Cryptography-Digest Digest #190, Volume #10 Mon, 6 Sep 99 17:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: Can we have randomness in the physical world of "Cause and Effect" ? (Tim Tyler)
Re: Can we have randomness in the physical world of "Cause and Effect" ? ("Douglas
A. Gwyn")
Re: arguement against randomness ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: NSA and MS windows (Jim Nelson)
Re: _NSAKey (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
sourcecode of DES in VB ("Buchinger Reinhold")
Re: _NSAKey ("Markku J. Saarelainen")
Re: NSA and MS windows (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: _NSAKey ("Microsoft Mail Server")
Re: _NSAKey ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: _NSAKey ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: hash function ? (David Wagner)
Re: NSA and MS windows ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Info on old cryptgraphy systems ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: point of a cipher (Enterrottacher Andreas)
Re: RSA the company ("Roger Schlafly")
red and white WINE STRICTLY KOSHER ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
NSAKEY as an upgrade key (Was: NSA and MS windows) ("Thomas J. Boschloo")
Re: THE NSAKEY (Guenther Brunthaler)
Re: NSA and MS windows (Dave Salovesh)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crossposted-To: sci.physics
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Can we have randomness in the physical world of "Cause and Effect" ?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1999 17:13:59 GMT
In sci.crypt Dave Knapp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: John Savard wrote:
:> Dave Knapp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
:> >Quantum mechanics requires either true randomness or nonlocality.
:>
:> [...] as someone has pointed out, many worlds can substitute for
:> randomness [...]
: I also don't understand how one can distinguish between MW and
: randomness experimentally.
The apparently random observed behaviour is structured in a manner
that suggests the existence of many worlds interfering with one
another.
If you're asking how can you experimentally verify whether the randomness
is "real" - and happens to statistically fit in with a many worlds
interpretation, or if many worlds' determinism /really/ holds, the the
answer would have to be that you can't.
I think the MWI advocates try to apply Occam's rasor at this point,
asking why hypothesise a source of "real" randomness, when it is
clearly not required?
:> However, I do *have* a substitute for nonlocality; faster-than-light
:> phenomena, so far internal to quantum systems.
: That results in problems with causality.
I suspect he'd be talking about EPR-style FTL phenomena here - i.e ones
which is not possible to communincate any information faster than light
with.
[follow-ups set to sci.physics only]
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
It's hard to be graceful when getting down from your high horse.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.physics
Subject: Re: Can we have randomness in the physical world of "Cause and Effect" ?
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 17:46:28 GMT
Tim Tyler wrote:
> I think the MWI advocates try to apply Occam's rasor at this point,
> asking why hypothesise a source of "real" randomness, when it is
> clearly not required?
If you want to wield Occam's razor, it is the infinitely-ramifying
physical-worlds model that should be trimmed. I don't know of any
serious quantum theorists these days that prefer the multiple-worlds
model. For one thing, it simply doesn't *explain* anything.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: arguement against randomness
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 17:41:32 GMT
Tim Tyler wrote:
> Whether the analogy holds true depends on to what extent the universe
> is funadmentally a cellular automata - i.e to what extend Fredkin's
> "Digital Mechanics" holds.
Good; then we're perfectly safe.
------------------------------
From: Jim Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and MS windows
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 11:40:03 -0700
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> people will continue to shell out money to Microsoft to get inferior bug
> ridden software that they could get for free if they used LInux. Yes people
> are stupid
Scott: if your crypto doesn't pans out, perhaps you might consider being a
spokesman for RedHat or LinuxCare.
Jim Nelson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: _NSAKey
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 19:42:19 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>
>> the need for privacy and secrecy goes "out the window" really fast when
>> bullets start whizzing closely past your childrens' faces!
>>
>
>Only if you're under the delusion that giving up your privacy will
>somehow protect your children.
>
>George
>
Well it is likely that his wife's children have a better chance of survival
if she picks the right guys in power to mate with. So maybe that si what
he meant.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: "Buchinger Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: sourcecode of DES in VB
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1999 20:05:37 +0200
Hi !
I need a version of DES in VB (possible in Pascal). It could also be a
simplified DES. It's only to see how it works.
I am very grateful for any help !
cu
Reinhold Buchinger
------------------------------
From: "Markku J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: _NSAKey
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 13:42:37 +0000
CIA is operating a wide and deep intelligence network in international
businesses in many regions. The objective of this network is to steal
economic, business and technological information and data for the benefit of
some specific U.S. corporations. 031599
CIA's former and current agents are promoting their services to certain
international companies in order to collect specific business intelligence
for these companies (their "clients"). There have been meetings, where
identified and known CIA agents have performed this promoting. 031599
U.S. and UK intelligence agencies are using Internet to collect economic
intelligence for U.S. and U.K businesses., 0427994
Encryption conspiracy to implement Wassenaar encryption control agreement so
that US UK intelligence agencies can collect and decipher more easily other
people's private / business information, 042799
There is an active secret channel between certain intelligence agencies and
some large software companies to enable these companies to continue it
monopolistic intentions and activities, 042799
One of the most popular encryption program is one element of NSA's covert
action program to control the strength of encryption algorithms in the market
place. An encryption application with trapdoors. Its "author" is the member
of info security architecture committee. 051699
Some rental car agencies have installed microphones and other surveillance
devices into their vehicles in order to monitor their clients. 070199
All search engine queries are used for many marketing, intelligence
collection and other research purposes and specific IP addresses and people
ID's are recorded on tracking files. 050199
Specific hubs have been created and used by CIA, NSA and other UKUSA
intelligence agencies to monitor most Internet traffic and communications.
031599
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: NSA and MS windows
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 18:17:13 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Geoff Thorpe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Hi there,
>
>Bruce Schneier wrote:
>[various speculations about the NSAKEY story]
>
>As Peter Gutmann pointed out quite some time ago (see
>http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/breakms3.txt for some
>background), CryptoAPI has such gaping holes in it that to call it swiss
>cheese would be to bestow too much structural value to it. Cheese
>requires a lot more heat (or time) to melt.
>
>The CryptExportKey() API function, present in the base CSP providers (as
>used by Outlook, IE, etc etc), will happily export private keys. It also
>doesn't take a password. Perhaps one possible use of NSAKEY is that it
>somehow simplifies the process of planting executable (executing would
>be more accurate) code on the destination PC to call this function?
>
>The fact this API call is there is scary, but one still needs code to
>call it. If NSAKEY is as dark and sinister as some would like to
>speculate, then it could possibly provide away to exploit this deformity
>of CryptoAPI with minimal fuss and bother. Whether this key allows one
>to do such things, or whether it's there purely to sign CSPs, I do not
>know. I'd welcome anyone's thoughts (except David Scott) on this idea.
>
I wasn't going to comment much on this thread since it is obvious to
most what I think the main purpose of the NSA is. However since you
went out of your way to request a reply and you seem to miss my writtings
I will reply. I feel the spin doctors will down play the whole thing and
people will continue to shell out money to Microsoft to get inferior bug
ridden software that they could get for free if they used LInux. Yes people
are stupid and the spin masters know it. I guess I should feel lucky to be in
the country that will benefit most form the rape of information from the
people in dumber countries. I guess I should be happy our companys will
continue to get the inside scoop on contract bids and such because if the
Europeans are to stupid to think for themselves maybe they are better off
under our control. We can contiue to buy there poilitcans with the money
we steal from them. So go ahead Europe make OUR day. Oh that goes
for New Zealand I just hope they leave enough cash there so they can
continue to make XENA.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: "Microsoft Mail Server" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: _NSAKey
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1999 13:27:48 -0400
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
the need for extreme information sharing is greater to determine exact
location of the source of the lead. the shooters are the ones needing the
secrecy to avoid apprehension.
this is the reason that crime is so successful in america, many local police
and federal units are determined to keep data secret and unshared, thus
allowing the social deviants the opportunity to quickly move about and
continue.
such a scenario should be cause to examine what direction the information is
being shared rather than obfuscating.
or shall we assign a greater authority with local terror groups or to a
larger (and far more benevolent) system of government?
--
best regards,
hapticzemail at email.msn.com
remove first email, sorry i had to do this!!
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: _NSAKey
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 17:17:47 GMT
Microsoft Mail Server wrote:
> (or go find another system that treats you better!)
Unfortunately, the situation is worse under most other governments.
That doesn't mitigate against its becoming intolerable under this one.
> the need for privacy and secrecy goes "out the window" really fast
> when bullets start whizzing closely past your childrens' faces!
To the contrary, that's when there is the *greatest* need for
careful, rational thought.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: _NSAKey
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 10:24:34 -0700
>
> the need for privacy and secrecy goes "out the window" really fast when
> bullets start whizzing closely past your childrens' faces!
>
Only if you're under the delusion that giving up your privacy will
somehow protect your children.
George
> --
> best regards,
> hapticzemail at email.msn.com
>
> remove first email, sorry i had to do this!!
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: hash function ?
Date: 6 Sep 1999 10:23:43 -0700
In article <7r0c0d$ivf$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I personally recommend HAVAL. It is highly configurable and hasn't been
> broken yet, unless I'm wrong. <insert contradictory statement here>
I don't know of any break, but nonetheless, my personal preference
would be SHA-1: it seems to have received a lot more analysis than
HAVAL, as far as I can tell.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and MS windows
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 17:47:50 GMT
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> people will continue to shell out money to Microsoft to get inferior
> bug ridden software that they could get for free if they used LInux.
That's pretty funny!
"Why go elsewhere to be cheated when you can come to us!"
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Info on old cryptgraphy systems
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 17:34:41 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> John ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> : I started out with a relative frequency match of the letters in the
> : text and in normal italian vocabulary, but it did not work.
> Well, that may indicate that the text is not encrypted with
> transposition, or that it is not in Italian.
It is not clear what he meant by "relative frequency match".
The first step in diagnosis should be to tabulate a histogram
of ciphertext letter frequencies, arranged in order of the
Italian alphabet, and compare the shape of that to the normal
Italian uniliteral frequencies. An experienced eye can tell
whether the distributions match well enough, or one could
perform Pearson's chi-square test.
If the cipher letter frequencies are fairly close to those
of the normal Italian language, then a transposition is
indicated.
An important cryptanalytic principle is to "try the simplest
things first". So if one suspects a transposition, try the
common route methods (rail-fence, etc.) right away, factor
the length and try rectangular arrangements, etc. I assume
Italian has some easy-to-pair digraphs analogous to English's
QU; by anagramming short stretches near such adjacent letters,
often other pairs appear, which can be extended by guesswork.
------------------------------
From: Enterrottacher Andreas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: point of a cipher
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 21:26:00 +0200
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" schrieb:
>
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Enterrottacher Andreas
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" schrieb:
> >>
> >> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] () wrote:
> >> >Dave Scott's compression idea, "one-to-one compression" is intended to
> >> >totally frustrate a brute-force search. Normally, if a file is being
> >> >compressed using Huffman compression, the resulting file will consist of
> >> >any old number of bits. For transmission, it might be padded out to an
> >> >even number of bytes: then, some indication of how many bits of padding
> >> >are applied is needed.
> >> >
> >> >Usually, this means that there is a way to check an attempted decrypted
> >> >file for validity; if we remove the bits claimed to be padding, do the
> >> >remaining bits end on a Huffman symbol, or in the middle of one?
> >> >
> >> >Mr. Scott is trying to devise a method of Huffman compression which
> >> >removes this (very weak) opportunity for the attacker to narrow down the
> >> >space of possible keys. However, he is doing so at the price of
> >> >introducing other forms of redundancy, which I think are worse.
> >> >
> >> >John Savard
> >>
> >> Ok John I bite. What are those worse form of redundancy that make it
> >> worse.
> >>
> >> David A. Scott
> >
> >At least the output of the one-to-one-compression is compressable while
> >encrypted text isn't: In a brute-force-attack one could try keys until
> >he
> >gets compressable data. The weak one-to-one-compression can be broken
> >afterwards.
> >
> >Other attacks may be based on the fact that there exists redundancy
> >without
> >knowledge of the kind of redundancy.
> >
> >
>
> What are you talking about. I don't think your "one to one" is the
> "one to one" I have been talking about these several days.
As far as I understand your method you aren't using the huffman-table
that
would allow an optimum of compression. But this way you are creating a
file
that is larger than a huffman-compressed one, isn't it?
Andreas Enterrottacher
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: "Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA the company
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1999 10:32:14 -0700
David A Molnar wrote in message <7qv7rl$a9j$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>> Well, there's always the Schnorr patent for DSA. <ducking>
>
>note : <ducking> because I'm aware that NIST is prepared to defend their
>DSA patent...and also aware of the section on "generalized signature
>schemes" in _Applied Cryptography_ which suggests that ElGamal, DSA, and
>Schnorr sigs are expressions of an (unpatented) underlying general
>construction.
Not only that, but RSADSI controls the Schnorr patent, and RSADSI
has admitted in court that it does not apply to the DSA. A lot of people
openly use DSA without licensing the Schnorr patent.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: red and white WINE STRICTLY KOSHER
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 20:23:17 PDT
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------------------------------
From: "Thomas J. Boschloo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: NSAKEY as an upgrade key (Was: NSA and MS windows)
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 22:09:30 +0200
Roger Schlafly wrote:
>
> David Wagner wrote in message
> <7qrtjq$old$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> >In article <7qqgs3$oan$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> >Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> Maybe. Perhaps someone from the NSA suggested using a
> >> backup key, and the MS programmers called it the NSA key.
> >
> >That is indeed what the MS techies are claiming. It's hard to
> >verify with 100% certainty, but it's certainly not an implausible
> >explanation.
>
> Yes, it is plausible, but not terribly convincing either. Why did
> MS need 2 keys? Is the concern that MS would lose one private
> key? If so, why don't they make 2 copies, instead of using 2 keys?
> Is the 2nd key really just a backup, or are there circumstances
> in which only one of the keys is used?
>
> I don't think MS is telling us the full story.
What MS is telling us, is that it is a backup key, put there to get NSA
approval <http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/backdoor.asp>:
> *Why the backup key labeled "NSA key"?*
> This is simply an unfortunate name. The NSA performs the technical
> review for all US cryptogrphic export requests. The keys in question are
> the onces that allow us to ensure compliance with the NSA's technical
> review. Therefore, they came to known within Microsoft as "the NSA
> keys", and this name was included in the symbol information for one of
> the keys. However, Microsoft holds these keys and does not share them
> with anyone, including the NSA.
Microsoft's explanation "Why is a backup key needed?" is bogus (they
claim it would be needed for when the building in which it is kept is
destroyed by a natural disaster, LOL).
But this day I thought of the following explanation:
What if the designers of MS Windows put the second key there to be able
to upgrade to a new Windows OS, without the crypto mess they made of the
current one?
User of the old Windows versions could keep using the new crypto
routines that where signed with the second key (_NSAKEY), but their
security would suck because Microsoft made such a mess of the routines
signed with the first key (_KEY). The new Windows version however would
not have the first key (_KEY) coded into it, so the old, messy, crypto
routines wouldn't work in the new OS, making it more secure!
Am I making any sense?,
Thomas
--
AMD K7 Athlon 650 Mhz! <http://www.bigbrotherinside.com/#help>
PGP key: http://x11.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=453727376
Email: boschloo_at_multiweb_dot_nl
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guenther Brunthaler)
Subject: Re: THE NSAKEY
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 20:42:28 GMT
On 5 Sep 1999 12:48:30 -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(David Wagner) wrote:
>> So Mr. Schneier has certainly to be very careful about what he's
>> saying, especially regarding alleged government intrusion attempts
>> into popular software (unless proven and verified already).
>
>I call bullshit. You're making allegations that are absolutely unfounded.
Are they really so unfounded? Do you really think it is completely
unlikely that law-enforcement agencies try to influence US companies
working on cryptosystems? Especially when you think of the NSAKEY
incident?
>Schneier has been outspoken against _many_ of the US government's crypto
>policies; some might say that he is one of the biggest thorns in their side.
Yes, but those policies have not been kept secret - in contrary to the
NSAKEY incident.
I also doubt that the NSA is especially fond of Mr. Schneier's
statements - but I am sure Mr. Schneier could also be a nightmare to
the NSA rather than just a thorn if he could say freely what he
wanted.
>Please take personal attacks like these elsewhere.
What attack are you referring to? I did not attack anyone.
In contrary, I have the highest respect for Mr. Schneier's abilities
and expertise.
And exactly for that reason I was trying to develop a possible
explanation of Mr. Schneier's strange statement that he really
'believes' that the NSAKEY is not an NSA key.
If I were the NSA, I certainly would have done it - and a lot of other
things. (But I would not have left the debugging information left in
the executable.)
Greetings,
Guenther
--
Note: the 'From'-address shown in the header is an Anti-Spam
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------------------------------
From: Dave Salovesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and MS windows
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 17:07:31 -0400
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Schneier) opined:
>Oh come now. They've ignored that prohibition so many times that they
>probably have forgotten that it ever existed.
Of course. I only meant that due to this public stance MS can't give
any explanation which involves NSA assistance. But this isn't really
about the NSA. If they've done anything, it's only what they've been
tasked to, laws be damned. Note that the NSA has said absolutely
nothing about this entire situation.
I'll try to keep this away from politics and MS bashing, but it seems
inherently political and like a (another) MS foul up.
I'm amused at <http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/backdoor.asp>
where MS seems to be offering two stories at once; it's a backup in case
Mt. Rainier blows the entire state of Washington off the map, and it's
called what it's called because its a key that allows them to ensure
compliance with the NSA's technical review.
In short, I say that means MS doesn't hold its important keys safely,
and that export control is entirely and improperly in the hands of MS.
In the details of the "backup" story, they say they want to be sure that
everything could function normally if the main secret key were
destroyed. I've considered that perhaps they would try to be strict and
keep only one copy of the main key, which would make it more vulnerable
to damage, but that can't be the case. There's more risk to having a
second valid key properly stored away from the main one than there would
be in having multiple copies of the main key.
And the symbol names just don't make sense - the name "NSAKEY" wouldn't
arise spontaneously for the second key. There must be some reason it
was called what it was called. That's why they give us the second
story:
The keys - either or both of them - are there so MS can ensure
compliance with technical review of export requests, which is done by
the NSA, and that's why MS refers to -one- of them as the NSA key.
If this is export control, it's broken.
Effective export control would mean (to me, anyway) that a vendor must
go to extra lengths to get exportable modules approved. For
installation in a domestic copy, only the vendor signature would be
needed. For installation in an exported copy, both the vendor signature
and an export approval signature would need to be present.
Even though that's how (I think) it should work, and even though that
would be an entirely reasonable explanation for why there's an export
control key called "NSAKEY", that's not what MS says is happening.
Since only MS holds these keys, they're saying there's nothing to
prevent them from signing any module they want to. NSA technical review
has nothing to do with this, at least through the stories MS is telling.
------------------------------
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