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<A HREF="aol://5863:126/alt.conspiracy:538034">CIA Operations in China</A>
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Subject: CIA Operations in China
From: Ralph McGehee <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 19 July 1999 08:24 AM EDT
Message-id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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A Paramilitary Operation in China
Introduction:
From the late 1940s until about ??, the CIA has run paramilitary
operations in China. Ken Knaus, a former CIA officer in his book,
Orphans of the Cold War, details the CIA's Tibetan operation. Other
CIA operations supported the Chinese Nationalist invasion of China
from Burma in the late 1940s early 1950s -- which failed but created
a drug smuggling force existing to this day. The CIA conducted
operations from the offshore islands of Kimoy and Matsu, air-dropped to
"dissidents" in the interior, operated from Taiwan and Hong Kong and ran
worldwide operations trying to recruit Chinese officials.
Beginning in 1983, Congress created and funded the National Endowment
for Democracy an off-shoot of the CIA. Since then NED has directed numerous
operations to change the government in China. It is curious that many
in Congress damn the Chinese for espionage operations in the U.S. while
Congress goes about trying to overthrow their government. Also DCI George
Tenet recently stated he wanted more operations aimed at China. Political
efforts to demonize the Chinese surely are being bolstered by CIA domestic
disinformation operations.
I have posted a number of items re CIA/China. I must note that
this effort is aimed at defending U.S. interests. I foresee another
period of demonization and operations against China -- possibly
resulting in another Vietnam -- this time the results could be even
more disastrous. (I should note the personal harassment that increases
with my efforts to inform -- this in spite of the fact that CIA has
written me numerous letters stating I may use any information in
the public domain.)
Ralph McGehee http://come.to/CIABASE
A Review of "Orphans of the Cold War":
The U.S. for years, during the 1950s and 1960s, backed the Tibetans
with arms, military training, money, air support and etc. The operation
failed. Tibetans were killed, but China's hold over Tibet was never
shaken. By the end of the 1960s, the effort ended, leaving the
Tibetans embittered and abandoned. CIA provided an annual subsidy of
$180,000 to the Dalai Lama from late 1950s through the 1960s. A
new book "Orphans of the Cold War" by John Kenneth Knaus, a former
CIA operative, says in 1951 the Truman administration tried to
persuade the Dalai Lama to leave Tibet for exile. Later his flight into
exile wasn't voluntary. Knaus found that the CIA's subsidies to the Dalai
Lama lasted, from about 1951 until 1974. By 1969, "the decision had
already been made to abandon Mustang [the headquarters in Nepal for
the Tibetan guerrillas] for operational and not geopolitical reasons."
CIA misled the Tibetans into thinking they had American support
for an independent Tibet. Los Angeles Times 6/16/99
Edited extracts from Orphans of the Cold War:
1951-79 Once under way an operation like this (support of
Tibetan resistance) acquires a psychological and bureaucratic
momentum that is difficult to stop. Preserving the operation
becomes an objective in itself. 324-5 (Comment: ala Vietnam).
1951-60 the primary objective of Tibetan operations per Sam Halperin,
of CIA had little to do with helping the Tibetans. It was to impede
and harass the Chinese Communists. The same policy motivated the CIA
program to help the Indonesian rebel colonels overthrow Sukarno in
1958. Pressure for both programs came from the State Department.
The decision to support the Tibetan resistance was made in the
summer of 56. 140.
1942-1945 -- OSS project re Tibet was codenamed FE-2,
and was approved May 42 was defined as a "reconnaissance mission
via India to Tibet, whose purpose was to move across Tibet to Chungking,
China while making [military-like] surveys. [Blissful ignorance
about Tibetan politics still prevailed when the US launched
its covert action program several years later. 5,6.
1947-49. Dr. Soong (a Chinese Nationalist leader) stated Tibet was
not a separate nation - it was part of China. The State Department held
fast to its support for China's sovereignty over Tibet. 12,13.
Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother in 49 began his
life's work as both a political adviser and his government's
emissary in negotiating with foreign governments. 48-9.
1950 - The plan was for Topgay to take over the Kham area, while
the Amdo was took over the province of (Qinghai). The rebels to
propose to Lhasa authorities to recognize the two provinces as part
of "Greater Tibet" and join in a united fight against the Chinese for
Tibet's independence. CIA via Patterson came into the picture. Patterson
remained for years in India where he was involved in several U.S. covert
operations. 59-60. Comment: The term a "Greater Tibet," has been used
more recently to include about one-third of all of China).
In 1950 Just before the Korean war the U.S. called in representatives
of the British to discuss plans to "encourage and support Tibetan resistance
to Communist control." No CIA representatives listed among participants but
guidance was available from the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC),
the CIA's center for covert action. With the beginning of the Korean war --
CIA was instructed to initiate psychological warfare and paramilitary
operations against Communist China. 62-3.
1952-56 In this period the Indians were interested only in
supporting intelligence operations in Tibet, but Chinese Nationalist
representatives in 1952 offered to back paramilitary operations in Tibet.
136.
1953-75 With Allen Dulles as DCI, the rebellion in
Tibet was tailor-made for a covert action program to challenge
the Communists. But the U.S. knew little re the Tibetan resistance.
In 56 Gyalo agree with CIA representatives to train a pilot group of
six Khampas in guerrilla war and radio commo and then parachute them back
into Tibet to provide regular reports on the insurgent movement.
The six were flown to Saipan in 12/56. They were trained in commo,
guerrilla tactics, intelligence, and the use of small arms up to 60 mm
mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles. The CIA's China Mission in the
Philippines closed after a series of unsuccessful operations to
threaten Chinese control of the mainland. 139.
1955-75 Gompo a trader from Litang took charge of national
resistance and CIA supported him. Throughout the fall of 57 the
Khampas and Amdowa comrades fought the Chinese. Phala served as
a buffer between Gompo to prevent the Dalai Lama from
acknowledging the violence. in 58 Ken Knaus lectured Lobsang Samtem
and eight others. Lobsang was a brother of the Dalai Lama. For Knaus
it was the first of 7 most satisfying years. Two teams had completed
training on Saipan and had parachuted into Tibet the previous September.
In the spring of 58 after the first CIA trained men were in contact with
Gompo -- he took his men into action with the Chinese. His organization
was named the Freedom Fighters for Religious and Political
Resistance (VFF). The first drop of arms to Gompo by CIA was organized
via India. First of these drops in July 58. Number of drops
insufficient for the 28 different groups of Freedom Fighters.
There were thirty airdrops during the next 3 years by CIA's airline,
the Civil Air Transport -- the staging area was Thailand.
>From 59, all drops of men and equipment was from C-130s with USAF
markings removed. This allowed doubling loads. From 57 to 61 the
CIA dropped more than 500,000 pounds--250 tons of
equipment, arms, ammo, radios, medical supplies and other gear and
hand-operated presses. Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado -
from Memorial day 58 where Tibetan resistance training was conducted
for the next six years. 154-56.
1958-65 Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist operations on the mainland -
supported by CIA China mission in Japan and later the Philippines
(closed down in 56). Operations irresponsible. 156.
1959-64 John Hart Chief of CIA China Operations,
said the Tibet program was "special" with no opposition within the
United States Government to whatever the CIA proposed - he recalled
a sense of romance re the Dalai Lama and his cause. Everything
was fair game, and in those freewheeling days approvals were given
orally and few records of operational detail were kept. State posed no
opposition and the Pentagon "fell all over themselves to be helpful."
161-2.
1950-65 The Chinese Nationalists airdropped a radio to a local
Tibetan tribal chieftain in the Aba Autonomous Region of Sichuan -
this team unable to organize operations and the team leader escaped back to
Taiwan. This was the Nationalists last direct involvement in Tibetan
resistance activities, although they had dropped men and supplies to
Moslem dissidents in the northeastern Amdo Region. 185.
1959-64 Radio team accompanying the Dalai Lama into India urgently
requested U.S. "help...send weapons for 30,000 men by airplane."
Tibetans trained at the CIA site in Colorado were ready to be parachuted
back and help start up guerrilla war. Chinese attacks took much of
the equipment. Allen Dulles said the Chinese were more effective than
anticipated. 186-8.
1959-64 CIA hired a (U.S.) PR firm to help the Tibetans publicize
their cause. 204.
1955-65 In 59 US's difficulties in winning political
support for Tibetans did not reduce efforts to train and equip
Tibet's own resistance forces. Rationale for these operations, even after
the Dalai Lama fled to India, was resistance would validate his claim
[to fame] with the international community. U.S. interests
would be served by forcing Mao to divert his resources to counter
guerrillas. It was also U.S. policy to contest Communist control
of China. The U.S. in December 1959 informed the Chinese Nationalists
that its program of developing resistance inside China would have
full U.S. support. The Nationalists planned 3,000 special forces to
"restore freedom to the mainland by political means." 214-6.
1956-61 A training center in Colorado was used to provide instructors,
leaders and commo for guerrilla warfare for Tibetans. Camp staffed
by vets of earlier PM program in SEA. CIAers respected the Tibetans.
Camp Hale in Colorado had conditions similar to Tibet. Camp called Dumra.
None of the instructors spoke Tibetan at the start of the seven years that
the camp served as a base. Mr. Zeke a trainer. The communications training
for 17 seventeen years, facilitated the link between Washington and Tibet.
A detailed discussion of the training given. 218-219.
1951-65 Operations resume inside Tibet. 9/19/59, nine Camp Hale trainees -
Khampas - were airdropped back into Tibet. An informer told the Chinese
and they had to flee to India. In that same month 3 other teams totaling
18 men where dropped to Gompo Tashi's area -- 200 miles northeast of Lhasa.
First arms drop delivered 126 pallets of cargo - M-1 rifles, 4 machine guns,
and 2 radio sets - details re follow-up arms drops. The Durma-trained
graduates taught operating as guerrillas - but they traveled with
their families and hers they could not abandon. The Chinese by the
spring of 60 had either killed or scattered the men and their families
and herds. Five escaped to India. In another area the pattern continued with
trained men, their families and herds and within six months the Chinese
bombed and scattered this force. A final team of seven was dropped
in the spring of 61. To the CIA the Tibetan resistance was homogenous
and we were ignorant of the tribal realities. 226-28.
1951-65 The fall of valiant volunteers marked the end of CIA's
active involvement in air operations in Tibet. Of the 49 men
dropped in Tibet since 57, only 12 survived - ten of these escaped
to India. Lhamo Tsering and Gyalo Thondup attributed failures to
several factors. The resistance fighters would not or could not
accept the advice of the trained people to fight as guerrillas
and instead fought frontal battles. Operations were in infertile
areas that could barely feed its own people let alone act as a
guerrilla force. The Chinese controlled the air and ground, could
locate and annihilate the resistance. There was no communication among
the different operational areas. Lhamo Tsering's criticism of the CIA's
failure to provided equipment for the groups to communicate
with each other, share intelligence and coordinate their movements is
valid. The equipment was withheld lest the Chinese monitor
the transmissions. 233-4.
1961 trained Tibetans attacked a Chinese convoy and killed all
members of the convoy. The commander's pouch was captured in
tact with more than 1,600 classified documents. 249.
1962-64 U.S. support for Tibetan resistance increased - the
Indians now became major partners. As a consequence of
the border war between India and China. The Tibetan resistance movement
began an involuntary change. Instead of focusing on fighting for their
independence, the Tibetans became defenders of their host's borders.
263-269.
1961-64 Operations in a New Era. The new Kennedy Administration
upgraded Special Forces Training at Fort Bragg and established a
special counterinsurgency committee under General Maxwell Taylor.
The new Tibetan-manned Special Force Frontier (SFF) aka Establishment 22
received the US's full endorsement. The SFF home base was 120 miles
from the Tibetan border in India. Gyalo Thondup said that until 1962
the Indians had refused his appeals to train Tibetans for resistance
inside Tibet. This changed with the border defeats and U.S. aid.
The Indian Intelligence Bureau wanted the Tibetans to join SFF - they wanted
6,000 troops but trained a force twice that size. The men were joined by two
companies of Tibetan women, were given 6 months of basic training
and supplemental training by CIA and Indian instructors in commando
tactics, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, etc. But the Indians used them
as scouts inside Tibet. From border bases they conducted cross-border
reconnaissance missions to place sensors for detecting nuclear
and missile tests and devices for intercepting Chinese military
communications. After prolonged discussions with CIA, they reached
an agreement -- 4 groups would operate inside Tibet,
and three in Nepal. Trainees at Camp Hale were to be used in
creating an in-depth Intelligence capability inside Tibet.
A parallel effort was to build a long-term program around
the Dalai Lama. 271-4.
1964 The US Special Group to keep the
political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive and to build a capability
for resistance. A monthly subsidy of $15,000.00 for the Dalai Lama
in India was to be continued. The $500,00 annual subsidy was continued.
New Delhi established a Combined Operations Center to assume direction
of the 133 Tibetans trained at Camp Hale and of guerrilla operations
based at Mustang, but not command over SFF, which was exercised solely
by the Indians. The U.S. underwrote the costs of operations, trained
the agents and gave guidance. The Tibetans manned the operations, but
the Indians controlled the area and thereby the operations. The Center
worked surprisingly well. Gyalo Thondup tried to call the shots for the
Tibetans, but as a one-man foreign minister, Intelligence chief, and
political adviser to his brother the Dalai Lama [he was overextended].
Two previous air drops in 1961 provided arms for seven of the sixteen
companies. In May 65 the U.S. decided to make the last drop which
included 250 rifles, 1000 grenades, 6 mortars, 36 Bren guns, etc.
Starting in early 1964 and continuing for the next three years, 25
teams were sent into Tibet mostly in central and western Tibet -
results were disappointing. The teams found little support among the
people. By 1967 it became clear that the risks were not worth the
small Intelligence take and their limited ability to
organize a resistance. They were called back to India.
279-82.
1964-75 India gave tacit approval for new Tibet offices opened
by Gyalo Thondup in New York and Geneva in the spring of 64. Later
an office was opened in London. The U.S. reaffirmed it did not
recognize Tibet as an independent entity. But the offices abroad
exists to this day. 283.
1964-74 CIA financed training young civil servants for the
Dalai Lama at Cornell. The seventeen graduates of the first two
groups of these trainees continued to work through the seventies,
and some even now at intelligence installations in India, the
Office of Tibet in New York, the Tibetan language section
of All-India Radio, the new Tibet Freedom magazine at Tibet House in
New Delhi, or in minor government posts in the Tibetan government in
exile at Dharamsala. Like the creation of the Cornell cadre,
Tibet House was one of the more lasting tangible contributions
CIA made to the Tibetans. 284-7.
1951-72 The talks between Nixon and Mao Tse-tung in 72
ended official U.S. support for the Tibetan cause. From the early fifties
encouraging Tibetan resistance to those meetings, when Kissinger reported
in 72: "We are now in the extraordinary situation that with the exception
of the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China might well be closest
to us in global perceptions." [We see the shift in US policy].
309.
1951-74 late in 74 the U.S. cut off its subsidy
it had been paying to the Dalai Lama. The Tibetans regarded
this as the final breach of the commitment made to them in 1951.
The Tibetans saw themselves as tools of the Cold War being
discarded and had to accept this with quiet resignation.
310.
1951-79 The Dalai Lama said thousands of lives were lost in
the resistance - the U.S. had involved itself not to help Tibet
but only as a Cold War tactic to challenge the Chinese.
He told an author "while motives for using force might be good,
the unforeseeable results may be bad." 313.
1951-79 The U.S. State Department wrestled with the questions
of Tibet's legal status and compromised on recognizing Tibet's
independence in fact but not in law. Thirty-five years later
it told Congress the "Historically, the United States had
acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet...and since
1966, US policy has explicitly recognized the Tibetan Autonomous
Region as part of the People's Republic of China." 320.
1950-75 in the fifties neither the CIA nor the State Department
had any depth of knowledge about Tibetan people or of the topography
of their country. CIA had to deal with them using interpreters.
Another Intelligence failure was an underestimation of the Chinese
capability and willingness to wipe out the Tibetan resistance - and
CIA was surprised at Chinese [military strength]. 322.
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Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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