At 05:54 AM 5/27/00 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: >David Honig wrote: >> >> >> Yes but *once* you've verified the RTL (and from them the masks) >> you don't have to worry about some stray applet hosing your security. >> You do with software. > >Errr ... you do with an FPGA, surely? Yep. By definition, reprogrammable logic is mutable, succeptible to code changes. But very accessable vs. an ASIC. A secure 'closed' PDA that used an FPGA would put its config in a write-once memory and make it tamper-resistant. The tamper-resistant packaging is only to protect it from others while you shower or sleep, not from you tinkering with it. Simply prohibiting over-the-air upgrades in the architecture is a good start.
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
- Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products John Young
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Dan Geer