Gauging Terror – Part II, India

Michael Krepon* | YaleGlobal | August 17, 2006

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=8008


When you have a hammer, every problem can look like a nail. But when 
a hammer is used to deal with the problem of terrorism, the nails 
can multiply. The US is learning this painful lesson in Iraq, and 
Israel seems to have relearned it in Lebanon, where Israeli military 
campaigns first created Hezbollah and now greatly empowered it. The 
development of power projection capabilities takes hard work and 
considerable expense. But it takes real wisdom to know when and how 
to use military power to combat terrorism. Without wisdom, power 
projection can be negated, while producing adverse, unintended 
consequences. 

One dog has yet to bark in what President George W. Bush calls 
the "global war on terror." Since 1994, India has suffered almost 
20,000 fatalities as a result of acts of terror, losses that dwarf 
those suffered by the US and Israel. Despite these losses, New Delhi 
has been very reluctant to initiate cross-border military strikes 
against targets based in Pakistan, where supporters and perpetrators 
of acts of violence directed against India have found safe haven. 

Pakistan is an essential partner in fighting terrorism, but is also 
an incubator of terrorists. This paradox, which has long confounded 
US and Indian leaders, is most evident in Kashmir and the Pashtun 
belt along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. If or when the Indian 
government feels compelled to retaliate militarily against acts of 
terror, it is likely to do so across the Line of Control that 
divides Kashmir. Prediction in such matters is hazardous, given New 
Delhi's record of prior restraint, which also makes the element of 
surprise more likely. Cross-border military operations would open 
another "front" in the war against terror, one in which both 
adversaries possess nuclear weapons. 

A face-off involving India and Pakistan would therefore be quite 
different from the military campaigns waged by the United States and 
Israel. To begin with, the use of force would presumably be far more 
glancing and circumspect. Prior wars between these two rivals, which 
were joined at the hip until partition in 1947, have been limited in 
scope. But choreography in warfare is a tricky business, and any new 
front in the global war against terror – especially in South Asia – 
poses huge risks, including risks for the Bush administration. 

The Bush team has prided itself on improving bilateral relations 
with both India and Pakistan. This significant accomplishment could 
be destroyed in the event of military hostilities on the 
subcontinent. As the victim of terrorism, India would naturally 
expect the sympathy and support of the Bush administration. If, 
instead, Washington seeks to play an evenhanded, honest-broker role, 
the vaunted strategic partnership sought by the Bush team would be 
placed at risk. And if Washington aligns with another democracy 
under threat by Islamic extremism, its relations with Pakistan would 
plummet, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the war 
against terror, domestic politics in Pakistan, Afghanistan's future, 
proliferation and India-Pakistan relations. 


The initiation of another limited war between India and Pakistan 
would also test the "stability-instability paradox." This academic 
construct – an offshoot of deterrence theory – holds that two 
nuclear-armed rivals will rile each other, but will avoid crossing 
the nuclear threshold. So far, both elements of the stability-
instability paradox seem very much in place on the subcontinent. 
India and Pakistan have experienced a succession of crises and one 
limited war since acquiring nuclear weapons – without producing 
mushroom clouds. But academic theories are neat and tidy, whereas 
crises and warfare can take unexpected and unwanted turns. 

Clearly, much could go wrong if successive acts of terror lead to 
skirmishing between India and Pakistan, which means that much is 
riding on New Delhi's state of mind regarding its chronic 
difficulties with Pakistan. The US has served as the crisis manager 
in previous nuclear-tinged confrontations, a role that was greatly 
facilitated by the reluctance of Indian leaders to go to war, even 
after grievous acts of terror. In the last such effort, the Bush 
administration brokered a climb-down from a 10-month-long military 
mobilization triggered by an attack on the Indian parliament 
building in December 2001. 


The Bush team is not well positioned to play this role again. The 
White House and State Department have their hands full in dealing 
with wars in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan, as well as 
with the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. The 
administration has waged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan predicated on 
the imperative to root out distant dangers before Americans again 
suffer the consequences of terrorist acts at home. Having embraced a 
proactive role in fighting terror, and having backed Israel's 
military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bush 
administration is in no position to counsel New Delhi to exercise 
restraint. 


The last crisis between India and Pakistan was defused by then-
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who in 2002 extracted a 
pledge by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to "permanently" end 
cross-border violence directed against India by Islamic extremists. 
This pledge and others like it from Musharraf make it more difficult 
to defuse another crisis preceded by heightened infiltration across 
the Kashmir divide and by bomb blasts at sensitive locations in 
India. 

Since the last exercise of US crisis management, Pakistan's list of 
grievances with the United States has grown considerably, while 
India has become the Bush administration's most favored up-and-
coming regional power. Most recently, New Delhi has been gifted with 
a nuclear cooperation agreement that Bush pointedly declined to 
offer Islamabad. This deal was strongly supported on Capitol Hill by 
US business interests and by the Indian-American community, which 
views the "Jewish lobby" as its model. With Republicans unwilling to 
undercut the White House, and with Democrats unwilling to offend the 
Indian-American community in an election year, the Congress shunted 
aside substantive concerns to endorse this deal overwhelmingly. 


If, after this sequence of events, India suffers horrific acts or 
terrorism, New Delhi has every reason to expect US support if it 
decides to strike "terrorist camps" and other targets across the 
Line of Control. And if New Delhi gets that backing, Pakistan could 
well explode. 


The Bush administration has long wanted to "de-hyphenate" India-
Pakistan relations. If this dreaded scenario plays out, de-
hyphenation could be shunted aside by a stark either/or choice. 
President Bush's famously simple formula – are you with me or 
against me in the war on terror? – could conceivably be played back 
at him. Then the Great Simplifier would face an excruciating choice: 
whether to lose one strategic partner or two. 


Because this scenario is sufficiently grim and plausible, preventive 
action in India and Pakistan is worth taking in the form of 
heightened domestic security against extremist groups and renewed 
diplomacy. A disproportionate share of this burden falls on India 
because its leaders understand far better than their counterparts in 
the US and Israel that military power is not well suited to combat 
terrorism. But at some point, reaching for the hammer could become 
New Delhi's unwelcome choice. 

*Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 
the editor of Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, and the author 
of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense and the Nuclear 
Future, both published by Palgrave Macmillan.


© 2006 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization










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