Mike, But interestingly while you deny that the given conception of intelligence
is rational and deterministic.. you then proceed to argue rationally and deterministically.
Universal intelligence is not based on a definition of what rationality is. It is based on the idea of achievement. I believe that if you start to behave irrationally (by any reasonable definition of the word) then your ability to achieve goals will go down and thus so will your universal intelligence. that actually you DON'T usually know what you desire. You have conflicting
desires and goals. [Just how much do you want sex right now? Can you produce a computable function for your desire?]
Not quite. Universal intelligence does not require that you personally can define your, or some other system's, goal. It just requires that the goal is well defined in the sense that a clear definition could be written down, even if you don't know what that would look like. If you want intelligence to include undefinable goals in the above weaker sense then you have this problem: "Machine C is not intelligent because it cannot do X, where X is something that cannot be defined." I guess that this isn't a road you want to take as I presume that you think that machine intelligence is possible. And you have to commit yourself at a given point, but that and your
priorities can change the next minute.
A changing goal is still a goal, and as such is already taken care of by the universal intelligence measure. And vis-a-vis universal intelligence, I'll go with Ben
"According to Ben Goertzel, Ph. D, "Since universal intelligence is only definable up to an arbitrary constant, it's of at best ~heuristic~ value in thinking about the constructure of real AI systems. In reality, different universally intelligent modules may be practically applicable to different types of problems." [8] <http://www.sl4.org/archive/0104/1137.html>"
Ben's comment is about AIXI, so I'll change to that for a moment. I'm going to have to be a bit more technical here. I think the compiler constant issue with Kolmogorov complexity is in some cases important, and in others it is not. In the case of Solomonoff's continuous universal prior (see my Scholarpedia article on algorithmic probability theory for details) the measure converges to the true measure very quickly for any reasonable choice of reference machine. With different choices of reference machine the compiler constant may mean that the system doesn't converge for a few more bytes of input. This isn't an issue for an AGI system that will be processing huge amounts of data over time. The optimality of its behaviour in the first hundred bytes of its existence really doesn't matter. Even incomputable super AIs go through an infantile stage, albeit a very short one. You seem to want to pin AG intelligence down precisely, I want to be more
pluralistic - and recognize that uncertainty and conflict are fundamental to its operation.
Yes, I would like to pin intelligence down as precisely as possible. I think that if somebody could do this it would be a great step forward. I believe that issues of definition and measurement are the bedrock of good science. Cheers Shane ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=231415&user_secret=fabd7936
