At 2:18 PM -0400 6/21/02, Ed Gerck wrote: >A DoS would not pitch one client against one server. A distributed attack >using several clients could overcome any single server advantage. A >scalable strategy would be a queue system for distributing load to >a pool of servers and a rating system for early rejection of repeated >bad queries from a source. The rating system would reset the source rating >after a pre-defined time, much like anti-congestion mechanisms on the Net. >Fast rejection of bogus signatures would help, but not alone.
I had already thought of this approach, but wanted to add to it a CPU limit on the client end. Hash cash with a server provided problem seems a good approach there. Cheers - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The principal effect of| Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | DMCA/CBDTPA is to | 16345 Englewood Ave. [EMAIL PROTECTED] | prevent fair use. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]