Class:          Bypassing Intended Security Controls

CVE:            <NA>

Remote:         Yes 

Local:  Yes 

Published:      August 11, 2010

Timeline:       Submission to MITRE: August 11, 2010

Credit:         Jeromie Jackson CISSP, CISM

                COBIT & ITIL Certified

                President- San Diego Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP)

                Vice President- San Diego Information Audit & Control 
Association (ISACA)

                SANS Mentor

                LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/securityassessment

                Blog: www.JeromieJackson.com

                Twitter: www.twitter.com/Security_Sifu

                Cell: 832-378-RISK (7475)



Validated Vulnerable:   

                All versions prior to 12/07/2010



Discussion: 

Palo Alto Networks firewall claims it can “identify and control applications 
regardless of port, protocol, encryption, or evasive tactic.”  Due to the need 
for organizations to support protocols and applications not yet categorized by 
Palo Alto there is an underlying logic issue.  Unless a company is willing to 
disable all services except for those well-known by the Palo Alto firewall risk 
will be constantly present.  I spent a couple hours testing the Palo Alto 
Network firewall to see if I could puncture the firewall and achieve remote 
command-and-control.  



The Palo Alto Networks firewall uses “Application Visibility” and “Application 
Control”  functions in order to identify services and apply controls across the 
firewall segments.  An attacker can leverage a phishing scam or a vulnerabile 
online forum to distribute a remote command-and-control payload to a machine 
behind the firewall.  The attacked machine will then initiate an outbound 
command-and-control connection.  Palo Alto Networks Firewall simply identifies 
it as “Unknown TCP.”  





Exploit: 



First, I thought about using HTTP to traverse the firewall and remotely control 
a device behind the firewall.  I successfully created a command-and-control 
session which the firewall identified as generic HTTP traffic.  I leveraged the 
following script from The Hacker's Choice (THC):



http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/groups/thc/rwwwshell-1.6.perl





Second, I generated a Metasploit reverse_tcp command-and-control payload.  I 
uploaded the payload to a website, generated a phishing email, and had the 
victim machine go to a malicious URL.  Command-and-Control was achieved and the 
firewall simply characterized it as “Unknown TCP”  traffic.  Metasploit has the 
ability to encode the payloads in a plethora of ways- Palo Alto Networks will 
need to address all potential encodings in order to mitigate the risk.





I worked with the vendor for several months and they recently came out with a 
signature update that will identify Metasploit.  Due to evasion techniques such 
as encoding, payload packing, and other ways to evade filters I believe the 
signatures may not catch all payloads generated by Metasploit.  I will be doing 
a little more work in the near future to run a small battery of tests to 
evaluate the detection rates.  



Below are the details pertaining to the update.  I find it odd it was marked as 
a medium severity.  Having these Metasploit remote command-and-control sessions 
enabled me to gain access to password hashes, install keyloggers, start remote 
desktop VNC sessions, hide my process, and to pivot off the attacked machine to 
gain further access into the environment.



Vulnerability Signatures Summary

Severity

ID

Attack Name

CVE ID

Vendor ID

Default Action

medium

33515

Metasploit Meterpreter Connection Attempt





alert

medium

33516

Metasploit Meterpreter Connection Attempt





alert

high

33616

IAX2 Asterisk Remote Denial of Service

CVE-2007-3763



alert

high

33446

Struts2 and XWork remote command execution Vulnerability

CVE-2010-1870



alert

critical

33605

Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability

CVE-2008-0118

MS08-016

alert

high

33606

Microsoft Word Crafted SmartTag Record Code Execution Vulnerability

CVE-2008-2244

MS08-042

alert

critical

33607

Microsoft Excel Record Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

CVE-2008-3006

MS08-043

alert

critical

33608

Microsoft PowerPoint Picture Index Variant Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

CVE-2008-0121

MS08-051

alert

critical

33609

Microsoft PowerPoint List Value Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

CVE-2008-1455

MS08-051

alert

medium

33621

Oracle Web Cache Admin Module Denial of Service Vulnerability

CVE-2002-0386



alert

high

33627

Adobe Flash Player loadBitmap Memory Corruption Vulnerability

cve-2010-3648

APSB10-26

alert



Solution: 

A patch will be required from the vendor.  In order for the vendor to meet its 
claims of “identifying and controlling applications regardless of port, 
protocol, encryption, or evasion techniques,” it will be required to gather 
signatures from at minimum the most prevalent command-and-control tools 
available in the wild and create identification techniques to mitigate the 
risk.  Users could block all non-identified application traffic passing through 
the firewall to mitigate the risk, however this is generally not a viable 
option.  While their technology is proving to be a strong firewall in the 
market the marketing statements are a bit lofty. 

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