On Thu, Sep 26, 2002 at 02:45:12PM -0700, John Gilmore wrote: > [...] > > After getting that getting started, though, I suggest beginning a > brute-force attack on the GSM cellphone encryption algorithm. That's > in use in hundreds of millions of devices worldwide, protecting (or > failing to protect) the privacy of billions of phone calls a day.
Is A5/3 deployed yet? If not, a brute force attack is not needed, for A5/1 and A5/2 more efficient tools exist to cryptanalyse it. Even in real-time, although you might need to invest in some hard disk space before being able to eavesdrop and intercept. See the following paper for more information: "A. Biryukov, A. Shamir and D. Wagner, Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC" As for A5/3, I'm not really sure what key length network operators are/will be using, 64-128 bits are allowed in the design requirements documentation. The specification should be available on the 3GPP website. A5/3 is based on Kasumi. Cheers, Ralf -- Ralf-P. Weinmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> PGP fingerprint: 2048/46C772078ACB58DEF6EBF8030CBF1724 --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]