On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 10:01 PM, James A. Donald <jam...@echeque.com>
wrote:
If /dev/urandom seeded at startup, and then seeded no further, bad, but not
very bad.
If /dev/urandom seeded at startup from /dev/random, then should block at
startup.
If /dev/urandom never blocks, bad. Should block at startup waiting to
receive 160 bits from /dev/random, and never block again.
On 2013-08-17 12:33 PM, shawn wilson wrote:
I don't follow this - I understand why lack of entropy should block
urandom but, why shouldn't it block on a running system that
<low_bound?
Once /dev/urandom has 160bits of true randomness, can generate
cryptographically strong pseudo randomness for an unenumerably long time.
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