-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
The Big Bankroll
Leo Katcher�1958,1959
Harper & Brothers
New York, NY
LCCCN 58-12452
369pps � First edition � Out-of-print
Reprint available - Amazon.com
Publisher: Da Capo Press 1994;
Trade Paperback x, 369
ISBN: 0306805650
--[1]--
Chapter 20
The Workingman's Friend
Labor racketeering in the construction industries goes back many centuries.
The builders of the Pyramids were laborers enslaved by an Egyptian labor boss
who had a connection with the Ptolemies. The ruling Inca of Peru, Pizarro
reported, farmed out labor contracts to local caciques.
It is no wonder, then, that it should have made its first appearance in the
United States in these same building and construction trades.
The actual labor boss-union leader, strong-arm man, crook, and political,
power�came into being at the end of the nineteenth century. His appearance
was almost simultaneous in three places�Chicago, San Francisco, New York. In
each instance it was in the construction field.
"Iron Sam" Parks began his career in Chicago, went from there to New York.
His friend Martin B. ("Skinny") Madden succeeded him and was, in turn,
succeeded by Michael J. ("Umbrella Mike") Boyle and Timothy ("Big Tim," of
course!) Murphy. The man who controlled the labor field in San Francisco was
Patrick Henry ("Pin Head") McCarthy.
The labor crooks attached themselves to the dominant political party. In New
York it was Tammany and the Democrats. In Chicago it was the Republicans. And
in San Francisco it was also the Republicans.
The Parkses, Maddens, Murphys, Boyles and McCarthys came into existence, and
gained their power, because of collusion between them and crooked employers
and equally crooked politicians.
The American Federation of Labor was made up of craft unions, unions of
skilled workers. Much of its organizing efforts went into the construction
field. As a result, hundreds of new union locals came into being throughout
the country. The AFL gave great autonomy to its locals. This was costly from
its beginning to the present.
As the AFL membership grew, so, too, did its political power. Samuel Gompers,
head of the Federation, enunciated a political creed for labor. It would
"reward its friends and punish its enemies." Politicians, who had for long
been on the side of management, now had to take into consideration the votes
of labor. In most instances it was the Democrats who decided in favor of the
unions.
The loose structure of the AFL made it possible for local labor strongmen to
emerge from the ranks and take on great power. These men could make their own
rules, call their own strikes, and impose the terms of settlement. These
strongmen became the first labor crooks, the first labor racketeers.
For almost a score of years the crooked labor boss would be the heart of
labor racketeering. Then a change would take place. And Arnold Rothstein, who
bad worked with the old-line labor racketeers, would introduce the new ones
and the racketeering form in which they would operate.
He would invade new labor fields. He would introduce stand-by gangster
armies. He would serve as protector of unions. And exact tribute from them.
And be would lay the foundation for his successors, who would profit far more
than he, terrorize as he had not, and become a part of the union framework.
But his beginning in this field would be by working with the first labor
bosses, who were the first labor crooks.
Sam Parks was the father of labor racketeering in New York. He had been a
workingman, a lumberjack, a coal heaver, a railroad brakeman, a roustabout
and a construction worker. Working as a housesmith in Chicago, he had joined
the union, become its walking delegate. The walking delegate had much power.
He was the liaison between union and employer. He served as union organizer
and work overseer. The first walking delegates had to be tough. They were
always in danger from paid strikebreakers and goons, from discontented union
members.
Sam Parks was tough. He was well over six feet, big-fisted and foul-mouthed.
He had fought a thousand battles and claimed never to have been defeated in a
rough-and-tumble fight. Certainly he fought from poverty to wealth.
His was a case history of labor racketeering about 1900. A walking delegate,
he so favorably impressed the mammoth construction firm of George A. Fuller
Company, that the firm made him its 'labor counsel." As labor counsel, he
dealt with Sam Parks, walking delegate, changing hats as he bargained with
himself. Other Chicago firms followed the lead of the Fuller company and
Parks prospered in his dual capacity.
It was the Fuller company that was responsible for Parks leaving Chicago for
New York. The firm decided to enter the New York construction field and
wanted to protect itself against trouble from both competing firms and local
union leaders.
Parks was offered a raise in salary as labor counsel if be would move himself
and his operations to New York. The raise would cover any temporary loss of
Chicago graft.
This was agreeable to Parks. In Chicago he was splitting his take with Skinny
Madden. New York had no real labor boss and promised far greater profits.
Arrived in New York, Parks set his sights on control of the Housesmiths,
Bridgemen and Structural Iron Workers' Union. He attended a meeting of the
union and appointed himself its new walking delegate. He offered to fight
anyone who challenged his right to the job. There were no takers.
The union had 4,000 members. In a short time they were 4,000 groveling
subjects of Iron Sam who had become "King Sam."
Parks was astute. From the start he realized that his basic job was to
satisfy, not antagonize, the rank and file of the union. So, in the process
of lining his own pockets, he also got higher wages and better working
conditions for the union members. But he always settled for terms with which
the construction companies had little quarrel.
Parks associated himself with two groups in New York. One was the Board of
Building Trades, composed of heads of unions in the building and construction
fields. The other was Tammany.
The construction field has always been in need of friends holding public
office. No other type of business is so vulnerable to political harassment.
Local bodies grant licenses and issue permits. Building inspectors, fire
inspectors, all kinds of inspectors, delay construction, even halt it. There
are dozens of city and county ordinances that can cause delays-and delays
always cost money.
And, in Parks's time, there was constant need for workers to have physical
protection from antiunion goons or dissident union members. It was a lot
cheaper to get this protection from the uniformed police, whom the city paid,
than to hire private guards.
The obvious place to go-the obvious ally-was Tammany. And there Parks went.
He did not get all the promises he wanted. After all, there were
long-standing political alliances between local construction interests and
Tammany. Parks saw an opportunity to advance both himself and his own cause.
At this period Murphy was seeking to consolidate his position. And Big Bill
Devery was challenging him. Parks allied himself with the Devery challenge.
His first overt move was to lend some of his strong-arm men to Devery in the
mayoralty election. He also contributed to Devery's campaign chest.
Parks immediately found himself in trouble.
The Hecla Iron Works, holding a number of municipal building contracts,
complained to the District Attorney that Parks had extorted money from Hecla
and its owners. Parks was arrested, arraigned and his bail was fixed at
$5,000.
What then followed was told by Harold Seidman in his book, The Labor Czars.
"His $5,000 bail," Seidman wrote, "Was quickly supplied by Bill Devery, New
York's former police chief. 'This whole roll,' said Devery flashing the money
to the gaping multitudes gathered at the prison, 'is for my friend Parks. It
is all money earned by honest labor, and will go to get an honest man who is
under arrest out. There is nothing crooked about Parks. He is the
workingman's friend and so am I.'"
This case was somehow settled. However, Parks's troubles were only beginning.
He was again indicted for extortion, this time on the basis of charges
preferred by the Hamburg-American Line, so dependent on Tammany for dock
facilities and other privileges. Once again, Devery supplied bail.
This case went to trial and Parks was found guilty and sentenced to Sing
Sing. His attorney obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and Parks was
returned to New York City. Bail was, once more, supplied by Devery.
Parks was grateful to Devery, but be was also a realist. Tammany had defeated
Devery badly. Big Bill's political power was at an end.
Parks held a meeting with Assemblyman Dick Butler, a Tammany .regular," and
asked for peace.
Murphy was amenable. He was more interested in friends than in enemies. He
realized that the labor vote was growing ever more important and that the
labor bosses were in a position to help Tammany in many ways. And even
provide sinecure jobs for deserving Tammany Democrats. However, he made it a
condition that Parks tone down his more blatant extortions and be more
careful of those whom he chose as victims.
Parks agreed, but be soon violated the agreement. Called on the carpet, he
was arrogant and boastful. As quoted by Ray Stannard Baker in McClure's magazi
ne, Parks's answer was, "Don't talk to me about the boss. I'm the boss."
He learned that he was not.
He was again indicted, this time for trying to shake down a company which was
building a theater for Big Tim Sullivan and his partner, John Considine.
Parks sent an emissary to Butler with the message that he wanted bail posted
immediately. Butler turned the message down. Now Parks turned to his old
friend Devery. He let Devery know that he was prepared to join him in another
fight on Tammany. This time, he assured Devery, they would win.
Devery's answer was a formal statement, quoted by Seidman:
"I will not stand for a man who carries water on both shoulders. Mr. Murphy
and his friends are not friends of the laboring man. When Mr. Parks commences
to flirt with Mr. Murphy and Company, I have no further use for him."
Parks remained in jail until he went on trial. It took a jury just fifteen
minutes to convict him. Parks was given a sentence of two years and three
months. He was serving this sentence in Sing Sing when he died.
It was some time before a successor to Parks appeared. But when he did he
caused one prominent builder to say, "Today Sam Parks would be a saint. He
was a hundred-dollar grafter. I wish he were here today."
The man who evoked this nostalgia for Parks was Robert P. Brindell.
Like Parks, he was a native Canadian. Like him, he had known poverty as a
youth, had worked as a laborer. It was on the docks of Canada and the United
States that Brindell served his apprenticeship. He was in New York, just
another dock-walloper, when Parks rose to power.
He began his career as a minor functionary in the Dock and Pier Carpenters'
Union. By 1907 be headed that union. In the next six years he began to make
his influence felt in other unions. Among those who supported him in this
drive were Tim Sullivan, Tom Foley and Charles Murphy.
Brindell early became a member of the Florrie Sullivan Association, though it
is a question whether he was ever a United States citizen. His union members
were active in primary and general elections.
Brindell, shrewder�or better advised-than Parks, sought to centralize all the
building unions in New York and put them under his control. His first step
was to affiliate his union with the national Brotherhood of Carpenters and
joiners, headed by William L. Hutcheson. With this as an entering wedge,
Brindell was able to get other conservative union leaders to join him in
forming the Building Trades Council.
This group, under an AFL charter from the national organization took unto
itself the power to call strikes and negotiate wage and working conditions
for all workers in the building industry. Brindell had himself elected to a
life term as president of this body and then arranged that all delegates
should be his appointees and none could be rank-and-file members. These
delegates, further, were to be the business agents of the various unions.
Had Benito Mussolini ever sought a model on which to build his fascist state,
he could not have chosen a better one than this charter and constitution of
the Building Trades Council.
Almost at once this organization became known as the "Tammany Hall Annex."
Its attorneys were John J. O'Connor, assemblyman from Murphy's own district,
and Francis X. Sullivan, Tammany commissioner of public works. William P.
Kenneally, one of the sachems of Tammany Hall and later its leader, was a
vice-president of the Council. Tom Farley, who was to serve as sheriff of
Manhattan and go down in history as "Tin-Box" Farley when he told the Seabury
Committee that he found all his wealth in a tin box, was a business agent for
the Cement and Concrete Workers.
Brindell also bad some outside activities. He was a partner in an agency
selling Simplex automobiles. The other partner was Arnold Rothstein. He got a
kickback from life insurance sold to members of his and other unions. The
insurance was placed by Rothstein. At one time Rothstein wrote almost
$700,000 worth of insurance in one day, all on the lives of persons working
for, or doing business with, Brindell.
There was still another field from which Rothstein prospered. When any new
project was begun, contractors and builders bad to supply performance bonds.
These always met requirements when they were provided by Rothstein's firm.
The performance bonds, of course, had to be provided by the employers.
However, organization of the employers was as streamlined and centralized as
organization of the unions. Where the unions had their council, the employers
had their "employers' association."
The fifteen largest construction firms were members of this association. The
members had a monopoly on building and installing every product needed in
construction work-except labor. No sand, marble, tile, stone, plumbing or
electrical supplies could be used in construction unless supplied by a member
of the Association.
A shrewd attorney, John Hettrick, had conceived of the Association, and, when
it was formed, managed its affairs. He supervised all bids from members,
setting any arbitrary figure he wished. Since he represented a monopoly
group, he believed in charging all�and, as eventually happened, more than�the
traffic would bear.
Two men, Hettrick for the employers and Brindell for the unions, had complete
control of construction in New York. The Association would hire only workers
under Brindell's discipline. The unions would boycott any construction work
not performed by the Association.
Brindell policed the agreement. He collected tribute from the members of his
union or they could not work. If any employer dared hire a worker who had not
paid off, the Association would cause the worker to be fired and would
discipline the employer.
Employers outside the Association could not hire union men. If they hired
nonunion men, Brindell would use hoodlums to wreck both the job and the
workers. He could always get a supply of hoods through his good friend Arnold
Rothstein.
It was their own greed which finally caught up with both Brindell and
Hettrick. The latter, drawing up bids, approving specifications, raised
prices so high that he priced all New York City construction out of the
market. Both private and public building came to a standstill.
New York City authorities refused to take any action but, once again, a State
Senate committee acted. The Lockwood Committee, with Samuel Untermyer as its
counsel, came to New York and held a series of hearings. There was no lack of
witnesses.
The facts concerning both the workers' Council and the Employers' Association
became public knowledge. The District Attorney was forced to act. BrindelI
was indicted on three counts of extortion. When be was arraigned, bail was
set at $10,000, and Rothstein posted the bail for him.
Then Hettrick was indicted as a fellow conspirator. Again Rothstein was on
hand to act as bondsman.
There was, as always, a political issue involved. Brindell, the big man of
labor, was tied to the Tammany machine. He was able to. provide votes and
money whenever these were needed. The Republican legislature was hoping to
cut off the flow of both.
Tammany fought back. Assemblyman O'Connor rose on the floor of the Assembly
and called on God to witness that "this entire investigation is part of a
deep-seated propaganda to discredit organized labor." His fellows on the
Democratic side of the chamber. cheered the speech. Other Tammany stalwarts
made the same charge.
But the evidence, assembled by Untermyer and handed, iron-riveted, to the
District Attorney, was overwhelming. Brindell was convicted and given a
five-to-ten-year sentence. Hettrick and a half dozen others also were sent to
jail.
The costs of construction fell. Once again there was new building.
That was the only real result of the investigation and the trials. It did not
affect the relationship between crooked labor leaders, crooked employers and
politicians. Men like Joseph P. Ryan and Joseph Fay would replace Brindell.
They would be replaced by' others when they were caught. Men like Johnny Dio
and Vincent Squillante and their like.
And Rothstein would go on. Brindell was in jail, but there were other
union leaders who required his services. Other employers, like his old friend
Sam Rosoff, who would call upon him for help in dealing with unions.
His influence, in many labor fields, far transcended the geographical limits
of New York.
Arch Selwyn, the theatrical producer, told the New York Times how far that
influence extended.
"When we and Sam Harris," he said, "were building our theaters, in Chicago,
we got into a jam. They pulled a strike on us and tried to bold us up for a
sum of money we did not have. We were absolutely in the hole.
"It was some of Big Tim's [Murphys] stuff.
"Murphy gave Al Woods the works. Woods wouldn't come across so they put a
bomb in his theatre. I told Arnold what we were up against. He was very fond
of Sam Harris. He called Tim up on long distance and told him: 'Listen, Tim,
these fellows haven't any such dough as that. They're friends of mine, and
what you're doing to them, you're doing to me. You leave it to me and I'll
treat you right. You can trust me. But call your dogs off and see that the
boys get a square deal."
"We had no more trouble after that."
Selwyn added that the original demand had been for $50,000, but that Murphy
had been placated with just $10,000 after Rothstein's call. "He [Rothstein]
had influence in every big city in the country. And he loved it."
One place where that influence was potent was just across the Hudson River,
in New Jersey. Boss Frank Hague had close relations with Tammany Hall and
when he was fighting for control of the Democratic organization in 1916 and
1917 he got help from the Hall. Rothstein sent a large group of floaters and
toughs across the river to give what assistance might be needed.
Hague showed his gratitude by giving Rothstein a bookmaking monopoly in
Hudson County. Rothstein first opened a big book in Weehawken and later moved
it to what was then Union Hill and is now Union City.
More important, Hague brought Rothstein together with Theodore Brandle, then
business agent for the Iron Workers' Union and later as powerful in New
Jersey as Brindell. had been in New York.
Brandle became labor boss, businessman, politician and even banker. Brandle
also had a bonding business. It bonded all companies which did work for
public agencies. It became the second largest such firm in New Jersey. Its
New York representative was Arnold Rothstein.
One hand fed the other.
Crooked as all this was, vicious and larcenous, it still came under the head
of "honest graft." It was not gangsterism. Not the gangsterism which Arnold
Rothstein introduced into the garment trades. It would be some time before
the methods used in that field would be imposed in other union fields.
The garment industry�call it cloaks and suits, needle trades, or all of
these�had its beginnings in New York City, and New York has remained its
major headquarters for some seventy-five years.
Like many industries and businesses, it started in New York because there was
an ample supply of cheap labor. The workers came from Europe to Castle
Garden, to the slums, and then to the sweatshops. The last two steps
frequently took place on the same day.
The first disorders in the garment industry occurred in 1897, when some
radicals incited a few of the workers to ask for an increase in pay. One
employer met this demand by calling on young Monk Eastman, who led a group of
toughs into an attic workroom on Allen Street and beat up two men supposed to
be the union ringleaders.
This was just a day's work to the unimaginative, hard-fisted Eastman. He did
not sense he had been offered a continuing source of revenue. His work done,
his pay collected, Eastman returned to robbery, slugging and general assault
and battery.
In 1909 the first large-scale strike of garment workers took place. By that
time, according to a report made by the Federal Immigration Commission, a
marked change had taken place in the garment workers. There were as many
Italian workers as there were Jews, and women had become the majority.
There was hardly a family in the lower East Side ghetto or in Little Italy,
to the north and West, which did not have at least one member working in a swe
atshop, taking home cloth to be sewn, or working as presser or fitter.
Hours were long, sometimes as much as eighteen hours a day. Pay: was low,
sometimes as little as fifty cents a day. Tens of thousands of the workers
were contracting, or had already contracted, tubercuilosis. This was an
occupational hazard, stolidly accepted.
>From the same homes that the workers came the gangsters came. There was not a
gangster who did not know about these working conditions firsthand. They
could see a mother, a sister, a father, a brother, working at the garment
trade.
Gangsters are surprisingly literal. Most of them are highly emotional.
(Recall the deathbed mumblings of Dutch Schultz: "Mamma. Mamma. Mamma." "Put
a roof on the doll.") In 1909 most of the gangsters had been reared in homes
where the honest, hard-working members damned the "bosses" and the "padrones"
even as they worked to make these rich. No wonder the hoodlums bad their
sympathies on the side of the workers.
To a great extent this influenced their action in the 1909 strike. Their
mothers and sisters were being beaten and kicked by "guards" whom the
employers hired. It was as important a factor to the gangsters as the few
dollars they earned during the strike.
The unions, splintered into factional groups on the basis of racial,
religious and political differences, could not have survived without the aid
of the gangsters, many of whom were volunteers. The unions bad little money
in their treasuries and bad not yet attained any political importance.
The union leaders knew they bad to win or die. They believed their cause was
just. Like so many other fanatics, they also rationalized that the end
justified the means. So they brought in gangsters to fight their battles for
them.
Among the first to be hired were Big Jack Zelig, so close to Charles Becker,
Joseph ("Joe the Greaser") Rosensweig, and Pincus ("Pinchy") Paul. Zelig and
Rosensweig worked together. Paul was a member of another gang.
When the strike was concluded the unions had gained a precarious foothold.
And the gangsters a firmer one. Zelig stayed on as an organizer for two
unions. He held this job when he was killed.
Rosensweig wanted a job as organizer for the Furriers' Union. Unfortunately
Paul already held that job. First, Rosensweig tried persuasion to get Paul to
resign. Two beatings did not persuade Paul. So Rosensweig decided he had to
take sterner measures. He called in one of his followers, Benny Snyder, and
told Snyder to kill Paul.
Snyder followed orders too literally. He went right out and murdered Paul in
front of a half dozen witnesses.
District Attorney Charles A. Perkins, an anti-Tammany office. holder, had
little trouble getting a full confession from Snyder. Snyder swore that be
had been paid five dollars by Rosensweig to commit the murder. He even had
the five greasy dollar bills in his pocket when he confessed.
The cooperative Snyder received a twenty-year term for second. degree murder.
Rosensweig was able to plead guilty to manslaughter and get off with ten
years. Perkins preferred this to putting Snyder on the stand as his only
witness.
All three of the original gang leaders who bad found soft pickings in the
garment industry were now out of circulation. A vacuum existed. The unions
still needed physical protection; "finks" and "goons," some of them with
deputies' badges, still harassed union members and owners of union shops.
Benjamin ("Dopey Benny") Fein soon filled the vacuum.
There was little "dopey" about Benny except his name, and this derived not
from any lack of intelligence but from the vacuous, slightly sleepy
expression he wore because of adenoids.
Excepting his open mouth, Benny's was a good-looking face. He had brown,
curly hair, large, limpid, brown eyes, a straight nose, and a strong mouth
and chin.
This was a period of disorganization among the gangs. Eastman was in jail.
Paul Kelly had moved to Harlem, where he was organizing the ragpickers.
Zelig, one of the few strong leaders, was dead. A reform administration was
arresting and convicting gangsters who had long been immune from law.
Fein was intelligent enough to sense that this was no time for an ambitious
gangster but a good time for a clever one. He sought to act as peacemaker
among the different gangs, such as those led by "Porkie" Flaherty, Abie
Fisher, "Little" Rhody and Billy Lustig. He pointed out that there was enough
loot for all, provided they acted together.
Sweet reason temporarily prevailed and a general agreement was reached. Benny
staked out the garment center as his own preserve.
Within a short period Fein was employed by twelve locals, drawing a weekly
salary from each. That salary ranged from $25 to $50. In addition, as he
later confessed, whenever trouble arose and he had to hire outside "help," he
received a bonus of $100, and $10 daily for each helper. He paid the helpers
$7.50 a day and pocketed the difference.
Benny also received protection. The unions agreed to engage lawyers for him,
provide bail when that was necessary, and counsel should such help be needed.
The unions had gone to a third party for this protection and these services.
They had gone to Arnold Rothstein.
There was a deep irony in the reason they had asked Rothstein's help.
Many of the union leaders were Jewish. One of the earliest workers'
organizations in New York was the United Hebrew Trades Union. This
organization, like most of the early unions, was not founded by fire-eating
labor leaders but by idealists, theoreticians and social philosophers.
They knew their Karl Marx. Many of them were followers of such Utopians as
Fourier and Robert Owen. Some were Platonic Socialists and others were
soapbox anarchists. But they knew very little about the practical side of
unionism.
They needed a middleman to act for them. They picked Arnold Rothstein-and
here was the irony-not because he was involved in politics, not because he
was Jewish, but because he was the son of Abraham Rothstein.
They had learned they could trust the father. So they placed their trust in
the son.
This was just another business proposition to Rothstein. He bad something to
sell and here were people who wanted to buy it. They were willing to pay a
good price both to him and to those to whom he would go in their behalf. He
would take the cash and let the votes go-where they would do the most good.
He agreed to use his influence with Tammany Hall. He agreed to provide bail
bonds, lawyers. That was his business.
He could not promise too much. New York City, as the result of the Becker
scandal, had once more elected a reform mayor, John Purroy Mitchel. Perkins,
the District Attorney, was a Republican. Both were antilabor.
Mitchel and his police commissioner, Arthur Woods, were carrying on a
campaign against the unions. Arrests were being made by the score. Finally,
even Dopey Benny was arrested. He was held on four counts of felonious
assault.
Fein sent out a hurry call for bail and a lawyer. The call was. relayed to
Rothstein. He advised against bailing out Fein. The advice was not unpleasant
to the union leaders. Fein had become a most expensive employee. In addition,
he had insinuated himself and some of his followers into various union
offices. Legitimate union leaders had feared his revenge if they moved
against him.
But now they had Rothstein on their side. Rothstein and his own,.. group of
hoodlums.
Rothstein had his own reasons for offering the advice. In the first place,
Fein was not dependent upon him. In the second, he felt Fein could be
sacrificed.
The union leaders followed Rothstein's advice. Fein stayed in jail. It took
some time, but finally Fein realized he was being made a sacrificial offering
to placate the authorities. He moved to save himself. He sent a message to
District Attorney Perkins offering to make a full confession in return for a
light sentence.
Perkins agreed. He saw an opportunity to connect his political enemies,
Tammany, with protected lawlessness. Charles Whitman was sitting in the
governor's chair in Albany as the result of just such an expose.
Fein proceeded to make a full confession. He told about his activities, his
pay scale, the numerous assaults and acts of terror he had committed. But he
could not put a finger on any big politicians or on Tammany. The closest be
could come to this was to inform Perkins that arrangements had been made by
the unions for Arnold Rothstein to provide bail and counsel for him and his
followers.
Rothstein was summoned to Perkins' office. He appeared, accompanied by his
current attorney, Isaiah Lebow. He admitted posting bail in numerous
instances. That was his business. He admitted nothing else.
The meeting ended almost immediately. Perkins had to admit, when Lebow
pressed him, that he was not against the right of accused persons to bail.
However, armed with Fein's confession and Grand jury testimony, Perkins got
indictments against eleven gangsters and twenty-three union officials.
Rothstein posted bail for all of them.
Trial of the union officials was delayed on one pretext or another until the
end of Perkins' term in office. He was succeeded by Edward Swann, a Tammany
choice.
In 1917 Swann appeared in court and asked for dismissal of the indictments on
the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution.
judge Delehanty granted Swann's request, almost a matter of form.
There were immediate cries of "fix" and "undue influence." L. S.
Breckenridge, who, as assistant district attorney under Perkins, had prepared
the cases, charged that the wholesale dismissal was the result of "a
disreputable Tammany plot and the dismissal . . . was a part of a
pre-election promise which gained for judge Swann the support of the East
Side labor leaders and a well-known gambler when he ran for District
Attorney."
judge Delehanty, on the basis of affidavits from Breckenridge and others,
accused Swann of presenting a false recommendation to him and demanded that
the Governor remove Swann from office.
Whitman held a series of hearings and concluded that, while the evidence was
not sufficient to warrant Swann's removal, it was enough to cause Swann to be
censured.
That slap on the wrist concluded the legal maneuverings.
Rothstein had proved his value to the unions. He had provided them with the
protection for which they had asked. For Rothstein, the unions now offered an
ever-expanding source of revenue. The larger they grew the more they needed
him.
Rothstein had placed his own crew of gangsters inside the unions, opened the
way for them to grow ever stronger within the industry. The first leader of
this group was Jacob ("Little Augie") Orgen. Little Augie, one of Benny
Fein's lieutenants, proved his worth in the garment disorders of 1919 and
1920.
He was clever rather than brave. He was a schemer. He disliked physical
combat, but when forced into it fought with the desperation of the born
coward. He wanted to rise above himself, to become a sport. To that end he
dressed in flashy clothes and even wore fawn-colored spats.
Those spats must have been a constant challenge to the gang of hoodlums who
worked under him. They were as hard, mean, cruel and ambitious a group as had
ever been gathered. Receiving their $7.50 a day from Little Augie were the
Diamond brothers, Lucky Luciano, Waxey Gordon, Lepke Buchalter and Gurrah
Shapiro.
Little Angie held control until 1923. Then he became involved in a battle
with a gangster called Kid Dropper, who sought to muscle in on the Wet Wash
Workers' Union. Dropper was killed by a follower of Little Augie's, Louis
Kushner.
The police could not connect Little Augie with the murder, but they placed
him under such close surveillance that his usefulness in the garment industry
ended. His place was taken by Lepke Buchalter.
Little Augie, in 1925, became a bootlegger and prospered. He was a partner of
Jack Diamond in 1927, when he was killed. He and Diamond were talking
together on Norfolk Street, on the East Side, when four men drove up and
opened fire on them. Diamond was not touched. It has remained moot whether
the killers were after Orgen or Diamond. It did not make any difference to
Orgen. He was dead and, if that was a mistake, it was not a rectifiable one.
Lepke Buchalter, the man who took Little Augie's place as leader of the
gangsters in the garment industry, was a complex character. When he took
first rank he was scarcely more than twenty, a presentable, soft-spoken
individual with soft, collie eyes and a dimple in one cheek. He already had a
police record, the first notation going back to 1915.
Lepke came from a good family, his antecedents much like Rothstein's. His
people were honest, in comfortable financial condition, pious and educated.
Of their children they had trouble only with one, Louis. And he was the most
intelligent and, seemingly, the best behaved.
By his mid-teens, he had become an outlaw. He was tough with his fists, but
he did not like to use them. Of medium height and weight, he was no match for
real bruisers. But he did not have to be. His brain more than made up for
lack of brawn. The young hoodlums with whom he hung out early made him their
leader. They might outfight him, but they couldn't out-think him.
Lepke had a talent for organization. He made friends easily. But he was an
unrelenting enemy. He could be double-crossed only once. That was why, in
later years, he could play so large a part in putting together the Syndicate.
Lepke had imagination. He was a dreamer with a touch of megalomania, a
disease so common to gang leaders.
When Rothstein gave him his opportunity in the garment rackets, Lepke grasped
it. He saw possibilities in it-for wealth and power -that Rothstein could not
envision. He bided his time, made his plans. Ultimately the time came when he
could put those plans in operation.
Lepke's partner, Jacob (Gurrah) Shapiro, was different. He was big, hulking,
loud-mouthed. His education was limited, his imagination even more
restricted, and his appetites completely animal. But he was a terror in a
fight, had complete loyalty to Lepke, his senior partner, and the physical
ability to keep recalcitrants in line.
A good index to the differences in the men stemmed from the source of their
nicknames. "Lepke" derived from "Leb," Buchalter's Jewish name, and was an
affectionate diminutive, bestowed by his mother. "Gurrah," on the other hand,
evolved from Shapiro's difficulties with the English language. When annoyed,
he would shout, "Gurrah'd a here." Translated, this meant "Get out of here"
and was usually accompanied by a blow or kick.
For some time the only importance they had in the gang world came from their
jobs with Rothstein. They had no other connections had not yet earned any
type of reputation. They ranked, for instance, far below Luciano, who was
already known as a lieutenant of Joe Masseria.
It was while working for Rothstein that Lepke and Luciano became friends, a
friendship that was to play so important a part in later years when they were
among the heads of the national crime cartel.
Lepke's great chance came during the vicious, damaging, bitter strike that
erupted in the garment center in 1926. Only then did he emerge as a man of
importance.
The 1926 strike went far beyond the classic struggle between worker and
management. Unions fought unions. Factions within the same union fought each
other. Employers found themselves on opposite sides of the battle.
In some locals right wing fought left wing. In others two left- wing factions
fought each other. One union might join an employer to fight a second local.
And an employer might give aid to I a local that the shop on the floor below
was trying to destroy.
Such a situation was made to order for Rothstein. Everyone needed his
services and he had no loyalties, except to his pocketbook.
Writing of this strike, Harold Seidman, in The Labor Czars, said:
"Arnold Rothstein maintained a flourishing business . . . supply-ing
gangsters to the furriers' and garment workers' unions. In addition, he
'fixed' the police so that they would not club the strikers. For his
services, he received fees running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars."
And Joel Seidman, in The Needle Trades, part of the series of books on "Labor
in the Twentieth Century," wrote:
"In the . . . 1926 strike . . . the General Strike Committee expended some
$3,500,000 . . . . Mile negotiations were in progress with manufacturers, it
became known that ... the notorious gambler, Arnold Rothstein, had been
sitting as mediator."
The furriers were deeply involved in this great strike, primarily a battle of
ideologies between different sectors of the union. During their strike the
late Matthew Woll, vice-president of the American Federation of Labor, wrote
a letter of protest to Mayor Walker. In it he declared:
"It is a common rumor, if not an understanding throughout the fur district,
that 'police protection' has been assured the Communist leaders and
sympathizers. [The left-wing faction was led by Ben Gold, destined a quarter
of a century later to be found guilty of violating the Smith Act.] It is said
that nearly ten days before the beginning of the present reign of terror, one
Arnold Rothstein, said to be a famous or infamous gambler, had been the means
of fixing the police in behalf of the Communists."
This charge was met by a barrage of denials. Walker announced that Rothstein
had no influence with his administration or with the police. Rothstein said
his only connection was to post bail for persons arrested. Gold issued a
statement pointing out that far more of his followers had been arrested and
clubbed than members of the opposition. And Morris Malkin, one of Gold's
associates, said he had documentary proof that Rothstein not only was not on
the left-wing side of the argument but that he was in the pay of the other
side.
In 1933 Malkin was a witness before a Congressional committee investigating
labor troubles. By this time Rothstein was five years dead and Malkin had
turned on his former beliefs, recanted his Communism. He now recanted on
another level. He swore that it was true that the Communist faction had
purchased Rothstein's support.
'We felt," he said, "we could not win without outside help to keep the police
and the politicians from interfering with us. We knew the man to see was
Arnold Rothstein. We went to him and paid him and we had no trouble with the
police during the strike."
The committee counsel then asked if Rothstein was a Communist.
"He didnt know or care about the politics of a strike. He named a price for
his help and we paid it."
Malkin was next asked, "Did he ever work against your�I mean the
Communist-side?"
"Yes. Whenever they got to him first, or if they paid him more"
Rothstein profited greatly from the 1926 strike�in cash. But he lost greatly
too. Even as he seemed strongest he was growing weaker.
The strike hurt many locals, decimated their memberships, bankrupted their
treasuries. The gangsters, however, had to be kept on the payrolls. Lepke
sensed his opportunity. Instead of taking pay from the unions, he simply took
over the unions. They became his property.
Lepke the dreamer was on his way to making his dream come true. He and his
cohorts gathered more and more garment unions into their hands. And they
moved into other union fields. Soon Lepke's domain included painters' unions,
motion-picture operators' unions, dockworkers' locals and teamsters' locals.
After 1926 Lepke worked not for Rothstein but with him.
Lepke needed Rothstein for his political importance. Neither Lepke nor any
other gangster had yet made direct contact with Tammany. Rothstein was still
the link.
But the unions�and the employers�soon learned that the man who dominated
their industry, who would dominate it for years, was Lepke. He and Gurrah
were "The Boys." And the Boys milked the garment industry as long as they
lived. It was their heirs-Anastasia, Plumeri, Levine and Luchese�who would
take over after them.
All, however, would owe a debt to Rothstein. He had opened the vein, showed
them how to exploit it. Showed them how to double-deal and cheat.
For Arnold Rothstein, protector of the unions, the workingman's friend, had
also sold them out.
The facts came to light when the Seabury investigation filed its report.
Buried in it was this, about the 1926 strike:
"Manufacturers had sought or welcomed the aid of underworld characters like
Arnold Rothstein . . . in an effort to avoid unionization."
Anything for a buck.
Even narcotics.
pps. 266-286
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
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