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South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 4 November, 2004 via: www.sacw.net [1] US Elections: The Election of Homophobia and Misogyny (Vijay Prashad) [2] Politics, elections and God (Razi Azmi) [3] Bangladesh: Ahmadiyyas ask govt to protect mosques from bigots' capture (The Daily Star) [4] Kashmir: Pass the pipe around (Balraj Puri) [5] India's model: faith, secularism and democracy (Rajeev Bhargava) [6] Upcoming events : - SANSAD 12th anniversary event - keynote by Harsh Mander (Vancouver, 6 November 2004) - Fourth Indian Diaspora Film Festival (New York, Nov 4-7, 2004) -------------- [1] SAMAR Issue 18 www.samarmagazine.org THE ELECTION OF HOMOPHOBIA AND MISOGYNY It is time to confront theocratic bigotry head on. By Vijay Prashad Four years ago, Bush's Brain Karl Rove swore that he would not rest until the four million Evangelicals who did not vote then would turn out yesterday. And they did. They came in droves. They told those who did the exit polls that the issue that brought them to the franchise was not their own unemployment or under employment, or even the loss of their family members in a war of choice. They came to vote for "moral values." After Rove told participants at an American Enterprise Institute seminar in 2001 that the goal of the Bush re-election campaign would be to make sure that all 19 million Evangelical Christians voted, his team hired Ralph Reed to take charge of the effort. Reed, the veteran of the Christian Coalition, mobilized his contacts and his good looks and went after the withheld votes. The effort began to pay off by the summer of 2004 when the National Association of Evangelicals released a report, For the Health of the Nation: An Evangelical Call to Civic Responsibility. "Because Jesus is Lord over every aspect of life," the report argued, Evangelicals should take an interest in public policy and vote to enforce their "values" over the polity. There are two sections of the document that are helpful guides to "moral values": (1) "Christian citizens of the United States must keep their eyes open to the potentially self-destructive tendencies of our society and our governmenta... We work to nurture family life and protect children," and (2) "We work to protect the sanctity of human life and to safeguard its nature." In other words, the report highlighted the twin "moral values" of anti-gay marriage and anti-abortion, of the preservation marriage as a heterosexual institution and of the prevention of women to determine the fate of their bodies. Bush ran an election campaign that appealed to this definition of "values." The fear of gay marriage and of abortion trumped all other issues, even a ransom-sized deficit and a murderous war. Some of this should have been predictable. The Pew Center for Religion and Public Life released a poll in August 2004 that showed 64% of those asked clearly saying that "moral values" is their most important issue. Blinded by the enormity of the Iraq lies and the deficit, progressives and liberals could not see how significant this "moral value" problem would be. We took comfort in the aggregate data that shows how a large percentage of the population is actually not averse to abortion and knows someone who is gay or lesbian. But the aggregate poll might have been weighted to the coasts, and not to Kansas. The Faith-Based initiatives, the ban on "partial-birth" abortions, the position against gay marriage, the refusal to fund stem-cell research, the "crusade" against Islam and Bush's personal story of transformation and forgiveness appealed to a population that is piously fundamentalist. Without meaningful work, with relatives and friends on the battlefield, with more and more corporations in domination over their lives, people who turn to Bush and to Evangelicalism do so for stability and order. As everything falls apart, belief provides organizations and institutions, and ideological stability. Religious organization offers the soul of soulless conditions. Progressives are loath to offer a frontal criticism of the theocracy that has overtaken the South and the Midwest -- where under the command of tolerance we have to endure the intolerance toward women and their bodies, toward gays and lesbians, towards anyone who does not fit the compass of the "moral values" mass-produced by the established churches. It is time to throw off our forbearance and open a direct debate on the suppression of rational argument in favor of theocratic bigotry. Homophobia elected Bush. Misogyny elected Bush. Unreason elected Bush. Vijay Prashad is Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT. His most recent books are Fat Cats and Running Dogs: The Enron Stage of Capitalism and Keeping Up with the Dow Joneses: Debt, Prison, Workfare. ______ [2] Daily Times November 4, 2004 POLITICS, ELECTIONS AND GOD by Razi Azmi Religion and politics make for a very lethal combination, not just for others but also for the very society in which this occurs. Pakistanis have witnessed its malignant influence for many years. Now, the Israeli 'settlers' -- numbering no more than two hundred thousand out of a total Jewish population of five million -- are holding society and state by the throat, claiming a biblical prerogative. Territorial expansionism directly stoked by religious conviction is now out to devour its own mentor, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Opposition leader Shimon Peres fears that radicals might try to kill Mr Sharon, just as the then prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated in 1995 by a young Israeli opposed to an interim peace agreement with the Palestinians. Police have reported numerous death threats against Mr Sharon, once a champion of the settler movement and now denounced by settler supporters as a traitor and Nazi collaborator. Orthodox Jews refer to the occupied territories by the biblical name of Judea and Samara. Many have forsaken comfortable and secure lives in Western countries to live there, encircled, despised and threatened by the surrounding Palestinian population. Although a vast majority of Israelis support the partial pullout proposed by Sharon, settlers and their allies describe it as a forcible expulsion of Jews from areas they see as part of their biblical birthright. Prominent rabbis have called on religiously observant soldiers to defy orders to evacuate the settlements, saying that carrying out such commands would violate Jewish law. Army chief of staff Lieutenant-General Moshe Yaalon said such resistance "endangers us as an army, as a society and as a state". In the United States, God appears to have joined Bush's election campaign, in violation of the American constitution. [The article was written before election results became available.] "God is out there, actively campaigning for President Bush", said Beverly Ryan, a retired legal secretary and born-again Christian. Referring to the military invasion of Iraq, he added: "George Bush did what God wanted him to do. Who cares what the rest of the world thinks?" Indeed, with God on his side, why should Bush care about anything at all! Whatever his personal religious convictions, by invoking religious symbolism to win the votes of the 40 million Americans who consider themselves evangelical Christians, George Bush has set a precedent that is full of perils and betrays a total disregard for the lessons of history. Barry Lynn, a United Church of Christ minister and the executive director of the Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, said: "It is, I think, extremely dangerous for people to believe that God is a Republican or a Democrat or a Naderite or even a Libertarian." In last year's Malaysian elections, Nik Aziz, the spiritual leader of the Islamist PAS Party, didn't beat about the bush. He declared that those who would vote for his party would go to heaven and those who did not were destined for hell. In the event, it is a pity that relatively few Malaysians chose to book a bed in paradise by voting for his party. As Mr Aziz has had the benefit of higher studies in Islam in Pakistan, it is no surprise that he arrogated to himself the right to distribute one-way tickets to heaven and hell. Pakistanis may be falling head over heels trying to go to other countries for a good education, but their country is a Harvard of sorts for the Islamists of the world. Name any spiritual, political or jihadist leader of any Islamist movement anywhere in the world, from the Indonesian Hambali to the Jordanian Zarqawi, from the Afghan Mullah Jalaludin Haqani to the above-mentioned Malaysian Nik Aziz, and the chances are that they have done their apprenticeship or perfected their religious education in Pakistan. Maulana Samiul Haque, principal of the Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak, also referred to as the University of Jihad, has also issued his fatwa on the American elections. Needless to say, he declares it to be a religious obligation of American Muslims to vote against George Bush. The former prime minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohamed, who had earlier denounced Nik Aziz for invoking religion to win votes in Malaysia, has gone one step further, telling American Muslims in writing that voting against Bush will be "an act of ibadah," no less. Modern and contemporary history is replete with instances of rift, violence and bloodshed when state and politics are infused with religion. Western and central Europe, now an island of peace, stability, progress and prosperity in a sea of instability, poverty and violence, was a theatre for war and bloodshed in the name of religion only a few centuries ago. Heretics were burnt alive and battles raged to preserve religious purity. It is due to this historical experience that Europe is now averse to mixing religion and politics and so tolerant of religious differences as to be a magnet for those fleeing religious persecution in other countries. In India, fanatical Hindus destroyed a mosque to build a temple to their God Ram, unleashing such a torrent of discord and violence for the sake of religion as to shake the very foundations of the country. Among its immediate results has been a pogrom against Muslims in the state of Gujrat carried out with the abetment of its Hindu extremist chief minister. Its long-term results are dreadful even to contemplate. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989, the various Mujahideen factions in Afghanistan fought a civil war which, besides causing indescribable suffering to the Afghan people, reduced Kabul to rubble. The Taliban emerged from the debris promising peace and security, but instead delivered more misery in the name of religion. For over ten years between then and the American military intervention in 2001, it was a war of all against all, with every protagonist denouncing his adversary as the "enemy of Allah". Those who decry American intervention now, complained then about American apathy. Neighbouring Iran, under the tight grip of the Ayatollahs, is a volcano waiting to erupt. A major producer and exporter of oil and gas, its economy is struggling and society fraught with tensions. The elected president, Mohammad Khatami, exercises less authority than the mayor of a large Western city. The courts, the police and the army are controlled by a self-appointed Council of Guardians, an un-elected group of mullahs. Saudi Arabia, which officially makes no distinction between religion and government, is seething with discontent despite its immense oil wealth. One recalls that, in an act of rebellion that has never been fully explained, hundreds of disgruntled Saudis went so far as to seize the Holy Kaaba in 1979. It took several days and a commando operation for the authorities to regain control of Islam's holiest shrine. Muslims are yet to learn the lesson that Europeans learnt long ago, namely, that religion and politics don't mix well. Since the so-called Islamisation carried out under Zia ul Haq, Pakistan has steadily gone down the road of sectarian strife and violence. Daily Khabrain of October 30 carries a photo that speaks volumes about the state of the nation. It shows two women armed with Kalashnikov rifles standing guard, while men in their hundreds offer Friday prayers. Pass it off with a shrug of the shoulder; blame it on our enemies, if you will; but to ignore the message embedded in this image is to invite even greater disasters. The author, a former academic with a doctorate in modern history, is now a freelance writer and columnist ______ [3] The Daily Star November 04, 2004 Ahmadiyyas ask govt to protect mosques from bigots' capture Staff Correspondent Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, Bangladesh (AMJB) yesterday appealed to the government to protect its mosques and complexes across the country, as religious bigots threatened to capture three mosques in Dhaka, Narayanganj and Brahmanbaria tomorrow. It also urged the government to free four of their mosques in Brahmanbaria from anti-Ahmadiyya captors. The AMJB leaders reiterated their demand of rescinding a ban on the Ahmadiyya publications, which they said, encouraged the bigots to mount torture on the Ahmadiyya community across the country. "Return us the mosques we built with our hard-earned money and let us practice our religion in peace," Abdul Awal Khan Chowdhury, Ahmadiyya missionary, pleaded at a press conference in Dhaka yesterday. "We've already gone through a lot of torture, please stop it now," said the Ahmadiyya leader and alleged that two constituents of the ruling coalition are patronising and taking active part in the persecution of the Ahmadiyyas. The AMJB leaders pointed out that they cannot refute the bigots' propaganda and false accusations against the Ahmadiyyas because of the ban on their publications. International Khatme Nabuwat Movement, one of the several anti-Ahmadiyya groups, has announced to capture Ahmadiyya mosque in Tejgaon's Nakhalpara after the Juma prayers today. Operatives of International Tahaffuz-e-Khatme Nabuwat Committee Bangladesh, who razed a mosque, vandalised houses of and injured 11 Ahmadiyyas at Bhadughar in Brahmanbaria last Friday, threatened to burn the Ahmadiyyas should they gather to say their prayers at the mosque tomorrow. Fanatics of Khatme Nabuwat Committee Bangladesh and Aamra Dhakabashi, who failed to capture Narayanganj Missionpara Ahmadiyya Mosque in the wake of strong police watch and civil society resistance on October 8, have been learnt to have prepared to make another attempt on either tomorrow or last Friday of Ramadan. Encouraged by their success in pulling down signboards of three Ahmadiyya mosques in Chittagong, Khulna and Patuakhali, the anti-Ahmadiyya zealots planned to hang news signboards at Nakhalpara, Narayanganj and Brahmanbaria mosque, branding the mosques as 'Kadiani (Ahmadiyya) Place of Worship'. They cautioned people against getting deceived by saying prayers there. Hailing from Brahmanbaria since 1912, the Ahmadiyyas follow the same rituals as the Sunnis, apart from their belief that Imam Mahdi, the last messenger of Prophet Mohammed, has already arrived to uphold Islam as it was preached 1400 years ago. The Sunnis believe Mahdi has not arrived as yet. The anti-Ahmadiyya capmpaign gathered momentum across the country after mid-2003 with an attempt to capture Nakhalpara mosque on November 20 last year and the Islami Oikya Jote (Islamic Alliance) of ruling coalition government is alleged to be tacitly supporting it. ______ [4] Hindustan Times, November 3, 2004 PASS THE PIPE AROUND Balraj Puri Scholars of academic and research institutions of countries which have global concerns are engaged in the study of various aspects of the Kashmir problem. Such intellectual exercises and policy prescriptions of the experts can add to the confusion on the subject if they do not take adequate notice of some ground realities. Which bear recapitulation and emphasis even if some experts have done so. The first and foremost is the bewildering diversity of the state where multiple identities overlap and cut across one another. The second is the complexity of inter-relationship between its internal and external as also between the long-term and day-to-day problems. Ideally, solution of the Kashmir problem should satisfy India, Pakistan and the people of the state, though the third party has not been mentioned in the current dialogue between India and Pakistan. However, despite unusual cordiality between the peoples of the two countries and their governments and flexibility in their approach, no common ground is visible between the minimalist positions of the two governments and their official and non-official interlocutors. Nor is there any consensus among various political groups and ethnic communities within the state about its final status. Ideally again, wishes and interests of the people of the state should matter. But would a majoritarian view expressed at a particular point of time be called democratic and be binding on the future generations? The popular mood in J&K has not been constant. There is much evidence from Pakistan sources, based on admissions of its leaders, that from 1947 to 1953, it avoided plebiscite. In a meeting between the governors general of India and Pakistan on Nov. 1, 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah rejected Louis Mountbatten's offer of a plebiscite in Kashmir as "redundant and undesirable". Alistair Lamb, who did much scholarly work to champion the Pakistan case, gives the reasons for Pakistan's opposition to plebiscite. In his book, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, he writes, "When the memory of horrors of tribal invasion was fresh in the minds of the local population and the prestige of Sheikh Abdullah at its height, thoughtful Pakistani leaders were not convinced that the vote would go in their favour." He adds, "Had Pakistan lost, Azad Kashmir would have disappeared into Sheikh Abdullah's empire." Thus, there is no sanctity about a particular date when popular opinion should decide their fate irreversibly. Nor has popular opinion in different regions of the state been uniform. Further, as majoritarianism is a negation of democracy, many experts have argued about parcelling the state according to overwhelming popular and stable opinion. Various forms of division have been mooted by some think-tanks and official and non-official sources of America, in particular. The snag in such proposals is that none of them divides the state into homogeneous entities, for various types of identities cut across one another. It is possible that if passions are sufficiently aroused, the Muslims of the state may vote together. But as was evident from the example of Bangladesh, when passions cool down, their cultural and regional identities reassert themselves. Apart from the risk of repetition of the communal holocaust of 1947 in the event of a communal division of the state, the worst sufferers would be Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. They genuinely pride in being the oldest civilisation of the subcontinent dating back to 5,000 years. This unique civilisational experiment would, thus, come to an end if the state is divided on communal lines. Homogeneity isn't always a vir-tue. It kills dissent, the most vital test of a democracy, and most often leads to authoritarianism. Diversity, on the other hand, is being increasingly recognised as the most celebrated value. The real misfortune of J&K is that instead of recognising the diversities and reconciling their aspirations and interests, a uniform, over-centralised regime has been imposed upon it, which is the major source of tensions in the state and complications in the J&K problem. If diversity is an asset worth preserving and division is risky, the paramount need is to consider measures for evolving a harmonious and composite personality of the state. That alone can aspire for a stable and lasting status. It's true that outside influences pull ethnic or regional identities in divergent directions. But it's equally true that divergence within the state makes its component parts susceptible to outside influences. For instance, the Hindu Sabha of Jammu, which supported the Maharaja's aspiration to make the state independent in 1947 under the new garb of a Praja Parishad, started an agitation for 'full accession to India' and abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Some elements of the same party, the RSS, in particular, conducted a campaign for a separate Jammu state for the same purpose. But the BJP-RSS parivar was routed in the 2002 assembly poll when the Congress projected Ghulam Nabi Azad, a Jammu Muslim leader who also believed in the unity of the state, as the next chief minister. Thus, the urges of the people of the region could be channeled through different outlets. Likewise, much of the alienation of Kashmiri Muslims, who had warmly welcomed the Indian army earlier in 1947, was due to the provocation provided by Jammu's protests. The Ladakhi Buddhists' demand for a Union territory status, too, is a result of regional discontent. Instead of dealing with these problems in an ad hoc manner or blaming them on external factors, a radical overhaul of the system is required. Personally, I have been campaigning for a federal and decentralised set-up. My drafts on the subject can be modified or rejected. But the need for a system that ensures an equitable sense of participation from every community and region cannot be denied. It is the job not only of the mainstream parties but also of those who want an entirely different status for the state. Whether they want azadi or autonomy, they must have a blueprint of how that azadi or autonomy would be shared with communities and individuals. There are many countries which attained independence from foreign rule, but their citizens aren't free and are ruled by local tyrants. If Mahatma Gandhi could write Hind Swaraj, his concept of independent India, in 1907, 40 years before the country became free, the leaders of the azadi movement in Kashmir also owe it to its people to present before them a broad picture of what such a Kashmir would be. The state's internal system has to be changed regardless of its external relations or status. For good governance, democratic freedom and harmony within the state are the primary needs of its people that can't be deferred till the 'final solution of the Kashmir problem'. In fact, the final solution would become much easier if these primary needs are satisfied. For, that is a pre-condition for a dialogue between the peoples of the state about their fate, followed by dialogue across the LoC, and eventually with governments of the two countries. Whatever the final outcome, every step in this direction would contribute to better mutual understanding and goodwill which, in itself, is a big gain. If, meanwhile, the current cordial relations between the peoples and governments of India and Pakistan lead to some sort of South Asian identity, problems like Kashmir would be cut to size, matters of border would become less relevant, and it would not matter much which country one belongs to. The writer is a Jammu-based political activist ______ [5] [India's tattered Laisse-Faire Secularism can hardly be presented as an example or a model to the world. Responses and reactions to the below paper would be welcome --SACW ] o o o www.opendemocracy.net | 3 - 11 - 2004 INDIA'S MODEL: FAITH, SECULARISM AND DEMOCRACY Rajeev Bhargava Western variants of multiculturalism and secularism are being challenged by religious demands for public recognition of faith. Instead of reinventing the wheel, the world should learn from India, says Rajeev Bhargava. The reality of the "multicultural", describing the mere presence of many cultures within a society, has been present in India for several millennia. But "multiculturalism" is different: it is a special kind of relationship adopted by the state towards different cultural communities that fall within its sovereignty. In addition, it is also the official, doctrinal articulation of this stance, and, naturally, a term for theories of this doctrine, propounded and argued over, by academics and journalists. While India might be invoked descriptively in treatments of the epiphenomena of multiculture, it is rarely mentioned in most theoretical discussions of multiculturalism. This is testimony to the narrowness and parochialism of the dominant public cultures of the west, which still assumes that it houses the future, not the past. To deepen our understanding of multiculturalism, to understand its internal tensions and foresee its problems - and accordingly to refine and focus public policies - the world needs to look to and learn from India. The emergence of an "ism" Will Kymlicka, one of the foremost scholars of the subject, says that "multiculturalism" as a unique experiment started in Canada in 1971, and that it was followed in other countries such as Australia. In a sense he is correct: as official doctrine and theory, it certainly began life in Canada, and was later adopted in Australia, the United States and Britain. The reason why, as a doctrine, multiculturalism appears to have originated where it did was twofold. First, Canada was already a multinational state, one characterised by French-speaking Quebec's refusal to "integrate" with its English-speaking neighbours on the model of the United States. Second, Canada was, like the US, a country of immigration. Canadian governments, both fighting to avoid the break-up of their country and unable to insist that newcomers accept "melting-pot" integration into a powerful US-style nationality, embraced a policy that recognised the right of all its citizens to demand distinct kinds of identities. The unity of the country thus came to depend upon granting a constitutional right of difference to its own people within the framework of their nation-state. On this social and constitutional experience, which Canada and its western partners saw as unique, was built the doctrine of multiculturalism. Canada, as well as the US and Australia, were formed by immigration, and came as a result to understand it - in their bones, as it were - as a permanent fact of life. Most other countries, by contrast, experienced it as an exception, an intrusion, a crisis in their composition. But migration has gradually become a permanent fact of life everywhere, making the view of immigration as exceptional or problematic harder to sustain. The immense imbalances of wealth and population on a world scale, coupled with global technologies and transports, render mass immigration "normal". The urbanisation of humankind is accelerating; hundreds of millions of people are moving from rural areas to the cities, and many of these journeys are leading people to cross and settle beyond national borders. In almost every country, new minorities and diasporas - often intensely self-conscious and interconnected thanks to information technology - are becoming normal components of the population. It appears that nothing can stop the process of "people flow" (as it was innovatively described in the debate jointly hosted by Demos and openDemocracy). This highlights a sense in which Will Kymlicka is wrong to champion Canada as the homeland of multiculturalism. For as official policy and broader normative orientation based on social experience, its lineage is much older. It has been an integral feature of public debate in India for more than a century. Indeed, there is hardly a multicultural policy known to the world that, in one form or another, has not been examined, used or discarded in India. All societies, it might be said, are today becoming like India. What can they learn from it? Indian constitutional secularism Since 1950, when India's lengthy constitution was adopted, the country's official, constitutional discourse has attended to the range of issues and arguments generated by a multiply diverse society. They include the cultural rights of minorities; the funding of minority educational institutions; the cultural rights of indigenous peoples; linguistic rights; the self-government rights of culturally distinct groups; asymmetrical federalism; legal pluralism; affirmative action for marginalised groups. Moreover, several concerns have long been part of official state policy: public holidays that bestow official recognition to minority religions; flexible dress codes; a sensitivity in history- and literature-teaching to the cultures and traditions of minorities; and government funding of especially significant religious practices. But perhaps the most important lesson India has for debate over and policies towards "multiculturalism" is the need to rethink and reform another "ism"- secularism. This term, originally non-Indian, is now part of the everyday vocabulary of Indian politics and society in a way that others could embrace. The introduction of secularism into a discussion of multiculturalism should be no surprise. Secularism defines itself in relation to religion; and always, everywhere, even when they are understood to be conceptually separate, cultures and religions remain deeply intertwined. This is even more so in cases where the very distinction between religion and culture is hard to draw. Is the hijab, for a Muslim, a cultural or a religious object? Is marriage among Muslims a cultural or a religious event? Is the identity of a Hindu or a Jew cultural or religious? To think about multiculturalism, then, is to be confronted with the (public, often conflictual) presence of multiple religions - something that has been a constitutive feature of social reality on the subcontinent. Since secularism defines itself in relation to religion, it must also see itself in relation to multiple religions. This is primarily how the term secularism works on the subcontinent (when indeed it is allowed to do any work at all!). The return of religion This multi-religious reality of the subcontinent should become the starting-point for discussions of western secularism, which is now being challenged by three distinct processes. First, it is now evident that a central aspect of the classic or western secularisation thesis is deeply mistaken. The projected privatisation of religion mandated by classic notions of modernisation has, even in western societies, failed to occur. Instead, two developments are visible: the continued public presence of religion, and what Jose Casanova calls the "de-privatisation" of religions that formerly had retreated from the public sphere. (Two examples of the latter are the militant role of evangelical and "born-again" Christianity in the United States and the global impact of the policies of the Roman Catholic Church.) Second, migration from former colonies and an intensified globalisation has thrown together on western soil pre-Christian faiths, Christianity and Islam. The public spaces of western societies are reappropriated by people of one religion and its various denominations, and increasingly claimed also by people adhering to several other religions; the accumulative result is a deep, unprecedented religious diversity. As a result, the weak but definite public monopoly of single religions is being challenged by the very norms that govern these societies. Third, the encounter between these multiple religions is not fully dialogic; rather, it generates mutual suspicion, distrust, hostility and conflict. To some extent, this too is a "normal" reaction to a close encounter with the unfamiliar; and due in part also to the different understandings of individual and social selves embodied in the divergent cumulative traditions of each of these religions. But there is also something troubling about the exclusions that mark the self-understanding of religions themselves, about their inability to form more benign and tolerant understandings of those outside their fold. The bigotry on one side is matched on the other by a demonisation that relentlessly legitimises denial of the other religion's right to an equal space in public life. The same point can be put another way. Different forms of dance or dress can have deep and abiding identity-significance for people, yet a classical liberalism that has been reshaped by the spectacle of the market and fashion can also easily incorporate them into a market-driven perspective. When, however, culture is organised by religion rather than politics, it is more usually accompanied by lasting forms of exclusion, bans and power-systems (often involving unaccountable rule by old men) as well as practices and procedures which limit freedom and have undemocratic consequences. This raises the question: is western secularism equipped to deal with the new reality of multiple religions in public life or with the social tensions this engenders? The problem of secularism The dominant self-understanding of western secularism, somewhat encrusted into formula, is that it is a universal doctrine requiring the strict separation of church and state, religion and politics, for the sake of individual liberty and equality (including religious liberty and equality). The social context that gave this self-understanding urgency and significance was the fundamental problem faced by modernising western societies: the tyranny, oppression and sectarianism of the church and the two threats to liberty it posed - to religious liberty conceived individualistically (the liberty of an individual to seek his own personal way to God, an individual's freedom of conscience), and to liberty more generally as (ultimately) the foundation of common citizenship. To overcome this problem, modernising western societies needed to create or strengthen an alternative centre of public power completely separate from the church. The rigidity of the demand here is unmistakable - mutual exclusion (a wall , as Thomas Jefferson famously put it) between the two relevant institutions, one intrinsically and solely public and the other expected to retreat into the private domain and remain there. The individualist underpinnings of this view are fully evident. This classic, western conception of secularism was designed to solve the internal problem of a single religion with different heresies - Christianity. It also appeared to rest on an active hostility to the public role of religion and an obligatory, sometimes respectful indifference to whatever religion does within its own internal, privatedomain. As long as it is private, the state is not meant to interfere. It is now increasingly clear that this form of western secularism has persistent difficulties in seeking to cope with community-oriented religions that demand a public presence, particularly when they begin to multiply in society. This individualistic, inward-looking secularism is already proving vulnerable to crisis after crisis. The rigid response of the French republican state to the hijab issue, and the more ambiguous response of the German state to the demand by Turkish Muslims for the public funding of their educational institutions, may be only harbingers of clashes to come. Which way will these western societies go? Will they become even more dogmatic in their assertions about their strict-separation secularism; or, in view of changed circumstances, will they abandon it in favour of an unashamed embrace of their majoritarian religious character founded on an official establishment? Or could they not work out a better form of secularism which addresses these new demands without giving up the values for which the original was devised? Most important of all, is it not worth asking if such an alternative exists already? I think it does - a conception not available as a doctrine or a theory but worked out in the subcontinent and available loosely in the best moments of inter-communal practice in India; in the country's constitution appropriately interpreted; and in the scattered writings of some of its best political actors. The Indian model Six features of the Indian model are striking and relevant to wider discussion. First, multiple religions are not extras, added on as an afterthought but present at its starting-point, as part of its foundation. Second, it is not entirely averse to the public character of religions. Although the state is not identified with a particular religion or with religion more generally (there is no establishment of religion), there is official and therefore public recognition granted to religious communities. Third, it has a commitment to multiple values - liberty or equality, not conceived narrowly but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities and equality of status in society, as well as other more basic values such as peace and toleration between communities. This model is acutely sensitive to the potential within religions to sanction violence. Fourth, it does not erect a wall of separation between state and religion. There are boundaries, of course, but they are porous. This allows the state to intervene in religions, to help or hinder them. This involves multiple roles: granting aid to educational institutions of religious communities on a non-preferential basis; or interfering in socio-religious institutions that deny equal dignity and status to members of their own religion or to those of others (for example, the ban on untouchability and the obligation to allow everyone, irrespective of their caste, to enter Hindu temples, and potentially to correct gender inequalities), on the basis of a more sensible understanding of equal concern and respect for all individuals and groups. In short, it interprets separation to mean not strict exclusion or strict neutrality but rather what I call principled distance. Fifth, this model shows that we do not have to choose between active hostility or passive indifference, or between disrespectful hostility or respectful indifference. We can have the necessary hostility as long as there is also active respect: the state may intervene to inhibit some practices, so long as it shows respect for the religious community and it does so by publicly lending support to it in some other way. Sixth, by not fixing its commitment from the start exclusively to individual or community values or marking rigid boundaries between the public and private, India's constitutional secularism allows decisions on these matters to be taken within the open dynamics of democratic politics - albeit with the basic constraints such as abnegation of violence and protection of basic human rights, including the right not to be disenfranchised. A lesson in democracy This commitment to multiple values and principled distance means that the state tries to balance different, ambiguous but equally important values. This makes its secular ideal more like an ethically sensitive, politically negotiated arrangement (which it really is), rather than a scientific doctrine conjured by ideologues and merely implemented by political agents. A somewhat forced, formulaic articulation of Indian secularism goes something like this. The state must keep a principled distance from all public or private, individual-oriented or community-oriented religious institutions for the sake of the equally significant (and sometimes conflicting) values of peace, this-worldly goods, dignity, liberty and equality (in all its complicated individualistic or non-individualistic versions). Some readers may find in this condensed version an irritatingly complicated collage and yearn for the elegance, economy and tidiness of western secularism. But, alas, no workable constitution will generate the geometrical beauty of a social-scientific theory or a chemical formula. The ambiguity and flexibility of the conception of secularism developed by India is not a weakness but in fact the strength of an inclusive and complex political ideal. Discerning students of western secularism may now begin to find something familiar in this ideal. But then, Indian secularism has not dropped fully formed from the sky. It shares a history with the west. In part, it has learnt from and built on it. But is it not time to give something in return? What better way than to do this than by showing that Indian secularism is a route to retrieving the rich history of western secularism - forgotten, underemphasised, or frequently obscured by the formula of strict separation and by many of its current articulations! For the image of western secularism I outlined above is just one of its variants, what can be called the church-state model. Another equally interesting version that deepens the idea of western secularism flows from the religious wars in Europe and can be called the religious-strife model. Yet, in its attempt to tackle the deep diversity of religious traditions, and in its ethically sensitive flexibility, there is something unparalleled in the Indian experiment - something different from each of the two versions. If so, western societies can find reflected in it not only a compressed version of their own history but also a vision of their future. But it might be objected: look at the state of the subcontinent! Look at India! How deeply divided it remains! How can success be claimed for the Indian version of secularism? I do not wish to underestimate the force of this objection. The secular ideal in India is in periodic crisis and is deeply contested. Besides, at the best of times, it generates as many problems as it solves. But it should not be forgotten either that a secular state was set up in India despite the massacre and displacement of millions of people on ethno-religious grounds. It has survived in a continuing context in which ethnic nationalism remains dominant throughout the world. As different religious cultures claim their place in societies across the world, it may be India's development of secularism that offers the most peaceful, freedom-sensitive and democratic way forward. At any rate, why should the fate of ideal conceptions with trans-cultural potential be decided purely on the basis of what happens to them in their place of origin? A final point - or rather a question. India in May 2004 witnessed an election in which the Hindu right was democratically ousted. At least part of the credit for this goes to the way the secular constitution helped transform the caste system from being an integral part of a sacral, hierarchical order to a political and associative formation tied to secular interests. As "lower castes" fight to get their share of power, wealth and dignity, the friction created in this struggle thwarts the majoritarian ambitions of the dominant religious group. Will the American constitution play a similar role in removing the vastly more dangerous takeover of the state by the Christian right? Or have the privatising ambitions of the "wall of separation" model backfired, leaving Americans exposed to yet another term of the same devils? ______ [6] Upcoming Events: (i) SANSAD completes 12 years Twelve years of struggles for secularism, democracy, social justice, economic wellbeing, peace in the sub-continent, friendship between the peoples and countries of South Asia Twelve years of defending the rights of women, dalits, workers, peasants, religious and other minorities Twelve years of building bridges between diverse sections of South Asian Diaspora living in the Vancouver area And twelve years of solidarity with the people of the world fighting colonialism, occupations, aggressive wars and economic domination ************ Come and join us for an evening of togetherness To celebrate our past, to consolidate our present, and to resolve for our future Saturday, November 6, 2004, 6 p.m. India Abroad Restaurant 3075 Kingsway (one block east of Rupert), Vancouver [Canada] poetry, songs, a full-course gourmet Indian dinner, and a no-host bar Key-note Speaker: Mr. Harsh Mander from India Harsh Mander's name should be familiar to anyone who has closely followed the political scene of India, especially after the Gujarat genocide of 2002. As a senior IAS Officer (Civil Servant), he witnessed the carnage carried out with the full support of the state machinery. He resigned from his coveted post, and became an activist, a campaigner, for saving the democratic and secular fabric of the country. He is currently the National Director of ActionAid India. He has authored numerous articles and two books: Cry My Beloved Country (Rainbow Publishers) and Unheard Voices: Stories of Forgotten Lives (Penguin). He was the recipient of M A. Thomas National Human Rights Award in 2002. SOUTH ASIAN NETWORK FOR SECULARISM AND DEMOCRACY phone: 604-420-2972, fax: 604-420-2970, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED], website: www.sansad.org o o o o (ii) IAAC presents the Fourth Indian Diaspora Film Festival - Nov 4-7, 2004 Buy tickets now: GO TO WWW.SMARTTIX.COM OR CALL 212 868 4444 Use discount code IAAC12 for $12 tickets All programs have post-screening Q&A with filmmakers and cast. Including but not limited to Shabana Azmi and Mira Nair. For more details visit: www.iaac.us _____________________________________________________________________ Thursday, November 4 - Walter Reade Theatre 7 pm BRIDE AND PREJUDICE by Gurinder Chadha. Starring: Aishwarya Rai, Martin Henderson, Daniel Gilles, For tickets to the Pre-screening cocktail, screening, POst-screeening Q&A with Anupam Kher and Richard Pena call 212-529-2347. Tickets -$100, very few remaining. ______________________________________________________________________ Friday, November 5 Courthouse Theatre 5pm. MORNING RAGA by Mahesh Dattani, Starring: Mahesh Dattani, Shabana Azmi, Prakash Rao, Perizaad Zorabian, Lillete Dubey 7.30pm INDIAN COWBOY by Nikhil Kamkolkar Starring: Nikhil Kamkolkar, Sheetal Sheth, Carla Borelli, Jonathan Sale, Deep Katdare, 9.30pm SAU JHOOTH, EK SACH by Bappaditya Roy Starring: Mammootty, Vikram Gokhle, Lillette Dubey, ______________________________________________________________________ Friday, November 5 - Maya Deren Theatre Shorts Prog 1: 5 PM SANGAM, by Prashant Bhargava BAREFEET by Sonali Gulati SOMETHING BETWEEN HER HANDS by Sonya Shah KARMA by Abhay Chopra EQUATION by Anuj Majumdar Shorts Prog 2: 7pm OLIVIA’S PUZZLE by Jason DaSilva THIS MOMENT by Directed/Written by Leena Pendharkar HOMECOMING by Nikhil Jayaram MIDNIGHT FEAST by Kristine Landon-Smith ROOM FOR ONE by Ambika Samarthya PASSION by Monica Aswani. FALLEN by Sonejuhi Sinha Documentary Prog. 1: 9.30 pm DANCING ON MOTHER EARTH by Jim Virga ______________________________________________________________________ Saturday, November 6, Courthouse Theatre 12 noon BANDHAK by Hyder Bilgrami Starring: Farokh Daruwala, Aasha Patel, Murtuza Sabir, Daman,Arora, Manoj Shinde, Meenu Mangal, Ramzan Lakhani 3pm SALAAM BOMBAY by Mira Nair Starring: Shafiq Syed, Hansa Vithal, Chanda Sharma, Nana Patekar, Aneeta Kanwar, Raghubir Yadav 6 pm JANE AUSTEN IN MANHATTAN by Merchant-Ivory Starring: Anne Baxter, Robert Powell, Michael Wagner, Tim Choate, John Guerrasio, Katrina Hodiak, Kurt Johnson, Sean Young 9 pm 19 REVOLUTIONS by Sridhar Reddy Starring: Tarun Arora, Sriya Reddy, Vishwaa, Gulshan Grover ______________________________________________________________________ Saturday, November 6, Maya Deren Theatre Documentary Prog 2: 1pm TAKE ME TO THE RIVER by Kenneth Eng Documentary Prog 3: 3 pm REINVENTING THE TALIBAN by Sharmeen Obaid/Ed Robbins Documentary Prog 4: 6pm DISCORDIA by Ben Addelman and Samir Mallal. Documentary Prog 5: 9pm ROCKSTAR AND THE MULLAH by Ruhi Hamid GHOOM TANA by Saquib Malik Starring: Nandita Das,Salman Ahmad and special voiceover by Naseeruddin Shah. ______________________________________________________________________ Sunday, November 7 - Courthouse Theatre 1pm SACRIFICE, 2004 by Frankie Sooknanan Starring: Frankie Sooknanan, DebbieAnn Pustam, Mahadeo Shivraj, Alisha Persaud 3pm SUNDAY AFTERNOON by Amit Dutt Starring: Sudipta Chakraborty, Bhaswar Chatterjee, Arun Mukherjee, Gita Dey, Abir Chatterjee, Rumki Chatterjee, Mou Bhattacharya 6pm BOMB THE SYSTEM by Adam Bhala Lough Starring: Mark Webber, Jaclyn DeSantis, Gano Grills, Jade Yorker, Al Sapienza ________________________________________________________________________ Sunday, November 7 - Maya Deren Theatre Shorts Prog 3: 1 pm SCULPTURE 1 by Gitanjali Kapila THE SEINE by Mahesh Umasankar Starring: Mark D. Hines, Ram Padmanabhan, Michaela Greeley, David Mesloh, Reginald Carbin Shorts Prog. 4: 3 pm BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN HOSTESS by Shilpa Sudhankar Starring: Shilpa Sudhankar, Ritah Parrish, David Burnett, Judith M. Ford, Matt Moris, EVERYTHING by Harjant Gill PARALLEL CINEMA by Jaideep Punjabi Starring Devika Shahani Punjabi, Ash Chandler, Krishnan Unnikrishnan WHOSE CHILDREN ARE THESE? by Theresa Thanjan. Starring: Navila Ali, Mohammad Hussain, Hager Youssef IN WHOSE NAME? by Nandini Sikand 6 pm IN THE NAME OF BUDDHA by Rajesh Takshiva Starring: Shju, Lal, Sonia _______________________________________________________________________ Pooja Kohli Festival Director Indo-American Arts Council, Inc. The 4th Annual IAAC Film Festival: Indian Diaspora 118 East 25th Street, 3rd Floor New York, NY 10010 Ph: 212-529-2347 Fax: 212-477-4106 Web: www.iaac.us _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/ Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on matters of peace and democratisation in South Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit citizens wire service run since 1998 by South Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/ SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/ Sister initiatives : South Asia Counter Information Project : snipurl.com/sacip South Asians Against Nukes: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org Communalism Watch: communalism.blogspot.com/ DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/act/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! 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