On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Mike Hearn <m...@plan99.net> wrote: > It absolutely is! > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=60937.0
May I direct your attention to the third post in that thread? Luke attempting to ret-con the enforcement flag into a vote didn't make it one, and certantly wouldn't make it a fair, just, or sane method of one. And so much for the effectiveness— you didn't implement it for years even after it was deployed. And yes, you can take any decision system and draw comparisons to voting and call it a vote but that doesn't mean is serves the same role or was intended for that purpose. > No, coinbases are deletable. If some miners fork the chain and build a > longer one, the others will all switch to it and the coinbases blocks they Yes, you can reorg out the blocks and actually remove them, but I understood that you were _not_ proposing that quite specifically. But instead proposed without reorging taking txouts that were previously assigned to one party and simply assigning them to others. > I think the root of this disagreement is whether the block chain algorithm > left by Satoshi is somehow immutable and itself the end, or whether it's (as > I see it) just a means to an end and therefore an algorithm that can be > tweaked and improved, to get us closer to the goal. I don't think thats the root of the the disagreement at all. I think all sorts of changes are interesting, especially ones that increase flexibility or fix bugs but less so ones that would impose significant changes on parties without their consent especially things that look like taking someone's coins and assigning them to someone else. I think the root is that you believe that the miners are, should be, or even could be trustworthy in ways that I do not, and as a result you expect to be able to extract the performance of a trusted centralized system out of them that I do not. Bitcoin is a system where the incentives are well enough aligned that you appear to only need a small amount of altruism to make it reliable. ... and even summoning that altruism is a challenge— as miners hand over control of their hash-power to centralized pools (some known to have behaved poorly in the past), etc. I would like that performance if it came at no cost: But proposals that miners conspiring to blacklist transactions/blocks produced by other people is something with a risk of a worse violation of the system's promises than some disagreement of the ordering of unconfirmed transactions. Pretty much immediately after your post Peter Todd— in his trouble making manner— went and posted on reddit proposing the mechanism be used to claw back mining income from a hardware vendor accused of violating its agreements on the amount of self mining / mining on customers hardware. While Peter's suggestion was no doubt intentionally trouble making— I'm not clear on where the line is here: Harm from reordering pretty much non-existent currently and is highly speculative, while the harm to miners by hardware vendors who've promised to not compete with their own customers or use their equipment is not at all speculative and very salient to miners. This especially in light of the fact that the system already has an equitable method to decide what order transactions should be in... but instead you propose an additional complex heuristic system where based on some unspecified collusion some majority of miners take a minorities coins and assign them to themselves. Unlike reorginization this form of wealth transferal has no collateral damage meaning that a majority cabal can use it to deprive a minority outsider of some or all income without risking disrupting the network, it would also lay the groundwork for additional forms of censorship which I believe would be at odds with the purpose and architecture of the system... and, as I noted above, it wouldn't actually prevent theft, it would just mean that no single block could make its theft services available to all comers (or even any of the public at all). The simple mechenism of allowing only only a small number of paid reordering transactions per block would prevent forming a quorum on the decision to revoke the coinbase, and you'd even get additional income from the probe transactions without even helping any real double spends at all. The incentives seem very hard to analyze. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Start Your Social Network Today - Download eXo Platform Build your Enterprise Intranet with eXo Platform Software Java Based Open Source Intranet - Social, Extensible, Cloud Ready Get Started Now And Turn Your Intranet Into A Collaboration Platform http://p.sf.net/sfu/ExoPlatform _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
