Cryptography-Digest Digest #486, Volume #11 Tue, 4 Apr 00 15:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Examples of topology related to crypto ? ("Charles H. Giffen")
Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: md5 spoofing ("Keith Monahan")
Re: The lightest side of cryptology ("Keith Monahan")
Re: PGP webmail (Paul Koning)
Re: GSM A5/1 Encryption (Paul Koning)
Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length? (Darren New)
ISO articles on sieving hardware (Francois Grieu)
Re: RNG based on primitive multiplicative generator. (Mike Rosing)
Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Crypto API for C (Mike Rosing)
Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
DDJ Crypto cdrom (first edition) (jean-baptiste.marchand)
Re: Q: Entropy (John Savard)
Re: Cryptoanalysis Algorithms (Mike Rosing)
Re: Massey-Omura protocol & ECC (Mike Rosing)
Re: Hysteresis? (wtshaw)
Re: Hysteresis? ("Scotty")
Re: summing hashes is not safe? (Bryan Olson)
Re: NSA (JimD)
Re: new Echelon article (JimD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Charles H. Giffen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Examples of topology related to crypto ?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 12:28:22 -0400
Klaus Pommerening wrote:
>
> In <8c5l6h$7lu$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > ..., refers to a seemingly interesting theorem by
> > Beutelspacher & Rosenbaum which I have never heard of:
> > http://www.mirageonline.it/zanella/
> >
> I once heard a talk by Stephan Schmidt of AT&T research where
> he used the Zariski topology of schemes over finite rings for
> modelling complex secret sharing schemes. But this is also
> rather finite geometry and combinatorics, as is Beutelspacher's
> work.
>
> After all, topology is mainly about nondiscrete phenomena
> whereas cryptology is a `discrete' subject. Therefore
> substantial applications of topology to cryptology seem
> rather unlikely.
> --
> Klaus Pommerening [http://www.Uni-Mainz.DE/~pommeren/]
> Institut fuer Medizinische Statistik und Dokumentation
> der Johannes-Gutenberg-Universitaet, D-55101 Mainz, Germany
Perhaps you are discounting what is known as "combinatorial
topology" -- which indeed can deal with discrete phenomena.
You might also contemplate the category of finite topological
spaces: for any ordinary topological space X which is
homotopy equivalent to a finite CW (or simplicial) complex,
there is a finite space F and a weak homotopy equivalence
f : X -> F.
--Chuck Giffen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 16:25:45 GMT
Hi Matt,
Do you think that you really have more info with (or is it easier to
decrypt)
<lastname>t§é"cdèe"rtdfè§</lastname>
than with
vyuè!"gfè!dge!vdjjbdjbzeç"yvé"è!& ???
Patrice Krakow
----
In article <O8oG4.36889$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Two party exchange a message (XML). I want a 3rd party VALIDATE
> > the message structure (with a DTD) without know the message content.
> > I can realize this by only encrypted the content.
>
> I may be overly dense this morning but I can't think of any way to
> validate a docuent instance without the tags. Are you planing on
> encrypting only the data between them?
>
> If so, then yes, this is _alot_ weaker than encrypting the longer
> document. Not because the strings are shorter, but because you have
> access to so much info about the structure of the plaintext.
>
> --
> Matt Gauthier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Keith Monahan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: md5 spoofing
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 16:26:12 GMT
Hi Jeff,
I have actually seen this method done. I've seen everything from
md5sum using a hidden file with stored filenames & precomputed
hashes to lines inside md5sum which do if argv[1] == login, printf
correctsum. I have heard rumors about people patching
the shared math libraries to fix the output -- but I have never
confirmed that.
I've played with programs like that before, but Im afraid I don't
have a copy of them -- they were so trivial to reproduce, it wasn't
worth the storage space :)
Keith
P.S. MD5SUM and hashes of important binaries should be stored
offline, on read-only media.
Jeff Sutch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I had put that very badly. What I had intended to get across was: 'is
> there a way to spoof the unique hashed checksum generated by md5sum (or
> others) my modifying the binary itself, making it infeasable to use
> md5sum as a test for unauthorized changes?".
> Another question along the same line would be, has anyone seen a hacked
> version of md5sum in the wild that recognizes a similarly patched binary
> to give a false answer when used? Say a binary that will look for an
> embedded string within a file (the true md5 hash), and if it doesn't
> find the string, then md5sums the file appropriately. This would, if the
> faux-md5sum binary had the same feature, be harder to detect, unless
> maybe you cross checked it with another strong signature. Anyone
> actually seen this?
>
> thanks,
>
> -Jeff
>
> Marty wrote:
>
> > Not possible. All files can be md5summed. Of course there are an
> > infinite number of files that md5sum to an identical hash. Its just
> > no-one actually knows any of them or how to find them as a practical
> > matter.
> >
> > -marty
> >
> > Jeff Sutch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > >
> > > I heard an account of spoofed md5sums from system binaries today,
> > that
> > > I can't seem to verify anywhere. Does anyone know of a validated
> > process
> > > to modify a binary so that it can't be md5summed?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
------------------------------
From: "Keith Monahan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The lightest side of cryptology
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 16:32:54 GMT
Jaime,
Not all books cost money. Go to http://cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/ and
peruse the chapters there. Excellent book.
Keith
P.S. Reading at libraries is free.
Jaime Cardoso <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> When I read the post that started this thread I was very please with it.
>
> I subscribe this NG to see if I can learn something about criptography
> but, the only posts I can't understand any of the interesting posts.
>
> Althouw the jokes are good, can anyone post some pointers to informtion
> about cript algoritms and common atacks?
>
> PS. Please don't recomed any books (buy books => money < house morgage +
> food)
>
> file://JaimeC
>
------------------------------
From: Paul Koning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: PGP webmail
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 12:27:55 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Hi
>
> I recently discovered a new free secure webmail site, and I had a
> question for the group:
>
> how secure is the PGP and SSL- encrypted webmail offered at
> www.lokmail.net? Are there any obvious security weaknesses to it?
A very obvious one: the crypto is done at the server. So if
the server is hacked, or bribed, or subpoenaed, you're hosed.
If you want the security you'd expect when you talk about
PGP, you should use PGP the way it was designed: end to end,
with the crypto done on YOUR machine. (No matter how you
slice it, you have to do the work needed to keep your machine
secure. But that way, you won't be dependent on the security
of other machines.)
paul
------------------------------
From: Paul Koning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GSM A5/1 Encryption
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 12:23:35 -0400
Matt Linder wrote:
> ...
> Thats what I am talking about when I say "real-time". I mean tune to a
> spefic channel and time slot, analyze the data for up to about a minute
> or so to break A5/1 then hear the audio without any known plaintext or
> 73 GB hard drives. Is this possible or not?
73 GB worth of disk drive costs only a few thousand dollars, if
that, and is getting cheaper rapidly. I don't see why you'd
want to rule out attacks that require such storage. Now if it
were 73 TB, that would be slightly different.
For "real time" keep in mind that the interesting question
isn't "can it be broken within minutes of the conversation"
but rather "can it be broken before the information has lost
its value". Depending on the conversation, the latter may be
zero seconds, or it may be months or years.
> I think thats what the phone people mean when they say it has not been
> broken, they are thinking of the old analog system, where anyone with a
> scanner could pick them up.
Maybe. Then again, maybe they are just demonstrating
that they don't understand crypto, which explains why they
designed something as feeble as A5 rather than using a
proven good quality cipher as they should have done.
paul
------------------------------
From: Darren New <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 17:05:52 GMT
Why not only send the tags, and perhaps the attributes necessary? I.e., just
chop out anything you otherwise would have encrypted.
--
Darren New / Senior MTS / Invisible Worlds Inc.
San Diego, CA, USA (PST). Cryptokeys on demand.
There is no safety in disarming only the fearful.
------------------------------
From: Francois Grieu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: ISO articles on sieving hardware
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 19:27:33 +0200
Adi Shamir's Twinkle (*) is inspiring the most visible part of recent
efforts on dedicated hardware for the sieving phase of MPQS and NFS.
But there must have been some work on the subject before.
Any pointers ?
Francois Grieu
(*) <http://jya.com/twinkle.zip>
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RNG based on primitive multiplicative generator.
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 11:30:23 -0500
Tom St Denis wrote:
> Ouch... sorry I meant to inrepret the integer as a long vector of bits,
> then to the dot product, so 5 <dot> 3 would be
>
> (1, 0, 1) <dot> (0, 1, 1) = 1*0 xor 0*1 xor 1*1 = 1
So N[i] = {g^(x+i) mod p} dot b. If we map the integers into a normal
basis,
your dot operation is Trace(a+b). My gut reaction is that this is too
linear,
but I'm not going to try to prove it :-)
How about Trace(b*g^(x+i) mod p)? That gives you 2 keys, x and b. All
b does
in this case is change x to x' as a single key, so it's probably not
useful.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 17:32:32 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hi Matt,
> Do you think that you really have more info with (or is it easier to
> decrypt)
[...]
More information to work with? Definately. Is it any easier to
decrypt? Probably. I'm far from a competant cryptogropher, however,
it's reasonable to assume that the first string:
1. Is a last name.
2. Begins with a captial letter.
3. Does not contain any non-letters.
etc
In any case where I can guess whose name it is, it's even worse. After
validating enough instances for you, I can being ammasing known
plaintext pairs.
--
Matt Gauthier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 17:35:54 GMT
Darren New <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Why not only send the tags, and perhaps the attributes necessary? I.e., just
> chop out anything you otherwise would have encrypted.
I'm not sure about XML, but SGML would have problems validating
encrypted input too. At least, you wouldn't be able to check entity
and character references in PCDATA or RCDATA.
Why, exactly, can't the sending or recieving party validate the dtd?
--
Matt Gauthier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Crypto API for C
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 11:43:18 -0500
Tom St Denis wrote:
>
> I simply can't believe it. About 100 people have downloaded cb.zip from
> my website, and no comments, suggestions or problems. Am I just that
> good of a library writer or are some people shy?
Hey, be happy they at least looked at it! If it works like you said,
then
there's no reason to send feedback. "No news is good news" you know?
Hang
in there and keep learning.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Encryption strength proportional to encrypted message length?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 17:49:33 GMT
In article <O8oG4.36889$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I may be overly dense this morning but I can't think of any way to
> validate a docuent instance without the tags. Are you planing on
> encrypting only the data between them?
>
> If so, then yes, this is _alot_ weaker than encrypting the longer
> document. Not because the strings are shorter, but because you have
> access to so much info about the structure of the plaintext.
I disagree. Information about the structure of the plaintext is bound
to eventually leak out anyway, and when it does a long encrypted
message (which includes the tags) will be vulnerable to a known plain
text attack - simply because the tags are known.
My advice is this:
1. Stream cipher implementations: Use WeakCipher (or some other cipher
in PCFB mode) and use the tags as PCFB-Salt (i.e. encrypt the tags just
to scramble the feedback buffer, and send the tags unencrypted.)
2. Large chunks: Compress all, encrypt all.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (jean-baptiste.marchand)
Subject: DDJ Crypto cdrom (first edition)
Date: 04 Apr 2000 22:23:45 +0200
Hi everyone,
does anyone ever tried to convert the horrible proprietary format of
the first edition of the DDJ Crypto cdrom in something more usable,
HTML for example ?
I konw that the new edition in in PDF but I have the old one and the
hypertext reader interface is so horrible...
Thanks for your help.
Jean-Baptiste Marchand
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Gnome is object-oriented, it is fully boss-compliant
(Miguel de Icaza, Linux Expo Paris, 2000/02/03)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Q: Entropy
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 18:36:21 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Thank you. My point is that people have been apparently using
>in cryptology a measure that is not reasonably computable in
>except by doing some guess work. A consequent (provocative) question
>is then how much real meaning one can attach to argumentations in
>which this measure plays a role in practical applications.
It is not computable _a posteriori_, however, it is very well
computable _a priori_, *if* you are willing to decide to encrypt
messages which contain, for example, the results of throwing dice.
Hence, although entropy does indeed have the limitations you are
thinking of - and people working in cryptography are well aware of all
this, but generally class it as 'philosophical' - it is still highly
useful, and perfectly valid, as an abstract simplification of what,
fundamentally, happens when a message is encrypted.
Since one does not really know, for example, the entropy of
English-language text, one cannot exactly quantify the danger created
by the fact that the eavesdropping cryptanalyst knows your message is
in English text. But since one does not know the strength of one's
cipher either (proving a cipher strong is like solving the halting
problem) one allows a margin of safety - in this case, use a cipher
that resists a known plaintext attack. Then, your message could have
entropy zero, yet not allow the key to be recovered.
(And, just as the entropy of numbers created by throwing dice is known
exactly, on an _a priori_ basis, the argument for the security of the
true one-time pad is not affected by the limitation on knowing the
entropy of _some_ types of sequence.)
John Savard (jsavard<at>ecn<dot>ab<dot>ca)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Cryptoanalysis Algorithms
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 12:31:18 -0500
J4RR3LLS wrote:
>
> I'm looking for code that will decrypt simple ciphers such as shift and
> substitution ciphers. I searched the web, but my effort was unsuccessful.
> Does anyone know where I can get some decryption code or do I have to write my
> own?
Check out "Secret Code Breaker" at http://codebrkr.infopages.net/
It's what you're looking for, and there's code available too. His books
are fun to read and the toys are great for kids.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Massey-Omura protocol & ECC
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 12:25:40 -0500
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Thank you Dr. Mike. I presume you must be Mike Rosing, the author of
> the book Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography ?
Yup. That .sig is burned into my fingers so I don't have to cart it
around from one machine to the next :-)
> In another thread in sci.crypt I have ben asking for a method of key
> exchange using only Secret Keys. From the response that I have been
> receiving It would seem that the there seem to be no way of doing that
> with only secret keys.
That makes sense to me.
> I have copied below a posting that I made in reply to John Savard
> comment.
>
> I am now considering allowing a Public Key Encryption to be allowed
> into the scenario but I could not yet formalize the scenario. I am
> considering the Massey-Omura protocol with Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
> Maybe I am not reading it right but from Mike Rosing's book it would
> seem the Massey-Omura protocol would make MITM impossible. Am I
> mistaken ?
>
> Would you mind adding you comment to this ?
I originally thought it made it impossible too, but it ain't so. Let's
take Harry, Ron and Malfor (from Harry Potter, my kids love it) and
Harry
trys to send a key to Ron with Malfor in the middle. Harry has e_h,
d_h,
Ron has e_r, d_r and Malfor has e_m, d_m. Harry sends to Ron, but
Malfor
intercepts. (e*d = 1 mod p) Let's see what happens:
Harry Malfor Ron
1) e_h*P_h = P1 -> M e_m*P_m -> R
2) e_m*e_h*P_h <- M e_r*e_m*P_m <- R
3) d_h*e_m*e_h*P_h -> M d_m*e_r*e_m*P_m -> R
at this point, Malfor can get the message P_h and Ron has the message
P_m.
So the man-in-the-middle can intercept the original message but has to
fake
it to the true receiver. If it's a private key, then Malfor knows both
keys and neither side knows they are compromised. Bad news.
Koblitz proposed using digital signatures to solve this problem in "A
Course in Number Theory and Cryptography". This means you have to send
much more data the first time since there are 2 components to the
signature
as well as the data being sent. However, since Massey-Omura uses a
curve of
known parameters, and you've got to use integer math to get the e and d
values,
you have all the code subroutines. So Harry first sends P1 and the
digital
signature of the message burried in P_h. At the end, Ron can check if
the
signature matches. Since he has P_m and not P_h, it won't check.
This whole thing is one way. So to eliminate man-in-the-middle you have
to send 2 keys, one from Harry to Ron and one from Ron to Harry.
I'm not sure it's worth worrying about really. The number of people
using
Diffie-Hellman which is far easier to compromise is rather high. If you
really think MITM attacks are feasable for your application tho, you
need
to worry about it.
Look at MQV too. No patents have been issued yet, but be ready to yank
the
code if ever does :-)
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Hysteresis?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 12:15:21 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, net.netscape@agottschald
(Alan Gottschald) wrote:
> Remember if you want to keep something secret don't put it on a
> computer, don't write it down and don't tell anyone.
>
There are reasonable ways to secure information on a computer, but most do
not realize what is essential for that to occur. Start by replacing *a*
computer with one that can support a tolerable level of real security;
same is for the system, and encryption methods, the actual algorithm only
important when everything else is in order.
--
Given all other distractions, I'd rather be programming.
%/^): [|]"! ?=)@~ ;)[]* :@\@} *#~}> ,=+)! .($`\
------------------------------
From: "Scotty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Hysteresis?
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2000 04:11:26 +0100
ISTR it overwrote more than once. In fact, if it didn't do that, the fact
that it was random wouldn't make much difference, since you can read
directly whether a 1 or 0 was the overwrite bit, and the deviation of the
signal from 1 or 0 directly gives you the previous contents. Isn't
hysteresis a wonderful thing :(
Alan Gottschald wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>I seem to remember in the good old days when sercurity was less of an
>issue we had a nice little utility from Norton I think, I even wrote
>one my self, that would write a random pattern over selected files or
>even disks. Now I'm not saying that it is imposible to to read what
>what's left but I suspect that is would be as good as.
>
>
>Remember if you want to keep something secret don't put it on a
>computer, don't write it down and don't tell anyone.
>
>"Scotty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>>G. R. Bricker wrote in message <01bf9d2d$df081040$4b06ebd0@default>...
>>>I surmise that hysteresis effects would leave traces of the previous
>>>condition of the "bit" on magnetic media. A bit which has been
overwritten
>>>once in its lifetime would probably have a measurable trace of residual
>>>magnetism from its previous condition. However, how you would measure
this
>>>I don't know. The level would be pretty low. As for bits which have been
>>>overwritten many times, I have absolutely no idea how each separate
"write"
>>>could be determined.
>>> G.R. Bricker
>>
>>When a 1 overwrites a 1 you get about 1.05 and 0.95 when it overwrites a
0.
>>The drive circuitry digitises that to give 1. That 10% difference is easy
to
>>measure if you sample it with an oscilloscope before the signal is
processed
>>by the drive circuitry. This is not rocket science.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>Thor Arne Johansen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in article
>>><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>>>> Hello all,
>>>>
>>>> "Thomas J. Boschloo" wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > EE Support wrote:
>>>> > >
>>>> > > We contend it does not. Overwriting all zeros practically trashes
>>>> > > files on the disk.
>>>
>>
>
------------------------------
From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: summing hashes is not safe?
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 18:49:55 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Just came across some code in which multiple (100's)
> > 20 byte message-digests are summed into one 24 byte
> > sum as a hash for the complete batch.
[...]
> If the purpose is to create a hash of a set of messages
> independent of ordering, this is not at all as bad as it
> sounds (actually XOR would do just as well as addition).
> It requires a fairly strong assumption on the
> "pseudo-randomness" of the hash output, but for SHA-1 it
> would probably be OK. In particular, if the hash acts an
> ideal PRF, it seems not to be breakable (for collision-,
> pre-image and 2nd pre-image resistance, where comparisons
> ignore ordering).
Breakable. Give me one such XOR-digest (160-bits)
and I'll give you a distinct set of messages with
the same XOR-digest.
I generate a couple hundred messages, and find their
digests, enough so that I should have 160 digests
which are linearly independent. 160 linearly
independent digests form a basis for the space of
160-bit vectors, so I can use simple Gaussian
elimination to find the subset.
(Actually, starting with exactly 160 digests, I'll
either find they're linearly independent, or find a
non-empty subset that XORs to zero. Either way I
can make a collision.)
The original proposal used addition, which gives us
a subset-sum problem rather than subset-XOR. Subset
sum is NP complete but the attacker has to much
flexibility in choosing what instance to solve. He
can generate as large a set as he wants from which
to draw the subset.
--Bryan
--
email: bolson at certicom dot com
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
Subject: Re: NSA
Reply-To: JimD
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 18:02:07 GMT
On Tue, 04 Apr 2000 03:52:47 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>In article <
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>om>,
>Johnny Bravo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On Mon, 03 Apr 2000 23:55:31 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> >I cannot tell if you are just making a funny.
>>
>> It was a joke, but it sounds so possible I'd bet $5 that there are
>> government agents using computer assisted search to read USENET.
>>
> I'd place a side bet that you'd win your bet.
>Supposedly, the UK's Defence Evaluation &
>Research Agency maintains the last 90 days of
>usenet messages (which are meant to be
>analyzed by computers and then humans if
>necessary). It's illegal for the NSA to spy on
>Americans living in the U.S....
Nothing to stop them doing it in the UK, Canada,
Australia or New Zealand, is there?
--
Jim Dunnett.
dynastic at cwcom.net
He who laughs last doesn't
get the joke.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
Crossposted-To:
alt.politics.org.cia,alt.politics.org.nsa,talk.politics.crypto,alt.journalism.print,alt.journalism.newspapers
Subject: Re: new Echelon article
Reply-To: JimD
Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2000 18:02:06 GMT
On Tue, 04 Apr 2000 04:45:42 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>On Sat, 18 Mar 2000 20:28:20 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
>wrote:
>
>>On Sat, 18 Mar 2000 15:01:58 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>
>>>On Sat, 18 Mar 2000 09:33:08 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>>wrote:
>>>
>>>>Jos Horikx wrote:
>>>>> Another interesting echelon-article on:
>>>>> http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
>>>>
>>>>Thanks; that was a refreshing change from Duncan-Campbellism.
>>>
>>>Made even more interesting in that Mr. Woolsey is defending himself
>>>and his methods of industrial espionage against accusations not yet
>>>cast.
>>>
>>>Mr. Woolsey claims in that Wall Street Journal opinion that the EU
>>>report accuses the CIA/NSA of using Echelon to steal technology from
>>>non-U.S. companies. While I don't doubt that technology theft occurs,
>>>the report by Duncan Campbell -- from my reading of it -- concerned
>>>itself with asserting the U.S. might be using this eavesdropping
>>>network to help specific companies _win contracts_.
>>
>>Well of course they do! Isn't '...the economic well-being of the
>>United States.' part of the NSA's mission statement?
>>
>>They ALL do it...Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, China...
>>New focus to justify their existence post Cold-War, and it helps
>>to maintain the funding.
>>
>>--
>>Jim Dunnett.
>>dynastic at cwcom.net
>>Exiled in Somerset
>>Right at the heart of England's BSE Industry.
>
>
>Again, as I've noted, I haven't read the NSA's mission statement. But
>... in the U.S., we have this thing called a Constitution, and the 5th
>Amendment to the thing states:
>
>"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
>infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
>except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
>militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
>shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
>jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
>to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
>property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
>taken for public use, without just compensation."
>
>The pertinent section here is "No person shall be ... deprived of
>life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
>
>If the CIA/NSA are assisting specific U.S. corporations win contracts
>overseas, as it appears they are via Commerce/SBA/State Depts., et al,
>(or assisting those corporations obtain specific technology), they are
>depriving other U.S. persons who work for competing companies of
>property by preventing those persons and their companies from winning
>the contracts themselves.
That's an interesting slant. I wonder how they decide which companies
are worthy of this intelligence?
If the following document is to believed, they ARE doing it:
http://www.cyber-rights.org/interception/stoa/ic2kreport.htm#Report
Section 5 - Comint & Economic Intelligence.
--
Jim Dunnett.
dynastic at cwcom.net
He who laughs last doesn't
get the joke.
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