Gary Mills wrote:
On Wed, Mar 04, 2009 at 01:20:42PM -0500, Miles Nordin wrote:
"gm" == Gary Mills <mi...@cc.umanitoba.ca> writes:
gm> I suppose my RFE for two-level ZFS should be included,
Not that my opinion counts for much, but I wasn't deaf to it---I did
respond.
I appreciate that.
I thought it was kind of based on mistaken understanding. It included
this strangeness of the upper ZFS ``informing'' the lower one when
corruption had occured on the network, and the lower ZFS was supposed
to do something with the physical disks...to resolve corruption on the
network? why? IIRC several others pointed out the same bogosity.
It's a simply a consequence of ZFS's end-to-end error detection.
There are many different components that could contribute to such
errors. Since only the lower ZFS has data redundancy, only it can
correct the error. Of course, if something in the data path
consistently corrupts the data regardless of its origin, it won't be
able to correct the error. The same thing can happen in the simple
case, with one ZFS over physical disks.
I would argue against building this into ZFS. Any corruption happening
on the wire should not be the responsibility of ZFS. If you want to make
sure your data is not corrupted over the wire, use IPSec. If you want to
prevent corruption in RAM, use ECC sticks, etc.
--
Dave
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