Cryptography-Digest Digest #706, Volume #11 Thu, 4 May 00 18:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers? (Tom St Denis)
Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers? ("almis")
Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers? ("almis")
Re: U-571 movie (OT) (David Hamer)
Re: Tempest Attacks with EMF Radiation (Diet NSA)
Re: Tempest Attacks with EMF Radiation (Diet NSA)
Re: RC6 (tm) as a Feistel Cipher (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: quantum crypto breakthru? (Roger Schlafly)
Re: U-571 movie (OT) (Jim Gillogly)
Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers? ("Tony T. Warnock")
Re: RC6 (tm) as a Feistel Cipher (Tom St Denis)
Re: quantum crypto breakthru? ("Leo Sgouros")
Re: Any good attorneys? (Jerry Coffin)
[ADV] Gartner InfoSec Conference June New Orleans (VictorW318)
Re: Sunday Times 30/4/2000: "MI5 builds new centre to read e-mails on (JCA)
Re: Fixed: Sboxgen tool (Ichinin)
Re: GPS encryption turned off (Paul Koning)
Re: Any good attorneys? (Roger Schlafly)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers?
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 20:16:14 GMT
Richard Heathfield wrote:
>
> Mike Oliver wrote:
> >
> > Richard Heathfield wrote:
> >
> > > Why not? As far as I'm aware, pi passes all mathematical tests for
> > > randomness.
> >
> > In some informal sense that may be true. But I can think of at
> > least one "mathematical test for randomness" that it doesn't
> > pass. Specifically, the linear correlation between the digits
> > of a random number, and the digits of pi, should approach zero
> > as the number of digits considered goes to infinity.
>
> Hmmmm. There must be more to this than meets the eye. After all, the
> obvious interpretation is:
>
> int test_for_randomness(BIGNUM *control_rndnum, BIGNUM *num_to_test); /*
> linear correlation test function */
>
> result = test_for_randomness(&some_known_random_number, &pi);
>
> If result is false, pi can't be random, because its digits' linear
> correlation with those of some_known_random_number doesn't approach
> zero. Now, how do we establish some_known_random_number? Well, since pi
> has passed loads of tests for randomness, we can use that.
>
> result = test_for_randomness(&pi, &some_known_random_number);
>
> Hey, it returns false. So some_known_random_number isn't random after
> all.
pi may be statistically random, hence a prng, but it's not random at
all. It's C/2r which is known.
Also making terms is not the fastest thing in the world and I doubt it's
a good prng anyways.
Tom
------------------------------
From: "almis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers?
Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 11:56:44 -0500
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
|But to actually do this in practice, b would at best be represented
|in a form suitable for symbolic arithmetic based on integer codes
|(since computers cannot represent all real numbers in even a finite
|range). So it seems to boil down to picking a collection of integer
|parameters, which would be limited in practice to a (possibly large)
|finite set of choices that could in principle be tested for a match.
For a method of generating such numbers see:
A. Schonage. The fundamental theorem of algebra in terms of
computational complexity. Preliminary report,
Mathematisches Intitut der Universitat Tubigen. August 1982.
'Splitting the circle'
...al
------------------------------
From: "almis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers?
Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 11:58:14 -0500
Or just use Mathematica.
...al
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 16:23:19 -0400
From: David Hamer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: U-571 movie (OT)
Paul Matthews does not specifically state that his quoted 'rules'
apply to German navy Enigma operations - so I will here cite
evidence that the Army/GAF did not always have such restrictions
on the daily Enigma settings.
The table [Sonder-Maschinenschlüssel] reproduced as Plate 4 in
Codebreakers, Hinsley & Stripp (eds.) [and elsewhere] tends to
refute Matthews' statement. In a month's worth of daily settings
there are clearly several counter examples to the 'never in the
same place' rules for Walzenlage [e.g. I IV II is followed by
V IV I, and III I IV is even followed by II I IV, etc.]. Counter
examples are also present for the 'never replace a letter with
its neighbour' rule for Steckerverbindungen - where RQ, GF, and
others appear.
Given that the Kriegsmarine was significantly more security-minded
the navy may very well have had such restrictions at some point.
Perhaps Ralph Erskine would care to comment...!
David Hamer
Paul Matthews wrote:
>
> Hello, I believe that one of failings of the original Enigma code books was
> the codes were "too" random. For example if the wheel settings for the day
> were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
> in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
> in the same place. Similarly the plugboard settings would never replace a
> letter with its neighbour - e.g. S would never be swapped for R or T.
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
David Hamer The Crypto Simulation Group
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Tempest Attacks with EMF Radiation
From: Diet NSA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 13:28:45 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>"NFN NMI L. a.k.a. S.T.L." wrote:
>> <<In some theories of physics, all particles are described as
>> vibrating instances of energy.>>
>> Quack or unproven ones.
>
>There is certainly (bound) energy in every particle.
>
By "quack or unproven ones", NFN NMI L.
seems to be correctly implying theories
(such as string theory) which attempt to
explain the origin of mass (and electric
charge) for particles. In conventional
quantum theory, for example, there is no
way to rigorously define the concept of
electric charge.
"640K of memory ought to be enough for anybody" - Bill Gates (1981)
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------------------------------
Subject: Re: Tempest Attacks with EMF Radiation
From: Diet NSA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 13:37:21 -0700
In article <
8eri7q$b71$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Richard Herring)
wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Diet
NSA ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>> Actually, "EMF" stands for electric & magnetic field or
>> electromagnetic field.
>
>I've never seen it used for "electric & magnetic field"
This is the way I have seen it used,
especially regarding concerns (warranted
or not) about the potentially harmful
effects of, for instance, cellphones or
microwaves. See, for example, the
website mentioned in the first post
http://www.x-ion.org OR
http://www.lessemf.com
"640K of memory ought to be enough for anybody" - Bill Gates (1981)
=================================================================
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The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RC6 (tm) as a Feistel Cipher
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 22:55:24 +0200
Tom St Denis wrote:
> At
>
> http://24.42.86.123/rc6a.c you can see my idea for a pure feistel RC6.
>
Would I be asking for too much, if I request you to post a short
abstract of your work to the group? It would facilitate discussions.
(A purely personal reason which certainly doesn't count is that I
don't like very much to switch between the newsreader and the
web browser.) Thanks.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: quantum crypto breakthru?
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 13:52:38 -0700
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> No, that's not how quantum cryptography is (usually) designed.
> What is exchanged in an intrusion-detectable manner is the *key*
> to be used for a conventional encryption. Sender and receiver
> can negotiate a key stream that has only a negligible fraction
> stolen by an eavesdropper. Protocols for doing that are tedious
> and (in my opinion) not very interesting; the important thing is
> that eavesdropping is detected (with high reliability). The
> message is then sent using the secure key (e.g. by simple XOR
> of the bit streams) over any non-secure channel; it's in effect
> a one-time pad system with a quantum solution to the key
> distribution problem.
That is a good description of it. The exciting thing about
quantum cryptography (QC) is that it seems to get provable
security without using any significant amount of conventional
crypto technology.
But I see big problems.
(1) QC cannot be used with any router, switch, or repeater
(with today's technology).
(2) QC offers no authentication.
(3) QC offers little protection against active attacks.
(4) A QC communication could leak a few bits with every
transmission.
(5) Imperfect equipment could leak some more info.
Point (4) is just rephrasing your "negligible fraction
stolen by an eavesdropper". For some applications, leaking
a small number of bits is acceptable, but for others it is
deadly.
All of these problems can be addressed by applying some
conventional cryptographic constructions, but then the
advantages of QC are negated.
I'd like to hear from anyone who think QC will ever be
advantageous for anything. What good is it?
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: U-571 movie (OT)
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 20:55:45 +0000
Paul Matthews wrote:
>
> Hello, I believe that one of failings of the original Enigma code books was
> the codes were "too" random. For example if the wheel settings for the day
> were 1-3-5, the next day the wheel settings would never have the same wheel
> in the same place e.g. the settings would not be 1-5-4 because wheel 1 was
> in the same place.
First, that's not "too random": it's "not random enough". I'm reminded of
the ancient computer heads-or-tails game from the 1960's, where the program
used a Markov model or something to predict what the human would pick next,
and consistently out-randomed him.
Second, I'm looking at a listing of the Enigma keys for the Bangkok-Tokio
German attache traffic, from the National Archives. Line 02 has rotors
II-III-I, and line 03 has rotors II-IV-I. Line 04 has V-IV-II and line 05
has V-IV-I. I don't see a case where all three are the same, but in these
100 lines there are many adjacent settings with two rotors the same in the
same position.
> Similarly the plugboard settings would never replace a
> letter with its neighbour - e.g. S would never be swapped for R or T. The
> bods are Bletchley Park quickly realised this and this substantially cut
> down the permutations to find the day's settings. In trying to be
> unpredictable, the code setters infact made it easier for Enigma to be
> broken.
In line 00 we have RS Steckered together. Line 01 has CD. Line 02 has
ON and WX. Line 03 has FG and ON. Line 04 is the first one that doesn't
have this property.
In at least one case (lines 61 and 62) the same Ringstellung is used in
the same position. This is the only one I spotted on a quick skim, so
it may be a non-randomness: with three Ringstellungen per setting and
100 settings, you'd expect 10 or 12 such matches. If I were a real
cryppie, though, I don't think I'd spend too much time counting on this.
Before you ask, there are also cases of the same letters being
Steckered together in adjacent settings: for example, EU in lines
06 and 07.
This may not refute your recollection about the "original" key lists,
since I don't know what year this list was used. For the experts here,
the rotors are drawn from only the first five, and there are 10
Steckered pairs in each -- that may help narrow down the date.
--
Jim Gillogly
14 Thrimidge S.R. 2000, 20:32
12.19.7.3.4, 3 Kan 7 Uo, First Lord of Night
------------------------------
From: "Tony T. Warnock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Silly way of generating randm numbers?
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 15:00:59 -0600
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Note that once a random number (stream of bits) is used once, it's not
random anymore. Two computations done with the same random number are
forever correlated. This may be good, bad, ugly, or indifferent.
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RC6 (tm) as a Feistel Cipher
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 21:10:07 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> Tom St Denis wrote:
>
> > At
> >
> > http://24.42.86.123/rc6a.c you can see my idea for a pure feistel RC6.
> >
>
> Would I be asking for too much, if I request you to post a short
> abstract of your work to the group? It would facilitate discussions.
> (A purely personal reason which certainly doesn't count is that I
> don't like very much to switch between the newsreader and the
> web browser.) Thanks.
Basically My modification works like this (this is just a round)...
input = (a, b, c, d)
t = F(c); a = ROTL(a ^ d, t) + S[4*r+4];
t = F(d); b = ROTL(b ^ c, t) + S[4*r+5];
t = F(a); c = ROTL(c ^ b, t) + S[4*r+6];
t = F(b); d = ROTL(d ^ a, t) + S[4*r+7];
Where F() is essentially four 8x5 sboxes xor'd together. It's a pure
feistel structure of sorts, where each 'input' portion effects the
rotation of another word, or effects the plaintext using 'xor'.
It has very quick avalanche (only needs 2 rounds) since a change in any
plaintext will most likely change the rotation of two words (at the
most) and this change will propate into the other round very quickly.
The sboxes are designed to have linear traits bounded to +- 28, and the
max value for any xor pair is 24. The sboxes also satisfy SAC (see the
new sboxgen.c I posted). The sboxes are designed this way to make their
cryptanalysis a bit tougher (i.e predicting the rotations becomes much
harder).
I did a similar modification to RC5 to increase the avalanche big time.
---
Any thoughts?
Tom
------------------------------
From: "Leo Sgouros" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: quantum crypto breakthru?
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 21:29:15 GMT
Hi Roger-
Perhaps you could look at this from an entirely different perspective.What
if it became a lost cause to ever try to intercept or break into any
transmission?
You could theorize that a co-orbital "memeplex" that shifts to the main
center of attention once an eavesdropper "looks" could carry all sorts of
misinormation, and thus change forever the trust put into such eavesdropping
for usefull intelligence.Can the networks carry a mirage that gets turned on
when someone "looks"?
Regards
"Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> "Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> > No, that's not how quantum cryptography is (usually) designed.
> > What is exchanged in an intrusion-detectable manner is the *key*
> > to be used for a conventional encryption. Sender and receiver
> > can negotiate a key stream that has only a negligible fraction
> > stolen by an eavesdropper. Protocols for doing that are tedious
> > and (in my opinion) not very interesting; the important thing is
> > that eavesdropping is detected (with high reliability). The
> > message is then sent using the secure key (e.g. by simple XOR
> > of the bit streams) over any non-secure channel; it's in effect
> > a one-time pad system with a quantum solution to the key
> > distribution problem.
>
> That is a good description of it. The exciting thing about
> quantum cryptography (QC) is that it seems to get provable
> security without using any significant amount of conventional
> crypto technology.
>
> But I see big problems.
>
> (1) QC cannot be used with any router, switch, or repeater
> (with today's technology).
> (2) QC offers no authentication.
> (3) QC offers little protection against active attacks.
> (4) A QC communication could leak a few bits with every
> transmission.
> (5) Imperfect equipment could leak some more info.
>
> Point (4) is just rephrasing your "negligible fraction
> stolen by an eavesdropper". For some applications, leaking
> a small number of bits is acceptable, but for others it is
> deadly.
>
> All of these problems can be addressed by applying some
> conventional cryptographic constructions, but then the
> advantages of QC are negated.
>
> I'd like to hear from anyone who think QC will ever be
> advantageous for anything. What good is it?
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any good attorneys?
Date: Thu, 4 May 2000 15:31:43 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
says...
>
>
> Jerry Coffin wrote:
>
> > That depends. A patent contains a set of claims that describe
> > exactly what the patent covers. To infringe a patent, you have to
> > use each element (or a reasonable equivalent of it) that's described
> > in at least one independent claim of the patent.
>
> Tahnks. I suppose you mean 'one element' instead of 'each element'.
No -- each and every element of at least one independent claim must
be used for direct infringement to take place.
There ARE a couple of other forms of infringement I suppose I should
mention. The primary one is contributory infringement. This was
invented primarily to keep people from building infringing products
but then selling them in pieces, none of which infringed by itself.
To that end, contributory infringement is limited to situations in
which something can infringe when used in conjunction with something
else AND there is no substantial non-infringing use for the patent.
For example, assume somebody has a patent on a particular way of
connecting a trailer to a car. Somebody else might sell a trailer
hitch that would infringe the patent, but only when/if it was
actually mounted to the car and a trailer was connected to it. They
can probably be held liable for contributory infringement because the
trailer hitch doesn't have any real use except for connecting the
trailer to the car. The company is probably going to hard a hard
time convincing a court that "paper weight" or "doorstop" is a
substantial use, even if neither one would infringe. OTOH, a company
that makes cars probably is NOT liable for contributory infringement
because cars have lots of real uses that don't involve trailer
hitches at all, not to mention this particlar kind of trailer hitch.
The other possibility is inducement to infringe. This is basically
just knowingly encouraging others to infringe a patent. For example,
I know the RSA encryption algorithm is patented. If I put up a web
site that encouraged people to use it without getting a license, I'd
probably be liable for inducing them to infringe.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (VictorW318)
Subject: [ADV] Gartner InfoSec Conference June New Orleans
Date: 04 May 2000 21:49:47 GMT
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------------------------------
From: JCA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
uk.media.newspapers,uk.legal,alt.security.pgp,alt.privacy,uk.politics.parliament,uk.politics.crime,talk.politics.crypto,alt.ph.uk,alt.conspiracy.spy,alt.politics.uk
Subject: Re: Sunday Times 30/4/2000: "MI5 builds new centre to read e-mails on
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 14:37:00 -0700
If I were in the UK I would set up a little cron job to send 3DES (or
something
like that) encrypted messages to friends in the UK a few times per night.
Hopefully
the MI5 will realize soon, after attempting to crack a few of them, how futile
their
efforts are.
Come to think of it, I might start doing it here in the UK, in order to
throw the NSA
off balance.
I am sick and tired of Big Brother governments that insist on meddling in
my
affairs and on telling me what is good for me - and all this with the money I
am
paying them with my work.
NoSpam wrote:
> http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2000/04/30/stinwenws01034.html
>
> MI5 builds new centre to read e-mails on the net
>
> Nicholas Rufford
>
> MI5 is building a new £25m e-mail surveillance centre that will have the
> power to monitor all e-mails and internet messages sent and received in
> Britain. The government is to require internet service providers, such as
> Freeserve and AOL, to have "hardwire" links to the new computer facility so
> that messages can be traced across the internet.
>
> The security service and the police will still need Home Office permission
> to search for e-mails and internet traffic, but they can apply for general
> warrants that would enable them to intercept communications for a company or
> an organisation.
>
> The new computer centre, codenamed GTAC - government technical assistance
> centre - which will be up and running by the end of the year inside MI5's
> London headquarters, has provoked concern among civil liberties groups.
> "With this facility, the government can track every website that a person
> visits, without a warrant, giving rise to a culture of suspicion by
> association," said Caspar Bowden, director of the Foundation for Information
> Policy Research.
>
> The government already has powers to tap phone lines linking computers, but
> the growth of the internet has made it impossible to read all material. By
> requiring service providers to install cables that will download material to
> MI5, the government will have the technical capability to read everything
> that passes over the internet.
>
> Home Office officials say the centre is needed to tackle the use of the
> internet and mobile phone networks by terrorists and international crime
> gangs.Charles Clark, the minister in charge of the spy centre project, said
> it would allow police to keep pace with technology.
>
> "Hardly anyone was using the internet or mobile phones 15 years ago," a Home
> Office source said. "Now criminals can communicate with each other by a huge
> array of devices and channels and can encrypt their messages, putting them
> beyond the reach of conventional eavesdropping."
>
> There has been an explosion in the use of the internet for crime in Britain
> and across the world, leading to fears in western intelligence agencies that
> they will soon be left behind as criminals abandon the telephone and resort
> to encrypted e-mails to run drug rings and illegal prostitution and
> immigration rackets.
>
> The new spy centre will decode messages that have been encrypted. Under new
> powers due to come into force this summer, police will be able to require
> individuals and companies to hand over computer "keys", special codes that
> unlock scrambled messages.
>
> There is controversy over how the costs of intercepting internet traffic
> should be shared between government and industry. Experts estimate that the
> cost to Britain's 400 service providers will be £30m in the first year.
> Internet companies say that this is too expensive, especially as many are
> making losses.
>
> About 15m people in Britain have internet access. Legal experts have warned
> that many are unguarded in the messages they send or the material they
> download, believing that they are safe from prying eyes.
>
> "The arrival of this spy centre means that Big Brother is finally here,"
> said Norman Baker, Liberal Democrat MP for Lewes. "The balance between the
> state and individual privacy has swung too far in favour of the state."
------------------------------
From: Ichinin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Fixed: Sboxgen tool
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 23:57:44 +0200
Runu Knips wrote:
> And I think its impossible to build any function where at least
> half of the bits changes between two possible inputs (except in
> trivial cases).
Explain:
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/hash/sha/
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/hash/mds/md5/
(In my mind, building a S-Box, based on the output of a one way
hash function in OFB mode, is just a question of creativity.)
A Separate question:
Where can one find the original SAC specification? (PDF/PS)
(Seems like it was published before '81 so it's not on "the" cd.)
Regards,
Glenn
Novice crypto guy
Sweden
______________________________
Yes - the email adress is real.
------------------------------
From: Paul Koning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GPS encryption turned off
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 18:01:19 -0400
Paul Schlyter wrote:
>
> In article <8eraha$5rq$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ...
> > I don't think it's the same situation. Satellite TV's don't have to
> > be rekeyed under battlefield conditions and they don't have to be
> > simultaneously rekeyed all over the world.
>
> That's only because a TV satellite doesn't cover the whole world. It
> usually doesn't even cover all of the visible hemisphere of the world.
Neither does GPS; in fact, GPS satellites are in lower orbits
(a few thousand miles if memory serves) than TV satellites (which
are in the Clarke orbit).
paul
------------------------------
From: Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any good attorneys?
Date: Thu, 04 May 2000 15:06:34 -0700
Jerry Coffin wrote:
> The other possibility is inducement to infringe. This is basically
> just knowingly encouraging others to infringe a patent. For example,
> I know the RSA encryption algorithm is patented. If I put up a web
> site that encouraged people to use it without getting a license, I'd
> probably be liable for inducing them to infringe.
That is still free speech. To get nailed, you usually have to be
selling a product with substantially no noninfringing use, and
know customers are going to use it to infringe.
------------------------------
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