Hi --
bear wrote:
On Thu, 2 Oct 2003, Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote:R. L. Rivest and A. Shamir. How to expose an eavesdropper. Communications of the ACM, 27:393-395, April 1984.
Ah. Interesting, I see. It's an interesting application of a bit-commitment scheme.
Ok, so my other mail came far too late to be useful to you ;-)
Why should this not be applicable to chess? There's nothing to prevent the two contestants from making "nonce" transmissions twice a move when it's not their turn.
Maybe you have already a more advanced thing in mind than I do, but if your protocol would then look just like this--
- Alice sends first half of cyphertext of her move - Bob sends first half of cyphertext of random nonce - Alice sends second half - Bob sends second half
and vice versa, consider this:
- Alice sends first half of cyphertext of her move (to Mitch) - Mitch sends first half of cyphertext of random nonce (to Alice) - Alice sends second half - Mitch sends second half
- Mitch sends first half of cyphertext of Alice's move (to Bob) - Bob sends first half of cyphertext of random nonce (to Alice) ...
I.e., you would need a protocol extension to verify the nonces somehow-- if that's possible at all-- or are you just faster than me, and have thought about a way to do that already?
Thx, - Benja
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