-Caveat Lector-

an excerpt from:
The Secret War Against The Jews
John Loftus & Mark Aarons©1994
ISBN 0-312-11057-X
658pps -
St. Martin’s Press
175 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY, 10010
--[4a]--
CHAPTER 17

REHEARSAL IN ANGOLA

Most of the Western histories of Israeli intelligence are quite negative. The
book Dangerous Liaison, for example, portrays the Mossad as a group of
gunrunning maniacs, shipping arms to Africa and Latin America for personal
profit. Israeli arms deals have been widely exposed and just as widely
criticized by the media.

Our sources in the Western intelligence community have a slightly different
perspective.[1] In their opinion, the Mossad's arms transfers were quite
small in scope, usually conducted at the behest of other Western nations, and
often were submerged by much larger arms deals by Western intelligence
services that have escaped public attention. Israel is a lightning rod for
the media. Over the years it has become a convenient scapegoat for other
countries' operations.

"The Jews get paid to take the blame for our screw-ups," one former Pentagon
official admitted candidly. "The American Government cannot be seen in public
as propping up violent dictators who torture their own citizens. The Mossad
trains the security teams for America's clients. That is the price of doing
business."[2] According to our sources, a small but significant portion of
U.S. military assistance to Israel is diverted to fund operations of which
Congress would never approve. It is a kickback that Israel must pay to the
Pentagon, State Department, and CIA in return for their support on Capitol
Hill.[3]

Our sources believe that Israel would not get a cent out of Congress were it
not for the support of the military, the defense industry, and the
intelligence community.[4] The myth of the powerful Jewish lobby is,
unfortunately, just a myth, as is the claim that Jews dominate the American
media. At 6 percent of the population, Jews are one of the tiniest minorities
in the United States. Half of all American Jews live in the New YorkNew
Jersey area and another group is concentrated on the southeast coast of
Florida. All the rest of the states have less than 3 percent of Jewish
voters. Jews account for less than 1 percent of the population in 80 percent
of the U.S. congressional districts. They just lack the votes to get a
foreign aid bill through on their own. They need help.[5]

Many Israelis privately fear that their country has become an eco- nomic
colony of the American "military industrial complex." Annually that complex
contributes $3.8 billion to Israel-almost ten times the amount raised by the
United Jewish Appeal in the United States. "When 20 percent. of our nation's
budget depends on American largesse, we do as the Americans ask," said one
retired Israeli officer. Whether it is training security forces for an
African dictator or running guns to the Contras, the Jews do what they are
told to do.[6]

In fairness, the Israeli involvement in under-the-table arms and covert
operations is relatively small. Jews are small-time players in the world of
international arms sales. When it comes to covert operations, the Mossad is
almost insignificant compared to the American intelligence community. When
compared to the British secret service, the Jews are Boy Scouts.

For the really dirty tricks, heavy-duty arms deals, and outrageously illegal
covert operations, the Americans turn to Britain, not Israel. The British
government has the most repressive combination of libel laws, press
censorship, and criminal sanctions against disclosing intelligence operations
of any country in the democratic world. It knows how to keep a secret from
its own press, public, and Parliament. More important, it knows how to shift
the blame to others when an operation is exposed.

While Israel has been roundly criticized for training Africans how to kill,
smuggling guns to the Contras, and shipping arms to Iran, the British secret
service was doing much worse, much earlier, and in complete secrecy. The
Western public has no idea that the Jews were set up to take the blame for a
series of British operations. To this day, the Israeli public believes that
its intelligence service originated the Iran-Contra affair in 1985. They have
never been told that the British secret service was running the arms pipeline
several years earlier, at the request of Vice President George Bush.

To understand just how thoroughly the Jews were conned into taking the blame
for recent covert intelligence scandals, we must examine how the British-Bush
back-channel evolved. According to our sources, we must look back to Bush's
largest covert operation as CIA director: the Angolan civil war.

In fact, the Angolan war was the beginning of a web of scandals that is known
by a number of names: Irangate, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the BCCI.
Compared to this, the CIA's phony oil estimates in 1976 were only a minor
fraud and had a very minor impact on Israel. In this chapter we examine the
following allegations:

During the 1970s British mercenaries supplied PLO terrorists with weapons so
the British secret service could infiltrate Middle Eastern intelligence
organizations. M16 did not warn either Israel or the United States of
impending attacks by the Palestinian terrorists.

o   When a British agent defected to the United States, the British secret
service was compelled to supply mercenaries for the Angolan war after
Congress banned CIA funding.

o   The British secret service established the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) as an intelligence collection center to track the
movement of terrorist money. The bank was later used as a covert back-channel
for arms deals and hostage ransom.

o   The involvement of CIA director George Bush with the British backchannel
in 1976 provided the model for his subsequent involvement in the Iran-Contra
affair.

o   The Carter administration was completely excluded from the BCCI-British
connection. The CIA unwittingly purchased arms for the Afghan resistance from
a PLO terrorist in the employ of the British secret service.

o   Both the British and American participants agreed to exclude Israel from
the back-channel intelligence and to use Israel as the scapegoat in the event
of exposure.

Bush may not have realized it back in 1976, but the British secret service
had replaced its Nazis with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The secret
war against the Jews had entered a new phase. Where once British intelligence
and its allies among the Dulles clique had relied on the Fascist emigres, the
modern espionage war would utilize the Arabs and their terrorist units. In
1976 the era of Palestinian and Syrian mercenaries had just begun.

The shroud of secrecy around George Bush's policy toward Israel can be
unraveled by tracing the history of a British intelligence agent who defected
to work for the CIA. His name was Leslie Aspin, not to be confused with the
American politician of the same name, or with Michael Aspin, his brother, the
convicted arms dealer. After Leslie's death in 1988, his family discovered
the archives of his employment as a contract agent for the British secret
service. Peggy Robohm, an American writer and researcher, passed them on to
us.[7]

To put it mildly, Leslie Aspin left behind an intriguing record of financial
deals, covert operations, and under-the-table deals. We have spent several
years attempting to corroborate his information because it seems to
contradict so much of the conventional history of the Iran-Contra affair.

Leslie Aspin's records indicate that he was the British intelligence agent
who became the White House bagman to the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International. It was Aspin who played a major role in Bush's plans to rescue
the American hostages held in Lebanon by pro-Iranian fundamentalists in the
mid-1980s. it was Aspin who helped Bush to cir cumvent the congressional ban
on U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Contras. More important for the story of
the secret espionage war against the Jews, it was Aspin who then helped the
White House to set up the Israelis as scapegoats for the Iran-Contra affair,
in which arms were sent to Iran and part of the proceeds used to fund secret,
illegal assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras.


Because of the importance of the issue, and the widespread confusion and
disinformation spread by a number of intelligence services, it may be useful
to start at the beginning of Aspin’s career. No one seriously can contend
that he was a reliable source. In the absence of extensive indepen-dent
corroboration, we would have dismissed his allegations out of hand.
His own 1975 autobiography begins with some candid admissions: "Leslie Aspin
is not a hero. He is a crook. He has never shot anyone, except from behind.
He became a British Secret Service Agent, not out of patriotism, or even for
money; but because he was blackmailed."[8] Even this confession is not
entirely true. There was more to Aspin than he let on. He was not really as
bad as he pretended to be. In fact, he was extraordinarily loyal to causes he
believed in, as well as to friends and family. He was a tough kid who grew up
in Britain, bold, brash, and very, very bright. In a way, he was quite
modest. Throughout the Iran-Contra affair, he preferred to let everyone think
that he was just a bit player.

Aspin was, by all accounts, a charming rogue with an exceptional skill for
espionage, a sort of working man's version of James Bond. Before dropping out
of the British military, he became a qualified paratrooper and a member of
the elite British commando force, the Special Air Service. The SAS, as we
shall see, does the British government's dirty work. It is not unusual for
former SAS men to enroll with one or more of the numerous firms specializing
in security operations, including providing mercenaries for secret and proxy
wars. There is more to such operations than adventure and moneymaking.
British intelligence carefully promotes these activities, especially when
they are consistent with London's foreign policy objectives.[9]

Aspin did not wish to become dependent on the British government for his
livelihood, so he became a smuggler. He was, by everyone's account, very good
at what he did. By 1968 Aspin had a reputation in the Middle East as the kind
of man who could move anything, anywhere, anytime, and without getting
caught. Whether it was black market cigarettes smuggled out of Yugoslavia, or
guns through Malta, Leslie Aspin was the man to see.[10]

He would have stayed happily on the fringes of the law for many years, had he
not taken on the wrong client, in the wrong country, at the wrong moment in
history. Aspin began to smuggle weapons for a PLO terrorist group known as
Black September, which was sponsored by both Libya and Syria.

In 1970 the original Palestinian population of Jordan, swelled by refugees
from Israel, were an unwelcome majority in their own country. The Hashemite
Bedouin kingdom, established by Lawrence of Arabia, Jack Philby, and the
British secret service many years before, ruled the native Palestinians with
an iron fist. The Syrian government, against the wishes of the Kremlin,
fomented a revolution to topple the pro-Western Jordanian government. When
the Palestinians took to the streets, a small Syrian tank column invaded
Jordan to aid the rebellion.

The CIA, Mossad, and the British secret service worked hard to keep King
Hussein on the throne. The rebellion was crushed ruthlessly and thousands of
Palestinians were killed. The Syrian tanks pulled out under international
pressure, to say nothing of Israeli threats to intervene in a most brutal
way, and the entire leadership of the PLO was expelled from the country. To
the Palestinian radicals, the events of that month became known as Black
September.

The Kremlin was appalled at the Palestinian debacle. The Soviets had warned
the Syrians against premature uprisings. It was Soviet policy to engage the
West not by direct military confrontation but by drawn-out guerrilla wars
that would bleed the Western allies and provoke the democracies into harsh,
reactionary policies. The protracted war in Vietnam had given Moscow the
whole idea, but in-the Middle East the Syrians had cost the PLO its best base
on the very borders of Israel.

The Soviets engineered a coup and installed a new puppet in Syria, young
Colonel Hafez Assad, who would follow the Kremlin's wishes more closely. As
president, Assad established a series of low-profile training camps for
Palestinian terrorists inside Syria. The new group called itself Black
September, in memory of the events in Jordan. Over the next two decades, this
militant terrorist organization would seize an influence in the Middle East
in inverse proportion to its size.

Assad directed his chief of Military Intelligence, Ali Douab, to supply the
Palestinian terrorists with all the arms and equipment they needed. In order
for the Syrian government to be able to deny its role, most of the arms would
have to be smuggled carefully to the Black September cells in Syria and
around the Middle East. President Assad also directed his own brother, Rifaat
Assad, the head of Syria's secret service, to work with Douab's Military
Intelligence in handling the sensitive smuggling assignment. The two Syrian
spy chiefs knew just the people to hire as agents: the Al-Kassars, a local
family specializing in drug-smuggling.

Monzer Al-Kassar was one of three brothers who handled clandestine movement
of money, drugs, and guns for the Syrians. His best friend was "the Prince of
the Coast," Rifaat Assad, the president's brother, a decorated war hero from
the Yom Kippur War and secret service chief.[11] When Monzer's brother
married Ali Douab's sister, the Syrians kept the intelligence business all in
the Al-Kassar family.


At the time it was Soviet policy to have their terrorist proxies become
financially self-sufficient through the sale of drugs. Syria had a small but
lucrative opium-heroin trade, which would, after the takeover of the Bekaa
Valley in Lebanon, become a multibillion-dollar industry supplying 20 percent
of the heroin sold in the United States. Monzer Al-Kassar had offices in
Spain, Poland, and East Germany, but his financial transactions were
laundered through a series of bank fronts in Switzerland.[12]

After being briefed by Rifaat Assad, Al-Kassar in turn recruited Leslie
Aspin. Aspin would not handle drugs under any circumstances, but he loved the
lucrative arms trade and helped recruit British advisers for the Libyan
intelligence service. Aspin freely admits in his autobiography that he
recruited a team of ex-SAS mercenaries, some of whom had already been
training members of Black September."

In his published writings, Aspin never referred to Al-Kassar by name, but
simply called him the head of "the Bank," which directed the smuggling
network. Aspin did good work and soon rose to the top of the motley crew of
former French Legionnaires, British mercenaries, and American ex-military who
worked on the smuggling ships. These high-speed boats ran cargoes past
blockades all across the Mediterranean. In 1969 Aspin graduated from smuggler
to shipper. Al-Kassar sent him to Libya.[14]

At the time, Libya's colonel Mu'ammar al-Gadhafi, was working with the
Soviets and the Syrians to arm terrorist groups in Spain, Ireland, and
Germany. Aspin was escorted to the secret school for terrorists in the
desert, which one colonel in Libyan intelligence boasted trained "people who
will strike fear into the very heart of Israel and anyone who helps them,"
and asked Aspin to supply some of his "many friends to fight for
money-mercenaries," who were needed to assist in this fight against the
Jews.[15]

So, Aspin's smuggling shop branched out from arms to human cargo. He escorted
Irish Marxists to Libya for training and recruited several of his old British
comrades to teach the terrorists how to kill, bomb, and attack more
effectively. Both the Syrians and Libyans were delighted. Al-Kassar was
pleased, and Aspin was getting rich. What none of them knew was that British
intelligence had its own source inside Black September and was watching Aspin
with growing interest. In February 1970 he had made a big mistake.

Life had been hectic for Aspin, channeling men to the secret training camp
and smuggling weapons from Libya to the Basque terrorists in Spain, so he
decided to take a long holiday in England.[16] The British secret service was
waiting for him at Heathrow Airport. It wanted Aspin to be an informant. For
three days Aspin played dumb and resisted all requests that he turn into a
double agent for M16.

Finally the British agent played his trump card: He threatened to tell the
Libyans and Syrians that Aspin was working for M16 anyway. "We and our
friends abroad have just sufficient knowledge to act against a few of the
people you have worked with and that will convince your old pals that we are
telling the truth," the British officer told him. "They will be convinced
that you have betrayed them. That will put you in the same situation that you
would be in if you actually did give us the help we require." Offered money
as a final inducement, Aspin eventually agreed.[17]

When Aspin started to talk to the British secret service in 1970, the
revelations first came as a trickle, then became a waterfall of information
about the secret world of terrorism in the Middle East. He told the agent
about the Al-Kassar family and provided all the other names of his key
contacts in the Arab world, including the Libyan colonel and the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of the colonel's European associates. He even
provided the details of the Swiss bank through which the drug and gun money
was laundered, the identities of the Irish terrorists who had been to the
Libyan school, and the names of the men, and their boats, who shipped the
Arabs' arms around the world.[18]

In the space of one conversation, Leslie Aspin became the most important
source for the British secret service in the Middle East. He was given the
code name Kovaks, then briefed on clandestine communication by his
controller, "Homer," and put on the payroll of the secret service. The
British had only one kind of intelligence operation in mind for him.

M16 did not care about the Jews, so it did not want Aspin to warn the
Israelis about arms to the PLO. Nor did the British care about its ally's
drug problems, so they did not want him to help the Americans stop Syrian
drug-running. All they wanted him to do was stop the shipments of guns from
Libya to Northern Ireland.[19] Aspin did this extremely well. In fact, his
ability to forewarn British intelligence of IRA weapons shipments earned him
a place in Irish history books.[20]

According to Aspin's version of these counterterrorist operations, they were
debacles, and his secret service controllers thoroughly botched nearly all of
them. In fact, Aspin suspected that the British secret service was incredibly
incompetent, although he made a lot of money on both sides, from M16 and the
Libyan arms dealers.[21]

Unfortunately for Aspin, the IRA had penetrated the Irish police
counterintelligence force, the Special Branch, and quickly discovered Aspin's
true role for the British.[22] He soon realized that he was becoming
expendable. From the British point of view, Monzer Al-Kassar was a much more
valuable source than Aspin. Al-Kassar was not only a friend to the
president's brother and an in-law of Syria's intelligence chief, but also,
his bank network handled the bulk of financing for the PLO, including the
drug sales and arms purchases.


The British had been looking for a way to penetrate the Al-Kassar family for
a long time. The father, Mohammed Al-Kassar, was one of the first major drug
smugglers in the Middle East. He had four sons, the second of whom, Monzer
Al-Kassar, was born on July 1, 1947.[23] Mohammed was a-member of the
powerful Alawite minority and an early supporter of the socialist Baath party
favored by Moscow. One of their Alawite proteges, Hafez Al Assad, became
president of Syria and the lifelong protector of the Al-Kassar family.
Mohammed Al-Kassar rose quickly from a smalltime drug runner to Syrian
special ambassador.[24]

It should be recalled that British intelligence had its own spies inside
Syria and discovered that the Kremlin intended to finance international
terrorist groups with drug sales. Syria and Bulgaria were to front the
networks, exchanging drugs for cash under diplomatic cover. It did not take
the British long to suspect which Syrian diplomats were involved in such
smuggling activities. Mohammed's eldest son, Ghassan, was arrested in Milan
in 1969 in connection with a stolen car ring operating out of Bulgaria.[25]

Ghassan was released, but kept under surveillance to see where the trail
would lead. On January 12, 1970, Ghassan and his younger brother, Monzer,
were arrested in Vienna for the same crime. On February 3 the brothers were
arrested again, this time in Trieste. The stolen car investigation had taken
on international significance as a possible new method for Eastern Bloc drug
smuggling, with its ramifications for the financing of international
terror.[26] The British had the Irish end of the drug ring safely under
control, but American kids were taking Monzer's drugs, and Israel's very
existence was threatened by the Arab terror squads.

Aspin, although he knew only a little of the Al-Kassars' drug business,
confirmed that the family also was running guns through Libya. He was told to
keep working for the Swiss bank network, while the British waited for their
chance to get one of the Al-Kassars on their own turf.[27]

In 1972 the Danish authorities were informed that Monzer Al-Kassar was
smuggling hashish from Lebanon to Copenhagen in stolen cars. The charges were
dropped, despite the fact that the Danes found a bag of hashish with Monzer's
fingerprints on it. In 1973, however, a warrant was issued for Al-Kassar's
arrest for trying to smuggle even more carloads of drugs into Denmark.[28]
According to the former intelligence officers we

spoke to for this chapter, the British M16 liaison was tipping off the Danes
about his every move, trying to keep the pressure on Al-Kassar.[29]

Soon after the Danish courts issued an arrest warrant on March 16, 1973,
charging Al-Kassar with international drug smuggling, the British secret
service made its move. According to our sources, M16 made the same approach
to Al-Kassar as it had to Aspin. If he cooperated, the British would reward
him handsomely. If he did not cooperate, the British would spread the word
that Monzer Al-Kassar was the informant who betrayed all the recent gun
shipments by Libya and Syria.[30]

There is some circumstantial evidence that Al-Kassar was recruited in
Denmark. Soon after the arrest warrant was issued, he was allowed to flee to
England, where he set up an import-export firm called Espargo, with a
subsidiary in Beirut. The smuggling continued, but this time under British
auspices. According to the "old spies," Al-Kassar was the "supersource."
Through him, the British could track money moving to every terrorist
organization in the world.[31] To protect him, the British were perfectly
willing to have the Arabs blame Aspin for all the botched shipments to the
IRA. By 1973 Aspin believed that the secret service was about to make him a
public scapegoat.[32]

Despite the fact that the IRA knew about Aspin, the British wanted him to go
back to Northern Ireland to carry out an assassination.[33] He deliberately
flubbed the job and escaped back to England, to the great annoyance of
"Homer." Aspin realized that his short career with the secret service was
coming to an end. In September 1974, just before the British leaked word of
his double agent role to the Irish press, he made his own plans to betray the
British and flee to the United States.[34]

As a safety measure, he had previously tipped off the Americans that the
British were not telling them everything they knew about Monzer Al-Kassar's
drug shipments to the United States. Aspin contacted Larry Katz, a narcotics
agent in the U.S. embassy in London, whom he had known in Turkey, and warned
that a trunkload of drugs was about to arrive in New York. "Homer" was not
amused when the Americans intercepted the drugs and suspected Aspin as the
source of the leak.[35] In order to continue Al-Kassar's bona fides as an
Arab terrorist, the secret service was quite willing to let his drug business
continue and keep the facts from its American liaison officers.

But that was nothing compared to what else the British were concealing.[36]
According to Aspin, at the end of 1973 he bumped into one of his old friends
from the Black September terrorist movement and got him drunk. The source:

... gleefully told me that his colleagues intended to blow up a Pan American
or El Al aircraft at Rome airport before the end of the month.

This was in December, 1973.... At the next meeting with Homer, I passed on
the information about the Arabs and made a particular point of the Rome
threat.

He promised to pass on this information to the three governments
concerned.

I'm almost positive that he never did this and the thought that I trusted him
to do so and did not make sure myself that they knew leaves me sick every
time I think of it.

Before the end of the month a Pan Am plane was blown up on the Rome tarmac.
I'll never forgive the bastard for that.[37]

The problem with Leslie Aspin was that he had developed a conscience. The
British secret service had a good thing going with Monzer Al-Kassar, and
Aspin was going to wreck it by telling the truth. Al-Kassar was the British
government's best window into the Middle East, and M16 did not want to share
him with the Americans.

The British intended to promote Al-Kassar's bank network as a cheap and easy
way to keep track of the terrorists, who trusted Monzer to mind their money
and launder it for them so they could buy weapons and explosives. The Arabs
believed in him because he kept the drug profits rolling in, but they were
curious why none of his arms shipments was reaching Northern Ireland. In
order to protect Al-Kassar, the British decided to publicly expose Aspin as
their informant.

On September 6, 1974, the secret service planted an expose on Leslie Aspin in
the Irish press. The British blew the whistle on their own agent, leaking his
true name, passport number, details of his role in one of the arms
intercepts, and his relations with the M16 provocateur, the Libyans, and the
IRA.[38] Aspin knew he was a dead man if he did not run. He evaded British
security, PLO hit men, and Libyan intelligence. In October 1974 Leslie Aspin
arrived in the United States.

As soon as Aspin's defection was known, the secret service placed Al-Kassar
in "administrative detention" in Britain. Officially he was charged with
smuggling cannabis oil to Britain. Unofficially, the British wanted to keep
him under wraps until they knew what Aspin planned to do.

After hiding out for a year, Aspin made his move. In 1975 he published his
autobiography, I, Kovaks, candidly admitting his criminal activities, his
work for the British secret service, and the manner in which he was betrayed.
However, he never used Al-Kassar's name. At the end of the book, he coyly
noted that "I have had two offers of work . . . from a government who knows
all about me but for whom I haven't yet worked."[39]

Our intelligence sources say that the first offer was probably from the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Only a handful of top people in DEA,
including Larry Katz, knew that the British had recruited Al-Kassar, who was
rapidly becoming one of the best drug informants in the world. The problem
was that the British could not expose the PLO drug network without exposing
their informant.[40]

As long as Al-Kassar worked for the British secret service, Aspin had a life
insurance policy. That was why Aspin never mentioned him in his tell-all
autobiography. Al-Kassar was his trump card over the British government.
Aspin made it clear that if he was killed, he would take Al-Kassar with him.
By the end of 1975, the British decided to leave well enough alone.[41]

So did his new employer, George Bush. In order to provide a steady stream of
income, Aspin decided to work for the new director of the CIA. Our sources in
the intelligence community say that Aspin's hiring was a closely held secret.
None of the CIA section chiefs were briefed. His information about the
British secret service's double-dealing gave George Bush the leverage he
needed to form a new, and private, relationship with the British
government.[42]

According to a number of the "old spies," it was a simple trade. The British
wanted Bush to keep Aspin quiet, and Bush wanted the British to provide
something he desperately needed: a secret army of mercenaries to fight in
Angola.[43]

The Portuguese colonial rulers finally had pulled out of their African
colonies in 1975 after decades of fighting guerrilla insurgencies. In Angola,
the pro-Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had won
the battle for power over its pro-Western rivals, Holden Roberto's National
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) and Jonas Savimbi's Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Before long, the civil war between the
groups became complicated by international intervention, first by
Western-backed South African forces, then by Cuban forces sent from thousands
of miles away. Just as Vietnam had been lost to the communists earlier in
1975, now it seemed that Angola would join the Red Empire. It was an
especially bitter pill for U.S. oil companies to swallow, as Angola contained
a fabulously rich oil deposit.

The Angolan war was Bush's first major covert operation as director of
Central intelligence, and it was going badly. According to John Stockwell,
the chief of the CIA's Angolan Task Force, it was an impossible assignment.
On November 14, 1975, the White House top-secret advisory board, the Forty
Committee, "had asked the CIA to outline a program which could win the
Angolan war."[44]

On December 2 the CIA recommended that the only way to win was to put
American advisors on the ground to direct the untrained anti-Communist
soldiers. Henry Kissinger just grunted and left without making any decision.
No one was willing to authorize another Vietnam.[45]


When Bush arrived at the CIA in December 1975, the Angolan problem was the
first mess dumped in his lap. He did not want his first operation to be a
loser, but the war was going downhill at a rapid rate. Worse, the U.S. Senate
was particularly opposed to sending American soldiers to fight in Africa and
was on the verge of ordering the CIA to terminate all of its covert
operations in Angola. There had to be some way to win the war behind
Congress's back. Eventually the White House Forty Committee approved
mercenaries as the solution, as long as they weren't Americans.[46]

Our intelligence sources insist that the only thing Bush wanted was victory.
His political future could be crippled if it were known that the first thing
he did as CIA head was to retreat and hand over Angola to the Communists
without a fight.[47] If it took foreign mercenaries to win, so be it. So the
CIA made formal approaches to the British for mercenaries and missiles. The
British government said no to the missile request, as missiles were too
easily traceable. However, it had no objections to supplying mercenaries to
the CIA behind Congress's back.[48]

To avoid embarrassment to the British government, several "private security
firms" of ex-SAS men in London are ready to carry out any sensitive operation
requested by the British government. One of the "less impressively connected
firms," run by John Banks, was assigned to help with Bush's problem in
Angola. It was Banks who provided CIA director Bush with "the British
mercenary corps for the Angolan civil war."[49]

Banks's partner, Leslie Aspin, kept his part of the CIA bargain: No mention
of Al-Kassar's name in his book. Soon after the Aspin deal was cut with the
Americans, it was safe for the British "supersource" to go back to work.
Al-Kassar was let out of administrative detention in October 1975, at the
same time the drug charges against him mysteriously vanished because of legal
technicalities. By January 1976 the first shipment of arms and mercenaries
from Britain were sent to Angola. Two of the Angola recruits, Leslie Aspin,
and John Berry later joined Al-Kassar's arms smuggling apparatus.[50]

Without informing John Stockwell, head of the CIA Task Force in Angola,
British mercenaries suddenly appeared.[51] CIA director George Bush was
keeping more than one secret from Stockwell. According to our sources, not
only were the British mercenaries being paid for by the CIA, they were being
recruited by a CIA agent named Leslie Aspin. Without Stockwell's knowledge,
Bush had sent Aspin back to London to help coordinate the mercenary
program.[52] In 1976 Leslie Aspin "turned up as an assistant to John Banks in
the mercenary recruitment scheme for Angola."[53]
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

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