Here are my comments on Hushmail and ZipLip:
HUSHMAIL
Hushmail publishes their design and it seems to be generally well
constructed. However it is extremely important for your readers to
understand that the security of their HushMail account depends
*entirely* on the strength of the passphrase they select. HushMail
acknowledges this in their technical description:
http://www.hushmail.com/tech_description.htm
"The user creates any passphrase he or she wishes. The strength of
the system directly correlates to how hard it would be to guess or
brute force this passphrase. Users should be told clearly to create a
strong passphrase."
However the advice that Hushmail actually gives users under "Choosing
a Good Passphrase" is buried pretty far down in their help system and
is not adequate in my opinion:
"The strength of the system is equivalent to the strength of your
passphrase. For
example,
?Mysistermary, Wasonce11?
would be a good example of a strong passphrase. The passphrase is an English
sentence, easy to remember; however, it includes both letters and numbers, thus
increasing the strength of the passphrase.
When choosing a passphrase, keep in mind that you will have to type
it every time
you log into your HushMail address. Keep your passphrase in a safe
place. If you
forget your passphrase, Team Hush cannot retrieve it for you! "
The average user who even bothers to read that text will still not
have a clue as to how to create a strong passphrase.
Take a look at my Diceware page http://www.diceware.com which
includes step by step advice on what users can do to create a strong
passphrase -- one that they can be confident really is strong. It is
a good idea for users to prepare their passphrase before they start
the account creation process since it takes a while to do it right.
Note that the standard password advice (6-8 characters with letters
and numbers) is nowhere near good enough for use with Hushmail.
ZIPLIP
Unlike Hushmail, ZipLip does not make a technical description of
their security approach available on their Web site (at least, I
could not find one). That is a red flag, in my opinion. They also
rely on passwords, but give no advice about how to create strong
ones. Indeed they seem to encourage the 6-8 character model which is
totally inadequate in this kind of application.
Feel free to contact me if you need more info,
Arnold Reinhold
>Hello,
>
>I'm working on a story that mentions several encryption systems, and I've
>heard that many companies often claim they have good products when in fact
>they have the equivalent of snake oil. John Gilmore suggested that I check
>in with the folks on this mailing list. I'd be interested to hear if any of
>these companies/products have problems that I, and Circuits readers, should
>be aware of. Here are the ones that I have looked at for this story:
>
>Freedom/Zero Knowledge Systems
>PGP
>Anonymizer.com
>Hushmail/HushCom
>ZipLip.com
>PrivacyX (I'm aware of the security problem publicized in November with the
>Web browser system)
>
>Thanks in advance for your time.
>
>Best regards,
>Lisa Guernsey
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>____________________
>Lisa Guernsey
>Reporter, Circuits
>The New York Times
>229 W. 43rd Street
>New York, NY 10036
>212-556-5905
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
