Ed Gerck wrote: > Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal > that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic > voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to > solve than the silent subversion of e-records. > > For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by > using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, > obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the > vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it.
As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a mechanical voting machine. The partial defence in all three systems is that the voter should be able to void the vote after photographing a "receipt" to hand over later to the vote-buyer, and then cast a real vote. In the UK, for example, you can obtain a new ballot paper from a polling station official in exchange for a "spoiled" one. I believe Rebecca Mercuri has always suggested that a voter should be able to confirm whether a receipt printed by an electronic voting machine correctly records their intended vote, and if not to void it. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]