsive state that leads to cooperative governance and social compacts…It entails a common national vision that cuts across economic self-interest in the short-term.”
 
Three things to note:
 
  1. Clearly, as with most scenario exercises, this is not what it purports to be - a relatively neutral list of things that might happen. It is a political argument in favour of one “scenario”, as opposed to two other “bad” scenarios.
  2. The scenario format has a habit of making certain things seem mutually exclusive. In this case, critically, the possibility of a strong state that is active in the economy and society, but which is also highly participatory in character, drawing its strength in part precisely from popular power (as, for instance, in Cuba) is rendered “unthinkable”. And yet this IS precisely at the heart of the SACP’s MTV perspective.
  3. Although, clearly, the SACP is in favour of many of the things promoted in scenario three (active citizenship, an accountable and responsive state, etc.) – notice how, in the Dinokeng scenario, these potentially progressive themes are captured (i.e. hegemonised) by an essentially liberal politics of “checks and balances” precisely because “accountability” and “responsiveness” are divorced from a politics of mass- and particularly working class-driven, state-led radical transformation.
 
This last observation brings us to the KEY point of this discussion document:
 
3. Towards a politics of mass-driven, state-led radical TRANSFORMATION on the terrain of a National Democratic Revolution
 
The sectarian left in our country is basically in denial that capitalism’s hegemony continues to be secured in South Africa fundamentally through the reproduction of RACIALISED inequality (i.e. through persisting, essentially market-driven, national oppression). For this reason they alternatively label the strategy of an NDR as “bourgeois” or “Stalinist” (in fact, it was Lenin who was the key theorist in elaborating the critical connection between the internationalist working class struggle and the democratic struggle of oppressed nationalities).
 
The obvious fact of a continued radical African nationalism amongst the majority of South Africa’s working class and poor is simply dismissed by the sectarian left as “false consciousness”, “populist manipulation”, etc. In other words, they treat these matters as if they were essentially subjective in character, and the sectarian left is, consequently, unable to develop a systemic analysis of our reality. For that reason, they are unable to develop a coherent strategic programme of action, or a coherent organisational approach, to address systemic transformation. Likewise, their critiques of the SACP, COSATU and the ANC quickly become reduced to the subjective – everything is “explained” by the “venality”, “career ambitions” and propensity to “sell out” by the leadership. (Needless to say, their internecine squabbles among themselves also take on the same features of an endless trading of personalised insults).
 
(Note how the re-nascent populist/Africanist tendency in our movement is also largely focused on the subjective aspect of matters – in this case they are already (!) trying to open up campaigns and a public debate around who should succeed whom in ANC and governmental leadership – years ahead of time.  As if the real political challenges of our time - the implementing of our manifesto commitments or dealing with a global crisis were mere side-shows.)
 
For their part, the more pro-capitalist centrist reformists (like the above populist tendency) in our broad movement ranks (and beyond) are unable to explain why 15 years after the defeat of apartheid our society continues to reproduce obscene levels of racialised inequality. They are unable to explain why, after more than a decade of economic growth, including some five years of an unprecedented global commodity boom benefiting our key exports, we only succeeded in bringing down unemployment to the crisis levels at which they had been when we started out in 1994 (above 20%). These are levels which are now, of course, soaring upwards once more – with nearly half a million jobs officially lost in the first half of this year.
 
The most common explanation for continuing social crises, from the centrist-reformers, focuses on “service delivery” failure, and “capacity” problems in the state. There are, certainly, serious capacity problems in the state – but note how the explanations are once more subjective in character – i.e. they avoid considering the systemic (i.e. capitalist) features underpinning the crisis in townships, for instance. As a result, the solutions offered tend to be entirely focused on the important (but only partial) questions of personal morality in the public sector and on top-down monitoring and performance management (in this respect, picking up central managerialist themes espoused by the “1996 class project”).
 
In the first place, the “failures of service delivery” argument ignores the truly massive “delivery” that has actually happened on many fronts since 1994 – 13 million social grants, 3,1million subsidised houses (2,7 million of them free), access for 88% of the population to running water (up from 62% in 1996); 80% of the population now with access to electricity (up from 58% in 1996). By international standards, these are extremely impressive achievements. However, at best, this massive “delivery” has ameliorated but not transformed the key structural realities that continue to reproduce crisis-levels of underdevelopment in SA.
 
What presents itself as a “service delivery” or “capacity” problem in a township, for instance, typically has much more profound systemic capitalist accumulation path underpinnings. Most “service delivery” and “capacity” problems manifest themselves in vast dormitory townships and informal settlements miles away from major public amenities, work, and leisure opportunities. These localities are typically bursting at the seams, with tens of thousands of rural newcomers, and thousands more economic refugees from throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Unemployment levels are often at crisis point (60% and more), scarce resources are often controlled by shack-lords, taxi warlords, etc. Many of these localities are bearing the brunt of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Popular energies are often consumed in atomised competition to get onto a housing queue, to monopolise the spaza shop trading opportunities in a small neighbourhood, to control a taxi rank, or to be friends with someone who has a hand-to-mouth SMME tender for some minor sub-contracted municipal service. Municipal budgets are under-resourced, and key planning decisions are often taken far-away by other spheres of government. In the face of all of these challenges, many township-based ward councillors feel completely disempowered. Typically, they might begin by making commitments and trying their best, but within a year or so of taking up office they have given up and do their best to avoid the community.
 
Meanwhile, in many cases, while these are the pressure-cooker realities confronting townships, the strategic agendas of many of our metro councils have, for instance, been dominated by a neo-liberal focus on being “world class cities” (i.e. on behalf of the “world class” of multi-national globetrotters) – each with its own international convention centre, wealthy enclaves, and exclusive shopping malls “twinned” to their global counterparts, while cut loose from and in denial about their own working class satellite townships and rural hinterlands.
 
FW De Klerk and the apartheid-era architects of the defeated Black Local Authority scheme must be smiling. Their dream of allowing urban Africans to play at democracy within their dormitory townships, while getting under-resourced “elected” BLA councillors to bear the brunt of popular pressure, is being re-enacted, despite our best intentions.
 
While some township-based ward councillors might be more effective than others, it is little wonder that nearly all of them are now the objects of popular condemnation. But it is doubtful whether the combined “capacity” of Vladimir Lenin and Mother Theresa would be able to make much “delivery” headway in ghetto situations like these…WITHOUT RE-LOCATING THE KEY CHALLENGES INTO A BROADER STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM THE CLASS POWER THAT CONTINUES TO REPRODUCE RACIALISED, PRESSURE-COOKER ENCLAVES IN CRISIS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND WEALTHY (AND PARTIALLY DE-RACIALISED) ENCLAVES OF POWER AND PRIVILEGE, ON THE OTHER.
 


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