On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:48:40PM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote: > > Given that many real organizations have hundreds of front end > > machines sharing RSA private keys, theft of RSA keys may very well be > > much easier in many cases than broader forms of sabotage. > > Or we could make it easy to have one separate RSA key per front end, signed > using the main RSA key of the organization.
This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3), and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release. For HTTPS, there is little indication yet that any of the major browsers are likely to implement DANE support in the near future. -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography