-Caveat Lector-
Thank You!
Jamie
-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Kingsbury [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 1999 10:04 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [CTRL] Anyone know this E.O.???
-Caveat Lector-
At 07:46 AM 12-28-1999 -0600, Jamie wrote:
>
> A friend was telling me about it and he thinks it was signed in Dec
>of one of the last couple of years. Within the E.O. it says that our
>nuclear missiles will not be on alert and we will absorb the first hit.
>And supposedly putting nuclear missiles on alert is not a short
>process.... Anyone familiar with this E.O.? Just curious.
From: Edward Britton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1999
Subject: [CTRL] A Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart
A Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart
Joel M. Skousen
March 25, 1999
In November 1997, President Clinton signed a top-secret
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-60) directing U.S. military
commanders to abandon the time-honored nuclear deterrence of
"launch on warning."
Ironically, this was done in the name of "increased deterrence."
Every sensible American needs to understand why this reasoning is
fraudulent at best and deadly at worst. First, some background.
The impetus to change U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine came on the
heels of Clinton's demand to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early
1997 that they prepare to unilaterally reduce America's nuclear
warhead deployment to 2,500 in eager anticipation of the
ratification of the START II disarmament treaty. This pact
has yet to be ratified by the Russian Duma.
Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responded
that he couldn't comply, since the U.S. military was still
operating on a former Presidential Decision Directive of 1981 to
prepare to "win a protracted nuclear war." A winning strategy
couldn't be implemented without the full contingent of current
nuclear strategic warheads.
According to Craig Cerniello of Arms Control Today
(November/December 1997 issue), "the administration viewed the
1981 guidelines as an anachronism of the Cold War. The notion
that the United States still had to be prepared to fight and win
a protracted nuclear war today seemed out of touch with reality,
given the fact that it has been six years since the collapse of
the Soviet Union."
Certainly, the apparent collapse of the Soviet Union is the
linchpin in every argument pointing toward the relaxation of
Western vigilance and accelerated disarmament. Indeed, it is
the driving argument that is trumpeted constantly before Congress,
U.S. military leaders, and the American people.
Almost everyone is buying it -- even most conservatives who should
know better. However, the most savvy Soviet-watchers can point to
a host of evidence indicating that the so-called "collapse" was
engineered to disarm the West and garner billions in direct aid to
assist Russia while inducing the West to take over the economic
burden of the former satellite states.
But the most ominous evidence is found in defectors from Russia
who tell the same story: Russia is cheating on all aspects of
disarmament, and is siphoning off billions in Western aid money to
modernize and deploy top-of-the-line new weapons systems aimed at
taking down the U.S. military in one huge, decapitating nuclear
strike.
Contrast this with the Clinton administration's response.
Incredibly, while still paying lip service to nuclear deterrence,
Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward L. Warner III went before
the Congress on March 31, 1998, and bragged about the litany of
unilateral disarmament this administration has forced upon the
U.S. military:
Warner noted the "success" the Clinton administration has had in
recent years, which has:
Eliminated our entire inventory of ground-launched
non-strategic nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and Lance
surface-to-surface missiles).
Removed all nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis
from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval
aircraft bases.
Removed our strategic bombers from alert.
Stood down the Minuteman II ICBMs scheduled for deactivation
under Start I.
Terminated the mobile Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM
programs.
Terminated the SCRAM-II nuclear short-range attack missile.
In January 1992, the second Presidential Nuclear Initiative took
further steps which included:
Limiting B-2 production to 20 bombers.
Canceling the entire small ICBM program.
Ceasing production of W-88 Trident SLBM (submarine-launched
missile) warheads.
Halting purchases of advanced cruise missiles.
Stopping new production of Peacekeeper missiles (our biggest
MIRV-warhead ICBM).
"As a result of these significant changes, the U.S. nuclear
stockpile has decreased by more than 50 percent," Warner enthused.
All of this has been done without any meaningful disarmament by
the Russians.
The Clinton administration would counter this charge by citing the
"successful" dismantling of 3,300 strategic nuclear warheads by
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and the destruction of their 252
ICBMs and related silos -- all paid for with U.S. taxpayer funds to
the tune of $300 million per year. But the real story is otherwise.
Yes, Americans paid for the dismantling of these systems -- the
oldest and most out-of-date in the Soviet inventory. They were
scheduled for replacement anyway, so the U.S. taxpayer ended up
saving the Russians over a billion dollars, allowing them to use
this and other Western aid to develop and build new systems,
coming on line right now. But that isn't all.
What the administration doesn't say is that they allowed the
Russians to reclaim all the nuclear warheads, and paid them to
recycle the usable material into new, updated warheads. We didn't
diminish the threat at all. We only helped them to transform it
into something more dangerous.
Thus, the Russians still maintain a more than 3-to-1 advantage over
the United States in both throw-weight and nuclear delivery
vehicles. That disparity is widening dramatically with the Clinton
administration's unilateral disarmament while at the same time
encouraging the Russians to proceed not only with the deployment of
500 new Topol-M missiles (which are mobile-launched and therefore
difficult to target), but to put three MIRVed warheads on each
missile instead of the treaty limit of one warhead -- for a total
deployment of 1,500 warheads.
Not counting the presumed minimum 4,000 to 6,000 warheads in the
current Russian inventory, these 1,500 new warheads would overwhelm
a measly 200-interceptor ABM system in North Dakota -- which the
Clinton administration is insisting should NOT be deployed before
2005. I wonder why?
With our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs scheduled to be decommissioned in
2003, that gives the Russians or Chinese a wide-open window for
attack, should they choose to exercise their first-strike,
nuclear-decapitation option.
So much for the "new realism" of the Clinton disarmament team and
their assertion that Russia poses no threat. Judging strictly by
public data from establishment sources (which is always understated
due to Moscow's heavy shroud of secrecy) the Russian threat is much
greater than it ever was, both in quantity and quality of strategic
nuclear forces. This is thanks, in part, to ongoing technology
transfers by IBM and other defense contractors with the knowing
participation and encouragement of this administration.
Now let's take a close look at this presumed "increased deterrence"
the Clinton Department of Defense is promising. The administration
claims its brand of deterrence is still based on the "mutual
assured destruction" (MAD) concept -- a truly appropriate acronym.
This is the presumption that, since both sides have an overwhelming
capability to destroy each other, that no sane leadership would
engage in nuclear war. Let's examine this closely. MAD could only
stand as a viable assumption if:
Both sides had sufficient weapons and delivery vehicles to
inflict total devastation.
Neither side had an effective anti-ballistic-missile system.
Neither side had electronic jamming capability on its incoming
ICBMs.
Neither side had hardened shelters protecting its population and
leadership. These assumptions clearly do not exist today:
First, we barely have enough nuclear warheads to take out the
Russian arsenal as presently constituted if we used them all at
once (which no sane military commander could afford to do, leaving
him with no reserves). Russia, on the other hand, has enough to
devastate our entire strategic forces and still retain 60 percent
of her weapons in reserve, for a prolonged conflict.
Second, we have no ABM system to protect against ICBMs at all.
Our dumbed-down and slowed-down Patriots are theater weapons
(built to conform to the flawed ABM Treaty) and can barely catch
slow, low-flying Scud missiles, let alone ICBMs that coming
screaming in from space at 6 to 12 kilometers per second.
The Russians have (in violation of the same ABM Treaty) a
nationwide system of ABMs tied to phased-array radars and
satellite guidance systems.
Third, we have no electronic jamming on our missiles to help them
penetrate the Russian ABM system, and the Russians claim their
newest Topol-M missiles do have such a capability. Whether or not
this claim is a bluff is immaterial. The fact is, they are
building new, high-tech missiles and our technology is 10 years old
and stagnant. We are not developing or building anything new.
This aspect can only worsen as time goes on.
Fourth, our civilian population is totally unprotected, while a
large portion of the Russian cities have public fallout shelter
facilities. New bunkers are being constructed for the Russian
leadership despite the economic hardships the people suffer. This
should tell us something about Russian leadership intentions.
Is this Mutually Assured Destruction? Hardly. It equates to
United States Assured Destruction! In every category of
deterrence, we are disarming and stagnant, and the Russians are
building and deploying. There is, in fact, only one type of
deterrence that is capable of somewhat balancing the scales:
the nuclear response doctrine of Launch on Warning.
Launch on Warning takes advantage of the fact that long-range
ballistic missiles take time to arrive on target -- up to 25
minutes, depending on where the missiles are fired from. If the
Russians were to launch a first strike, our satellites would detect
and confirm that launch within seconds. In a Launch on Warning
doctrine, our missiles (if on alert status) could be launched
before the Russian or Chinese missiles hit our silos. There is
also time to retarget our missiles so that they are not wasted on
Russian silos that are now empty.
Thus, one of the great advantages for a Launch on Warning doctrine
is that it allows the nation that launches second to have an
advantage over the nation that launches first. The one to launch
first wastes a certain number of its missiles on our silos that
are now empty. By contrast, our missiles (utilizing real-time
targeting data from satellites) strike targets that are still
viable.
Now that is deterrence -- a deterrence that we presently do not
have due to PDD-60.
Clinton national security aide Robert Bell proudly proclaimed to
a group of disarmament advocates, "In this PDD, we direct our
military forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as
to not rely on Launch on Warning -- to be able to absorb a nuclear
strike and still have enough force surviving to constitute credible
deterrence."
This is patently preposterous. Respond with what?
We have no mobile missiles to avoid being targeted. We have
already unilaterally agreed to keep over half of our ballistic
missile submarines in port at any one time, so they can easily be
targeted. After all, we don't want our Russian "allies" to feel
insecure!
All of our Navy and Air Force strategic forces are incapable of
withstanding a nuclear strike. Even the remaining Trident subs on
patrol would be unable to respond when communication links and
satellites are downed in a first strike.
PDD-60 removes all alternate submarine launch codes so that our
subs cannot fire without direct communication with the president.
Those vital communications links will assuredly not survive a
massive first strike. When you tell the Russians we are going to
absorb a first strike, you induce them to make sure they hit us
with everything necessary to make sure we cannot respond.
This is not deterrence. This is suicide.
Joel M. Skousen is a political scientist by training and former
chairman of the Conservative National Commitee. He is a
specialist in security matters and consults nationwide on
"Strategic Relocation" -- the title of his latest book.
Visit his web site here...
© 1998, NewsMax.com
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CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic
screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters
and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright
frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects
spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL
gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers;
be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and
nazi's need not apply.
Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
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