-Caveat Lector- > July 22, 1999 > > The Silence at the Times > > Memo To: Howell Raines, NYTimes editorial page editor > From: Jude Wanniski > Re: Chinese Espionage at the National Labs > > There has been a lot going on in the last week or so about the > China Espionage story that had been so big in the news pages of > the Times since Jeff Gerth broke the story in April. I’ve been > keeping the Times editors informed from the first days about my > suspicions that the story was incorrect in all particulars -- > that the Beijing government did not penetrate our national > nuclear labs, that it stole no secrets from us, and that our > scientists did not give any to them. I informed you when the > report commissioned by Jack Kemp of Empower America was issued, > based on the evaluation and assessment of a nuclear physicist who > had worked at the labs and served as deputy assistant secretary > of Army in the Reagan administration. The report of Dr. Gordon > Prather concluded that the report of the Cox Commission, which > treated the Chinese espionage story as a proven fact, was as > empty of evidence as I had suggested would be the case all along. > As far as I know, the Times has not had a line about the Prather > Report, which Jack Kemp has been defending in his talks with the > news media, most recently on MSNBC. My working assumption has > been that the Times is embarrassed at having trumpeted the spy > story without having it sufficiently vetted by people who knew > something about nuclear weaponry and the operation of the labs. I > also assumed the story would have "legs," moving forward in a way > that would force the Times to put aside its embarrassment and let > its readers in on the news that maybe the Chinese did not > penetrate our national labs and now did not possess all our most > vital nuclear secrets. > > In the last week, Rep. Jack Spratt [D-SC], a member of the Cox > Commission who signed its report, now has issued his own report > detailing his misgivings about its findings. His report, which > can be found on his website at > http://www.house.gov/spratt/n10626.htm was written without > knowledge of the Prather Report yet offers an assessment that > almost is identical to that of Dr. Prather. The only mystery to > me is why he would sign the Cox Commission report when his > misgivings cover almost every word of the commission report. If > you have not seen Spratt’s statement, I suggest you go to the > address I provided and read it in its entirety. Then I suggest > you go to the website of Insight magazine > http://insightmag.com/articles/story3.html where you will find a > report by Sam Cohen, a prominent nuclear scientist who is > credited with development of the "neutron bomb," although Cohen > points out in the article that a true "neutron bomb," a > zero-fission bomb, has never been developed. Cohen practically > ridicules the Cox Commission for its findings, with many of the > same arguments in the Prather Report and in the Spratt statement > of misgivings. > > Once you read the material, Howell, I think you will agree that > this is an important story and deserves space in the Times even > though it makes Jeff Gerth’s "scoop" look bad. My belief is that > the Cox Commission deserves to be flogged for its sloppiness -- > putting together a report because it wanted to believe in Chinese > espionage so much that it did not want to vet the findings with > experts in nuclear weaponry. Rep. Chris Cox [R-CA], who was > assigned the committee chairmanship back when Newt Gingrich was > speaker, is a Catholic with very pronounced views on China’s > human rights record, who I believe has been, as a result, biased > in his inquiries from the outset. As a fellow Catholic, I’ve told > him China’s problems with the Vatican can be worked out if the > Vatican agrees to recognize Beijing, not Taiwan, as the > sovereign. We don’t have to find reasons to antagonize the > Beijing government, giving their hawks reason to shout down those > who are eager to expand a constructive engagement with the United > States. I was a hawk for more of my life, a Cold Warrior, and I’m > ready to take up intellectual arms against Beijing if our > national security was at issue. I not only do not believe it is, > but that my old Cold War allies are bent on igniting an > adversarial relationship. That I will not buy. This is no small > matter, Howell, which is why I have spent so much time on it, > giving heartburn to many of my friends in the Republican Party > because I’ve been questioning the reliability of the Cox report. > (Although the more news comes out as in Insight, the more my old > friends are realizing they may have been too quick to believe in > the spy story themselves.) > > Please pass this memo on to Joe Lelyveld and Mr. Sulzberger. They > surely have been following the story as it has progressed and may > agree that the Times should swing into action, embarrassment or > not. > > XXXXX {{From polyconomics.com}} ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ And now for Spratt: > Statement of U.S. Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) > Release of the Select Committee Report > Technology Transfers to China > > > > > The Select Committee was chartered in the wake of allegations > about U.S. satellites launched on Chinese rockets. The > allegations involved mainly Space Systems / Loral and Hughes > Space and Communications International, Inc. Three rocket > failures over 38 months were followed by accident investigations > that were not licensed by the State Department, and resulted in > technology transfers to China. It was initially alleged that U.S. > encryption technology had been compromised when the three > satellites went down with their launches. These rumors turned out > to be unfounded. It was also alleged that Motorola had helped > China design a platform for off-loading Iridium satellites that > was a precursor to a post-boost vehicle for off-loading MIRV's. > This too was unfounded. Finally, it was alleged that Hughes and > Loral had helped China improve the accuracy, range, and payload > of its rockets and missiles. The report deals with their launch > failure investigations in detail, and concludes that China's > rockets and missiles may have gained reliability, but not range, > payload, or accuracy. > > In 1988, the Reagan-Bush Administration decided to let U.S. > satellites be launched on Chinese rockets. In taking this step, > we effectively decided to underwrite the development of Chinese > rockets. Since 1988, firms like Loral and Hughes have used > Chinese rockets to launch 28 satellites, 12 approved by the Bush > Administration, 16 by the Clinton Administration. 3 of the 28 > were failures. Each time Chinese launch is used, the Chinese > build another rocket and test their technology at a third party's > expense. The committee finds that China has acquired technology > from Loral and Hughes that will improve the reliability of its > rockets. But the greatest contribution to reliability probably > comes from having its rocket launches, 28 to date, paid for by > someone else. > > The decision to allow Chinese launch raised the risk of > technology transfer. No firm like Loral or Hughes is likely to > consign a satellite worth millions of dollars to China Great Wall > Industries for launch and be unconcerned with the reliability of > its rockets. Nor can an underwriter or broker like Johnson & > Higgins or an end-user like Intelsat afford to be indifferent. > All of these parties have such a compelling stake in the success > of the launch that what has happened should have been foreseen. > > To some extent, the risks were foreseen, and export controls were > imposed to avert them. This committee was created to find if the > relaxation of these controls, and particularly the removal of > communication satellites from State Department licensing, > permitted the transfer of rocket or satellite technology. The > committee has found that transfers did take place, but not with > respect to satellites. There is no reason to believe, for > example, that any encryption technology has been lost. As for > rocket technology, the transfers go more to reliability than > payload, range, or accuracy. The committee has also found that > though the State Department is regarded as more rigorous and > rule-driven than Commerce, technology transfers took place under > both State and Commerce. > > The specific flaw in the Long March 3B, found after its failure > to launch the Intelsat 708, was a badly soldered wire on its > Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). An interagency review by our > government concluded that the IMU used by Long March 3B is not a > likely candidate for any current or future PRC intercontinental > ballistic missiles. The classified report gives convincing > reasons for this conclusion, but they are redacted in the > unclassified report. The report cites the interagency conclusion, > but offers its own contrary conclusion several pages later: "The > rocket guidance system on which Loral and Hughes provided advice > in 1996 is judged by the Select Committee to be among the systems > capable of being adapted for use as a guidance for future PRC > road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, although if a > better system is available, it is more likely to be chosen for > that mission." > > The specific flaw in the Long March 2E, found after its failure > to launch the Optus B2, was in the vertical seam of the fairing. > The Chinese were so reluctant to admit this defect that it took a > second launch failure and a Hughes "tutorial" in rocket science > before the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) made > adequate changes in the fairing. The losses in this case were > more serious, but the engineering is as basic as torque, and in > time, the Chinese would have resolved the problem themselves. > > Without obtaining a license from State, Hughes took up an > "in-depth" analysis of defects in the LM 2E's fairing, working > right beside CALT scientists. Hughes performed extensive "coupled > load analysis," testing the rocket and satellite under different > forms of stress. The "coupled load analysis" that Hughes shared > with their Chinese counterparts does apply to ICBMs, and could be > useful if China developed a missile with multiple re-entry > vehicles. But according to the Intelligence Community, "China has > had the technical capability to develop a multiple independently > targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) system for its large, > currently deployed ICBMs for many years, but has not done so." > CALT did not seek the coupled load analysis from Hughes and > resisted the idea until Hughes completed its accident analysis > and proved that the Chinese fairing, and not the Hughes > satellite, was the problem. > > The most significant technology that Hughes transferred to China > was not the structural fix proposed for the fairing, but the > "tutorial" they gave their Chinese counterparts in failure > analysis and diagnostic techniques. The same is true of Loral. > This assistance, according to the Department of Defense, is > likely to make their rockets and their missiles more reliable; > and this was a "defense service" under the International > Trafficking in Arms Regulations that would not have been approved > if a license had been sought. The gain is hard to quantify > because it goes to reliability, and not the range, payload, or > accuracy of Chinese rockets and missiles. > > What have we learned from all of this? For one thing, we have > learned that the culture of compliance with export control rules > is weak, especially in these cases where the satellite makers > have so much riding on a successful rocket launch. Self-interest > overrides self-policing. We need tighter rules, closer oversight, > tougher sanctions, more monitors, better training, and more > export control officers. But we are lucky to learn this lesson > without having lost very much. Our losses in this case were not > comparable, for example, to the Toshiba case, where we lost the > technology that is our submarines' secret to quietness. > > If the committee had ended its work here, the report would have > raised concerns about exports controls and technology transfer, > but nothing earthshaking. In mid-October, however, committee > staff learned that design information about the W-88 warhead had > been lost to Chinese espionage. The committee heard testimony > about these losses at hearings on November 12 and December 16. > Due to the shortness of time, the record on this subject is much > thinner than the extensive record compiled on Loral and Hughes. > > The committee reports that in 1995, the CIA learned from a PRC > walk-in of nuclear losses to Chinese espionage. The National > Security Advisor, Samuel R. Berger, was informed of espionage at > Los Alamos National Laboratory in April 1996, but the President > was not briefed until 1997, and Presidential Decision Directive > 61 was not issued until February 1998. The Administration has > been criticized for not acting quickly or vigorously enough. But > in July 1996 the House and Senate Intelligence Committees > received a similar briefing, and neither sounded an alarm or took > action. The lag seems to be owing partly to an incomplete > investigation and fragmentary, uncertain facts. The Select > Committee required three staff briefings, one from the FBI and > two from DoE, two hearings, and multiple telephone calls to get > the facts for this report, which was prepared two years after the > National Security Advisor was first briefed. > > One is still baffled by how this investigation has been handled, > but security lapses and a lack of coordination between the FBI > and the DoE date back to the early 1980s when information about > the W-70 was lost from Livermore and red flags were raised but > not heeded. The first clear call for beefed-up security and > counter-intelligence against China came then, in the early 1980s, > when loss of W-70 design data was confirmed. The W-70 is an > enhanced radiation weapon or "neutron bomb." When China tested a > neutron bomb in 1988, the call for stronger security should have > been unmistakable. > > Among those calling for tighter security were the General > Accounting Office and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. > Responding to reports from the GAO, the Carter Administration set > up an independent interagency group reporting directly to the DoE > IG on security at DoE facilities. This group engaged experts in > anti-terrorism and protection of classified material. In 1981, > the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs was replaced by the > Reagan Administration with an appointee from Los Alamos who > terminated the independent interagency group. The Oversight > Subcommittee of Energy and Commerce, under Chairman Dingell, kept > up the drumbeat for an independent Office of Safeguards > Evaluation, and was answered by Secretary Herrington with > assurances of "significant progress." In 1991 and 1992, the > Oversight Subcommittee received six GAO reports critical of DoE's > safeguards and security. These cited lax internal controls and > weak accountability for classified documents. During this period, > between 1984 and 1992, design information about the W-88 warhead > was stolen by Chinese agents. > > All of these facts raise serious concerns, but need to be kept in > perspective. Unlike the Loral and Hughes investigations, there > was too little time to conduct an independent investigation of > this subject before the committee's charter expired. The > committee relied heavily on a few witnesses, and did not > substantiate their testimony with experts at the national > laboratories or interagency review. As a result, there are > statements in the report that will not bear scrutiny. I objected > to a number of these in our mark-up of the "Overview," but not > all were deleted or revised, and some of the revisions are still > inadequate, in my opinion. > > Take the first page of the "Overview," for example. It makes one > statement that is simply incorrect. It says that the United > States has not deployed an enhanced radiation warhead or a > neutron bomb. In fact, we have deployed three: the W-70 on the > Lance tactical missile; the W-66 on the Sprint interceptor; and > the W-79 on an 8-inch artillery round. This is not a serious > mistake, but a report of this importance should not contain such > mistakes. Two other sentences are much more serious. The opening > sentence states that "The PRC has stolen design information on > the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons." That's a > sweeping charge. It is followed by the statement that "The stolen > U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on > thermonuclear weapons on a par with our own." That's even more > alarming, but are these assessments accurate? > > Here is the Intelligence Community's best estimate of what the > PRC has obtained: Late 1970's: Design information on the W-70 > enhanced radiation warhead. 1984-1988 : Design information on the > W-88 warhead and its RV. 1984-1988: Classified (but not design) > information on re-entry vehicles and weight-to- yield ratios of > the W-62 (Minuteman II), W-76 (Trident C-4), W-78 (Minuteman > III), and W-87(Peacekeeper). > > The Intelligence Community has does not know whether weapons > blueprints or design documents have been stolen. As for loss of > neutron or enhanced radiation technology in the mid- 1990s, the > evidence is limited; there is no settled conclusion within the > Intelligence Community; but the information, if stolen, is > esoteric physics that may have little military application. > > The "legacy codes" that were down-loaded from Los Alamos' > classified computer, if they have been stolen, are an alarming > loss. And the down-loading itself raises serious questions about > security in our national labs. A lot of what our scientists know > about nuclear materials is empirically based rather than > scientifically understood. The "legacy codes" are mathematical > equations that model physical phenomena observed in the explosion > of a thermonuclear weapon. They record, for example, how neutrons > and protons move through matter; how shock waves go through > materials; how heat is transferred. This is a treasure-lode of > empirical data, and if the PRC has obtained these codes, they > will enhance their ability to model nuclear explosions. > > But these legacy codes are not three-dimensional models of bombs > or warheads, or CAD/CAM designs, and even if these codes have > been lost, it is a reach to say that "stolen U.S. nuclear secrets > give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par > with our own." The United States has conducted 1,100 nuclear > tests and built more than 30,000 nuclear weapons. China has > conducted fewer than 50 nuclear tests, and built a small fraction > of the weapons we have built. The PRC has tested a neutron bomb > and a W-88 derivative, but the PRC has not replicated the W-70 or > the W-88. In addition to a complex physics package, the W-88 has > sophisticated electronics and thousands of parts, which the PRC > would be hard put to replicate. In view of the enormous > differences in experience and capability, it is simply not > accurate to say that China's design is on a "par" with our own. I > disagreed when the witness said this before our committee; I > disagreed when our committee marked up the report; and I disagree > now. > > Harold Agnew was Director of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory > when the W-88 was developed. Here is his assessment of our > potential loss, as stated in his letter published in The Wall > Street Journal on May 17, 1999: "The design of the W-88...is > actually quite old. The basic test was done by Los Alamos > Scientific Laboratory when I was director, and I retired 20 years > ago. It is a ‘delicate' and neat package. Having the computer > printouts, as I remember them, gives a general idea, but actually > being able to manufacture the total system from a computer code > is a different matter. No nation would ever stockpile any device > based on another nation's computer codes." > > If the committee had the time to hear from witnesses like Dr. > Agnew, statements like those I have cited probably would not have > survived the cut. There are, unfortunately, a number of places > where the report reaches to make a point, and frankly, > exaggerates. The report states, for example, that "the PRC has > stolen a specific U.S. guidance technology used on current and > past generations of U.S. weapons systems." The guidance component > in question is employed on aircraft like the 747 and has been > commercially available for years, though it does require an > export license. I moved in mark-up to strike this reference, to > no avail. > > The report also states that the PRC has stolen data about an > electromagnetic gun, and "Such technology, once developed, can be > used for space-based weapons to attack satellites and missiles." > This program was started in the late 1970s by DARPA, and funded > for awhile by SDI but eventually dropped from its budget. It is > in basic research today as an Army program, and is so > experimental that the Army does not expect to have a weapon > system using this technology before the second decade of the next > century. > > In the end, none of our security measures, counter-intelligence > efforts, or export controls is likely to be totally foolproof or > completely adequate. The Chinese are not on par with the United > States, but they are capable, and they do have other technology > sources, like Russia. The chief purpose of our controls is to > impede and slow down the pace at which China develops nuclear > weapons and missiles. One of the surest devices to this end is > the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). I offered an amendment > in mark-up to underscore this fact, but the committee did not > accept it. Nevertheless, the CTBT would impose major impediments > on China, while imposing minor impediments on us. Without saying > it, this report makes that fact more clear than ever. > >From www.house.gov/spratt/n10626.htm A<>E<>R ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Believe nothing, no matter where you read it, or who said it, no matter if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your common sense." --Buddha + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A merely fallen enemy may rise again, but the reconciled one is truly vanquished. -Johann Christoph Schiller, German Writer (1759-1805) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + It is preoccupation with possessions, more than anything else, that prevents us from living freely and nobly. -Bertrand Russell + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Everyone has the right...to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 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