http://www.thejakartapost.com/detaileditorial.asp?fileid=20070615.E02&irec=1
No time to sleep on JI Noor Huda Ismail, Jakarta Needless to say, the arrest of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) top operative Abu Dujana is of great significance to Indonesia's fight against terror. Interviews with reformed JI leader Nasir Abbas suggest that Dujana is one of the most important figures within the Southeast Asian terror network and his arrest is seen as a major blow for them. "The JI mainstream is now finished," Abbas said recently. "He was the last in the line", although he warned that JI splinter groups could still launch attacks. Dujana knows how JI is structured, the people who form its backbone and most importantly he knows how the organization is bankrolled. Prior to his arrest, Dujana was a young, respected leader of JI. In the organization, Dujana sat in Markazi or JI's central board. He was one of several leaders who held control of JI for the last three years, in his case since April 2004. Born in West Java 38 years ago, Dujana speaks Arabic and English fluently. The light-skinned man is the graduate of a mujahiddin camp in Afghanistan, where he met al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Dujana trained in Afghanistan under Abbas, who says he was a brilliant and hard-working student, who excelled in assembling explosives. Abbas says Dujana's initial position was as secretary to JI's alleged spiritual leader or amir, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. When Ba'asyir was arrested, Dujana became secretary to Abu Rusdan, who replaced Ba'asyir as amir. But when Rusdan was captured and later imprisoned, the amir position was left vacant. Dujana then indirectly assumed the amir's duties. Prior to the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta on Aug. 5, 2003, Abbas says, now number-one most wanted fugitive Noordin M. Top appeared before Dujana. Abbas did not say whether Noordin's appearance was to ask for Dujana's blessing. Police believe that Dujana also knows JI's plans for the future and the details of its international network. The capture of the JI leader, however, does not mean the threat of terrorist attacks in Indonesia is over. We do know that Indonesia's two most wanted jihadis -- Dulmatin, an electronics specialist known for his bomb-making expertise, and Umar Patek, whose role has been focused on recruitment and training -- are both JI operatives who remain at large and have sought refuge with Abu Sayyaf fighters. More importantly, Noordin, who masterminded attacks including the Bali bombing in 2002, is still at large. Abbas says Noordin has broken away from JI and now leads his own splinter group. Noordin has narrowly eluded police on several occasions. He is reported to be planning new attacks, but it's unclear whether he will again target foreigners. It is important to underline that JI is a social and economic organization. Therefore, it is resilient enough to withstand the arrest of a small number of individuals because its ideological roots run deep in Indonesia. Many of these individuals are most likely living in one place, involved in local religious studies. The new challenge, perhaps the most difficult one yet, is to combat the ideological recruitment process before any crime is committed. Still fresh in our memory is the recording Noordin made before the second Bali blast in October 2005, in which he referred to the attack as a "martyrdom operation". This video testament was part of Noordin's strategy to woo more recruits and expand support. They may not be JI members through induction, and never use the name of JI either, but they share the ideology. Another example is the distribution of many books written by jihadists while inside jail. The most well known one is a book written by Imam Samudra titled I am against terrorists. The book has been well received among militants. Achmad Michdan, Samudra's attorney who wrote the preface, said thousands of copies of the book had been issued in at least seven cities across Java and Sumatra. Thus, to prevent further attacks, we need to understand the group's ideology in addition to the psychological and cultural relationships which have attracted dozens, if not hundreds, of ordinary people to the jihadi organization. This call for understanding demands more patience and there is no magic bullet to solve this problem. This awareness should be built because the cost of ignorance is too severe to consider. Conflicts such as those that occurred in Ambon and Poso also serve as important events for jihadis to build relationships. When isolated individually, a jihadi does not have connections to people who can transform their intense hatred into acts of terrorism. Therefore, it is crucial for the government and beyond to address the root causes of these existing conflicts. It is also crucial to understand the nature of their leaders' movements and the areas in which they operate so that one can prevent the recruitment of new members eager to participate in the deadly operations. The writer is a security consultant who earned a master's in international security studies at St. Andrews University. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
