Eric Rescorla wrote:
So what's the status?, the MD5 collisions has been confirmed by Eric Rescorla (taken the type into consideration), the MD4 by David Shaw, what about Haval and RipeMD?.Check out this ePrint paper, which claims to have collisions in MD5, MD4, HAVAL, and full RIPEMD.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf
The authors claim that the MD5 attack took an hour for the first collision and 15 seconds to 5 minutes for subsequent attacks with the same first 512 bits.
I did a test on the RipeMD results and couldn't get the results written. Anybody else having the same problems?
Any news on Antoine Joux and his attack on SHA-0? how did he create the collision previously announced on sci.crypt?
Eli Biham -- has collisions on 34 (out of 80) rounds of SHA-1, but can extend that to probably 46. Still nowhere near a break.
Antoine Joux -- his team announced the collision on SHA-0 earlier this week. There is concentration on the so-called "IF" function in the first 20 rounds... f(a,b,c) = (a & b) ^ (~a & c). That is, the bits of a choose whether to pass the bits from b, or c, to the result. The technique (and Eli's) depends on getting a "near collision" in the first block hashed, then using more near collisions to move the different bits around, finally using another near collision to converge after the fourth block hashed. This took 20 days on 160 Itanium processors. It was about 2^50 hash evaluations.
Xiaoyun Wang was almost unintelligible. But the attack works with "any initial values", which means that they can take any prefix, and produce collisions between two different suffixes. The can produce the first collision for a given initial value in less than an hour, and then can crank them out at about one every 5 minutes. It seems to be a straightforward differential cryptanalysis attack, so one wonders why no-one else came up with it. The attack on Haval takes about 64 tries. On MD4, about 4 tries. RIPE-MD, about 2 hours (but can improve it). SHA-0 about 2^40 (1000 times better than Joux).
Xuejia Lai clarified that the paper on E-print has been updated with correct initial values. They were initially byte-reversed, which they blamed on Bruce Schneier.
Greg.
Regards,
Mads Rasmussen Open Communications Security
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