------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Make a clean sweep of pop-up ads. Yahoo! Companion Toolbar. Now with Pop-Up Blocker. Get it for free! http://us.click.yahoo.com/L5YrjA/eSIIAA/yQLSAA/nJ9qlB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~->
South Asia Citizens Wire | 1-2 November, 2004 via: www.sacw.net [1] India / Pakistan /Kashmir: (i) Mutual trust fund (A.G. Noorani) (ii) Exile on main street (Sajad Lone) [2] Pakistan: Pakistan Army Inc.: Propping up Musharraf (Ali Dayan Hasan) [3] Pakistan: Excerpts: NAB: the early years (Hassan Abbas) [4] India: 1984 in the life of a nation - Gujarat happened because of the failure to punish the killers of '84 (Indira Jaising) [5] India: Education under BJP - School drops badges - One School Two Badges [6] India: Gujarat textbook mum on riots (Rathin Das) [7] India: Upcoming events : (i) LARZISH: International Film Festival of Sexuality and Gender Plurality, Mumbai, India, 2004 (Bombay, 4th-7th November, 2004) (ii) South Asian Queer Shorts at Reeling, Chicago Lesbian and Gay International Film Festival 2004 (Chicago, 11th of November) (iii) BASAS Annual Workshop 2004 'Chauvinism in South Asia' (Bristol, 13 November 2004) (iv) CERAS - Annual General Meeting 2004 (Montreal, 21 November) 20th anniversary of the anti-Sikh Delhi Riots 20th anniversary of the Bhopal Gas Disaster -------------- [1] (i) Hindustan Times November 2, 2004 MUTUAL TRUST FUND A.G. Noorani 'Pandit Nehru gave his view that Kashmir could be divided into four well-defined areas, viz. the valley of Srinagar itself, Poonch (with which he included Mirpur), Jammu and the Gilgit Agency'. That was at a meeting in New Delhi with Mountbatten, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel and Ghulam Mohammed on Nov. 28, 1947. The minutes record that he was propounding a scheme whereby Liaquat's "wishes would be met". That he overlooked Ladakh is less relevant than the fact that demarcation of areas has ever been a part of the discourse on the Kashmir problem. Pervez Musharraf's offering of 'food for thought', after a hearty iftar on Oct. 25, is in good tradition. His tally is seven regions which "we will have to identify"; next, "demilitarise them forever, and in the third stage change their status". That "can be independence, condominium where there can be a joint control or there can be UN mandate". It has to be defined by 'legal people'. Lawyers should be consulted before a scheme is proposed. If originality is not a feature of the serving, neither is realism or practicality. Condominiums have been very rare: Austro-Prussian condominium over Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenberg (1864-1866); Anglo-Egyptian over Sudan (1898-1955); Anglo-French over the New Hebrides, now Venuatu (1914-1980); and Anglo-American (1939-1989) over the Islands of Canton and Endenberry, now part of Kiribatu. India and Pakistan will be bad partners in such an exercise. Kashmir is not Kosovo to be governed under a UN mandate. Independence is an unreal idea. Musharraf's venture took off from his understanding with Manmohan Singh in New York on Sept. 25 to explore options. This is a quest that goes beyond a Kashmir solution. It concerns the future of Indo-Pak relations. Which is why New Delhi's churlish reaction is as disappointing as are the outpourings of distrust by some. Yet, both reactions are understandable. India is in a time wrap on Kashmir. Having frozen its own thinking, it hopes that the status quo will freeze as well and the world would accept it. Each day, however, yields a new recruit for change. The latest is Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon who said on Oct. 23: "The resolution of the core issue of Kashmir is necessary for durable peace." Nehru spoke of areas in 1947 in the context of plebiscite to which he had pledged himself. The minutes of a meeting on Dec. 21, 1947, record: "Pandit Nehru reassured Mr Liaquat Ali that the Government of India would never depart from the policy of holding a fair and impartial plebiscite under UNO and that indeed they had declared this policy often and too publicly to make it possible for them to withdraw from it, even if they wanted to, which they did not." But Indira Gandhi warned him in a letter from Srinagar of May 14, 1948, "They say Sheikh saheb is confident of winning the plebiscite." But, as he wrote to the (as then titled) Prime Minister of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, in a secret note of August 25, 1952, he had privately changed his mind "towards the end of 1948" significantly. He had concluded that "the only feasible solution... was the acceptance of the status quo more or less". This was based on six calculations. First, that "we are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power". Second, "a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, [Pakistan] will be in a mood to accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere". Third, the people also would acquiesce. Though gifted, they "are not what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy living... They were interested only in honest administration and cheap and adequate food". Fourth, he asked the Sheikh to finalise Kashmir's accession to India. Fifth, tensions could be eased "between India and Pakistan by tackling other problems... And development of trade and other relations". He had offered partition on the basis of the ceasefire line. Finally, "I am convinced that in the long run India and Pakistan must come together." We must offer friendship to Pakistan on this basis. Everyone of these calculations has been proved wrong. Neither Pakistan nor the Kashmiris have acquiesced in this scheme even after half a century. Nehru's understanding of the people's psyche was hopelessly wrong. His strategy of by-passing Kashmir by talking of 'other problems' and offering trade has failed. Military superiority didn't settle the issue. But this note has governed - and continues to govern - India's policy and the outlook of the bogus doves. Its status on the Indo-Pak cold war is akin to the US National Security Council's document NSC-68 of April 1950, the Bible on containment of the Soviet Union. Sheikh Abdullah couldn't accept the note. He doubted the assurances of respect for autonomy; knew that the dispute couldn't be settled without an accord with Pakistan; and sensed the growing alienation among the people. He was sacked as J&K PM and was jailed on Nehru's orders, as the documents show. Nehru's policy created an alienated populace and an aggrieved neighbour, both deeply resentful at his breach of solemn pledges. To both, the LoC, based as it is on force, signifies 'lump it'. Time will not assuage the grievance or heal the wound. A solution alone can do both. Alienation of the people of Kashmir has increased and come to the boil. Hartals can be imposed on shopkeepers. There is no way thousands can be forced to throng funeral processions of militants, indigenous or Pakistani, or women driven to the windows to wail over their deaths. Musharraf's details are ill-considered. But hand it to him that ever since he came to power on Oct. 12, 1999, he has consistently offered alternatives to plebiscite. Three days later he told the US Ambassador, Willian B. Milam, that both sides must move beyond 'stated positions'. Milam's assessment that he was a 'moderate' has proved correct. Two extremes to be ruled out are 'the UN resolutions' and Kashmir as a closed chapter rather than a live dispute. He became bolder as he consolidated his power. An Indian journalist was told in April 2001 that both sides should "reach somewhere in the mid-ground". Then came the famous four points at the Agra breakfast on July 16, 2001: meet; accept Kashmir as an issue; 'negate' extreme positions; and adopt a compromise acceptable to both. Indian visitors were told on Oct. 12, 2004, that the last two steps should be merged. "If Step 3 is taken in isolation, all hell will break loose." The process of elimination, dangerous in isolation, will be unnecessary if the parties reach out for the outlines of the end product. It was on this occasion that he said: "Identify the region, demilitarise it and change its status." He wouldn't be talking of reaching an accord in 'a full day's sitting' unless he was prepared to meet India halfway. Preceding all this was Musharraf's declaration on Dec. 18, 2003, that he had 'left aside' the UN resolutions. His policy has aroused opposition at home. The Indian PM is sincere in the quest for options. It's plain that unless India reciprocates, the peace process will end. Musharraf isn't one to use Kashmir for domestic support. He wants to settle it to rebuild a fractured State. That's in India's interests too. _____ (ii) Hindustan Times - October 31, 2004 EXILE ON MAIN STREET Sajad Lone It is important to identify the nuanced political distinction between the terms 'resolution' to the Kashmir conflict and a 'solution' to the Kashmir conflict. Resolution is more of a long-term concept and is an improbability at this stage. It could mean settling of all claims on Kashmir of all the actors, once and for all. The peoples of India, Pakistan and J&K have grown up on a diet of vicious rhetoric and hostile folklores and seen the bloody manifestation in terms of violence. Bitter peoples, competing in bitterness, are the most unlikely settings for a resolution. Add to it the lack of exposure, the lack of free movement. For an average Pakistani, an Indian is symbolised as a perpetual threat to a dream called Pakistan. For an average Indian, Pakistan is symbolised by the images of conspiring generals out to destroy India. And for the fatigued Kashmiri, consumed with anger against both the countries, if only violence could end he could express his true will. The landless peasant of Sindh is either ignorant of the travails of the bonded labour in Bihar or his scope for empathising is completely crowded out by the patriotic fervour generated by malignant demagoguery. The majority in both the countries - who are economically persecuted - 'don't know each other', don't feel for each other. Perhaps their bond of exploitation, hunger, impoverishment could set the stage for a resolution somewhere in the future. Realities don't blend while the surreal rules. Resolution will have to wait for realities to blend. In the interim period, we will have to look for a solution, a short-term concept, whose aim should primarily be to set the stage for an era of uninterrupted peace and reconciliation of realities. It would entail concessions, bold decisions, resorting to the unthinkable and yet not threatening geography. The actors are obsessed with land and may have lost sight of the costs, and flirting with geography may make solutions elusive. The status quo and the three slogans, accession to India, accession to Pakistan and an independent Kashmir, depict the problem. The short-term concept of solution will have to rule out all these options. In the Indo-Pak scheme of things, solutions need not be announced or hyped. They invite stigmatisation. A solution will have to be felt in the region. Summits and hyped bilateral talks need to make way for a feeling of a solution having been reached. The process of confidence-building measures initiated by India and Pakistan needs to be institutionalised and an element of irreversibility needs to be embedded in these measures. This will mean a movement of these measures away from joint forums and societies into the majority section - i.e. the peoples of the region. A solution could grow to become a resolution, if the mindsets of the peoples in the region change. A few decades down the line, stakes against erratic movements in the contours of a solution could be high. A solution could pave the way for a gradual, painless resolution in the long run. Economics could be a major input in defining the contours of a solution. Economics could generate direct and indirect benefits for the common man through increased trade. It could lead a frontal assault on the per capita - an upwardly mobile journey, to relatively respectable levels and increase in the purchasing power of the existing per capita. An irreversible economic interdependence between an average Indian and a Pakistani citizen is the essential paradigm of a solution. Gains could, however, be frittered away if economics is used in isolation. A psychological strategy should try and tackle the psyche of the people of the region. It should evolve naturally through sustained economic, cultural, academic, social interaction. Political management of economics and psychology is the key to a solution. We will have to have an optimal blend of economics, politics and psychology in order to pursue a solution. The blend will have to be put to prudent use between New Delhi and Islamabad and between Srinagar and New Delhi. The onus of success will primarily be on New Delhi. And it means magnanimity and acting like a great nation: abandoning the role of a pedantic geographer and refusing to be a prisoner of geography. It will have to shift the focus from the land to the people. And especially in Kashmir, it should recognise that it has a problem. This is an angry population, crippled under the debt of thousands of sacrifices, overwhelmed with anger and aspiring for eternal political salvation. It would be naive to mistake fatigue and defeat at the hands of violence as consent. In Kashmir there are no grievances. There are aspirations. New Delhi might have controlled the hostilities to manageable levels but the aspirations are alive. Engagement rather than management should be the key word in Kashmir. A solution will have to be centred around Kashmir, the people, not the land. Economics could be a part of a solution. However, defaming economics in Kashmir by making it a part of theatre will only impede a solution. Marketing economic intervention as a package to the impoverished Kashmiris is tantamount to dishonouring their aspirations and branding their aspirations as the desperately extreme step of a hungry population. National dole is not the way out. A solution-centric role of economics would mean institutional economic intervention - empowering the Kashmiris with an independent economic system, which would partly comply with the macro aspirations in Kashmir. Theatrical economics will have to make way for traditional economics. The psychological aspect would mean tackling aspects pertaining to the relationship between the Kashmirs on the two sides of the LoC. With due respect to geography, a short-term solution could mean psychological integration of the two regions of Kashmir followed by economic integration. This could serve as a model for the future. The political input could mean redefining the relationship between New Delhi and Srinagar. It could further mean opening up Kashmir for the average Pakistani and making travel for a Kashmiri between the two regions of Kashmir a birthright. Pakistan would have to facilitate the process of psychological and economic integration between the two regions of Kashmir. It would have to ensure that violence in the Valley is not encouraged by the State of Pakistan and New Delhi will have to take steps to dilute its military presence, or at least dilute the visibility of its military presence. Both countries would have to match deeds with words and ensure that proxies thrust by both the countries are reined in. The diffused state of Kashmiri leadership may not be as diffused as it appears to be. Consolidation of Kashmiri political voices into single digit figures is imperative for a solution. Srinagar is the source of anger and unfulfilled aspirations and any solution skipping Srinagar is unlikely to succeed. New Delhi will have to engage the Kashmiris and Pakistan will have to facilitate the engagement. A mollified Kashmiri population is essential for a solution. New Delhi will have to decide whether it wants to restore peace in Kashmir or end violence in Kashmir, or settle scores with Pakistan or hold on to the land or show the will to find a solution. The writer is Chairman, People's Conference ______ [2] International Herald Tribune November 1, 2004 PAKISTAN ARMY INC.: PROPPING UP MUSHARRAF Ali Dayan Hasan LAHORE, Pakistan The word in Urdu is "be-sharmi." Think of it as chutzpah, or shamelessness, and you'll understand what President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan did in October in violating his pledges to step down as army chief on Dec. 31, 2004. . In 1999, Musharraf took power in a coup. This year, in order to push through controversial constitutional reforms that increased his powers, Musharraf acceded to widespread demands to step down as army chief as part of the process of returning the country to civilian rule. Last month - the fifth anniversary of his coup - he reneged by securing the passage of the "The President to Hold Another Office Act." Pakistani democracy activists are reeling. . Last year, President George W. Bush, in a widely publicized speech, admitted that the United States had turned a blind eye as dictators and authoritarian rulers in the Muslim world trampled on basic rights and ruled by fiat. . Bush spoke passionately about how democracy and human rights in the Muslim world are critical to combating terrorism. He vowed that future U.S. policy would be different. . Yet when the new Bush doctrine met its first real test, Pakistan, the United States remained silent. Why? The general is a friend of the United States. After Sept. 11, Musharraf immediately announced his support for the United States against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. . Musharraf has successfully convinced the United States - and other countries - that he is Pakistan's indispensable man. Claiming that only he can save what he destroyed - Pakistan's fragile democracy - Musharraf has essentially been given a pass on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation, the exile and jailing of opposition political leaders and serious human rights abuses by the Pakistani Army. . The Bush administration has uncritically accepted Musharraf's premise that pressuring him too much on human rights and democracy could push the country into the hands of Islamists. . This is a profound misunderstanding of power and political reality in Pakistan. With or without Musharraf, the leadership of the Pakistani military is dedicated to self-preservation and power. It was the military that created the Taliban and then, after Sept. 11, made a U-turn at full speed. . If Musharraf leaves office, it will primarily be because he is viewed as an ineffective CEO for Pakistan Army Inc. His replacement, chosen from within the ranks of the army command, will continue to pursue a pro-U.S. policy with equal zeal. Pakistani generals know that Islamic fundamentalists are just as opposed to the largely secular military establishment as they are to the United States. For Pakistan Army Inc., the United States is the only game in town. . While the Bush administration sees stability, we Pakistanis see a nonperforming state, structured primarily around the preservation of the institutional interests of its military. . The military prioritizes the acquisition of nuclear weapons over accessible schooling, clean drinking water, basic medical care or any meaningful reduction in the poverty of its citizens. It is a systematic human rights abuser. Increasingly these abuses are conducted under the umbrella of the U.S.-led "war on terror." . The Pakistani Army's traditional policy of denying fundamental rights to the tribal belt, encompassing Waziristan along the Afghan border, and its brutality in conducting recent antiterrorist operations there, has created a rebellion that shows every sign of outliving Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile, the southwestern province of Balochistan, sullenly peaceful until recently, is rapidly moving toward an insurgency as decades of resentment against the Pakistani military come to a head. . Pakistan continues to preside over a host of discriminatory and dangerous laws and practices for women. And while waxing eloquent about "real democracy," it was Musharraf who eviscerated the judiciary by sacking Supreme Court judges who opposed martial law. . Indeed, Pakistan continues to run a pseudodemocracy put in place through elections described as deeply flawed by independent international observers. Musharraf ratified his own position as president through a referendum in which he was the only candidate. . Javed Hashmi, president of the opposition Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, has been sentenced to 23 years in prison. His crime? He read a letter critical of Musharraf to assembled journalists. . The desire of the Bush administration for political stability in Pakistan is no excuse for failing to pursue a proactive human rights agenda with Pakistan. The United States has the leverage, and Pakistan has the experience with democracy, to make it happen. No Muslim country is more able to prove President Bush right, if only he means what he said. . (Ali Dayan Hasan is the Pakistan researcher for Human Rights Watch.) . ______ [3] Dawn - 31 October 2004 EXCERPTS: NAB: the early years By Hassan Abbas Hassan Abbas writes about the inception of the National Accountability Bureau and its sorry performance. The first decisive step that Musharraf took was on the domestic front - accountability of the corrupt. With every change of government since the revival of democracy, the cry for accountability had become louder and louder, but as the problem was so widespread and the ramparts of vested interest so invincible, no government dared go beyond a judicious mixture of flimsy steps and lip service toward meeting this demand. By the time Musharraf found himself catapulted to the helm he had no option but to bow to the overwhelming sentiment of the people. Thus before the month of October 1999 was exhausted, he announced the formation of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), with Lieutenant-General Syed Mohammad Amjad as its first chairman. And by a strange irony, it was fated that the 'Attock conspiracy' officers who had paid a heavy price for attempting to conduct accountability 25 years before would have a fair representation on the Bureau. Within two days of the formation of NAB, the services of Saeed Akhtar Malik and Farouk Adam Khan were requisitioned. General Amjad was the ideal and unanimous choice of the senior ranks of the army to be NAB chairman. He was an officer of extraordinary diligence and exemplary character, his name was a byword for integrity... In the event, Musharraf's credibility and commitment were to be defined by the performance of NAB... From the survey of the NAB team, one could only draw optimism. Farouk Adam had a courtly manner, an impressive personality, and a unique ability to smile through the tedium of a 16-hour workday. Saeed A. Malik had much idealism and passion and also a flair for winning the esteem of those working under him... The initial labours of NAB were dedicated to drawing up the NAB Ordinance to provide a legal framework for this new organization. The central principle that dictated the ordinance was the shifting of the onus of proof to the accused, that is, that if the accused person could not reconcile his wealth, earnings, expenses, and taxes that he had paid, he must be deemed guilty of corruption. The framers of this ordinance were very conscious that this draconian law would be applied to a maximum of only 400 of the most corrupt in the land and the principle that would determine the qualification of these "selected few" would be that of either an association with a great crime or having a big name adorned perhaps by a theft not that big. Without such a law, the NAB would essentially have been a non-starter because of the virtual non-existence of investigative and prosecutorial resources To implement this agenda, Amjad was given full authority to select the "targets", though he regularly consulted the ISI and a few legal experts while making vital decisions in this regard. Amjad had a free hand to hold across the board and evenhanded accountability from which no one was exempt, except the judiciary and serving armed forces officials. On November 17, 1999 NAB moved in for its first crop of arrests. Many of those arrested were big names. There was great euphoria among the people because many individuals who had always considered themselves beyond the reach of law were now behind bars. Yet most of the arrests were made on the charges of loan default, perhaps the easiest charge to prove, but one that NAB could be horrendously wrong about because it was very difficult to tell an honest from a wilful default. With the first blood having been drawn, the public appetite was whetted and they bayed for more. Their clamour could have been ignored, but not that of the government, whose credibility and performance had nothing but the achievements of NAB to show for itself. The ordinary public was under the impression that the ISI and other intelligence agencies had collected enough data on corrupt elements when they were "monitoring" the civilian governments during the 1990s, but when a few ISI files were handed over to NAB officials, these were mostly speculative and devoid of any sound material necessary to prove a case in a court of law. To quicken up things, General Amjad hurriedly developed a core team to run the organization comprising bankers, economists, lawyers, and a few from intelligence and police backgrounds. It was a combination never tried before, the only handicap being a shortage of time to organize and deliver. Around that time, a letter from Musharraf's office to NAB (dated December 11, 1999) adequately reflects the anxiety of the government and its dependence on NAB to shore up its credibility: "It has been reported with... great concern that corrupt politicians are becoming bold and the press is gradually becoming sympathetic to them. This trend must be stopped and reversed. Following steps are suggested: 1. Move fast on all issues. 2. Expose the corrupt people very expeditiously. 3. Scoop on corruption on a daily basis." Consequently, more people were arrested based on their reputations, but proof of their corruption was lacking. NAB could have gained a lot of credibility in its initial days by prosecuting the ones who were already in custody, but the special accountability courts were not in place yet as the selection of judges and establishing a new chain of courts and developing a whole new infrastructure was taking time. What the military hierarchy did not realize was that there is a huge difference between deploying a military unit to a new location and establishing a law enforcement institution that has to act within the parameters of law. To overcome this shortage, dozens of retired ISI officials were inducted who perhaps knew the art of interrogation well, but had very little legal and investigative experience, which was the core requirement in this case. There was a reason behind the compulsion that the new inductees had to be former ISI officials -the ISI was providing the funds for this NAB expansion and they opted to benefit their comrades in the process. As if these problems were not enough to hamper NAB's work, all of the arrested persons were kept in different cities under the custody of respective military commands where the local military officials and intelligence operatives started investigating/interrogating the accused on their own. Every single institution was trying to spy on NAB, making the task further complicated. This was symbolic of the general state of affairs in Pakistan. Amjad and Farouk Adam, the two public faces of NAB, were now under immense pressure from the public, the press and the government. As they addressed the press, it seemed to the military hierarchy that they were hogging the limelight, and they became victims of gratuitous envy. Shaukat Aziz, the finance minister then, who had Musharraf's ear, was for blanket protection to businessmen despite the fact that some of the latter, in cahoots with the bankers, were the biggest crooks. Amjad, on the other hand, was heading toward making an example of those industrialists and businessmen who had established their business empires through corrupt practices. This was a risky business as big money was involved. One of Amjad's problems was the subtle increase of government interference with his functioning. As it was, NAB had an ominous start to begin with. In its first two weeks of operations, it cracked open a multimillion-dollar case of fraud and corruption. Nortel, a Canadian telecommunications company, had unfairly been handed a fat contract to build a mobile telephone network in Pakistan. This was an open-and-shut case as all the evidence was there, but when Amjad wanted to move in and scuttle the contract, he was refrained from doing so. The only man who had the power to do this was Musharraf himself. As NAB moved along, two questions were frequently asked of Amjad, that is, whether there were any holy cows, and if the army generals involved in corruption would also be arrested. The government position was that only serving army officers and the judiciary were exempt from NAB because both institutions had effective in-house correction systems, but technically, retired armed forces officials were not a part of this category Amjad was absolutely dedicated to having them probed, but was restrained from doing so. In another high-profile case, a leading politician from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) known for his corrupt practices threatened NAB officials during his interrogation by saying that he was a CIA agent, and that political instability would be created in the country if he were not released immediately. Amjad responded by making things harsher for him and by appointing more investigators to probe his case. The politician was ultimately convicted. It was becoming obvious to NAB that the task before it was gigantic. Realizing this, NAB hired a couple of foreign investigative and law firms to get the corruption money stashed in foreign banks back to Pakistan. It did not work well in the long run but at least sent a strong warning to many Pakistanis abroad who had stolen the money and were now enjoying life in Europe and America. Foreign governments were also contacted for cooperation in this endeavour, and the first positive reply came from the US government. In August 2000 a US team led by Mr Harry Marshall, a senior legal adviser in the US Department of Justice, landed in Pakistan to discuss US-Pakistan cooperation in the domain of the extradition treaty between the two states. NAB presented its cases for extradition of five Pakistanis who were reported as to be in the United States. That led to a successful collaboration between the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and NAB in pursuit of the short-listed cases. From Pakistan's list, one of the cases involved former chief of the Pakistan Navy, Admiral Mansurul Haq, against whom NAB had a sound case. The admiral had been involved in the famous French submarines kickback case in the mid-1990s. Due to the superb efforts of FBI official Michael Dorris, the accused was traced and picked up by the FBI from Austin, Texas, and extradited to Pakistan for the NAB case. * * * * * The saddest commentary on Musharraf's much-vaunted commitment to the cause of accountability is that each member of this team of officers was hounded out of NAB soon after Amjad's departure from the institution. Their only handicap was that not one of them was prone to entertaining any adverse dictates. And so ended a heroic chapter of the war against crime by a handful of officers in a corrupt environment. Reportedly, Amjad had asked to be relieved of his duties more than once. He was not one to take government partiality lying down. He left the NAB at the end of September 2000. The NAB's change of command, in the words of Mohammad Malick's commentary in Dawn, was "a clear sign of NAB's tailored, if not changed priorities". No one then knew who the real "tailor" might be, but there was an acknowledgment that "Amjad remained a very fair accountability chief". But Tariq Ali in his book The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihadis, and Modernity was much more perceptive when he observed that Amjad was ready to push through, but "Musharraf balked at the scale of the enterprise". The new chairman was Lieutenant General Khalid Maqbool, whose reputation was no match for Amjad's. NAB was dead for all practical purposes. A noble experiment had ended because those who had initiated it did not have the moral stamina to carry it through. But it would not be them who would pay the price for this failure. This would be paid once more by those who have always paid it, the people of Pakistan. Musharraf had made a clear choice - he would compromise with those politicians who were ready to side with him. He had given into pressure from various sectors that wanted the regime to behave "normally" and not as a revolutionary one. This was the dilemma Musharraf faced - the masses were looking for a Messiah in him, whereas the political and military elite wanted the status quo to continue. Musharraf was still swinging in between. Hassan Abbas is a visiting scholar at the Negotiation Project, Harvard Law School, and a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served in the Government of Pakistan for ten years. This book probes into the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan and examines its linkages with the military and fluctuating US-Pakistan relations. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Excerpted with permission from: Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror By Hassan Abbas Copyright (c) 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc Available with Mr Books, 10-D Super Market, Islamabad Tel: 051-2278843-5. Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: www.mrbooks.com.pk ISBN 0-7656-1497-9 275pp. Rs1,795 ______ [4] Indian Express - November 01, 2004 1984 IN THE LIFE OF A NATION GUJARAT HAPPENED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO PUNISH THE KILLERS OF '84 Indira Jaising Twenty years in the life of a nation is not too long a time. Today is the 20th anniversary (if one can call it that) of the massacre of Sikhs in Delhi following the death of the Indira Gandhi. December 3-4 will be the 20th anniversary of what is described as the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster. In between we have had the genocide in Gujarat in February-March '02. Is there perhaps a pattern emerging from these events which should alert the nation to its failure in preventing and then dealing with the wanton killing of innocents? Twenty years after the Sikh killings, justice has not been done. There have been no convictions of the politicians who led crowds to kill Sikhs for no other reason than that they were Sikhs. The question arises, are we perhaps using obsolete legal concepts to deal with mass killings which have the backing of the state? A charge of murder alone does not seem to adequately describe the crime. Was '84 a crime without a name and hence a crime without a remedy? To charge people with murder and nothing more fails to point the finger to the real accused. It does not address the issue of constitutional responsibility for preventing such killings. Although what happened in '84 was not described as "genocide", that is what it was. Our legal system failed to answer the question: what is the constitutional and personal responsibility of the head of state for mass killings? In December '84, a gas leak in the UCC facility killed more than 2,000 people living in the vicinity instantly and left thousands seriously injured. Those victims, too, are still awaiting justice. The liability of UCC was never determined. Instead, the apex court recorded a settlement to which the victims were not a party, accepting US$470 million as compensation on their behalf. The question, who was responsible for this disaster, was it UCC, the government who failed to monitor safety standards, the directors of the Indian subsidiary who were managing the facility, or was it all of them - was never answered. The Supreme Court's role was reduced to that of a bargainer mediating between the highest offer and demand. As a result, the legal system offered no solutions, whether civil or criminal. With the killings of the Muslims in Gujarat in '02, it became clear that they were genocidal in nature. Many of us, who responded on behalf of Gujarat victims, were equally active in the '84 Delhi massacres. Having been through that experience, we realised that unless the question of state complicity was addressed, justice would remain a distant dream. Soon it became apparent that this was not just an act of failure but part of a design. It seemed that through periodic communal violence, the state had gained experience not only in organising violence but also organising the denial of access to justice. It is now clear that the cover-up plan was in place before the violence was unleashed. Failure to investigate the crimes, refusal to name leaders in FIRs, appointing public prosecutors who were VHP members, ensuring witnesses turn hostile, were only some of the methods used to ensure acquittals. While this happened, the judiciary remained a mute spectator until the NHRC moved the apex court with the active assistance of members of civil society. The final verdict on Gujarat is not out, but human rights activists have learned certain lessons. One of them was the immense importance of holding the perpetrators of the violence legally liable. In a manner of speaking, it is the entire legal system that is on trial. It is the failure to hold the killers of '84 liable, the failure to hold the UCC liable, that led to the belief that criminals enjoy immunity from the legal process. It is easier to convict for a single murder, than it is to convict for 2,000 mass murders. The significance of describing the Gujarat killings as genocide is that they enable us to hold the CM personally liable for the killings that took place on the theory of command responsibility. The position of a CM or PM is one of command and neither can claim that they were not responsible for the acts of their subordinates. Apart from holding those who committed the acts of killing liable, we also have to hold liable people in positions of power, who not only failed to prevent the killings but encouraged it by hate speech, justified it as an understandable response. All chargesheets in the Gujarat cases began with the assertion that the killings took place as a "reaction" to the burning for the Sabarmati train in Godhra. The police have already decided, even before any trial, that the killings were not planned but were a "spontaneous reaction" to the Sabarmati Express burning. In the district court in Himmatnagar, a suit has been filed by two widows who lost their husbands against the CM, the State of Gujarat and the accused in the criminal trial which have has been commenced against those accused of murdering their husbands. This suit squarely raises the issue of the personal responsibility of the CM for his complicity in the genocide that took place in March '02 and invokes the theory of command responsibility. India is a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The chief merit of invoking the Convention is that it destroys the theory of state immunity. It also enables us to hold people personally liable for their actions without hiding behind the juristic personality of the state. What will happen to the suit is anybody's guess, but the fact that it has been filed means that the CM has a case to answer. The suit has come 20 years too late. Had such legal action been taken against the PM in power in '84, perhaps the legal system would have been tested and accountability for human rights violations established. What Gujarat has done is to help us understand '84 better. Equally, '84 helped us to understand what was required to be done in the post-Gujarat killings. I am amazed when people say, "What's new about Gujarat?" The difference is that in Gujarat, those at the helm of power have been challenged by human rights activists. The very act of challenge hold promise for the future. But there are similarities too. In the final analysis, the legal system is the steel frame of accountability. That steel frame crumbled in '84 in Delhi. It crumbled again in the face of the UCC killings. By '04, it was literally non-existent. It was these failures of the legal system and more specifically of our judiciary, that made Gujarat happen. Surprisingly, in situations of mass killings and disappearances it has proved easier to get justice in societies which have been governed by military regimes - take the case of Argentina - than in a democracy like India. This leads me to conclude that the illusion of justice that we in live with is more dangerous than the absence of it. Or is illusion perhaps a necessary component of our democracy that sustains our politicians in power? The writer is a senior Supreme Court advocate ______ [5] The Telegraph October 29, 2004 SCHOOL DROPS BADGES Ahmedabad, Oct. 28: Eight years after the practice was started, a school in a town 25 km from Godhra has removed separate badges for its Hindu and Muslim students following a showcause notice from the district authorities. The controversy, however, broke only early this week when two trustees of the SJ Dave High School in Shehra highlighted the emblems on the uniforms - one with Goddess Saraswati and another with a star. "It was a practice of convenience and not compulsion. Some vested interests are trying to harm peace, which was not disturbed here even after the Godhra carnage," school board vice-president Iqbal Pocha said. Panchmahal district collector Dinesh Brahmbhatt said: "The controversy appears to be a fallout of local political rivalry." He did not elaborate. Last week, the Shiv Sena had set up an office in Shehra. The collector, who ordered to "discontinue this discriminatory practice", admitted that residents had never complained. The school of 714 students, 150 Muslim, has been asked why its state grant should not be suspended. o o o The Tribune - November 2, 2004 Editorial ONE SCHOOL, TWO BADGES! Gujarat must end this practice Long before a man called Narendra Modi and his politics gripped Gujarat, the mindset on which communalists thrive was becoming increasingly pervasive in the state of Mahatma Gandhi. So much so that an abhorrent practice, which reinforces and deepens the communal divide, is accepted as the norm, rather than being seen for the deviation it is from civilised conduct. The case of the S J Dave School in Shehra village of Godhra district - where, as a part of the uniform, Muslim students are required to wear a badge with a star and Hindu students one of the goddess Saraswati - is too shocking an outrage. It is abominable that the school administration should have even thought of such a scheme when uniforms were introduced some years ago. More appalling is the defence of the practice - as an example of "communal amity" - by some school functionaries now, when the matter surfaced with the District Education Officer acting to end the uniform divide. The communal identification enforced is rationalised on the ground that since parents of Muslim students had reservations over sporting badges with Saraswati, they were asked to wear one with a star. This is clearly in gross violation of the Constitution and ought not to have been initiated or allowed in the first instance. It is all to the good that two of the trustees of the school have come out against the deplorable practice and resolved to end it. The principal, who has been in charge for about two years, has confessed that he was opposed to the practice. While criticism of the principal for continuing the uniform divide may be valid to the extent he did not act earlier, it is mischievous and motivated to criticise him with the expectation that he should continue to enforce what he had merely put up with earlier. As in all things, here too politics and politicians of different hues have pitched in to muddy the situation. The school and the authorities should forthwith bury the divisive uniform code and let all students wear the same uniform and the same badge-of an Indian, irrespective their religious affiliation. ______ [6] Hindustan Times - October 2, 2004 Gujarat textbook mum on riots Rathin Das Ahmedabad, October 2 The post-Godhra riots of 2002 may have brought international media attention to Gujarat but the state's history textbooks don't think the events are worth even a mention. The Class VIII social sciences textbook - published by the Gujarat State Board of School Textbooks - makes no mention of the Godhra episode or of the anti-minority pogrom that followed. But it does have the Akshardham attack - an event that took place much after the riots. The omission is in tune with the thinking of the BJP and Sangh Parivar, which has always tried to underplay the riots. It has become almost a trademark of chief minister Narendra Modi to say in public that the adverse publicity the riots gave rise to was a conspiracy by the national English media to defame the people of Gujarat. In fact, one industry association in the state had described the riots as a 'social mishap'. Besides the omission, the book has plenty of spelling and grammatical errors - mostly due to inefficient translation from the original Gujarati version - as well as several historical inaccuracies. For instance, the move of eminent lawyers like C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajagopalachari to quit the legal profession and join the freedom movement has been described as a 'negative aspect' of Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation call. In another chapter, mention is made of Subhash Chandra Bose's 10-month-long tour through the country in 1939 but among the leaders he met, only Veer Savarkar is named. The Prashant Centre for Human Rights, Justice and Peace - which pointed out these and many other mistakes on Friday - has demanded that the textbook be withdrawn immediately. State education minister Anandiben Patel said if it were true, the book would be withdrawn in the next session. Five years back, some textbooks had described minorities as the problem of India. These books were corrected in the subsequent editions. ______ [7] Upcoming Events: (i) LARZISH: Tremors of a Revolution, the 2nd International Film Festival of Sexuality and Gender Plurality, Mumbai, India, 2004 Larzish welcomes you back in its second year! This year we bring to you, new and diverse programs. Expect to catch about 90 films spread over four days from Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Canada, Columbia, France, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Iraq, Japan, Kenya, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, USA, UK, Uruguay and Uganda. Festival highlights include: A RETROSPECTIVE OF FILMS BY FILMMAKER PRATIBHA PARMAR - Daily The festival brings the first ever retrospective of Pratibha Parmar to India. She is an award winning independent director and producer. Her films have exhibited widely at international film festivals and broadcast on television in many countries. (Kindly refer to the festival catalogue for timings) DISCIPLINING BHUPEN - SEXUAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND NORMATIVE VISUALITIES A talk by Parul Dave Mukerjee - 4th November, 15:00 - 16:00hrs Themes of homosexuality have either been anathema, viewed as transgressions to be contained or reductive modes of organizing Bhupen Khakhar's entire oeuvre by institutions of art. Art historian Parul Dave argues that the radicalism of his work lies elsewhere and that homosexuality emerges as one among several positions of marginality. MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COMMUNITY - A PANEL DISCUSSION, 6th November, 17:00 - 19:00Hrs Panelists: Anupama Rao, Mary John, Rinchin and Rohini Hensman It is apparent that the institution of the 'natural family', as decreed through marriage, has remained a dominant organising principle. In what ways has feminism, dalit, queer or left politics attempted to transgress the familiar boundaries of family? The panel will address these issues and look at more fluid forms of family and community. APPEARANCES & IDENTITY, A PANEL DISCUSSION, 7th November, 15:00 - 17:00hrs Panelists: Kajol, Maya Sharma and Shohini Ghosh The panelists will make linkages between gender and sexuality within a bi-gendered society. What happens when people's appearances seem to create fissures in the binary of 'male' and 'female'? What identity does one carry, and how is that perceived in the reading of our gender? Venue: 4th-7th November, 2004, Rama Watumull Auditorium, KC College, Dinshaw Wachha Road, Churchgate, Bombay-20 Please check the web-site for further details: <http://www.larzish.org>http://www.larzish.org For invitation passes to the festival, please contact: 23439651 or 23436692 or write to <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (ii) Showcasing four films from LARZISH: Tremors of a Revolution, the 1st International Film Festival of Sexuality and Gender Plurality, Mumbai, India, 2003 at Reeling, 23rd Chicago Lesbian and Gay International Film Festival 2004 Date: 11th of November, Thursday, 2004 Time: 8:30pm Venue: Chicago Filmmakers 5243 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60640 Ph: 312-458-0639 Ticket: $7 (or festival passes) For more information on the film festival and tickets, go to: www.reelingfilmfestival.org One of its kind in India, LARZISH is a festival of films that address sexuality and gender issues. It is a fitting answer to the state, which recently proclaimed that homosexuality couldn't be tolerated in India. This program of four films is being screened in the Reeling, 23rd Chicago Lesbian and Gay International Film Festival 2004. Gautam Bhan, a queer activist, writer and performance artist from New Delhi, India, currently studying at the University of Chicago will introduce this program of four films. Gautam is closely related to the Larzish Festival and queer movements in India. Film Descriptions: 1. Untitled III Dir: Tejal Shah/India/2000/3 mins/Silent An abstracted and quiet exploration of bodies in space, at once negotiating contact between the two bodies in the video and their relationship with the viewer. 2. Bombay Longing Dir: Georgina Maddox & Shalini/India/2001/3:30 mins/English A coming out story that uses poetic excerpts from a daily journal of everyday encounters ending moaningly happy. 3. Beauty Parlour Dir: Mehreen Jabbar/Pakistan/2000/18mins/Urdu with English subtitles 4 faces, 4 masks: 4 short sketches of the lives and loves of 3 women and a eunuch as they talk about their desires traced through their visits to the beauty parlour and other everyday events. 4. My Friend Su Dir: Neeraj Bhasin/India/2001/54 mins/Hindi & English with English subtitles Traditional Indian and contemporary trance music sets the mood for a night with Su, the filmmaker's friend from art school. Though he is outwardly male, Su feels that inside he is really female. The film revolves around Su's halting monologues about his feelings about society, his upbringing and family, his identity crisis, and his art. Shot at night the images are fluid, sensual. (iii) British Association of South Asian Studies Annual Workshop 2004 'Chauvinism in South Asia' 13 November 2004 Governance Research Centre University of Bristol, UK in conjunction with the Politics of South Asia Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association PROGRAMME 10.30: Arrival & coffee 11.00-12.00: Neil DeVotta (Hartwick College) Chauvinism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka Discussant: James Chiriyankandath (London Metropolitan University) 12.00 - 1.00: Prasun Sonwalker (University of the West of England) Assamese Chauvinism and the Political Dynamics of North East India Discussant: Gareth Price (Royal Institute for International Affairs) 1.00-1.45 pm: Lunch 1.45 - 2.45 pm: Emma Mawdsley (Birkbeck College) The Abuse of Religion and Ecology: The Vishva Hindu Parishad and the Tehri Dam Discussant: Barbara Harriss-White (University of Oxford) 2.45 - 3.15: Tea break 3.15 - 4.15 pm: Dibyesh Anand (University of Bath) Imagining Muslims: Hindutva's politics of representation Discussant: John Zavos (University of Manchester) 4.15-4.45: Tea and close REGISTRATION The workshop is free of charge to members of BASAS and the Political Studies Association subgroup. However, the room has a limited capacity so participants will need to register their attendance with Ben Kisby at [EMAIL PROTECTED] (iv) ANNOUNCEMENT CERAS - Annual General Meeting 2004 20th anniversary of the anti-Sikh Delhi Riots 20th anniversary of the Bhopal Gas Disaster Sunday 21 November at the SOUTH ASIAN WOMEN'S COMMUNITY CENTRE 1035 Rachel est (between Boyer & Christophe Colomb - metro Mt-Royal and bus 11 to Christophe-Colomb and Rachel) 12-1:30pm panel presentation -- SOUTH ASIA IN THE WORLD TODAY 1:30-2:30pm light lunch [if participating in lunch, please reply so that we have an accurate count] 2:30-4pm Business meeting: Agenda 1. Approval of the agenda 2. Minutes of the last AGM 3. Business arising from the minutes of the last AGM 4. Annual Report of the Board of CERAS by the President 5. Accounts by the Treasurer 6. Organizational matter 7. Varia [pl note that we have set the day up so that if people only have time to attend the business part of the meeting that can do so] info and replies: daya varma [EMAIL PROTECTED] _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/ Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on matters of peace and democratisation in South Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit citizens wire service run since 1998 by South Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/ SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/ Sister initiatives : South Asia Counter Information Project : snipurl.com/sacip South Asians Against Nukes: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org Communalism Watch: communalism.blogspot.com/ DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/act/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/