On 30/06/13 at 07:32pm, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> > I'd love to see a revitalisation of remailer research, focussing on
> > unlinkability (which we know many people would benefit from) rather
> > than sender anonymity (which fewer people need, and which is prone to
> > abuse that discourages people from running mixes).
> >
>
> I'd also like to see revitalisation of remailer research. Though
> anonymity as Tor is designed is specifically about unlinkability. To
> reduce it to sender anonymity is pretty ... ridiculous. What one does
> with an anonymous communications channel is up to them - many people do
> actually want that feature for chatting, web browsing, news, email, etc.
>
Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
[1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability (David Chaum)
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
