On 11/25/2013 08:09 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: > Let's first cut-off the massive passive traffic analysis, then improve > current systems to provide some added protection against metadata, > focusing in a far future, when the new system got already wide adoption, > make it perfect.
New work on improving hop-by-hop security for email and other things is getting underway in the IETF. [1] Basically the idea is to document stuff that can be turned on already in current deployments (to the extent possible) that gets you PFS and modern TLS ciphersuites. Pre-working-group charter discussion for this is being directed to the apps-disc...@ietf.org list for now, or if folks aren't keen to get on that list, feel free to send me comments and I'll make sure they get into the pot. I'll send a mail here when the WG is officially kicked off (in a few weeks hopefully) with a pointer to the eventual wg mailing list. That does address the short-term/quick-win stuff that we can get for foo-over-TLS protocols like SMTP, IMAP etc., but doesn't address end-to-end mail security, for lots of the reasons already stated in this thread. So if you think there's value in that short-term work too, then I'm sure more help and expertise will be welcomed. Personally, I'm not at all confident that we can do something that provides end-to-end security, can be deployed at full Internet scale and is compatible with today's email protocols. But if others are more optimistic then I'm all for 'em trying to figure it out and would be delighted to be proven wrong. Cheers, S. [1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf-announce/current/msg12140.html _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
