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On the eve of war, here are eleven questions and answers bearing on
movement responses to unfolding events, imminent war and what follows
closely thereafter. Iit is longer than our usual free update mailing and
it you prefer the essay can also be reached from the top page of ZNet --
www.zmag.org/weluser.htm as can many other new pieces online.

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Reject Defeatism... Organize!

By Stephen R. Shalom and Michael Albert

The onset of war does not negate the unprecedented antiwar activism in
recent weeks and months, nor does it provide reason to diminish our
efforts. Quite the contrary.

Struggle for change should not be apocalyptic. The task is to steadily
amass growing commitment to prevent U.S. imperial, anti-democratic,
illegal, and immoral assaults on defenseless third world nations. We
must persist in our rejection of war on Iraq, on Iran, on Syria, on
Venezuela, on North Korea.

The FBI has reported that "the intensity and scope of opposition to a
U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein has grown to levels that far exceed
any such opposition that existed in 1991." (Wilgoren, NYT, 3/19/03) We
haven't prevented this war, but that is not the key point in assessing
our efforts. The key point is that our efforts to prevent immoral wars
are growing ever larger and ever more effective, and are on a path -- a
long path, to be sure -- toward not only preventing such wars but then
removing their institutional causes. 

We should not apply wrong standards to our efforts. We should not snatch
defeat from the jaws of victory. 

The assault on Iraq will be horrific. The risk to citizens there and to
people around the globe will be enormous. But, at the same time, the
emergence of massive, coordinated, and rapidly escalating and maturing
movements against war and corporate globalization across the planet is
more than just hopeful, exciting, and optimistic. It is the stuff of new
worlds. 

There are now two super powers in the world, the New York Times told its
readers, after the February 15th demonstrations. 

On one side there is the U.S. military machine. On the other side, there
is international public opinion. 

True, the latter has not yet restrained the former. But we need to
understand our achievements and step up our efforts. We should  not
mourn our failure to prevent war as if it means we are on a losing
trajectory. 

Objective assessment is good but defeatism will reduce our potentials
even when the prospects for victory have never been nearer.

We hope the following questions and answers will help activists deal
with the difficult, chaotic conditions likely to confront us in the
immediate days and weeks ahead.



(1) What is the point of demonstrating and organizing? How can it win?
When can it win?

We demonstrate in order to win outcomes that we desire -- it could be
higher wages, it could be affirmative action, it could be a new law, or,
as now, it could be preventing or terminating a grotesque war.

Activism does not rationally convince elites to change their policies.
Nor does activism massage their hearts and lead to a moral
transformation. 

Activism wins when it creates conditions within which elites making
critical decisions feel they have no choice but to change their
behavior. They change when they decide that to pursue their policies and
otherwise ignore popular demands, with the risk that this will energize
dissent, is a worse course of action for them than not doing so.

In the case of war in Iraq, subsequent occupation of Iraq, and then war
against other victims of the U.S. Empire, the U.S. government -- the
"Asses of Evil" -- is seeking to change the rules of international
relations. They want increased control over oil and the power to broker
and coerce outcomes that that control bestows. They want to demonstrate
U.S. power to intimidate, and they want to weaken and perhaps literally
destroy international law so that it cannot restrain their options and
choices. But mostly it seems that they want to create a unipolar world
in which military might -- which Washington monopolizes -- is the only
currency, and thus which the U.S. rules.

Our dissent must raise very substantial costs for elites, creating a
situation  in which they decide that the pursuit of their aims is no
longer advisable because the dissent it engenders is too costly to their
interests. Instead of gaining greater power and sway as they desire from
war, elites must face the prospect that the war's side-effect creation
of popular opposition actually threatens to reduce their power and sway.


When can a movement raising such a threat win? At any moment. It has,
for example, already convinced large sectors of owners and political
leaders that war against Iraq is too risky for what they value most:
their authority. These elements, including whole governments, now oppose
war. When dissent convinces enough elite elements that war risks their
interests, the policies will be abandoned.



(2) What are the right issues on which to focus in order to be most
effective? Should our efforts be single or multi-issue?

A movement is effective to precisely the extent that it conveys to
elites an indication that continued rejection of the movement's demands
will lead to growing costs and risks for them. In our current case, the
movement must convey that continued pursuit of war and occupation in
Iraq, and then subsequent war against other targets, will produce an
opposition that elites simply don't want to bring into existence. This
is the logic of dissent and of elite reactions to it.

So, we need only ask, what type of movement raises social costs and
threatens to be a continuing and growing problem for elites? Is it a
movement that has a very narrow focus on a single war or a single
policy? Is it a movement which will dissolve once that primary issue is
no longer in the forefront? Or is it a movement which certainly focuses
on the opposed policy -- in this case war in Iraq -- making it clear
that continued pursuit of the war is enlarging the movement, but which
also stretches and grows to address other dimensions of international
relations and then of corporate and political power, thereby making
clear that if the movement is produced by continued pursuit of the war,
it will not just fade away with the war's conclusion, and that once it
is brought into being it will not only persist, but will function to
obstruct and challenge state policies on diverse fronts held in even
higher priority by elites than the war itself?

To ask the question is to answer it. We need to continually reach out
and enlarge the movement if its trajectory of development is to
effectively raise costs for elites. But we also need to present clear
evidence that the growing opposition is extending beyond the immediate
issue to basic defining relations and institutions of society. This is
what will cause elite constituencies served by Bush to think to
themselves "our war policy is threatening the fabric of our rule over
society, it is disrupting our capacity to undertake business as usual,
it is taking the next generation from us and making them our enemy, it
is putting at risk things we hold even more dear than the war policy --
our power and wealth -- therefore, we must cease our support for war.



(3) Regarding the war itself, what demands should we be raising?

We should call for an immediate end to the war. 

We should particularly condemn violations of international humanitarian
law, such as the use of cluster bombs and other indiscriminate weapons,
and the targeting of infrastructure needed by civilians.

We should condemn the press censorship and demand access for independent
media.

We should denounce the grossly inadequate humanitarian preparations and
demand that as the occupying power the United States accept its legal
responsibility to provide for the welfare of the civilian population.

We should push for democracy in Iraq, giving as little say to the
invading forces as possible (and this includes Turkey). 

We should insist that the U.S. is entitled to absolutely none of Iraq's
oil. It is the property of the Iraqi people.

As soon as humanitarian supplies are assured, all U.S. troops should be
withdrawn from Iraq. Any military bases or U.S. occupation is an
imperial imposition and unacceptable.



(4) What's the right tactic to use to be most effective? Should our
movements be single or multi-tactic and with what mix?

Imagine a movement that keeps growing, but there is no diversification
of approach, and therefore no evidence of increasing depth of commitment
and perseverance, or a movement that shrinks but its diminishing numbers
are evidently becoming more committed, or a movement that is continually
growing, and which has a growing subset of members who display growing
militancy and commitment and whose involvement seems in time to be the
destination point for all other members as well. 

Isn't it clear that the last option presents a far more threatening
prospect to elites? If so, then isn't it obvious that the task is to
combine diverse tactics suitable for different sectors but without in
any way curtailing the movement's ability to reach out to new and less
committed people and to engage their participation as well?

What we need to incorporate if we are to have the most effective
movement is a combination of consciousness-raising activities,
demonstrations and marches, strikes and civil disobedience, all of them
mutually supportive, and none of them pursued in a way that undermines
the rest. 

That approach is what can simultaneously enlarge the movement, make the
movement congenial to its members, and raise the greatest threat of
continued development and danger for elites.



(5) What happens and how do we respond if there is a terrorist attack on
the U.S.?

The prospects of a terrorist attack on the United States or American
citizens abroad is very real. And if any attack does occur it will
likely be used by the Bush administration just as 9-11 was used -- to
mobilize public opinion behind more repression at home and more
aggression abroad. People's critical judgment is often a major victim of
terrorist attack and the Bush administration knows this. Bush's approval
rating jumped from 50 percent in late August 2001 to 89 percent a week
and a half after 9-11. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asked
her senior staff "how do you capitalize on these opportunities?" (quoted
in New Yorker, 4/1/02) And capitalize they did.

The Bush administration will claim that any new terrorist attack proves
the wisdom of its having gone to war. But this argument is utterly
illogical; it proves not that Bush was right but that his critics were. 

The antiwar movement noted, for example, the likely affect of any U.S.
war against Iraq would be to "super charge" recruiting for al Qaeda type
organizations, to use the words of General Wesley Clark. And sure
enough, that's precisely what's been happening. (See Sebastian Rotella,
"Threat of war in Iraq is adding to the pool of potential recruits for
Al Qaeda and others," Los Angeles Times, 3/2/03; Don Van Natta Jr. and
Desmond Butler, "Anger on Iraq Seen as New Qaeda Recruiting Tool," New
York Times, 3/16/03.)

As for Saddam Hussein, the CIA stated on October 7, 2002: 

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. chemical and biological
weapons against the United States. 

Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be
deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting
terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as
with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or
C.B.W.
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2002/iraq-021007-ci
a01.htm) 

U.S. officials are well aware that their war increases the risks of
terrorism against the United States. "There is a certainty that
terrorists will attempt to launch multiple attacks" against the United
States and its allies, declared the State Department's coordinator for
counterterrorism. The FBI's Deputy Assistant Director told senators that
there is some intelligence about the Iraqis "indicating an interest in
taking terrorist actions against the U.S." (CNN, 3/18/03) (This is quite
an intelligence coup, given that suicide bomber squads have marched
through the streets of Baghdad and Saddam has warned that the invaders
would be fought anywhere in the world.) Hussein presumably hopes to
"shock and awe" the U.S. population, ignoring the clear lesson of
history that terror tends to yield hatred and resolve rather than
capitulation. The U.S. counterpart may be immense enough to induce an
Iraqi surrender, but it surely won't lessen hatred for the United States
throughout the world.

So rather than reducing anti-U.S. terrorism, U.S. policy has the effect
-- the predictable effect -- of increasing it. In Israel/Palestine we
have often seen this same pattern. When there is a lull in the violence,
and peace proposals are in the air, the Israeli government launches an
assassination or a military operation killing many civilians. There is
then a Palestinian attack on civilians, which Israel claims shows the
need for the continued iron fist. There is in fact a symbiotic
relationship between the terrorists on both sides in maintaining the
cycle of violence.

The Bush administration will no doubt try to use any terrorist incident
to discredit and silence the antiwar movement. In that fevered
atmosphere, it will be hard for us to speak up. But we need to do so. We
need to make these points:

->      We condemn all attacks on civilians and we sympathize with the
victims of all such attacks. 
        
->      As the CIA and the antiwar movement warned, the U.S. war policy
led to anti-U.S. terrorism. 
        
->      Real measures to deal with the threat of terrorism against the
United States have long been urged by the antiwar movement, both long
term (changing U.S. foreign policy to reduce the level of anti-U.S.
hatred in the world) and short term (desisting from an unjust and
unnecessary war, adequately funding first-responders, providing
financial aid to bankrupt cities, building ties to, rather than
alienating immigrant communities, and so on). To take just one example,
Congress required the Justice Department to submit a report by August
2002 on the vulnerabilities of U.S. chemical facilities. The report has
still not been prepared and there exists no legislation requiring
chemical plants to protect themselves and no federal agency monitors
whether they have done so voluntarily. (GAO-03-439)  Instead of pursuing
policies that might actually have dealt with the terrorist threat, the
administration, against all advice, chose the course of war, with its
predictable -- and horrible -- consequences. 
        


(6) What happens and how do we respond if the TV shows cheering in the
streets of Baghdad?

We need to keep in mind how easy it is for the media to give a false
picture of what is going on. The Pentagon has been making every effort
to exclude independent journalists from the war zone, and with a
compliant media it is not hard to make a handful of supporters of the
U.S. invasion appear to represent the general Iraqi reaction. 

In Afghanistan the media broadcast scenes of cheering women throwing off
their burqas as if this were a widespread phenomenon. In fact, it was a
scene confined to Kabul, or parts of Kabul, and over the following
months our television screens did not focus on the warlordism outside
the capital, or the narrowing opportunities for women, or the growing
number of people in need of food (exceeding that under the Taliban), or
the non-arrival of promised Western aid.

Saddam Hussein is rightly despised by many Iraqis and millions will be
thrilled at his ouster. We too ought to cheer his removal, though not
the means by which it was accomplished. (There's no contradiction here:
the ends do not justify the means. If the police catch a murderer, but
kill several innocent bystanders in the process, we're glad that the
murderer has been apprehended, but we condemn the way it was done.) That
people may dance in the streets at Hussein's fall does not tell us that
they favored the U.S. war (and those lying under the rubble of buildings
struck by U.S. bombs are presumably not out celebrating.), and certainly
does not tell us what their attitude is to the coming U.S. occupation.
Recall that when Hussein released thousands of prisoners last October,
many people cheered, without necessarily supporting the dictator,
long-term or short-term. "'Saddam is our hero,' said one, before adding
quickly, 'for today.'" (Washington Post, Oct. 21, 2002)



(7) What happens and how do we respond if Saddam Hussein uses chemical
weapons or if U.S. forces discover prohibited weapons of mass
destruction? Does that mean Bush was right?

This is certainly the spin that the Bush administration will try to put
on it. Already, administration officials have told the New York Times
that discovery of weapons of mass destruction "would vindicate the
administration's decision to go to war." (3/19/03) But this is
unadulterated nonsense. The issue here is not whether Iraq has WMD.
Although the antiwar movement has pointed to exaggerated charges and
suppressed exculpatory evidence (such as the full testimony of defector
Hussein Kamel), its claim was not that Saddam Hussein had no proscribed
weapons. Most antiwar analysts had no illusions about Hussein and knew
that he was morally capable of producing and hiding WMD. Rather, the
claim has been that whatever weapons Hussein might have (1) they
constitute a negligible military threat to the United States or any one
else beyond Iraq's borders; and (2) the danger they posed was being
reduced even further by the inspections process. 

Given the Bush administration's record for pushing forgeries,
plagiarized documents, and photographic evidence of what Hans Blix
tactfully noted "could just as easily have been a routine activity," one
should naturally be suspicious of any "discovery" claimed by U.S.
forces. But in any event, the only way Bush will have been proven right
is if evidence is found that Hussein had a WMD capability that posed an
imminent military threat that could neither be deterred nor uncovered by
the inspectors.

Nor would Hussein's use of chemical weapons against the U.S. invasion
prove Bush right. On the contrary, it would confirm that the antiwar
movement was right. Antiwar activists had insisted all along -- citing
the CIA -- that the only conceivable circumstances under which Saddam
Hussein would consider using any chemical weapons he might have was
precisely in the event of a U.S. attack. Such a use of chemical weapons
would be unconscionable and violate international law, but it would not
prove that the weapons would have been used in the absence of the U.S.
attack (which itself is more seriously unconscionable and contrary to
international law). 



(8) How do we respond to the entreaty to "support our troops" and the
assertion that opposing the war is treasonous?

Even before the war began, the jingoists were proclaiming that anyone
who isn't a traitor needs to rally around Washington to "support our
troops." Opponents of the war have several possible replies. 

We could point out that our troops in Iraq are barely in danger at all
because they are assaulting a tenth-rate opponent that has no serious
means to defend Iraq much less to attack the world's sole superpower. 

Or we could point out that the lives of American troops are no more
worthy of compassionate support than the lives of Iraqis. 

And of course we could explain how unleashing a campaign to "shock and
awe" a country is unjust and immoral, and an archetype of the terrorism
the U.S. claims to be against. 

But the response we propose is a bit different. It is that we too
"support our troops."

We support our troops coming home alive, but we also support our troops
not having to kill people in Iraq. We support our troops not dying in
Iraq figuratively or literally, physically or psychologically. We
support our troops coming home with their hearts not broken, retaining
humanity and compassion essential to feeling true solidarity with those
who confront tyrannical behavior abroad, or right here in the U.S. with
its 30 million tyrannized poor. 

So: Support our troops, bring them home, provide them housing, provide
them health care, provide them socially valuable jobs. 

Support our troops and one day they will join the fight for justice for
all.



(9) What happens and how do we respond if there's a massive government
crackdown on dissent?

There are two sides to this question. The first is how do we prevent the
use of ever more destructive and damaging policies of repression by the
government. The second is, to the extent that they do escalate their
tactics, how do we reply.

What takes options out of play for the government is a belief by them
that to use those options would do their efforts more harm than good.
Why doesn't the government drop bombs on demonstrators in the streets of
Washington DC? Because it would lead to a growth rather than diminution
of the opposition; it would strengthen rather than weaken resistance.
What determines the government's choice of tactics is their estimate of
our response, and of the response of the population at large to the
tactic's use.

What will protect the most militant dissenters is huge numbers of less
militant dissenters who would be horribly upset at the forceful
repression of the militants. What will protect huge numbers of less
militant dissenters is a population at large that would be horribly
upset at the repression of the dissidents. 

If we allow repression to silence us, our ability to protect ourselves
will diminish and the repression will grow. If we continually talk to
our neighbors, our classmates, our fellow workers, discuss the war with
them, expose government lies to them, point out how the liberties of all
of us are in danger, we can create an environment within which the
government cannot get away with repression. We must not induce paranoia
by overstating the level of repression, but nor should we minimize
actual government repression.

In the event that repressive policies are forthcoming, our response
should be no different than our response to war policies themselves. It
is to enlarge the movement, to increase the ties between the movement
and the public -- and at the same time to enlarge the more militant
sectors of the movement and increase the ties between them and other
dissenters.

Nothing else wards off repressive or even violent government response.
Arrests will be employed if they cripple dissent, avoided if they boost
dissent. Repressive force will be employed if it cripples dissent,
avoided if it promotes dissent. 

We will have to react to repression but should do so in the context of
continuing to react to war...and the balance and mix of attention we
should give to each ought to be determined, for us, precisely by what
enlarges and deepens overall dissent. Whatever works more to that end,
we should do. Whatever doesn't work to that end, we should leave aside. 

The exact balance is often hard to know, and there is little gain in
fighting about alternative choices. Just explore them, apply energy to
what seems wise and worthy...and let others do likewise.



(10) What happens and how do we respond if there's a massive crackdown
on immigrants, Muslims, Arabs, etc.?

Immigrants are especially vulnerable and therefore we need to make
special efforts to protect them. The government goes after immigrants as
part of its salami tactics, cutting off one piece of the opposition at a
time, hoping that non-immigrants will not protest very much because it's
"them" not "us." Our response, therefore, is clear: we need to
vigorously defend the basic rights of immigrants. 

Protecting the rights of immigrants, particularly the Arabs and Muslims
who are especially singled out, must become an additional focus of our
movement, along with the war itself, and with raising broader
consciousness. 

This is morally right and it is also strategically right. A movement
that will not stand up in solidarity with its own supporters is a
movement which won't retain its supporters. A movement that fails to
protect the most vulnerable will find that everyone is vulnerable.



(11) What happens and how do we respond if Israel uses a war to escalate
its repression of Palestinians?

After the Iraqi civilian population, the people most at risk as a result
of a U.S. attack on Iraq are the Palestinians. Ever since September 11,
2001, the Israeli government has used the U.S. "war on terrorism" as a
cover and justification for increased repression against Palestinians. 

Today Israel is ruled by an extreme right-wing government. Headed by
Ariel Sharon, the person found responsible by an Israeli commission for
the massacre of thousands of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shitila
refugee camps in Lebanon, the cabinet includes Uzi Landau (who suggested
doing to the Palestinians "what the Iraqis did to the Kurds." [Ha'aretz,
2/20/02]); Gideon Ezra (who said regarding a U.S. attack on Iraq "The
more aggressive the attack is, the more it will help Israel against the
Palestinians. The understanding would be that what is good to do in
Iraq, is also good for here." [Christian Science Monitor, 8/30/02]); and
two members of the National Union Party, which calls for the "transfer"
of the Palestinian population to neighboring Arab countries (one of the
two, Benny Elon, told Evangelical Christians in the U.S. "Let's turn to
the Bible, which says very clearly... we have to resettle them, to
relocate them." (Forward, 10/18/02) Polls show that a fifth of the
Israeli population supports the idea of "transfer." 

Three circumstances are particularly worrisome: if Iraq strikes Israel
with missiles, if Palestinians display public support for Iraq, or if
some Palestinian group launches a large-scale terrorist attack -- it is
possible that the Israeli response might be mass expulsions of
Palestinians. Even if the government does not itself do this, if mobs of
angry Israelis try to drive out Palestinians, it is quite possible that
the armed forces will not intervene -- just as they recently allowed
Jewish settlers to prevent Palestinians from harvesting their olive
crops.

Fortunately, the U.S. government, which in general shares the Israeli
government's strategic interests, does not want anything to happen that
might incite Arab opinion against the United States while the war with
Iraq is going on. Whereas Washington might be willing to permit all
sorts of quiet atrocities against the Palestinians, it would likely
block any actions that threatened to become the focus of world
attention. The task of the U.S. antiwar movement then is obvious: we
must make sure that any stepped up Israeli attacks on the Palestinians
are widely known and hugely protested. 


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