I think I will take over this soon... On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 5:22 PM, Siegfried Gevatter <[email protected]>wrote:
> What's the status of this? I think there hasn't been any activity on > this since before the Vala port started. > > @jplacerda: Are you still interested in working on it? > > ** Changed in: zeitgeist > Importance: Medium => Wishlist > > -- > You received this bug notification because you are subscribed to The > Zeitgeist Project. > https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/787868 > > Title: > Encryption of database > > Status in Zeitgeist Framework: > In Progress > > Bug description: > I think that Zeitgeist should encrypt databases in > ~/.local/share/zeitgeist/* for anti-forensics reasons. > > While someone may happen to use an encrypted disk, Zeitgeist may serve > as the ultimate accidental spyware to an unsuspecting user. One > possible mitigation is to randomly generate a reasonable key, tie it > into the login keychain and then use that key with something like > http://sqlcipher.net/ rather than straight sqlite. > > In theory, a user will never know that this encryption/decryption is > happening - no underlying assumptions about the disk need to be made > to maintain any security guarantees. This should prevent anyone from > learning the contents of the database without also learning the login > password. Modern Ubuntu machines disallow non-root ptracing ( > https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening#ptrace ) > and if the gnome keyring is locked, an attacker would have a much > harder time grabbing meaningful Zeitgeist data without interacting > with the user or bruteforcing the login keychain. > > To manage notifications about this bug go to: > https://bugs.launchpad.net/zeitgeist/+bug/787868/+subscriptions > -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Zeitgeist Framework Team, which is subscribed to Zeitgeist Framework. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/787868 Title: Encryption of database Status in Zeitgeist Framework: In Progress Bug description: I think that Zeitgeist should encrypt databases in ~/.local/share/zeitgeist/* for anti-forensics reasons. While someone may happen to use an encrypted disk, Zeitgeist may serve as the ultimate accidental spyware to an unsuspecting user. One possible mitigation is to randomly generate a reasonable key, tie it into the login keychain and then use that key with something like http://sqlcipher.net/ rather than straight sqlite. In theory, a user will never know that this encryption/decryption is happening - no underlying assumptions about the disk need to be made to maintain any security guarantees. This should prevent anyone from learning the contents of the database without also learning the login password. Modern Ubuntu machines disallow non-root ptracing ( https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening#ptrace ) and if the gnome keyring is locked, an attacker would have a much harder time grabbing meaningful Zeitgeist data without interacting with the user or bruteforcing the login keychain. To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/zeitgeist/+bug/787868/+subscriptions _______________________________________________ Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~zeitgeist Post to : [email protected] Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~zeitgeist More help : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
