Cryptography-Digest Digest #890, Volume #10 Wed, 12 Jan 00 15:13:01 EST
Contents:
Cryptanalysis (Todd Smith)
Re: My background - Markku Juhani Saarelainen (Markku J. Saarelainen)
Re: More Cryptography on Canadian TV (John Savard)
Re: AES & satellite example (Jerry Coffin)
Re: Double transposition/playfair (John Savard)
Re: lfsr - polynom (Mike Rosing)
Re: LSFR (Mike Rosing)
Re: Why is EDI dead? Is S/MIME 'safe'? Who and why? (James Redfern)
Re: Questions about message digest functions (Tim Tyler)
Re: Wagner et Al. (Burma120)
Re: LSFR ("Michael Darling")
Re: Why is EDI dead? Is S/MIME 'safe'? Who and why? ("Richard A. Schulman")
Re: Truly random bistream (Mike McCarty)
Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?) (Mike McCarty)
Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?) (Mike McCarty)
Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?) (Mike McCarty)
Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?) (Mike McCarty)
Re: Unsafe Advice in Cryptonomicon (Mike McCarty)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Todd Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Cryptanalysis
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 17:56:07 GMT
Does anyone know of a newsgroup or mailing list that deals only with
cryptanalysis, specifically the paper-and-pencil kind?
--
--
=====================
Todd Smith
Perl/Cold Fusion Programmer
InfoTrax Services
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Markku J. Saarelainen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.politics.org.cia
Subject: Re: My background - Markku Juhani Saarelainen
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 18:05:25 GMT
Only drove 24 hours / day for the last 4 days ...
Let's go ahead with our willigness to win ....
I have one interesting intelligence board game that I would like to
play with any interested individuals. It is a totally new innovation.
The game can have from 2 to N (as many as you like) players.
Are you interested in?
I am sure you would have the time of your life.
Markku
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: More Cryptography on Canadian TV
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 11:29:06 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) wrote, in part:
>On Canadian television, there is a cable channel devoted to history,
>called "History Television" IIRC; it isn't identical with "The History
>Channel" in the U.S. (so we didn't get to see "Secrets of War" yet,
>although it's been shown in French in Quebec).
>At 7 PM MST, on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, they will be showing
>two consecutive half-hour segments (so you can think of it as a
>one-hour program) of "Breaking The Codes".
Well, I've watched the first two days of it.
I was a bit dismayed by the first day: David Kahn appears on screen,
but his name isn't mentioned, and no caption identifies him!
(They corrected that omission in episode 4 on the second day; maybe
there was a caption when he first appeared, and I just missed it.)
And on the first day, calling a Caesar cipher a "transposition cipher"
was a rather egregious technical blunder. On the second day, there
wasn't anything like that, although the narrator did (in episode 5)
make one comment that seemed to imply that, if not for mistakes by
Enigma operators, the Enigma could not have been attacked except by
brute force. (But I tend to think that to cavil at that was probably
being picky.)
John Savard (jsavard<at>ecn<dot>ab<dot>ca)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: AES & satellite example
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 11:49:27 -0700
In article <85h5qo$si6$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
[ ... ]
> > This probably helps a little, but only a little. [...]
> > IOW, if you're going to allow updating of the code, you certainly want
> > to use a separate algorithm, but even at best this is only a _minor_
> > improvement, not a real cure for the fundamental problem.
>
> Do you think so?
Yes.
> I was thinking that this might help a lot. The special algorithms
> used for code uploading will be used only very rarely, and are not
> performance-intensive, so they could be (e.g.) 1000 rounds of Triple-DES,
> if you like.
Unfortunately, 1000 rounds of triple-DES isn't any more provably
secure than what we started with. In fact, it might even be less
secure for all we really know.
The whole basic notion is fundamentally flawed in any case: as was
stated to start with, the extra storage for multiple algorithms is
insignificant as long as you're dealing with a software
implementation. If you're dealing with a hardware implementation, you
have two choices: you use either hardwired logic, or else you use
something like FPGAs.
FPGAs would allow on-the-fly reprogramming of the hardware.
Unfortunately, FPGAs have much lower circuit density than hard-wired
chips. Unless you expected to require something on the order of
_hundreds_ of different algorithms, it's a near certainty that simply
hardwiring ALL the algorithms would still require less chip area,
power, etc., than having enough gates of FPGA to implement any one
algorithm.
Worse, you have to also include the OTHER algorithm and hope it's
secure. If you use something like a one-time-pad, you might be able
to argue that it would be secure, but this has yet another problem:
you have to include something like ROM to hold the pad. That ROM has
to be as large as all the code you'll ever attempt to transmit. If
you're going to include a ROM large enough to hold, say, 5 different
algorithms, why not just put 5 algorithms in the ROM? Your method
requires enough ROM for 5 algorithms PLUS enough re-writable memory
for one algorithm. If you simply pre-program 5 algorithms, you use
the same amount of ROM, but only need a couple of bits of re-writable
memory to tell which one is to be used, rather than enough to hold the
entire algorithm for the one being used.
There IS (at least) one argument in favor of the OTP with re-writable
memory. In theory, somebody might devise an attack that completely
devastated ALL the pre-selected algorithms. In this case, the ability
to upload a new algorithm designed to resist the new attack would be
of value. At least IMO, this general notion is far-fetched in the
extreme. I can believe that somebody could find a useful attack on
one AES finalist. Such attacks on two becomes substantially more
difficult to believe, but I suppose is still just barely conceivable.
It seems far-fetched in the extreme, however, to believe that _all_ of
them would be subject to such attacks. Note that in this scenario, we
probably have to provide substantial hardware over and above what any
current algorithm justifies: we simply have no idea how complex an
algorithm might be needed for security in the situation implied here.
Ultimately, I'm pretty sure that after-the-fact reprogramming will
cause more problems than it cures. As mentioned above, I can think of
one scenario in which it makes sense, but I consider that scenario
much too far-fetched to be worth consideration.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Double transposition/playfair
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 11:53:21 GMT
Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Double Playfair is not as simple as it looks from Bauer and the other
>authors I've seen published. I found a paper from Bletchley in the
>declassified NARA "Open Door" documents: besides using two squares
>like a Two-square cipher, it has two encryption steps. The encrypted
>digraph is pushed through the same cipher process a second time.
>See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/decoding/faceoff.html for links to
>descriptions of double Playfair and double transposition as used for
>actual traffic in WW2.
Thank you for this information. I found that I used the term "Double
Playfair" as an alternate name for the Two-Square cipher; I have
corrected my web page based on this information.
(I recently recieved an E-mail chiding me for not reminding people who
last visited my site some time ago that it has grown and improved.)
I also have you to thank for a set of frequency tables, as noted
before: I'm working on my own set, including frequencies of word
lengths (which are relevant to a two-state Huffman code I recommend
for cryptography: instead of using a symbol for the space character,
switch between two modes - one with a Huffman code for word lengths,
and one with a Huffman code for letters...mixed in with the codes for
word lengths are the escape codes that allow handling special
characters, upper/lower case, and so on).
John Savard (jsavard<at>ecn<dot>ab<dot>ca)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: lfsr - polynom
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 12:49:28 -0600
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> My problem is, to choose feedback polynoms
> for a stream cipher system consisting of
> lfsr.
>
> In which way i find a suitable polynom?
> Rueppel write in his book (analysis and design
> of stream ciphers) to choose a polynom which
> produce random sequences which lin. complexity
> is near to his period length. Is this rigth?
>
> In other books the use of primitive polynoms
> is recommended. Primitive Polynoms produces
> m-sequences which period length ist very differnt
> from the lin. complexity of such a sequence.
It won't be very secure. But if you want to, you
first find a prime polynomial which covers the
period length you want (in GF(2^n) your period
will be 2^n-1). Start with some non-zero state,
and on each step output the xor of the bits set
in the prime polynomial (of the state).
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: LSFR
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 13:00:36 -0600
Michael Darling wrote:
>
> We wish to use an LSFR to generate a time stamp for an electronic component
> we are designing.
>
> The idea is to use a very simple 2 tap LSFR which is 49 bits long with taps
> at bit 9 and bit 0.
> This would provide us a nice non-repeating sequence which we could use to
> uniquely identify each stamp.
>
> Now then: We want to say when each stamp occurred, i.e. map each output to
> its location in the sequence.
>
> In other words we want to get an output and say that it is output 'n' in the
> sequence.
>
> Obviously, we don't want to run through the sequence in software and match
> the output we got from the
> hardware - as this could take some time :)
>
> Are we being naive to expect that we can do this, or is there a method that
> we don't know about?
First off, it has to be a 3 tap sequence, without the most significant
bit you only have a 2^9-1 (=511) repeat pattern, if x^9 + 1 is prime.
(It can't be, but I'll leave the proof to you.)
Do you know the initial state of the hardware? If so, then it's
pretty trivial to duplicate the states in software.
I don't understand the connection between time and the state,
but if you know the ouput states, you should be able to easily
make the connection.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: James Redfern <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Why is EDI dead? Is S/MIME 'safe'? Who and why?
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 16:53:41 +0000
Reply-To: James Redfern <redfern[AT]privacyx[DOT]com>
On Wed, 12 Jan 2000 10:38:55 -0500, "Richard A. Schulman"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
| I'm not sure what your friend means, unless he is referring to
| traditional EDI.
What do you mean by "traditional EDI" and how do you differentiate?
| With the advent of XML, it is anticipated that there
| will be a major increase in EDI applications because of the fact that
| XML, as a standard language for representing content, makes it much
| easier to overcome differences between the proprietary data formats
| used by different companies.
So are you saying that people/companies will simply start using XML in this
modality or that he would be wise to think of using XML as his output?
| EDI exists for the reliable interchange of formatted data between
| computers. Whether the source is a mainframe, desktop, or laptop, and
| whether the target is computer or printer "makes no never mind" (as
| one of my aunts if fond of saying).
Well, bless her heart. But does she know what sort of companies they are and
why they would want to do so, that's the question, not whether they can or
not.
JR.
--
James Redfern <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> The Redfern Organization
PGP key ID 0x8244C43A from <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]?subject=0x8244C43A>
...ActiveNames delivers my undeliverable mail at <www.ActiveNames.com>
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Questions about message digest functions
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 18:51:58 GMT
David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:> When using a pseudo-random function hash collisions may be found.
:> This makes a brute-force search a possibility, and finding hash
:> collisions is consequently easier than it needs to be whenever
:> messages are constrained to be of a certain size.
: This doesn't make any sense to me.
: So long as you choose the output length to be large enough (e.g., 160 bits),
: brute-force collision search is infeasible. So who cares if collisions
: exist, if they can't be found?
Yes, if you pick a large enough hash, the reasonableness of employing
brute force is likely to decrease.
There will /still/ be circumstances where a failure to use a flat
distribution makes finding hash collisions "infinitely more likely",
but if it's pretty unlikely anyway, that may not matter much.
The problems mostly arise in practice when the size of the hash is
limited. This can happen when the messages are small, and it is
undesirable to have half your bandwidth devoted to hash, for example.
This is the same case where the problems arise - i.e. message size is of
the order of hash size.
However, as I mention later, any attacks on a hash may suddenly make brute
force practical, even with what appears to be large hash. If you can cut
down the message space that corresponds to a given hash in some way,
searching the remaining region may become possible.
:> A conventional PRF actually dilutes the entropy in some streams of data,
:> *despite* being offered more message than hash.
: But the dilution is very small, and only becomes non-negligible when the
: entropy in the input closely approaches (or exceeds) the output size.
That's correct.
: Even then, you only lose at most about 1 bit of entropy or so. Typically,
: you don't need 160 bits of entropy; 128 is more than enough. So, who cares
: if you only get 159 bits of entropy out, rather than 160?
If the figues are that large 1 bit may not be relevant. As I mentioned
near the start of the thread, it is where hash size is limited that
the problem is most severe -as this is where brute force becomes
practical.
I believe if there is an attack on the security of the hash, this may have
an effect closely related to decreasing the size of the keyspace.
I'm not sure a brute-force attack on a 160-bit hash is out of the question
if some of the bits in the hash bear a known relationship to the message
in a manner that can be reverse engineered.
It may only be possible to discount my argument on the grounds that the
size of the hash is too large for brute force, if you are *very* confident
that there is no attack on the hash that works better than brute force.
: Note also that the entropy loss is very small if the input entropy is
: considerably less than 160 bits. So in the cases where entropy is scarce,
: dilution is negligible.
Also true. I /think/ if there are 159 input bits approx. 1/2 a bit is
lost, if there are 158 bits approx. 1/4 of a bit is lost, and so on.
: Are those the worst disadvantages of non-bijective hash functions?
Yes, I think that's a reasonable summary. PRF-based hashes get within
about a factor of two (depending on how you measure it) of the ideal
frequency distribution in the _worst_ case. The worst case is not very
common in practice.
I don't doubt these considerations have been responsible for the apparent
fact that the distinction between a random distribution and the ideal
flat frequency distribution of a hash for practically any real-world
target data appears to have been ignored.
The difference is in the majority of practical cases a relatively minor
one.
There are no doubt cases where the distinction makes a significant
difference - but these are probably not very common.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Faith goes out by the window as beauty comes in at the door.
------------------------------
From: Burma120 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Wagner et Al.
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 11:04:23 -0800
In article <85gumj$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Guy Macon) wrote:
> I never managed to get this to work. I can boot from the NT disc
> when my HD is 100% wiped (no MBR, no boot record, nothing but zeros
> everywhere), but I never got NT to boot from the CD. I had the
> same problem trying to get NT to boot from a Jazz drive. I haven't
> spent much time on the problem, so maybe it's simple.
We have a group of many identical machines all running Windows NT
Workstation. Certain users have an amazing ability to screw up their
computers because idiotic policies allow the head of a department to
have local administrator permissions at all of the computers in his or
her group. We took an identical machine and installed a base
configuration that is updated and patched. Using customized software,
we create images (byte for byte, sector for sector) that we burn on to
currently three CDs. We boot from these CDs and the extractor handles
the details of clearing out the previous disk and transferring the disk
image to the hard drive. Next, the program generate new randomized IDs
for each computer that it is installed to so that NT works correctly.
Quite a pain to setup, but infinitely better than going around with a
binder filled with CDs in hand.
* Sent from RemarQ http://www.remarq.com The Internet's Discussion Network *
The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!
------------------------------
From: "Michael Darling" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: LSFR
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 19:33:10 -0000
You say its easy to make the connection. I haven't got a clue how to do it
I got the 2 tap sequence from a list
of maximal period LSFR's so I'll have to check my polynomial. Assuming I do
have a maximal period LSFR how
do I make the connection between output and time?
regards,
mike.
Mike Rosing wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>
>First off, it has to be a 3 tap sequence, without the most significant
>bit you only have a 2^9-1 (=511) repeat pattern, if x^9 + 1 is prime.
>(It can't be, but I'll leave the proof to you.)
>
>Do you know the initial state of the hardware? If so, then it's
>pretty trivial to duplicate the states in software.
>
>I don't understand the connection between time and the state,
>but if you know the ouput states, you should be able to easily
>make the connection.
>
>Patience, persistence, truth,
>Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: "Richard A. Schulman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Why is EDI dead? Is S/MIME 'safe'? Who and why?
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 14:46:03 -0500
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
"James Redfern" writes:
> What do you mean by "traditional EDI" and how do you differentiate?
Traditional EDI requires each participating company to agree on one
protocol. Then each company needs to write its own custom programs to
translate to and from its proprietary files and databases one the one
hand and the agreed-on industry protocol on the other hand.
> So are you saying that people/companies will simply start using XML
> in this modality or that he would be wise to think of using XML as
> his output?
I'm not a mind reader. He's your friend -- why don't you ask him?
Perhaps he's bringing some new ideas to the table that I'm not aware
of. But what I can tell you is that, to the best of my knowledge,
most companies contemplating EDI right now are planning on doing
these systems with XML.
Schulman:
> | EDI exists for the reliable interchange of formatted data between
> | computers. Whether the source is a mainframe, desktop, or laptop,
> | and whether the target is computer or printer "makes no never
> | mind" (as one of my aunts if fond of saying).
Redfern:
> Well, bless her heart. But does she know what sort of companies
> they are and why they would want to do so, that's the question, not
> whether they can or not.
I was just using her delightful phrase (= "It doesn't make any
difference.") As I explained to you in my previous post, EDI is in
widespread use wherever companies need to communicate with each other
with formatted data, e.g., suppliers communicating with retailers
regarding current inventory on each side of the supply chain.
- --
Richard Schulman
(for email reply, remove the anti-spamming 'XYZ')
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike McCarty)
Subject: Re: Truly random bistream
Date: 12 Jan 2000 19:32:40 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)
)I believe I recognised the existence of negative viscosity, and
)/still/ claimed the absolute zero viscosity was an academic dream.
)
)There's no such thing as perfect conductivity (or zero resistance).
Actually, there is. When the Cooper pairs form, they actually *cannot*
be scattered.
)Even if there /were/ (as usual) nobody would ever know if it had been
)realised or not.
This sentence means nothing to me.
)The universe just doesn't seem to like these absolutes people keep
)claiming it can exhibit.
Umm. Anthropormophism aside, *you* seem not to like it.
)Electrons insist on materialising and dematerialising, protons decay right
No one has ever observed electrons "materialising and dematerialising",
no one has ever observed a proton to decay.
)in the middle of your experiment, things from the environment get in the
)way, and perfection remains elusive.
Not so. What you wrote is perfectly incorrect.
Mike
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike McCarty)
Subject: Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?)
Date: 12 Jan 2000 19:39:37 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Tony T. Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)
)There is no English word with gh at the beginning of a sylable that has the
)f sound. There is only one word with o as a short i. There are no words in
This is dialectally dependent. For example, "persimmon" is in some
American english dialects pronounced "persimmin". "Women" is of course
universally pronounced "wimmin" in American English.
Perhaps you could back off a little on your pronouncements?
)English with ti as sh (there are words with tion as shun or tian ash shun.)
)Shaw's example is cute but has little to do with English spelling. On the
)other hand, "unionize" is fun to give to automatic hyphenation routines.
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike McCarty)
Subject: Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?)
Date: 12 Jan 2000 19:41:06 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Tony T. Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)Guy Macon wrote:
)
)> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony
T. Warnock) wrote:
)>
)> >"unionize" is fun to give to automatic hyphenation routines.
)>
)> Here are two sentences to give to automatic language translators:
)>
)> Time flies like an arrow.
)>
)> Fruit flies like an orange.
)
)"The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak."
"The vodka is strong, but the meat is rotten."
Translated to Russian and back to English in the very early 60s by a
computer.
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike McCarty)
Subject: Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?)
Date: 12 Jan 2000 19:36:33 GMT
In article <855emu$3ba$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
William Rowden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)I, too, was a reading child. "Omnipotent" is logically "omni-potent"
)/om'nee poe'tent/, right? I also remember the quizzical look I
)received when I first said "annihilation," complete with two short
)i's. Why is that "h" there?
It comes from latin "nihil" meaning "nothing".
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike McCarty)
Subject: Re: Mispronounce words. (OT Re: How to pronounce "Vigenere"?)
Date: 12 Jan 2000 19:42:17 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)My wife still laughs when I say armegadon - ar-MEG-a-don. I think
)it was some 20 years before I actually heard anyone else say the
)word right :-)
Perhaps it would have helped if you had seen it spelled correctly
armageddon
coming from the valley of Megiddo.
Mike
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike McCarty)
Subject: Re: Unsafe Advice in Cryptonomicon
Date: 12 Jan 2000 19:49:48 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Steve K <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)Only if they were carrying magnets through the door, and keeping them
)lined up exactly with the field. AC magnets pull non-polarized
)materials toward the nearest reigon of high(er) field concentration
Paramagnetic and ferromagnetic materials are attracted to higher field
concentrations, diamagnetic materials are repelled from higher field
concentrations.
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
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