-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
Secrets of The SS
Glenn B. Infield(C)1982
Stein & Day
ISBN 0-8128-8033-1
-----
-15-
America's Secret Alliance with the SS
The end of the war and the collapse of the Third Reich revealed the horror
wrought by the SS under Hitler. The world was shocked as reports of the
Holocaust became known and photographs were published of the victims found in
the concentration and death camps of Europe. The entire SS organization
became a target for Allied investigators seeking war criminals and at
Nuremberg, where the war crimes tribunal met, the SS was officially declared
a criminal organization. SS members were even shunned by many German citizens
who had helplessly observed their actions during the years of Nazi power but
who had been unable to interfere without jeopardizing their own lives.
Everywhere the SS was undoubtedly the most hated of Nazi organizations, and
public feeling in the United States was no exception. There was an outcry for
their "heads." In a freedom-loving country, the deeds of the SS were
considered so horrendous that death to the perpetrators seemed the only
answer. American government officials agreed--at least publicly.
Eisenhower's proclamation to the Germans set the tone for the Americans in
their occupation zone: "We shall obliterate Nazism and German militarism. We
shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi party, and abolish the
cruel, oppresive, and discriminatory laws and institutions which the party
has created." To follow these guidelines, the Americans, through the U.S.
military government, decided that they would denazify the 13 million
surviving German adults in their zone. Under the watchful eye of Colonel
Orlando Wilson, commander of the Public Sa disclosing all aspects of their
life during the Third Reich. Long prison terms were threatened to those
Germans who didn't fill out the questionnaire fully and truthfully. The
American counterintelligence corps, using the Nazi files found in the Brown
House in Munich, checked the questionnaires to make certain that the answers
were correct. Five major categories were defined and each German was placed
in one of the five. They were: major offenders, offenders, lesser offenders,
followers, and exonerated.
The plan seemed simple and workable. It proved complex and unworkable. After
the questionnaires were scrutinized, it was discovered that there were nearly
4 million Germans in the American zone alone in the categories requiring
trials! There were not nearly enough American personnel in Germany to handle
that many cases. A rough estimate indicated that it would take more than
eight years to complete the trials. American officials also came to conclude
that the denazification program had many failings, and that if zealously
pushed could do more harm to American interests than was at first understood.
They began to realize that all Nazi party members did not join for the same
reason. Some joined under pressure to keep their jobs, others because they
believed in the party's aims. Many wealthy persons contributed large sums to
the party and helped it grow, but never became members. And as the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated
during the postwar years, many of the "war criminals" identified under the
American denazification program became more and more valuable to the U.S.
Facing all these problems, American officials decided that they would solve
the sticky problem by turning the entire denazification program over to the
Germans.
On June 1, 1946, all denazification trials became the responsibility of the
Germans. Immediately there were two important results: The United States was
relieved of the responsibility for passing judgment on the indicted Germans,
and it became very obvious that the German judges were not going to be as
severe as the Americans had first intended to be when the program began.
Enough time had already passed that the average German citizen felt safe in
deciding not to testify against other Germans; they preferred not to be seen
as traitors. In fact, most of the Germans considered admitting that they had
played a minor role in the Nazi party, proof that they had been loyal to
their country! By right, the American officials should have been angry and
disillusioned by the debasement of the process and should perhaps have
reclaimed the denazification program from the Germans. But the world
situation was such at the time that they were more pleased than disappointed.
There was not a word of criticism when the Germans freed General Franz
Halder, Hitler's army chief of staff; Edward Jadamczik, former Gestapo chief
in East Prussia-l -Gunther Reinecke, chief SS judge; and Hugo Stinnes, the
Ruhr steel and coal industrialist; and when the courts classified Karol Baron
von Eberstein, an SS general, a minor offender. Others who received light or
no sentences were Heinrich Morgen, deputy SS judge (exonerated); SS General
Felix Steiner (minor offender); SS General Wilhelm Bruckner (three-year
sentence); SS Brigadier Alexander von Dornberg (exonerated); and Kurt Schmitt
(minor offender).
Why didn't the United States complain about the verdicts of the German
denazification courts? The ever-growing conflict between the United States
and Russia was causing great concern in Washington. The huge American
military force that had played an important role in the defeat of Nazi
Germany had been demobilized and only a small U.S. military establishment
remained in Germany. Washington had | believed that Russia, too, intended to
demobilize. Instead, Stalin had I enlarged his military force in eastern
Europe and gave evidence of, intending to move into western Europe if the
Western Allies showed any weakness. With their military strength at a minimum
American officials realized that the situation was critical. It was at this
time that a subtle change in the official U.S. attitude toward the SS "war
criminals" took place. It was decided that the SS members who had been active
on the eastern front and were knowledgeable about the Soviets and their
tactics could be of help. When the Soviets seized Czechoslovakia and
established the Berlin blockade, the public outcry against the SS acts during
the Third Reich was ignored by the American officials and a secret alliance
between the United States and the SS was instigated.
One of the first high-ranking SS officers contacted was Otto Skorzeny, who
was in a detention camp at Dachau. Skorzeny had been cleared by an American
tribunal of any war crimes, but the German denazification court wanted to try
him. United States officials were confident that the Germans would free him,
too, but when the denazification trial was postponed seven times under
pressure from Communist groups in the American zone so that Czechoslovakia
could prepare a request to have Skorzeny extradited to their country for
trial, the matter came to a head. The American counterintelligence agency
tipped off Skorzeny that they could delay the extradition request for a few
weeks with paperwork; after that, if he was still in the camp, there was
little hope of keeping him from Soviet-dominated authorities in
Czechoslovakia. The Americans arranged for him to be transferred to Darmstadt
where, with the help of some SS comrades who had still not been arrested,
Skorzeny escaped on July 27, 1948. The escape was well planned. An automobile
with American military license plates and carrying three men wearing U.S.
military police uniforms arrived at-the Darmstadt prison main gate early in
the afternoon. One of the occupants, disguised as a captain, announced to the
guards at the camp that they had arrived to take Otto Skorzeny to Nuremberg
for a scheduled hearing. Showing forged documents to the guard, the "captain"
insisted he must get the prisoner immediately so that he could get back to
Nuremberg before nightfall. The guard, convinced he was doing his duty,
turned Skorzeny over to the trio and they got into the car. That was the last
time Skorzeny was in prison.
Did the Americans help in Skorzeny's escape? The Soviet authorities were
convinced that they did and were furious. One Russian report stated that
Skorzeny had been flown to the United States, where he was being interrogated
about his knowledge of Russian military forces. Washington vehemently denied
the report and stated that American investigators were searching throughout
Europe for the elusive Skorzeny. Questioned in later years about the escape,
Skorzeny just laughed. "The uniforms were provided by the Americans," was all
he would say, referring to the military police uniforms worn by the trio that
picked him up at the Darmstadt prison camp.
If the Americans helped Skorzeny escape as the Soviets charged, what was the
reason? Even among U.S. military authorities in Europe at the time there was
confusion and mistrust. When the G-2 section of the U.S. Army in Europe heard
rumors that Skorzeny was working very closely with U.S. counterintelligence
in thwarting Soviet aggression, the assistant chief of staff immediately sent
a query to the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. The reply was
"doubletalk" at a high level. One paragraph stated: "In view of his past as
well as the notoriety received by Skorzeny in the press during past years, it
is felt that any open sponsorship or support by the U.S. government on behalf
of Skorzeny would probably expose the U.S. government to extreme
international embarrassment. However, the possibility exists that Skorzeny
has been and is being utilized by U.S. intelligence."
In a later letter, the 66th CIC reported that Skorzeny was not a source or
contact for their organization but admitted that they knew his whereabouts.
There is no question that Skorzeny was used by various U.S. agencies and
military units during this period. The confusion arises because of lack of
communication and the adherence to strict secrecy by each of the U.S.
organizations hiring Skorzeny. Each was fearful that if the American public
discovered that they were collaborating with a former SS officer, the
resultant publicity would be detrimental to their organization. CIC agents,
for example, still suspected that he had aided several high-ranking Nazis to
escape from Germany during the last days of the Third Reich, perhaps even
Hitler as had been rumored. They wanted Skorzeny out of prison so they could
follow him in hopes he could lead them to Bormann, Fegelein, Hitler, or
others of prominence. He didn't.
They did discover, however that Skorzeny and his SS comrades had an efficient
escape route out of Germany and an organization to administer it. Die Spinne
(The Spider) was organized by Skorzeny and other SS members long before he
escaped from Darmstadt. As one U.S. intelligence report stated: "The leader
of this movement is Otto Skorzeny, who is directing this movement out of
Dachau. The Polish guards are helping the men that receive orders from
Skorzeny." Die Spinne established a route of "safe houses" between Germany
and Italy, starting from Stuttgart, Munich, Frankfurt, or Bremen. From any of
these cities the SS members traveled to Memmingen in the Allgau section of
Bavaria. From there two routes took the men south to Italy, one going through
Bregenz, Austria, and the other through Switzerland. Rome and Genoa were the
destinations. It took the CIC considerably longer to learn, however, that
most of the drivers of the trucks delivering the popular American army
newspaper The Stars and Stripes were Spinne members and that behind the
bundles of newspapers were one or more other SS members en route to Italy.
The U.S. military police never checked these trucks. Working with Skorzeny in
Die Spinne were SS Captain Franz Rostel, Hermann Lauterbacher of Himmler's
staff, Hasso von Manteuffel, and Helmut Beck, among others.
Despite their knowledge of Die Spinne and the escape route, American
authorities did nothing to stop the exodus of SS members. By this time the
Korean conflict was under way and the United States was concerned about what
other action the Communists might take in other parts of the world. Many poli
tical and military officials thought that Korea was merely a ploy to attract
attention while lulling the U.S. asleep in western Europe and to draw further
troops from the already weak American occupation forces in Germany. The
ultimate aim of the Communists, according to these analysts, was to move into
western Europe and control all of Germany. Skorzeny, understanding the
situation clearly, made an offer to the Americans. He was in contact with
most of the German generals who had survived the war, knew where the SS
officers who escaped the Allies were located, and had a long list of
ex-Wehrmacht and SS soldiers, including his former commandos, who were ready
and willing to help the United States against the Russians. He vowed that he
could organize four or five divisions of veterans who had fought against the
Soviets during World War 11 and have them ready to defend western Europe or
to be transferred to Korea within a short time, if the U.S. agreed and
provided the necessary funds. It was a tempting offer and one that the
American authorities seriously considered during the critical period of the
Korean conflict.
By this time Skorzeny had set up an "engineering" office in Madrid under the
protection of dictator Generalissimo Francisco Franco, whose brother-in-law
Skorzeny had saved during the Nazi period. Actually he was coordinating Die
Spinne activities from the office as well as handling illegal arms sales. He
also managed to close a deal between Germany and Spain for the delivery of
railway stock and machine tools, a deal made possible through his SS and
German' industrialist connections. His commission earned Skorzeny additional
wealth beyond his share of the booty he'd gotten out of Germany at the end of
the war. When it became obvious that the Communists were not going to use
direct military force to take over all of Germany during the Korean conflict,
Skorzeny's proposal to gather a new SS army was refused. But the United
States government still had use for Skorzeny and his SS comrades.
As the Korean War continued it became evident to American strategists that
Germany's industrial might, especially its steel-producing potential, could
be vitally important to the Allies. The United States had limited West
Germany to no more than 11 million tons of steel production annually, but as
Peking entered the Korean War this limit was immediately rescinded. But the
question of how to quickly increase that steel production for weapons to
defend Western Europe puzzled American officials until it was suggested by
Skorzeny and other Germans that the industrial barons who had been sentenced
to jail as war criminals were needed . The most prominent of these was
Alfried Krupp, of the Krupp arms dynasty. Krupp had joined the SS in the
summer of IS3 I while still a civil engineering student at Aachen Technical
College, and eventually reached the rank of colonel. During these years the
Krupp factories perfected the Panzers and designed and built other weapons
for Hitler. During the Third Reich the Krupps controlled one hundred
thirty-eight private concentration camps where slave labor was kept. At
Nuremberg in 1948 Alfried Krupp was found guilty of war crimes and sentenced
to 12 years in prison. All his property, including the factories, was ordered
confiscated. This was the man that Hitler's commando chief suggested should
be released from prison, given back his industrial and personal property, and
permitted to rebuild his armaments dynasty. To the American public this would
have seemed heresy--but the public was not aware of what was going on at the
office of the new high commissioner of the U.S. zone of occupation.
John J. McCloy, the new high commissioner, was concerned about two matters:
the Korean conflict and the possibility of Soviet aggression in Western
Europe; and, second, the fate of the Germans sentenced to prison by the
tribunal at Nuremberg. In an effort to arrange German help for the defense of
Western Europe, he permitted Krupp to hold meetings in prison with his former
board of directors and legal staff in order to discuss the reopening of the
Krupp plants if permission to do so was granted. McCloy then established a
panel under the chairmanship of David W. Peck, presiding justice of the New
York Supreme Court, to review the sentences of the Nazis sentenced by U.S.
tribunals. The two initiatives merged on January 31, 1951, when McCloy signed
two documents: one releasing Krupp from prison, the other restoring his
property to him. The SS had won another battle, a postwar battle where the
odds had appeared unbeatable. Krupp soon had his dynasty back in operation
and within a matter of months was producing 18 million tons of steel. This
steel was of great value to the United States during the Korean crisis since
the nation's mills could not provide enough steel for the defense of both
western Europe and Korea.
Skorzeny was later revealed to be Krupp's representative in Argentina,
verification that the SS influence had certainly not died with the end of the
Third Reich. Far from it. After the United States "suggested" that West
Germany rearm and join NATO, many German generals resumed important positions
in the new military force. However, because of fear of public reaction both
in Germany and in the U.S., prominent SS officers played a minor role at the
beginning, seeking positions outside Germany. Men such as former SS
Lieutenant General Wilhelm Farmbacher; Leopold Gleim, chief of Hitler's
personal guard; Joachim Daemling, former chief of the Gestapo in Dusseldorf;
Dr. Hans Eisele, Buchenwald's chief physician; and Heinrich Willermann, the
SS doctor at Dachau; went to Egypt at the request of the U.S. to help build
up Gamal Abdel Nasser's security forces. Skorzeny spent time in Argentina as
well as Egypt helping organize pseudo-SS forces for these countries. By 1953,
101 prisoners had been released from prison under the McCloy-Peck sentence
review procedure, so many that Eleanor Roosevelt, the ex-president's wife,
demanded an explanation from the high commissioner. McCloy merely said that
he considered it a fundamental principle of American justice that accused
persons have a final right to be heard. He didn't mention that his
predecessor, General Lucius Clay, had already had each case reviewed. Nor did
he mention the real reason that Krupp and a host of other Nazis were being
released--to work with and for the United States.
Germans not as well known to the public as Krupp were released from prison
for a reason which was even more secret. Wilhelm Hoettl, an SS officer who
worked with Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of the SD who was sentenced to hang at
Nuremberg; Gerhard Pinckert, a member of a terrorist group commanded by
Skorzeny; Alfred Benzinger of the Secret Field Police; Fritz Schmidt, Gestapo
chief at Kiel; and other SS officers were quietly discharged from Landsberg
and other prisons or the indictments pending against them were dropped. Most
of them disappeared from sight under assumed names but they definitely did
not go into hiding. They became secret intelligence agents for the U.S.,
first for the military forces, later for the newly formed Central
Intelligence Agency. Of all the strange alliances between the Nazis and the
U.S. during the postwar years, this was the most secret.
The idea for the alliance actually began in 1944 when Hitler's chief
intelligence officer on the eastern front, Reinhard Gehlen, came into
disfavor with the Fuhrer. At the time Gehlen was chief of Foreign Armies East
and greatly respected by General Heinz Guderian, his superior officer. When
Gehlen reported to Guderian that the Russians were planning a huge winter
offensive and warned that the attack would crush the Nazi armies in the east,
Guderian had him repeat the prediction to Hitler personally. The Fuhrer raged
that Gehlen's report was wrong and that he should be sent to a lunatic
asylum. Guderian, angry, vowed that he, too, would go. Both men were
subsequently relieved of duty by Hitler but not before Gehien had decided
that the war was lost. Convinced of this, he made plans to protect himself
and his staff after the surrender he knew would come. At the same time, he
planned to lay the groundwork for the rebuilding of Germany. His plan was
simple. He made copies of all his important documents dealing with
intelligence work on the eastern front, put the copies into 50 steel cases,
and buried them in the Bavarian mountains. He was aware that the U.S. had no
intelligence organization operating behind Russian lines because the Soviet
Union was an ally. He was convinced, just as Hitler was, that the United
States and the Soviet Union would not remain allies long after the end of
World War 11, that the two nations would eventually fight each other over the
control of Europe.
Gehlen and a skeleton staff of his Foreign Armies East hid out in. the
Bavarian mountains after the war ended until they could surrender to the
American troops in the area. When Gehlen walked into the U.S. Army
headquarters in Fischausen in May 1945 and announced who he was, he expected
to be treated as a VIP prisoner. Instead he was sent to a prison at Miesbach
and ignored. It wasn't until Soviet agents came to the American zone asking
for him by name that the American officials paid any attention to Gehlen. It
was then that they discovered that Gehlen knew a great deal about the Soviet
forces, and that he had voluminous files detailing their disposition,
organization, and leadership. By this time it was becoming more and more
evident to the Americans that the Russians, instead Of cooperating with the
Western Allies in the difficult problem of governing the large areas of
Europe that had been liberated from the Nazis, were determined to seize
control of as much of that territory as possible. Not only did the United
States find itself vulnerable because of its military demobilization but
because it had no intelligence operation. The Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) had been disbanded under orders from President Truman and as yet no
other organization had been established to replace it.
So when the Russians showed an interest in Gehlen and demanded that he be
turned over to them, General Edwin Luther Sibert, G-2 of 12th Army Group,
interrogated Gehlen. When the German general offered to place himself, his
Foreign Armies East-staff, and his intelligence files at the disposal of the
United States under certain conditions, Sibert immediately notified General
Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff The offer was tempting, but
once again the thought of collaborating with Nazi officers so soon after the
end of the war and the realization of the public outcry that would provoke if
such a collaboration were discovered, made the two men hesitate. Finally
Smith decided that Washington should make the decision. Gehlen and three of
his officers were flown to the United States in Smith's plane.
Even in Washington the decision was not quick. It took nearly a year before
Allen Dulles, formerly the station agent for the OSS in Switzerland; Loftus
Becker; Dr. Sherman Kent; General Lucius Clay; J. Edgar Hoover; and others
decided that it would be in the best interests of the United States to take
Gehlen up on his offer. Moral considerations would have to take a back seat,
and they so advised the Pentagon.
One of the restrictions placed on the German general, however, was that he
would not use SS men in his operation. Gehlen was based at Pullach, a small
town south of Munich, and he immediately began rebuilding his intelligence
organization by reestablishing his network of agents in the Soviet zone of
occupation and in the Soviet Union itself. Without the knowledge of Sibert
and Smith initially, Gehlen combed the American prison camps for former
German intelligence agents and-managed to have them released so they could
join his organization. Among these agents were many SS men. By the time the
Americans discovered that Gehlen had duped them it was too late. The American
intelligence chiefs had become too dependent upon his organization for
information about the Soviets to disown it. After the CIA was formed in 1947,
the Gehlen group joined it as the Soviet intelligence arm and worked with the
CIA until 1956 when the organization transferred to the new West German
government as its intelligence section.
So within months after the public learned about the SS atrocities and the
worldwide condemnation of that hated organization, the United States was
actively collaborating with surviving SS members in a number of ways. This
was one of the most closely guarded secrets shared by the SS and the United
States government following the war.
pp. 193-203
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