Assalamu'alaikum Samud , Thanks for your info from milis tetangga ,... Listrik mahal karena ,...... nah , ini harus hati2 cara menyikapinya , karena nyatanya , saat ini PLN justru malah mematok angka 7 cents/kWh pada tahun 2005 . , artinya , sebetulnya ada pengakuan bahwa harga listrik pada waktu ditandatanganinya kontrak listrik swasta , cukup wajar ,....(saat itu 1 US$ = Rp.2300,- sedangkan harga listrik PLN dijual dengan angka Rp. 170,-/kWh) Memang , harga menjadi jungkir balik karena krisis moneter menyebabkan anjloknya rupiah hingga mencapai Rp.17.500,- bulan Maret 1998. Dan , hal ini jangan langsung semua kesalahan ditimpakan pada listrik swasta . Kalau memang demikian , mengapa sekarang PLN mengundang lagi swasta untuk masuk ke sektor pembangkitan listrik ?? Kalau kita pelajari laporan Eddie Widiono selaku Ketua Harian Team Keppres 133 , yang mengatakan bahwa mereka sudah berhasil melakukan negosiasi ulang dan berhasil menghemat sekian miliar dollar , nah ,.... ini patut kita audit bener2 , ...... Tolong lihat deh tulisannya Bp.Nengah Sudja , di Kompas hari Kamis , 3 Juli 2003 . Beliau cukup tajam menyoroti hal ini dan saya malahan punya perkiraan bahwa laporan tersebut agak menyesatkan karena tanpa pedoman yang jelas . Yang terjadi sebenarnya adalah , proses negosiasi yang berat sebelah , karena memang kesalahan Pemerintah dalam pembatalan kontrak secara sepihak , didukung sikap arogansi PLN/ Team Negosiasi yang menganggap semua kontraktor listrik swasta adalah "lawan" nya , bukan partner nya . Coba saja perhatikan , berapa banyak kekalahan PLN dalam arbitrase , berapa banyak proyek yang malahan dibeli PLN karena sudah tahu urusannya jadi tambah runyam kalau negosiasi ,... Kalau proyek dibeli PLN , khan paling sedikit ada "komisi" nya yang bakal nyangkut di si........ (ssst) Bahwa pada saat swasta terjun ke sektor pembangkit listrik tahun 1994 , tentu karena ada peluang usaha dan iklim usaha lagi baik ,... maka rame2 mereka tanamkan uangnya di Indonesia ,... Kalau Indonesia tidak mampu bayar listrik karena itungan dollarnya naik empat kali lipat , sebetulnya bisa ditempuh jalan damai , negosiasi tentang masa pembayaran atau jangka waktu kontrak dipanjangin , dll .... Tetapi , mengapa tidak terjadi upaya damai tersebut ,... mungkin karena pemainnya sudah berganti dan yang baru2 kurang paham aturan mainnya . Lalu , apakah listrik harganya akan naik terus ??? Mestinya khan kewajiban pemerintah untuk menghasilkan listrik murah ,...Tetapi , dengan subsidi BBM dicabut , production cost per kWh terlalu tinggi karena apresiasi dollar , PLN lebih suka membeli diesel daripada pakai tenaga panasbumi atau tenaga alternatif lainnya ,.., yaaaa , terima saja nasibmu , beli listrik dengan harga mahal .
Masukan dari kang Samud kita terima dengan lapang dada , untuk bahan evaluasi ,.. tetapi kebijakan energi kayaknya harus juga menjadi perhatian kita semua . Perkara swasta mau ikut atau tidak , semuanya kembali pada itung2an untung ruginya ,... Makasih kang Samud , awas setrum Amerika lebih gede ,.. Wassalam , Priyo PS --------------------- >From: Bambang Samudra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: [yonsatu] Fwd: [Iatmi_houston] FW: [Oil&Gas] FW: Listrik mahal - >Inilah rahasianya >Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2003 16:56:42 -0500 > >Dari milis tetangga.... >Wass, > > >Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2003 09:53:49 -0500 > >From: "Istadi, Bambang P" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Subject: [Iatmi_houston] FW: [Oil&Gas] FW: Listrik mahal - Inilah >rahasianya > >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >Reply-to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > >Dari milis Migas Indonesia,... > > > > > >Bambang Istadi > >ConocoPhillips Inc. > >New Ventures Exploration > >+1-281-293-3763 > >-----Original Message----- > >From: Desmawati [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > >Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2003 12:16 AM > >Subject: [Oil&Gas] FW: Listrik mahal - Inilah rahasianya > > > >Inilah yang terjadi, yang menyebabkan PLN selalu rugi dan harga listrik > >harus naik tiap 3 bulan sekali. > >Dari milis tetangga. > > > >Regards, > > > >Desma > > > >____________________________________________________________________________ > > > >Larouche Society March 28/2001 > >Looting Indonesia: The energy brokers 'warm-up' for California by >Michael > >Billington > > > >It is now widely acknowledged among sane individuals that the ongoing > >looting of California (and other states) by a handful of energy brokers, > >under the cover of 'deregulation', is having the effect, as if by design, >of > >collapsing an economy which was already weakened by the bursting of the > >financial bubble. It is instructive to those who may doubt that such > >corporate geniuses would consciously destroy an economy, for nothing more > >than an apparent short-term gain, to examine the process of looting which > >has taken place against Indonesia since the mid-1990s, by many of the >same > >entities now 'doing' California. > >Although the specific mechanism used was different, the species > >characteristic of the looting process was precisely the same. After the > >near-breakdown of the world financial system in 1987 and 1989, a > >hyperinflationary process was unleashed out of New York and London, based >on > >the creation of a huge derivatives-based financial bubble, in order to > >preserve the power of the (actually bankrupt) global financial >institutions. > >One aspect of this bubble was the 'globalization' process, generating hot > >money flows into developing nations, financing maquiladora-style >cheap-labor > >export industries, and creating local bubbles in the real estate and >equity > >markets in much of the Third World--and in Asia in particular. > >Energy generation, like most infrastructure in the Third World, was >woefully > >inadequate in Asia, so the energy companies jumped in to meet the >need--an > >admirable task, under normal circumstances, but conditions were hardly > >normal. Although the following profile of the Indonesia situation was > >repeated in nearly every country in the region, the Indonesian case is > >exemplary. > > > >Sweetheart Deals with Suharto > >Altogether, 27 joint venture energy contracts were set up in the early to > >mid 1990s in Indonesia. Each one included a foreign power producer--we'll > >examine below projects with MidAmerican, Edison Mission, and Florida >Power > >and Light--in partnership with the Indonesian state electricity company, > >Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), and an Indonesian private firm, >inevitably > >run by one of President Suharto's children. All had the same general > >character: A power plant would be built on the condition that PLN (i.e., >the > >government) would be bound to purchase a fixed amount of electricity each > >year, regardless of whether or not the electricity was needed at the >time, > >and that the cost of the electricity would be determined in dollars, not >in > >the local currency, the rupiah. > >These lucrative deals were set up through personal connections between >the > >energy producers (and their international banks) and the Suharto family >and > >friends, the same circle which was later denounced as 'corrupt' by the > >so-called 'international community'. While the fantasy persisted that the > >financial bubble would expand forever (a fantasy that persisted within >the > >United States up until the past year), the Indonesian energy deals proved >to > >be a bonanza for everyone involved. > >However, when the bubble burst in 1997-98, brought on by the speculative > >attack on the Asian currencies by the hedge funds, and the >conditionalities > >imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the energy deals were > >exposed for what they were--a scam which left the government helpless >before > >the combined power of the multinational corporations, the international > >banks, the IMF, the United Nations, and the U.S. State Department, all of > >whom demanded that the corrupt contracts be honored in full, or Indonesia > >would be subjected to credit termination, economic sanctions, seizure of > >assets, and political destabilization by non-governmental organizations > >(NGOs) and other 'private' operations controlled by the Wall Street and > >London power elite. > >With the sudden collapse of the economy, and the subsequent rapid decline >in > >energy needs, many of the newly built power plants were no longer needed. > >The risk, however, had been entirely transferred to the Indonesian > >government, through the corrupt conditions of the contracts. Indonesia >was > >required to pay for electricity for which it had no use. Beyond that, >since > >the electricity was priced in dollars, when the speculative raid drove >the > >value of the Indonesian rupiah to about one-forth its former value, the > >government-owned PLN was forced to pay four times the actual value (in > >Indonesian terms) for the electricity it didn't need! > >The currency eventually settled at about one-third its former value. PLN > >raised the price on the electricity it sold to Indonesian consumers > >substantially, but it could not even begin to charge the price it was >forced > >to pay the foreign producers. In fact, when President Suharto allowed an > >increase in the costs of certain fuels, it precipitated riots which > >ultimately brought down his government, and similar instability would >have > >been certain in the case of any further drastic rate increases. The >result, > >then, was that PLN was faced with purchasing huge quantities of energy at > >prices in the range of 5-8ct per kilowatt hour, while reselling only a > >fraction of that amount, and at only about 2-3ct per kilowatt-hour (kWh). > >This ridiculous, untenable situation could only be truly appreciated by a > >California governor! > >The Indonesian government approached the 27 different foreign producers >with > >a request that the contracts be renegotiated to account for the >drastically > >changed circumstances. In some of the cases where plants were not yet > >completed (or not yet begun), the contracts were cancelled, with requests > >for reasonable breach of contract settlements. The response was a barrage >of > >hypocritical demands that the sanctity of contracts must be upheld. The > >extent to which pure thug tactics were used is demonstrated in the case > >studies below. > >Several leaders in the new Indonesian government pointed out the obvious > >inconsistency: Why is it that the IMF and other foreign interests insist > >that the 'cronyism and corruption' of the Suharto era must be ended, by > >imposing 'transparency', and by bringing those guilty of corruption to > >trial, but that the foreign partners who participated in the corruption >(or, > >more likely, instigated it) are not only let off the hook of criminal > >responsibility, but their corrupt contracts must be respected to the >letter? > >In August 1999, then-PLN president Adhi Satriya said he would ask the >courts > >to 'annul contracts secured by the Independent Power Brokers through >corrupt > >practices, and to punish all those involved'. He accused former PLN > >directors of signing contracts with 'marked-up prices', even before the > >devaluations. One former PLN chief, Djiteng Marsudi, said that he had >been > >'forced' to sign such contracts under political pressure. In fact, as >shown > >below, failure by the Indonesian government to meet the terms of these > >corrupt contracts led to legal proceedings in international courts which > >simply disregarded the question of the general welfare of the Indonesian > >people, and ignored rulings by Indonesian courts, while U.S. Ambassador > >Robert Gelbard and the IMF issued explicit threats of sanctions if the >pound > >of flesh were not delivered As a result, the government is now losing > >billions of dollars every year to the power brokers, while the country > >descends further into poverty, social divisiveness, and rising levels of > >violence. Is that California's future under the current deregulation > >'free-market' policy? > > > >Case study #1: MidAmerican Energy Holdings > >MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company (formerly CalEnergy), owned by Warren > >Buffett, is both a leading international energy producer and a major >player > >in the deregulated energy markets in the United States and the United > >Kingdom. MidAmerican contracted to build two geothermal power plants in > >Java. One plant was completed and one was under construction at the time >of > >the 1997-98 collapse in Southeast Asia. > >When Indonesia put a hold on the incomplete plant, and could not meet the > >contracted purchases on the other, MidAmerican refused to renegotiate, >but > >took the matter to the United Nations Commission on International Trade >Law > >(Uncitral). This international body ruled in favor of MidAmerican, >ordering > >that Indonesia immediately pay $572 million to MidAmerican for breach of > >contract. > >PLN responded in May 1999, by filing suit in a Jakarta District Court to > >annul the Uncitral ruling as having 'gravely prejudiced PLN's legal >rights > >by ignoring or misinterpreting the Indonesian laws', according to PLN > >President Adhi Satriya. The contracts, he said, were 'clearly specified >to > >be subject to the sovereign laws of Indonesia'. MidAmerican returned to >the > >Uncitral, which simply asserted its jurisdiction over the dispute > >'notwithstanding Indonesian court orders purporting to enjoin the > >arbitration ... in violation of generally recognized principles of > >international law'. > >Since Indonesia had no means of paying the extortionists, MidAmerican >turned > >to its insurers, which included the U.S. government's insurance >operation, > >the Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC), which paid the American >firm > >for its loss in the collapsed Indonesian market. Rather than leaving it >at > >that, the U.S. State Department, behind the thugish U.S. Ambassador to > >Indonesia, Gelbard, went to work to collect the blood money. In July >2000, > >Gelbard announced that he was 'running out of patience' with Indonesia's > >tardy repayment to OPIC of the $290 million it had paid to MidAmerican. > >'There is always the possibility of declaring expropriation [of >Indonesian > >assets].... If we were to do this', snarled the diplomat, 'it would >result > >in a dramatic deterioration of the rupiah and would hurt Indonesia very > >much'. > > > >Case study #2: Edison Mission Energy > >Edison Mission Energy (EME), the international arm of the same holding > >company, Edison International, which owns Southern California Edison, > >launched a $2.5 billion project in Indonesia in February 1994, called >Paiton > >Energy, in partnership with General Electric, Mitsui, and a local firm >run > >by an associate of General Suharto. The total energy production was > >contracted to the state electricity company, PLN, with all costs indexed >to > >the Indonesian rupiah/U.S. dollar exchange rate established at the time >the > >agreement was executed. The 30-year agreement called for PLN to pay 8.4ct > >per kWh for six years, declining slightly after that. > >As with MidAmerican, the entire risk was transferred to the Indonesian > >government. After the collapse in 1998, PLN president Adhi called on >Paiton > >to lower their prices, calling the original price a 'world-class >mark-up'. > >Adhi pointed out that the 'take-or-pay' clause, which held PLN to pay >$995 > >million per year for 'fixed costs', was enough to develop a new power >plant > >of 600 megawatts each year. After a year of fruitless discussions, PLN >went > >into court in Jakarta to nullify the contract as 'unlawful, unfair, and >not > >transparent', and called on the court to declare the contract 'void and >not > >enforceable'. > >Paiton then followed the path of MidAmerican's successful use of > >'extraterritoriality', going outside the Indonesian court system, to > >international arbitration, 'to preserve the sanctity of its >power-purchase > >agreement and to protect the interest of its shareholders, lenders, and > >other credit support providers'. Let the welfare of the Indonesian people >be > >damned. The Central Jakarta District Court appeared to be moving toward a > >favorable ruling for PLN, when the new government of President >Abdurrahman > >Wahid, under intense pressure from the 'international community', decided >to > >drop the suit, agreeing to an out-of-court settlement. PLN President Adhi > >and a top assistant resigned. > > > >Case study #3: Florida Power and Light > >In 1994, Florida Power and Light (FPL), in partnership with Caithness >Energy > >(which has recently attached a lien on Southern California Edison for >unpaid > >bills from the debt-ridden utility), contracted with PLN and Indonesia's > >state oil firm, Pertimina, to build a 400 mw geothermal plant in West >Java. > >As in all the sweetheart deals with the Suharto regime, all risk was >shifted > >to the government, including a clause which specified that Indonesia >would > >bear the entire burden if the government took any action detrimental to >the > >project. > >Between 1994 and 1998, FPL and its other foreign partners spent $93 >million > >on site search, testing, and other preparatory measures, but had not >begun > >construction when the crisis hit, causing the government to cancel the > >project, in January 1998. FPL took the case to the UN arbitration board, > >which not only awarded FPL its entire invested capital (since, of course, > >these 'free trade' deals bore zero risk), but awarded them an additional > >penalty of $150 million, for 'lost profits'--i.e., profits they could >have > >extracted had the project gone through! > >In February of this year, FPL took the case to the U.S. District Court in > >the Southern District of Texas, with a petition to confirm the award and > >enforce payment. Why Texas? Because Pertimina has property and assets in > >Texas--the same assets Ambassador Gelbard had threatened to seize for > >MidAmerican--which FPL plans to grab for itself if the Indonesians refuse >to > >wring the unearned profits out of the bare sustenance of the population. > >Other Cases: Enron > >There are other cases. Enron, the powerbroker now at the center of the > >criminal looting process in the United States, signed an agreement in >1996 > >to build a power plant in East Java, which was to begin construction in >late > >1997. When the contract was cancelled after the crisis, Enron walked away > >with $15 million. And there are more. Indonesia, with half its population > >suddenly thrust into poverty, with ethnic and regional conflicts tearing >at > >the very structure of the republic, has been forced to bear the entire > >burden of the foreign 'shareholders' value'. > >For the year 2000, PLN posted losses of $2.2 billion, adding drastically >to > >the nation's overall intolerable debt burden--and there is no indication > >that the looting process will end in the foreseeable future. Wherever the > >sovereign regulation of utilities are manipulated, eliminated, or >ignored, > >the powerbrokers have proven to follow the lure of fast money, rather >than > >the long-term need for the development of a nation's infrastructure. That > >this process destroys the future market for such power industries > >themselves, seems to be of no concern. America has watched passively as >our > >friends and neighbors have been financially and economically raped, often >in > >our name. Will we remain passive, now that the rapists have turned their > >sights on California? > > > > > > > > > > > >[Non-text portions of this message have been removed] > > >--[YONSATU - ITB]---------------------------------------------------------- >Online archive : <http://yonsatu.mahawarman.net> >Moderators : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Unsubscribe : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Vacation : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > _________________________________________________________________ The new MSN 8: smart spam protection and 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail --[YONSATU - ITB]---------------------------------------------------------- Online archive : <http://yonsatu.mahawarman.net> Moderators : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Unsubscribe : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Vacation : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
