-Caveat Lector- from: http://jya.com/tsdocs-gertz.htm <A HREF="http://jya.com/tsdocs-gertz.htm">Top Secret Documents - Gertz</A> ----- 26 May 1999. See Betrayal excerpts: http://www.washtimes.com/investiga/gertz1.html. See also secret documents on BMD/ABM: http://jya.com/bmddocs-gertz.htm 25 May 1999 Source: Betrayal, Bill Gertz, Washington, D.C., 1999. ISBN 0-89526-317-3. Thanks to Bill Gertz. Selections from an Appendix of 59 images of classified government documents, pp. 219-84. Gertz on code words: "UMBRA and GAMMA are code words designating special intelligence obtained from intercepted electronic communciations. NOFORN means that 'no foreign' nationals should be permitted to see it, and ORCON is the intelligence marking signaling that material contained is 'originator controlled' and cannot be distributed further without the National Security Agency's permission." (p. 152) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [pp. 226-25] Key findings of a 1996 CIA report show that Russian control over nuclear weapons is weak. (2 pages) Top Secret UMBRA NOFORN-ORCON GAMMA Item [Seal of the Central Intelligence Agency] Intelligence Report Office of Russian and Eurasian Analysis Office of Weapons, Technology and Proliferation Prospects for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons (C) A Research Paper This report was prepared by Jerry Sparks, Office of Russian and Eurasian Analysis, and Julie Grimes, Office of Weapons, Technology and Proliferation. The draft was reviewed by analysts in DIA and NSA, who have somewhat different views (see footnote 3). Comments and queries are welcome arid may be directed to the Chief, Security Issues Division, ORE, on (703) 482-5552 or secure (93) 52625. (U) Handle via COMINT Channels Reverse Blank Top Secret ORE 96-10007CX WTP 96-100099CX September 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Top Secret UMBRA NOFORN-ORCON GAMMA Item Key Findings Infomation available as of 28 August 1996 was used in this report. (U) Prospects for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons (C) The Russian nuclear command and control system is being subjected to stresses it was not designed to withstand as a result of wrenching social change, economic hardship, and malaise within the armed forces. Moreover, some evidence suggests that, despite their official assurances, high level Moscow officials are concerned about the security of their nuclear inventory. Adding to our concerns are significant gaps and inconsistencies in our information about the command and control of Russian nuclear weapons: •Some reporting indicates that echelons below the General Staff -- such as SRF command posts -- have the technical ability to launch without authorization by political leaders or the General Staff. •Human sources have repeatedly warned that the controls over some tactical nuclear weapons are poor; these appear to be the weapons most at risk. •There also are conflicting reports that Russian ballistic missile submarines carry valid launch codes on board for emergency use. (S NF) We continue to assess the possibility of unauthorised launch or nuckar blackmail as low, because many of the safeguards built into the old Soviet system are still in place. A severe political crisis, however, could exacerbate existing problems in military-political relations and widen internal fissures in the armed forces, especially is control of the military -- already demoralized and corrupted -- were to break down. Such a crisis could raise concerns about nuclear control: •An array of evidence indicates that political authonties could not prevent the General Staff from launching nuclear weapons on its own initiative. •Nuclear-armed units conceivably could become involved in conspiracies to threaten or blackmail perceived enemies or political authorities; a rogue submarine crew might have the autonomous ability to launch at least tactical nuclear weapons. (S NF) Handle via COMINT Channels iii Reverse Blank Top Secret ORE 96-10007CX WTP 96-100099CX September 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [p. 242-45] These excerpts from two 1996 CIA reports state that Russia is increasing production of advanced air defense systems for export. Moscow used negotiations with the United States on regional missile defenses to delay and restrict U.S. missile defenses in order to enhance the marketability of Russian systems. (3 pages) Top Secret UMBRA EURASIA _______________________________________________________ Russia: New Production of SA-12 SAMs for Possible Export (S NF) Satellite imagery suggests that a surge in production of SA-12 surface-to-air missiles is imminent: thc imagery shows that last month at least 38 SA-12A canisters were moved into the production buildings at the Verkhnyaya Salda missile assembly facility which has been almost inactive for two years. -- Because deployment of the missdes to Russian units ended in 1992 and the forces probably do not need large numbers of new missiles, any surge in production is probably intended for export. (S NF) Special intelligence and clandestine sources indicate that Russia has negotiated sales with a number of countries, including China, India, the UAE, and Cyprus. There is no evidence that any contract has been signed, however. -- The missile would provide an anti-tactical-ballistic missile capability to countries concerned about tactical ballistic missile threats. -- Export sales would boost SA-12 production facilities, whose domestic orders had fallen dramatically since the breakup of the USSR. (TS U NF OC) -CIA, NSA- Top Secret 17 June 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Russia: SA-12 Production Resumes Verkhnvaya Salda, 28 Mar 1996 (S NF) [Photo of SA-12 facilities and map of region omitted here] Secret NOFORN 353547PM5 5-96 Top Secret 17 June 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Proliferation of Advanced Air Defense Systems (U.) Special intelligence, clandestine reports, and press reports indicate Russia has recently concluded several contracts to sell modern SAM systems and their technology. Included in these sales are the first exports of the SA-15, SA-19. and SA-11 to countries other than former Warsaw Pact members. -- According to a source of the US military, a Peruvian group recently went to Russia for training on the SA-19 Tunguska gun-missile system in anticipation of receiving the system in two to three months. The SA-19 is the first deployed system to incorporate guns and missiles on a single, self-propelled platform. -- Satellite imagery shows that India received six SA-19 systems in February. By late March, India expected to receive another SA-19 shipment, according to special intelligence. -- Finland will soon receive Russian Buk SA-11 SAM fire units as part of an arms-for-debt-retirement arrangement worth about $210 million, according to press and US Embassy reports. Russian test range activity and press reports indicate the deal may include a mix of SA-11 and the higher performance SA-X-17 missiles; the latter has not yet been deployed with Russian Ground Forces. (TS U NF) Russian press reports assert that such sales have helped the missile builders avoid collapse. The sales also contribute to funding further air defense R&D and production. -- The director of a radar production plant recently said that the sale of the SA-12 to the US saved the SA-12s design institute and manufacturing plants. (U) -CIA, DIA, NSA- Top Secret 3 June 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [p. 265] The text of this 1996 U.S. intelligence report discloses that North Korea's widespread famine has led to cannibalism in parts of the country, revealing the troubled state of the nation. (1 page) TOP SECRET CODEWORD/EXDIS DPRK: All the Fine, Young Cannibals (SS) Incidents of cannibalism have begun to punctuate reporting on North Korea's deepening food shortage. Reported occurrences so far have been limited to the far northeast, a remote and chronic food-deficit reaion. (SS) The North's internal security apparatus has provided details of three cases -- one of which prompted Kim Jong I1 personally to demand that those responsible be severely punished, according to special intelligence. Lurid rumors are causing paranoia and apprehension among the populace. Kim Jong I1 reportedly has ordered the party's central inspection committee to investigate the scope of the problem, thus elevating it to a national-level concern. (SS) Senior South Korean officials are aware of the cannibalism -- the ROK Defense Security command collected the information -- and the reports are too sensational not to leak. When they do, President Kim Young Sam, who has adopted a hardline stance and played down the seriousness of the North's food shortage, could have a political problem. Public opposition to more food aid has already begun to soften; this story could accelerate the trend, raising serious questions about Kim's judgement and -- more important for Koreans -- his morality. (SS) (SECRET SPOKE) TOP SECRET CODEWORD/EXDIS February 29, 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [pp. 266-67] This September 1996 CIA memorandum reveals that China secretly continued to sell nuclear weapons-related equipment to Pakistan after promising the United States it would halt such transfers. (2 pages) TOP SECRET UMBRA NOFORN ORCON GAMMA Central Intelligence Agency [Seal] Washington, D.C. 20505 14 September 1996 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: China and Pakistan Discuss US Demarche on Nuclear Assistance 1. Chinese officials -- probably from the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) -- recently met with Ghulam Kibna, Pakistan's nuclear and missile procurement officer in Beijing, to discuss the 30 August US demarche on China's sale of diagnostic equipment and a furnace to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan, according to an intercepted message. Kibna said Chinese personnel were already in Pakistan to install the equipment, which an intercept in August indicated was to be delivered on 2 September. -- A Chinese nuclear official informally told our Embassy on Wednesday that the equipment was sent late last year or early this year, but he claimed not to know the final end user at the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. -- The Pakistanis' expectation of the 2 September delivery, however, indicates either that the Chinese shipment scheduled in January did not occur or that it may have been only a partial shipment. (TS U NF OC G) 2. In the aftermath of CNEIC's ring magnet sale to Pakistan and China's 11 May commitment not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, senior-level govennment approval probably was needed for this most recent assistance. The Chinese told Kibna they needed end user certificates for the sale and all future dual-use shipments and other equipment for Pakistan's unsafeguarded facilities and vowed to discuss the certificates only with a "third party" -- apparently the US -- probably to demonstrate that Beijing is complying with its May commitment. (TS U NF OC G) 3. The PAEC's chainnan told Kibna any decision to share documents with others would require the approval of Pakistan's President or Prime Minister. Kibna suggested possible language for the false end user certificatess to make it appear that one item -- possibly the diagnostic equipment -- was intended for the safeguarded Chasma nuclear power plasm which Chinese firms are building. -- The intercept indicates Kibna also suggested to the Chinese that all remaning contracts, apparently for unsafeguarded facilities, be canceled and new ones drawn up naming unobjectionable end users. -- Kibna claimed the Chinese reacted positively to the idea, but added this kind of agreement is "dangerous." Such a subterfuge probably would require the approval of senior Chinese Govemment leaders (TS U NF OC G) _________________ This memorandum was pnepared by Ken Sichel and Ray Bogusz of the office of Weapons Technology and Proliferation with a contribution from Ted Clark from the office of East Asian Analysis. The author can be reached on 70481 secure. TOP SECRET UMBRA NOFORN ORCON GAMMA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ TOP SECRET UMBRA NO FORN ORCON GAMMA US Intelligence Collection Jeopardized 4. The Chinese reportedly told Kibria the "secret"-- apparently the latest sale -- had leaked in Pakistan. In response, Islamabad ordered Kibna to stop using telephones and faxes and to confine future messages to the diplomatic pouch. -- If implemented, the order will severely limit our ability to monitor Chinese-Pakistani nuclear and, to a lesser extent, ballistic missile cooperation. -- It also could slow down Pakistani procurement. (TS U NF OC G) TOP SECRET UMBRA NO FORN ORCON GAMMA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [p. 268] The text of this 1994 U.S. intelligence report shows that China secretly sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan. (1 page) Pakistan: M-11 Update Pakistan has ordered a further payment to China on the 1988 M-11 deal, and Chinese engineers plan soon to provide further M-11 training to the Pakistani army. Though we continue to receive reports that M- l l s are in Pakistan, the army has made no plans for field deployment and is just beginning to formulate an operational doctrine for the system. Pakistan on August 22 made arrangements to pay China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation $15 million on the 1988 contract for M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment, according to special intelligence. We have no indication of upcoming shipments or other events that would explain the timing of this payment. The last known payment on this contract -- $83 million -- was in late 1992 for unspecified "goods" shipped at that time; subsequent reporting has provided strong evidence that missiles were part of the cargo. A Chinese team is expected to arrive at Pakistan's Sargodha missile facility in September to provide training on the M-11, probably on the handling of spare parts, according to special intelligence and a clandestine source. This team probably is separate from one that reportedly will arrive later this year -- once the Sargodha facility is complete -- to unpack and assemble M-11s. This latter team's arrival has been repeatedly delayed by the Pakistanis, ostensibly because of the need to complete construction at Sargodha, but almost certainly also because of the greater likelihood of US detection of the missiles once assembled. At least some of the M-11s that had been dispersed at military locations throughout Pakistan are now being stored at Sargodha, according to a clandestine source. But we have yet to see operational missiles on imagery. April imagery showed canisters at Sargodha similar to ones seen at the M-11 production facility in China. But a missile-handling exercise was under way at Sargodha at that time, and the canisters were assessed to be mock-ups for use in that exercise. (TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [p. 283] This excerpt from a 1997 CIA "National Intelligence Daily" report shows that Russia arranged $10 billion to $12 billion in economic deals with Iraq. (1 page) Top Secret UMBRA EURASIA ______________________________________________________ Russia: Economic Agreements To Be Signed With Iraq (TS U NF) A Russian delegation headed by Energy and Fuels Minister Rodionov left yesterday for Baghdad with $10-12 billion in economic agreements to be signed. The delegation includes the directors of at least nine oil companies, the chief of the Rosvooruzheniye arms exporting firm, and of finials from the Foreign Economic Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Industrial Ministries, according to special intelligence. -- The large number of oil industry executives reflects the focus the Russians have given to oil projects. (TS U NF) Russian officials have said publicly the pacts to be signed involve Russian development of the West Kurna and North Rumayla oilfields, two of the Middle East's largest, as well as expansion of the Haditha-Rumaila oil pipeline and Nasiriyah-Baghdad gas pipeline, all Soviet-era projects interrupted by the Gulf war. -- According to press reports, production from the fields will be used to settle Iraq's $10 billion debt to Russia. (C NF) Moscow has pledged to honor UN sanctions but has indicated it is eager to be in position to pursue its economic interests. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Aziz recently assured Russian officials when he was in Moscow that Iraqi officials would give priority to Russians in the execution of strategic projects. -- The size of these deals and the possibility other states will follow suit could generate new efforts in the UN to ease the sanctions. (C NF) -CIA, DIA, NSA- Top Secret 17 March 1997 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Transcription and HTML by JYA/Urban Deadline. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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