Star2.jpg

 

 

Cuba’s decisive role in African liberation

 

It was the “most beautiful cause of mankind” that motivated Castro's
intervention

 

 

Shannon Ebrahim, The Star, Johannesburg, 25 November 2016

 

 

The myth that Cuba operated in Africa during the Cold War at the behest of
the Soviet Union has finally been shattered. The declassification of CIA and
US State Department documents and the memoirs of key foreign policy makers
during the Cold War have exposed the truth.

 

Cuba was driven by the revolutionary zeal of its leader Fidel Castro and
often made decisive interventions in Africa without consulting the Soviet
leadership, and at times without their support.

 

The visit to South Africa this week of Italian academic Piero Gleijeses
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piero_Gleijeses>  has set the record straight
on what motivated Cuba’s intervention in Africa’s liberation struggles and
its independent foreign policy that was at times at loggerheads with the
USSR.

 

Gleijeses is a professor of US foreign policy at the Paul H Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has written
two books on Cuban foreign policy. He is also the only foreigner to have
conducted research in the closed Cuban archives.

 

Fidel Castro

 

Gleijeses addressed a select audience at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia on
Saturday, and struggle stalwarts and academics in Cape Town this week, as
well as the Politics of Armed Struggle Conference, which ends at Wits on
Friday.

 

Gleijeses presented a solid analysis on what motivated the small and
impoverished island nation of Cuba to spend its limited resources to fight
alongside African liberation movements. In the words of Fidel Castro
himself, his comrades were fighting “the most beautiful cause of mankind”.

 

According to Gleijeses, it was Fidel Castro’s revolutionary zeal that played
a critical role in assisting African liberation movements to destroy the
myth of white invincibility. From Angola to Namibia, Algeria to Guinea
Bissau, it was Cuba that played a decisive role in contributing to the
liberation of these African countries from colonial occupation. This has led
many to ascertain that Castro was the most genuine revolutionary leader in
power at the time.

 

Motivation

 

What motivated Cuba was not only its commitment to the liberation of
Africans from colonial occupation and Castro’s messianic sense of mission,
but the need to fight the US in the developing world. By assisting
liberation movements, it was hoped that the influence of the US on the
African continent would be weakened.

 

Cuba had sought détente with the US and proposed talks in 1961, 1963, and
1964, which were rejected out of hand by successive US administrations. With
the negotiations route a non-starter, Cuba resorted to a strategy of
countering US influence in the developing world.

 

Gleijeses contends that of all the US intelligence reports he has seen, not
one says Cuba intervened in Africa at the behest of the Soviet Union.

 

Algeria, Congo, Guinea-Bissau

 

One of Cuba’s early forays on the African continent was when it provided
assistance to the Algerian liberation movement against French colonial
occupation. In 1961, a Cuban ship docked in Casablanca with weapons for the
Algerian revolutionary fighters, and the ship returned to Cuba with Algerian
orphans who were to be cared for in Cuba.

 

Two years later in 1963, another Cuban ship arrived in Algeria with 55
doctors, nurses and technicians to defend Algeria from Moroccan aggression.
Later that year, 700 Cuban soldiers and 22 tanks were sent to Algeria.
Algerians have never forgotten Cuba’s selfless solidarity.

 

In sub-Saharan Africa, Cuban revolutionaries were sent to the Congo to
support the liberation movement and later the anti-Mobutu movement. Che
Guevara ultimately pulled Cuban forces out of the Congo, disillusioned by
what he called the ill-discipline and corruption of Laurent Kabila’s
opposition.

 

Much of Cuba’s focus from 1966 was on Guinea Bissau’s liberation struggle,
where Cuban doctors and troops remained until the country’s independence in
1974. According to Gleijeses, 90 percent of the doctors who supported the
guerrillas of Guinea Bissau were Cuban at the time. This intervention was
considered Cuba’s most successful until its intervention in Angola in 1975.
On the eve of Angola’s independence, it intervened in support of the
Peoples’ Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

 

Angola

 

What changed the course of the liberation struggle in Angola and Mozambique
was the overthrow of Portugal’s dictator Marcello Caetano in 1974. Following
Angola’s independence, the country descended into civil war. What led to a
protracted conflict was the invasion of South Africa, whose apartheid
leaders saw the MPLA as a significant threat.

 

With the real prospect that South Africa could have crushed the MPLA, Castro
took a principled decision to send Cuban troops to support the MPLA.
According to CIA documents at the time, it was clear that “the Cuban
presence was necessary to preserve Angolan independence”.

 

As Gleijeses outlined in South Africa this week, Castro was primarily
motivated by revolutionary idealism, and did not even consult the USSR
regarding Cuba’s intervention in Angola. This is verified by now
declassified CIA documents from 1981, as well as Henry Kissinger’s memoirs,
where he stated that Cuba had not acted as a proxy of the USSR and the
opposite was the case.

 

1975

 

Between November 1975 and January 1976 Cuban troops and planes poured in to
Angola, with the USSR only stepping in to assist in mid-January 1976. As a
result of Cuba’s intervention, South African troops started leaving Angola
while black Africans celebrated.

 

As the Cubans pushed back the South Africans, the South African general in
charge of South African troops in Namibia claimed Swapo had a border that
provided their fighters with refuge.

 

Despite the gains made by Cuban and MPLA forces, they were not equipped with
sophisticated planes and anti-aircraft missiles to match the advanced
military hardware of the South Africans. Cuba’s best planes remained in Cuba
to defend against a possible US attack on the island.

 

Unable to oust the South Africans from Angola, the Cubans withdrew to a
700km defensive line which they manned for over a decade in a stalemate.
Throughout this period, Cuba pleaded with the Soviet Union for weapons to
launch an offensive in south-western Angola to eject South African troops,
but Soviet assistance was not forthcoming.

 

1986

 

According to Gleijeses, the Soviet concern was that if they provided the
necessary weapons to the Cubans, they may not have stopped at Angola and
might have continued to Namibia. This would have implicated the USSR in the
Cuban campaign at a time when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev was seeking
détente with the US.

 

Cuba’s ultimate success in Angola was precipitated by a major South African
attack which forced the MPLA to withdraw to Cuito Cuanavale, leaving the
fighters demoralised. In November 1986, Fidel Castro held an all-night
meeting with his closest aides in Havana and decided Cuba would launch an
offensive in the south-west to oust South African troops once and for all.

 

According to Gleijeses, what enabled Castro to take such a bold decision was
the fact that then US president Ronald Reagan had been weakened by the
Iran-Contra scandal and had fired the extreme elements in his national
security apparatus. This left Castro with little reason to fear a US attack
against Cuba, which meant it could send its most sophisticated weapons to
Angola.

 

Non-Aligned Movement

 

When Fidel Castro attended the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Harare in
December 1986, he used the opportunity to travel to Luanda and plead his
case to the Soviet point man in Angola. Castro was asking for weapons to
“cut the cloth of the South Africans in Angola”.

 

Ironically, Castro’s bold decision went completely against what the Soviets
had wanted. Gorbachev had called Castro’s decision “a real surprise”.
Despite Castro sending the Soviets a list of weapons they wanted for the
operation, the Soviets said and did nothing. It was only at the end of
January 1987 that the Soviets agreed to send weaponry, but not everything
the Cubans had requested.

 

Cuito Cuanavale

 

The Cuban attack on the South Africans was, according to the head of the
South African task force for Cuito Cuanavale, “a blinding and deafening
strike, from an enemy that is strong and clever”. The CIA at the time also
admitted that the war had taken an “undesirable turn”.

 

Cuba had been the decisive element in turning the tide of the Angolan war in
favour of Angola’s liberation movement. As the US Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs Chester Crocker said at the time: “It was Castro
who had been driving the communist train.”

 

Negotiations and Success

 

The military successes against the South Africans led to the negotiations in
London on June 4, 1988, between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the US. No
one was sure of Castro’s real intentions, and even the Americans had
conceded that the Cubans were capable of occupying South African bases in
Namibia.

 

Reading the balance of forces, the South Africans gave up and in December
1988, accepted Cuban demands to abandon Angola and facilitate Namibian
independence.

 

Were it not for the selfless intervention of the Cubans in southern Africa
over the course of three decades, it would have taken far longer to liberate
the region from colonial oppression. Nelson Mandela understood this, which
is why Cuba was the first country outside the continent he visited upon his
release from prison.

 

•    Shannon Ebrahim is Independent Media's foreign editor.

 

 

From:
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/shannon-ebrahim-cubas-decisive-role-in-african
-liberation-2093312

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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