-Cavet Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> -Cui Bono- from: http://www.prouty.org/ Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.prouty.org/">The Col. L. Fletcher Prouty Reference Site</A> ----- Military Experiences Part III: 1961-1963 Experiences of and Perspectives on the Bay of Pigs Prouty: Some time before we were ready to actually launch the Bay of Pigs invasion, there had been so much training and detonation of various explosive devices at the Agency's training camp down at what we call The Farm, in Virginia, that we had to close The Farm and move all this training to Elizabeth City, North Carolina, where there's a harbor and a lot of open spaces, and an airbase. They asked me to see if we could find -- purchase -- a couple of transport ships. We got some people that were in that business, and they went along the coast and they found two old ships that we purchased and sent down to Elizabeth City and began to load with an awful lot of trucks that the Army was sending down there. We deck-loaded the trucks, and got all of their supplies on board. Everything that they needed was on two ships. It was rather interesting to note, looking back these days, that one of the ships was called the Houston, and the other ship was called the Barbara J. Colonel Hawkins had renamed the program as we selected a name for the Bay of Pigs operation. The code name was "Zapata." I was thinking a few months ago of what a coincidence that is. When Mr. Bush graduated from Yale, back there in the days when I was a professor at Yale, he formed an oil company, called "Zapata," with a man, Lieddke, who later on became president of Pennzoil. But the company that Lieddke and Mr. Bush formed was the Zapata Oil Company. Mr. Bush's wife's name is Barbara J. And Mr. Bush claims as his hometown Houston, Texas. Now the triple coincidence there is strange; but I think it's interesting. I know nothing about its meaning. But these invasion ships were the Barbara J and the Houston, and the program was "Zapata." George Bush must have been somewhere around. With the ships loaded and ready to go, the Agency went in to brief the President one more time. Actually, the ships were at sea, the troops were at sea. And finally, on a Sunday afternoon -- well, we'll go back a few days. On Saturday morning, April 15th 1961, three B-26 bombers flew over Cuba, and hit the military base near Havana, and destroyed all but three of Castro's combat-capable aircraft. It was a pretty successful trip. We knew that the odds of getting them all in one shot would be a slim chance, so we were ready again to strike a second time. And we had already had briefings on two strikes, one earlier and then one to follow up. We had to follow it up. So we had U-2's fly all over Cuba and we found the three planes that were missing. They were three of what we call T-birds, T-33 jets. They were just training planes, but each one had two 50-caliber machine guns. They were fast little airplanes, easy to maneuver, and they were a great threat to the B-26's of our Cuban-exile airforce. We had to destroy them. We found them down in the southern part of Cuba, all in the same little base, sitting on the ground, wingtip to wingtip. The plan for the second attack was that we would hit them just before sunrise with four B-26 bombers. One bomber could have destroyed them, but we would go with four: right at sunrise, because the brigade was due to land on the beach at sunrise. And if we were bringing the brigade in, certainly that would alert their aircraft, and their planes would be in the air. We had to hit them just before sunrise or everything was gone. So this was approved when we briefed the President on Sunday afternoon, which was April 16th, 1961. He approved the whole plan. And he approved the strike with the Cuban-exile's bombers for the morning of the 17th which was absolutely necessary. Without that we could not have hit the beach. Nobody had any problem with that whatsoever. In fact, a very good friend of mine (an old Agency friend) was the base commander for this operation at Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua where we had the four B-26 bombers just ready to go. That was about 3:30 on Sunday afternoon. The ships were at sea; the President said OK -- that was the first time he approved it, by the way. Here we were a few hours before the attack, before he even approved, that he first said they could go. You could see how reluctant he was, really, to approve this program. At one o'clock in the morning (Monday) my telephone rang, right here in Washington. On the phone was my old friend in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. He was saying, "Fletch, you have got to get approval for my bombers to leave. Somebody canceled the strike." I said, "That's impossible. We got the approval this afternoon from the President. Who can cancel that strike?" He said, "I don't know. But I've been told I can't let the bombers go." And he said, "Listen." He was living in a little tent and he had a field telephone, and he held the telephone out and I could hear the engines on the bombers going. And I said, jokingly, "Let them go!" And he said, "No, they gave me orders. I can't let them go." I said, "OK, I'll call the city and see what I can get." So I called into this control center (that I'd been working with every day since that New Year's Day of 1959) and I said, "Listen. Why aren't the bombers going?" And they said, "General Cabell got a call saying he cannot let them go unless he can talk to Secretary Rusk and get Secretary Rusk to approve, and he's trying to find Secretary Rusk now." And I said, "Yes, but we've got a sunrise attack and the sun is going to come up." It'd take the bombers four hours to fly from Puerto Cabezas to the base where the T-33's were in Cuba, and any time we lost there would put the arrival of the bombers after sunrise. The B-26's wouldn't be there, and the brigade would be attacking the beach -- which is what they did, of course. I called as many as I could and all I found was that everybody was in an uproar. Everything was in a shambles. After all this careful planning, the whole CIA section in there was just distraught with the developments. General Cabell was off trying to make some arrangements -- trying to find Mr. Rusk, I guess, or make arrangements with him. And -- in a strange little side episode -- Allen Dulles, who was in charge of the whole thing, was out of the United States. He wasn't even in the country. He'd gone out to a speaking engagement in Puerto Rico. In other words, he's out of the cycle. We had to use General Cabell or nothing. (General Cabell was his deputy, as you will recall.) I had done what I could do. I was not that close to the program in a command sense; I couldn't order them to go. I had called everybody I knew to alert them. I went to sleep. I went to the office the next morning and found out that the bombers had not gone. And I found out that already those jets had been attacking the ships. One ship had pulled offshore, trying to escape; the other ship had been sunk. The men had landed on the beach. The beach landing was pretty good, but we knew the effort was lost. In that first day, we lost 16 B-26s. The jets just chopped them up. And all due to this call to Cabell saying, "You can't go unless you can get Mr. Rusk or unless you want to confront the President." The President was out of Washington; he was in Glen Ora, Virginia, his home in Northern Virginia. General Cabell had been with the Agency for years. He was an Air Force lieutenant general. He had a lot of administrative experience, but not combat experience. He was not exactly the man you'd want to have fight his way through this kind of a situation, especially when somebody like the President was involved. During the latter part of this same month of April, after the failure of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy appointed a board to investigate what had happened and why things went wrong and what he should know about this whole operation. He was very wise about the appointment, because the first man he put on was Allen Dulles himself. The second man was Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was the Chief of Naval Operations and was the closest man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the daily operations of this planning. General Lemnitzer was the chairman, but Burke had handled all the details because the Navy command had the ships and all that. So Burke was on it. The third man was a man Kennedy had never met until 1961: General Maxwell Taylor, who had been Chief of Staff of the Army under Eisenhower. And the fourth man was Bobby Kennedy. I cannot imagine a more able, competent and -- what would you say? -- cleverly devised group than those four. Kennedy did it right, because they came from different circles. And they sat in there, in an office that was only two doors from mine. I talked with almost everybody going in and out of there as they went, because they were all old friends I'd been working with for a long time. And they combed this operation from one end to the other. When they were done, Maxwell Taylor wrote a long, long letter to the President that had the full approval of the other three members -- Dulles, Arleigh Burke and Bobby Kennedy. In this, they came to the conclusion that the reason for the failure was because of the phone call that came from McGeorge Bundy to General Cabell. People have looked at this with a lot of different views. McGeorge Bundy was a Special Assistant to the President; he was in the White House. He and his brother, Bill Bundy, had been very close to the CIA (in fact, Bill Bundy worked for the CIA for years) and they also were acquainted with President Kennedy. McGeorge Bundy for some reason called Cabell. What the Taylor committee found out was that he had been talking with Adlai Stevenson, our Ambassador to the UN. And Ambassador Stevenson had been seriously embarrassed when he was asked to tell the UN that the bombers that struck Cuba on the first attack (Saturday morning) did not have anything to do with America; that they were Cubans who were defecting, and as they defected they shot up the air force. He showed pictures. He showed the front page of the New York Times with a picture of one of the defector's planes on the ground in Miami: it had Cuban markings on it and everything. Within an hour after Stevenson had held that picture up to show the UN, Castro had proved, beyond doubt, that that airplane was not one of his. He didn't have an airplane with eight guns in the nose and all that sort of thing, and he blew Stevenson's argument out of the water. And that seriously embarrassed Stevenson, who had been our ambassador to the UN only recently having been appointed by Kennedy (a month or two at the most). He was irate to think that his own government would set him up for that. So Stevenson had reason to want to talk to McGeorge Bundy and to say: "No more air attacks. We're not going to get into this business", without ever thinking about the landing on the beach. He didn't know about the landing on the beach. He just didn't want another "air attack." And McGeorge Bundy may have (may have, this is conjecture, but he may have) been sufficiently convinced by Stevenson of "no more air attacks," without realizing the enormous significance of that air attack, that last strike to wipe out the last airplanes of Castro's force. So you can make an allowance for how that happened. But the record is perfectly clear that, at 9:30 that Sunday night, McGeorge Bundy reversed the President's decision and called Cabell and said "no air strike tomorrow." That doomed the whole affair, because the airplanes destroyed the mission. Now, people have said: "OK. Bundy was Kennedy's Assistant, right in the White House. Why didn't Kennedy straighten this out?" That's a good question. But let's go one step further. That is true; but within weeks Bobby Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, Admiral Burke and Allen Dulles were writing this in a letter to the President to tell the President this was their finding. Why would they have to tell him, in an official letter, that this was the reason it failed, if he had been the man that called McGeorge Bundy? You see, Bobby Kennedy could have told them right there in the meeting: "OK, I know Jack called him. Let's drop it right now. We'll say that it was Jack Kennedy's problem." Or the others could have said it because Allen Dulles was being fired, he could have said it out of spite. But they didn't. They knew that McGeorge Bundy had made a serious mistake, or had made a decision that looked like a mistake later on. It could have been an honest decision -- he could have thought that Stevenson was making a good point ("no more air attacks"), without thinking about the effect of that. They weren't military tacticians. Jack Hawkins had designed the plan, but not these people. It's a very mixed-up thing. As a result, people later on have argued that Kennedy destroyed his own plan by not sending over U.S. Military air cover for the beach landing. Air cover was no part of the beach landing, any more than it was for the British and the French in Cairo in 1956, because there were supposed to be no airplanes. You don't need air cover if there are no airplanes. You don't need an umbrella if it isn't raining. It's a shame that through the years the literature has been filled up with partial information, none of which explains this all the way from the fact that I got that phone call from Nicaragua explaining what that man was up against. I could hear the planes running, and I jokingly told him, "Let them roll!" He knew I was joking, I didn't have the authority. And then people have written that the problem with the Bay of Pigs was: Kennedy didn't provide U.S. Military air cover. They didn't need air cover. And General Cabell never did tell Kennedy that the call had been made. Kennedy woke up in the morning thinking there had been more than adequate air cover by the brigade's own B-26's. That was the plan as he had approved it on Sunday afternoon. Ratcliffe: What do you mean by "air cover"? Prouty: The distinction lies between the brigade's own B-26's that Bundy had grounded, and U.S. Military Air Cover that the National Security Council Directive 5412 prohibits. This is why the public has been led to believe "Air Cover" meant that Kennedy should have sent fighters from the aircraft carriers (Navy fighters) and wiped out those jets; in other words, wiped out any opposition. But we didn't need air cover. Those Cuban jets were supposed to be rubble by sunrise. Ratcliffe: We didn't need air cover if the plan had been allowed to proceed as it had been approved by JFK on Sunday afternoon. Prouty: And the plan had said that if they didn't destroy those planes, don't land on the beach. You can't stop a snowball once it's going downhill. But the difference was the levels between the military tacticians and the political tacticians, which didn't meet. This was a new Kennedy team. They didn't have -- even Maxwell Taylor had never met Kennedy. He wasn't an advisor to him until afterwards. Kennedy kept Taylor in the White House to be his military advisor to guard against this again. He didn't want it to happen again. This is very complicated. But you can see how, if we think about it realistically, it makes sense that it could have happened. It's the unfortunate (I believe it is unfortunate, "the unfortunate call" -- I don't think it was malicious) -- the unfortunate call that Bundy made, that the Taylor Report clearly states "Bundy made." There's a very good book out called Operation Zapata, which explains this word by word, signed by Maxwell Taylor -- not by some author -- this was Maxwell Taylor. Operation Zapata did nothing but translate the government records into a book cover. There's no editorializing whatsoever. The Bay of Pigs operation plan itself was much more effective than most people think. Ratcliffe: Why do you think Bundy didn't think to confirm with Kennedy that this was OK before he simply called Cabell and said "no air strike"? Prouty: I think that he and Stevenson discussed this carefully during the evening. Stevenson, wrathful after being embarrassed the day before; Stevenson not knowing about the invasion; Bundy not knowing about the tactical significance of this -- you see, there's plenty of room to give each man his own thoughts. A Result of CIA Covert Military Commanders in Vietnam: The League of Families for the Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia A good example: I was in the Pentagon (of course, I had been there for years) when the whole Kennedy team came in. Well, they were great guys, but: of all these people coming in to run the Department of Defense (Bob McNamara and on down through Ed Katzenbach, Alan Einhoven and, oh, you can go on and on, Paul Nitze -- Nitze's made a great record since, Bill Bundy), not a one of them with a day of military service, and they were running the Department of Defense. That doesn't mean they didn't know how; it meant they needed some experience. Let them stay there awhile, and they were going to do all right. If you put yourself back to that era: Eisenhower had been in the White House for eight years. The Pentagon was run by Eisenhower people who had the vast experience of World War II behind them: they knew warfare; they knew the Defense Department. All of a sudden, in comes the Kennedy team. That didn't change the bureaucracy, but it changed the top. And every one of these top jobs went to people who had little or no military experience. It was very noticeable to me. I was one of the few current military officers at that level, at that time, and I'd go to lunch with these fellows. I remember Ed Katzenbach: He had been Dean at Princeton (I believe I'm correct by saying Princeton) -- a terrific fellow. I mean, just the most enjoyable, experienced, intelligent guy you'd ever met. I'd go to lunch with him. (In the Pentagon he couldn't find the dining room, he couldn't find the bathroom! The Pentagon's a helluva place!) So Ed would come down to my office and he'd say, "Hey, let's go to lunch." And we'd talk about everything. He had no military experience. And the same with a lot of these people. But they had a tremendous capability. And if they had stayed in the Pentagon for a full eight years, this country would be much different than it is today. I'm not taking anything off their capability. I'm simply saying that, the Bay of Pigs came too early; it was too much, and a little bit too crafty for them to understand at that stage of the game. It became a disaster, and then it has never been explained properly. The words of Operation Zapata explain it, but you have to know what it's all about to read it properly. But it's on the record. I'm not creating a record here, I'm simply stating what is in the record there. So that influenced Kennedy's view of Vietnam. When Kennedy was briefed by President Eisenhower in January of 1961, President Eisenhower told him about the hotspots around the world. He didn't use the word "Vietnam" at all, he talked about Laos. Time Magazine, in all of 1960, mentioned Vietnam only six times, and four of them had nothing to do with the war. You know, Vietnam was not a hot button. Cuba was, Laos was, Berlin was, and so on. So it's easy to forget the preface to Vietnam when you don't remember these things. These events led up to the Vietnam scene much more significantly than most people want to remember. Of course, the generation gap is coming and the people coming of age now don't remember this at all. They just know that 25 years ago Kennedy was killed. But they don't remember the antecedents to the decisions he made about the Bay of Pigs and about Vietnam. This was a very interesting period. When we got this Bay of Pigs thing behind us (much to our disgust), we did move toward Vietnam. For instance, C-123 aircraft that we were using in these operations were flown to Vietnam. They became the Agent Orange spray planes, they played that part. The B-26's that had been converted with the eight guns in the nose (what was left of them), we re flown to Vietnam and became the first heavy combat aircraft over there. Helicopters that had been used in different operations in Laos were moved to Vietnam and they became the air patrol capability in Vietnam. The P-51 fighters that we had fixed up for Indonesia: they went into Vietnam. They were available -- all these aircraft were available, and they scraped them all together and parked them in Vietnam. In other words, the war was going to happen whether anybody planned it or not. Everything was moving in that direction. So we saw the years from 1960 into '61 and '62 as years when a certain amount of momentum kept going. And the only command structure in Vietnam at that time was CIA. The military were in the position of being the logistics staff. We provided the equipment, we provided certain training. For instance, people don't think about helicopters. In those days, for every hour a helicopter flew (a military helicopter), it had to receive 24 hours of maintenance. That was just a general rule: twenty-four hours of maintenance. Which meant we had to cover Vietnam with helicopter maintenance people. They were called soldiers. And it looked like the troop size was growing, because they were soldiers or marines or whoever -- airforce people -- but they were maintaining helicopters. Anytime you get a helicopter squadron together, you have to get a helicopter supply unit together. If you have a supply unit, you have to get a maintenance unit. So what was 400 men becomes 1200 men. You get 1200 men together, you have to have a PX, you have to have a hospital, and so on. We were creating a structure in Vietnam built upon the operation of helicopters. And all they did was to fly the Vietnamese soldiers around more or less like a police activity -- transporting the Vietnamese military. The next thing you know, we had 3,000 men in Vietnam, then we had 6,000. By the end of 1963, at about the time of Kennedy's death, there were somewhere between thirteen and sixteen thousand military (so-called military) in Vietnam. What was strange was that a great number of those military were really not military. They were cover military; they were involved with the CIA or other covert programs. That has a great significance. Has it ever occurred to you why, of all the wars the United States ever fought, that at the end of this war we created a League of Families for the Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia? Why did we turn the Prisoners of War program over to wives, mothers, sisters of soldiers in Vietnam? Do you know why? I was a founding advisor of that organization, by request of a general. I was retired by that time, but I was asked to come back and work on it because I knew Vietnam so well and I knew the situation so well. The reason I was asked to be an advisor was that we had so many men who were called "Captain So-and-so" but really were civilians with the CIA. When one got shot down, the people that captured him found his records: "Captain So-and-so." But the U.S. Army wasn't missing a captain, so nobody declared him a prisoner. Their records were so messed up because of the way these people were lost: out of "Air America," the CIA airline, out of helicopter support units, out of all these other contrived units that we were putting in there which were not military. So that insurance programs, mortgage payments, all the normal things people have to take care of, were tumbling down on this group of people called Prisoners of War over there. And our own Army, Navy and Air Force couldn't account for them. We didn't even know they were missing. I talked at great length to the father of a Navy pilot who went down. He was telling me about all the abnormal things that had happened in his dealings with the Navy since his son went down somewhere in Indochina -- he didn't even know where. So I turned to the father and I said, "Do you know if your son was flying for the Navy?" He said, "Of course he was, he -- " "No," I said, "do you know for sure? Or was he flying for CIA or Air America?" That poor man was totally shocked. He went over to the Pentagon immediately and demanded an answer. He found out his son was flying for CIA, and he never knew that. You see, what are you going to do with a situation like that? So we created this unusual organization called the League of Families for the Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia. And I was there at the first meeting. I was there years after that -- many, many, many meetings -- because we had a very serious job to perform. For instance, we had to see if something as simple as their military insurance coverage would be acknowledged by the insurance companies. We had a big re-insurance organization we used for this. We tried to put across the Geneva Accords to protect these men. And a lot of other things that were necessary (that we could not normally do for prisoners of war) with this kind of a covert war. It was really a screwed-up mess. But you see, it grew that way and we had to do something. This is what had confronted Kennedy and his people as the war moved on into 1963. JFK Prepares To Get Out Of Vietnam: The Taylor/McNamara Trip Report of October 1963 and NSAM 263 By the summer of '63 Kennedy had made up his mind to get out of Vietnam. By that time I had been transferred from the Office of Secretary of Defense to the Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ratcliffe: In 1963? Prouty: In '62. But I'm talking about the summer of '63: by that time I had been transferred. I was transferred in '62. Mr. McNamara had approved the plan submitted by General Erskine to create the Defense Intelligence Agency. With that approval General Erskine (who had been on service for an awful long time) retired, and his office (the Office of Special Operations, where I had worked and where Lansdale was working) was abolished. Mr. McNamara suggested that the office that I was in (the Military Support of Clandestine Operations) be transferred to the JCS. We established the office there; it was the Office of Special Operations. I created it. I was its chief for the first two years, until I retired in 1964. During that period we watched this rise of increasingly effective military in Vietnam. At the same time, the Kennedy administration could find no real reason to continue a war there. They gradually began to rationalize that: `Look, this is a Vietnamese war, it's not an American war. We should provide support to them but let them fight their war.' This rationale began to snowball into the latter part of 1963. At that time Kennedy did something that I think was quite typical of him and quite clever. General Krulak was my boss in the JCS, he was an experienced combat-trained Marine, and he was probably the closest military officer to the Kennedy family -- very close to Bobby Kennedy and quite close to Jack Kennedy. He went to meetings in the White House frequently. I know because I worked right in his office. Kennedy sent General Krulak to Vietnam. This was more or less a nominal visit. Krulak knew an awful lot about Vietnam; he didn't need to go. But it brought him up to date; it let him hear some briefings that were current, let him talk with some people, so that when he came back he could write, `I've just come from Vietnam; here's the story.' Ratcliffe: And when was that? Prouty: That was in September of 1963. By that time General Krulak knew what Kennedy's plans were. So that when he came back he sat down and he started writing what became NSAM 263 -- otherwise known as the Taylor/McNamara Trip Report of October '63.[1] They both are the same, although some people don't realize that the numbered memoranda simply covers the Taylor/McNamara Report. But they're the same document, and they bear the same authority coming from the White House as a National Security Action Memorandum. So Krulak was engaged writing this major report -- and I was one of his principal writers -- I wrote probably as much or more of that document than anybody else did. It was a very large report, profusely illustrated; we had pictures in it, we had maps in it. When it was all done, they bound it in a big leather cover that said "President John F. Kennedy from Robert McNamara and Maxwell Taylor." We flew the finished report to Hawaii in a jet, gave it to Taylor and McNamara so they could read it on their way back, so that when they gave it to Kennedy they at least would know it existed. But what the report was really, was Kennedy's own views on the Vietnam War -- not anybody else's. All Krulak did (and all I did) was write what Kennedy had told us to do. The agent in that was Bobby Kennedy. Krulak would see Bobby Kennedy, I guess, every day. We even slept in the office for awhile. We were working right around the clock. We had something like 16 secretaries, four every four hours, just going right around the clock like that, getting this huge report prepared. (It was before the days of word processors and things like that.) But when Taylor and McNamara came back and landed in a helicopter on the lawn of the White House, they gave the President this big report. The President knew exactly what was in the report because it was what he had dictated to Krulak. What Krulak had written and given to them had made the circle; it was back in Kennedy's hands and now he could declare it to be national policy. About two days later, on October 11th, 1963, he signed this NSAM 263 which, among other things, said that by Christmas time a thousand military men are coming out of Vietnam, coming home. And by the end of 1965 all U.S. personnel will be out of Vietnam. That was very important. For instance, in the Pacific at that time we had a military publication called the Stars and Stripes. It was the old newspaper from WWII. The headline of the Stars and Stripes that day (great big headline) said: "One thousand troops being withdrawn from Vietnam by Christmas and the remainder by '65." Nobody missed the point. It was right there in big letters. And this is what Kennedy planned. Privately, Kennedy had told some of his confidants that "As soon as I am reelected, I am going to get people out of Vietnam and we're going to Vietnamize that war; we'll just provide support for them;" and "I'm going to break the CIA into a thousand pieces." Those are quotables you can get from Senator Mansfield and from other intimates of the President (and that those of us working on those things day-by-day knew were exactly the sentiments of John F. Kennedy). --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. 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