Bush's quest to be a great war President 

Gary Younge, The Hindu, March 21, 2006 

http://www.hindu.com/2006/03/21/stories/2006032105290900.htm

SHORTLY BEFORE the first Gulf war the recently retired Chairman of 
the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, went 
for lunch with his successor, Colin Powell. In words that resonate 
today, Admiral Crowe warned Mr. Powell that "a war in the Middle 
East — killing thousands of Arabs for whatever noble purpose — would 
set back the U.S. in the region for a long time. And that was to say 
nothing of the Americans who might die." 

But despite his own misgivings, Admiral Crowe clearly believed 
military intervention was likely in the interests of presidential 
prestige. 

"It takes two things to be a great president," he told Mr. 
Powell. "First you have to have a war. All the great presidents have 
had their wars. Two you have to find a war where you are attacked." 

Six years into his presidency it is difficult to think of a single, 
substantial foreign policy initiative that President George W. Bush 
has pursued that did not involve war, or the threat of it. There is 
good reason for this. It is the one area in which America reigns 
supreme, accounting alone for 40 per cent of the global military 
expenditure and spending almost seven times the amount of its 
nearest rival, China. 

Yet greatness eludes him. For if the last six years have proved 
anything it is the limitations of military might as the central 
plank of foreign policy. Indeed, shorn of meaningful diplomacy or 
substantial negotiation, it has failed even on its own narrow, 
nationalistic terms of making America safer and securing its global 
hegemony. In short, in displaying his strength in such a brash, 
brazen, reckless and ruthless manner, Mr. Bush has asserted power 
and lost authority and influence both at home and abroad. 

Low rating 


With his approval ratings at Nixonian lows and the mid-term 
elections on the horizon, many of his fellow Republicans regard him 
as a liability. 

Stumbling across the political landscape, rallying support for lost 
causes, he resembles Ernest Harrowden in The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
a character whom Oscar Wilde described as "one of those middle-aged 
mediocrities, who have no enemies, but are thoroughly disliked by 
their friends." 

The release of the national security strategy last week did not 
counter that trend but confirmed it. Insisting that diplomacy 
remains America's "strong preference," it went on to reaffirm its 
commitment to pre-emption. "If necessary under long-standing 
principles of self-defence, we do not rule out use of force before 
attacks occur," it states. Iran received special mention, with a 
warning that talks "must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided." 

In practice this translates into a perverse version of carrot-and-
stick diplomacy. Offer your adversaries a carrot and then threaten 
to whack them with the stick while they are eating it. That 
America's standing has plummeted with this approach is without 
question. Of the 10 countries polled in 2000 and again in 2005 by 
the Pew research group, the U.S. had fallen in people's estimation 
in eight of them. In only three — Canada, Britain, and Russia — did 
a majority still look upon the U.S. favourably. It is not difficult 
to see why. 

Last week the country that aspires to lead the free world stood 
alongside only Israel, Palau, and the Marshall Islands and against 
170 countries in rejecting the creation of a new U.N. council to 
protect human rights. Only the U.S. and Somalia (which has no 
recognised government) have failed to ratify the U.N. convention on 
the rights of the child. So long as the U.S. clung to the notion 
that military strength would always have the last say, none of this 
mattered. The Bush administration could strut across the global 
stage chanting: "No one likes us, we don't care." Indeed in the 
first few years after 9/11 it wore its unpopularity like a badge of 
honour. 

But as events in Iraq have soured, the ability of the Bush 
administration to deliver on these threats has diminished 
considerably. With its military overstretched and its diplomatic 
goodwill spent, it has been forced back to the table from a relative 
position of weakness, because nobody trusts it or particularly fears 
it. If anything, both Iran and North Korea have been emboldened by 
its failures in the Gulf. 

Meanwhile, elections keep on producing the wrong results. Hamas is 
in power in Palestine; Rene Preval, the protégé of Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide whom the U.S. helped remove in a coup two years ago, won 
the presidency in Haiti; Ahmed Chalabi, the protégé of the neocons 
whom the U.S. wanted to impose on the Iraqi people at the outset of 
the war, could not win a single seat. Elsewhere, voters in Latin 
America have opted for leaders who campaigned against the neoliberal 
economic strictures imposed by Washington. 

The issue is not whether the developing world is ready for 
democracy — as the administration keeps arguing — but if the U.S. is 
ready for the democratic choices made by the developing world. 

But the principal area where the U.S. has demonstrated its military 
supremacy and its diplomatic weakness is Iraq. This misadventure has 
not only alienated the administration from most of the world but 
increasingly from the two constituencies it really does need to win 
over — the Iraqis and the Americans. One of the key demands of the 
United Iraqi Alliance, the broad-based Shia coalition that won the 
elections in December, was the removal of the American military. 
Given that the Sunnis are leading the insurgency, this leaves few 
backers among the Iraqis. 

And, simultaneously, support for the war in the U.S. is 
haemorrhaging. A CNN/USA Today poll last week showed 60 per cent of 
Americans believe it was a mistake to send troops to Iraq and 
disapprove of the way Mr. Bush is handling the war. More than half 
want to see the troops withdrawn within a year. 

Even three-quarters of the soldiers fighting in Iraq, according to 
another poll, believe the U.S. should leave within a year. 

These problems may in no small part be due to the fact that in 
invading Iraq, Mr. Bush fulfilled only half of Admiral Crowe's 
criteria for a great presidency. Despite efforts to convince the 
world otherwise, the war for which he will be remembered — Iraq — 
had nothing to do with why the U.S. was attacked on September 11. On 
its own, that would be a moral issue of lying to the public. 

Dire situation 


What has transformed it into a political problem is the dire 
situation on the ground in Iraq. The most important single factor 
that shapes Americans' attitudes to any war is whether they think 
America will win, explains Christopher Gelpi, an associate professor 
of political science at Duke University who specialises in public 
attitudes to foreign policy. Over the past year, the percentage of 
Americans who believe the U.S. is "certain to win" has plummeted 
from 79 per cent to 22 per cent; those who are either certain it 
will not win or believe this to be unlikely have risen from 1 per 
cent to 41 per cent. 

"They are in big trouble," explains Prof. Gelpi. "Bush's speeches, 
even as late as December, managed to shore up public opinion a 
little bit. But what you can do with speeches at this point is 
pretty limited. It's not even clear who's listening." 

Wrong war. Wrong strategy. Wrong President. Just plain wrong. — 

© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004










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