[CTRL] Fwd: Tthe Herbert S. Winokur Public Policy Fund at Harvard University; The CIA Connection.....

[Kris Millegan]

---

To remind...Hitz got a chair at Princeton funded by Goldman Sachs.....Deutch
got a check from Pug through Harvard....should we presume that Hitz and
Deutch are on different teams?

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Catherine Austin Fitts [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2000 1:51 PM
> To: Catherine Austin Fitts; Kpomeara@Aol. Com; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Kate;
> Bob [[EMAIL PROTECTED]]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: Uri Dowbenko; Lois Ann Battuello; Linda Minor [[EMAIL PROTECTED]];
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Tthe Herbert S. Winokur Public Policy Fund at Harvard
> University
>
>
> http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/visions/gtrept.htm
>
>
> Pug's public policy fund at Harvard, funded with the wealth he
> created side by side with Harvard, while he was a Harvard
> Management (Endowment) trustee, including in HUD housing (NHP &
> WMF), has funded the following report by the John F. Kennedy
> (Cuomo's wifes uncle) School at Harvard (current employer of the
> former FHA Commissioner, Nic Retsinas, and former employer of the
> current FHA Commissoner, Bill Apgar).
>
> Lois---note joint Harvard-Stanford project.
>
> Cat-we should add publication to chronology. Thanks.
>
> ==================================================================
> =================================================
>
>
>
>
>
>
>                                                Catastrophic Terrorism:
>
>                                              Elements of a National Policy
>
>                                                           By
>
>                                             Ashton B. Carter,
> John M. Deutch
>
>                                                   and Philip D. Zelikow
>
>                                                        A Report of
>
>                                           Visions of Governance
> for the Twenty-First Century
>
>                                         A Project of the John F.
> Kennedy School of Government
>
>                                                      Harvard University
>
>
>
> �1998 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
> University and the Board of Trustees of Harvard University
>
> This report was made possible in part by the Carnegie Corporation
> of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
> and the Herbert S. Winokur Public Policy Fund at Harvard
> University.  The statements made and views
> expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
>
>
>
> Contents
>
> Foreword: Preventive Defense
>
> Acknowledgments
>
> Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy
>
>      Imagining the Transforming Event
>
>      Organizing for Success
>
>      Intelligence and Warning
>
>      Prevention and Deterrence
>
>      Crisis and Consequence Management
>
>      Acquisition
>
>      Conclusion
>
> Notes
>
> About the Authors
>
> About Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century
>
> About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project
>
>
>
> Foreword: Preventive Defense
>
> Through more than four decades of Cold War, American national
> security strategy was difficult to implement but easy to
> understand. America was
> set on a clear course to contain Soviet expansionism anywhere in
> the world, all the while building a formidable arsenal of nuclear
> weapons to deter
> the Soviet Union from using military force against it or its
> allies. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the underlying
> rationale for that strategy�the
> threat from the Soviet Union�has disappeared. What strategy
> should replace it? Much depends on finding the correct answer to
> this question.
>
> The world survived three global wars this century. The first two
> resulted in tens of millions of deaths, but the third�the Cold
> War�would have
> been even more horrible than the others had deterrence failed.
> These three wars trace a path that leads to the strategy needed
> for the post-Cold War
> era.
>
> At the end of the First World War, the victorious European allies
> sought revenge and reparations; what they got was a massive depression and
> another world war. The United States sought "normalcy" and
> isolation; what it got was total war and leadership in winning
> it. Because it failed to
> prevent and then to deter Germany�s aggression, America was
> forced to mobilize a second time to defeat it.
>
> At the end of the Second World War, America initially chose a
> strategy based on prevention. Vowing not to repeat the mistakes
> made after World
> War I, the Truman administration created the Marshall Plan, which
> sought to assist the devastated nations of Europe, friends and
> foes alike, to
> rebuild. The Marshall Plan and other examples of the preventive
> defense strategy, aimed at preventing the conditions that would
> lead to a future
> world war, were an outstanding success in Western Europe and in Japan.
>
> But the Soviet Union turned down the Marshall Plan and, instead,
> persisted in a program of expansion, trying to take advantage of
> the weakened
> condition of most of the countries of Europe. The resulting
> security problem was clearly articulated by George Kennan, who
> forecast that the
> wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union would be replaced with
> a struggle for the heart of Europe and that the United States
> should prepare for a
> protracted period of confrontation. Kennan�s analysis was
> accepted by the Truman administration, which then formulated a
> strategy that would get
> us through the Cold War: deterring another global war while
> containing the Soviet Union�s demonstrated expansionist
> ambitions. Deterrence
> supplanted prevention: there was no other choice.
>
> Even deterrence was a departure from earlier American military
> strategy. The United States had twice previously risen to defeat
> aggression, but it
> had not maintained the peacetime military establishment or the
> engagement in the world to deter World Wars I or II. Marshall and
> other defense
> leaders around Truman created the peacetime posture and new
> security institutions required. In time, as George Kennan had
> forecast, the Soviet
> Union disintegrated because of the limitations of its political
> and economic systems. Deterrence worked.
>
> The result is a world today seemingly without a major threat to
> the United States, and the U.S. is now enjoying a period of peace
> and influence as
> never before. But while this situation is to be savored by the
> public, foreign policy and defense leaders should not be
> complacent. This period of an
> absence of threat challenges these leaders to find the vision and
> foresight to act strategically, even when events and imminent
> threats do not compel
> them to do so.
>
> To understand the dangers and opportunities that will define our
> nation�s strategy in the new era, we must see the post-Cold War
> world the way
> George Marshall looked upon Europe after World War II, and return
> to prevention. In essence, we now have another chance to realize
> Marshall�s
> vision: a world not of threats to be deterred, but a world united
> in peace, freedom, and prosperity. To realize this vision, we
> should return to
> Marshall�s strategy of preventive defense.
>
> Preventive Defense is a concept of defense strategy for the
> United States in the post-Cold War Era. It stresses the need to
> anticipate security dangers
> which, if mismanaged, have the potential to re-create Cold
> War-scale threats to U.S. interests and survival. The foci of
> Preventive Defense are:
> proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, catastrophic
> terrorism, "loose nukes" and other military technology from the
> former Soviet Union,
> Russia�s post-Cold War security identity, and the peaceful rise of China.
>
> Preventive Defense is the most important mission of national
> security leaders and of the defense establishment. They must
> dedicate themselves to
> Preventive Defense while they deter lesser but existing
> threats�in Iraq and North Korea�and conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian
> missions�in Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and so on�where aggression
> occurs but where American vital interests are not directly threatened.
>
> This report is the sixth in a series of Preventive Defense
> Project reports on key applications of Preventive Defense. We are
> grateful to our colleagues
> in the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group and the Visions of
> Governance for the Twenty-First Century for their collaboration
>
>
>
> Acknowledgments
>
> This report is a product of the Catastrophic Terrorism Study
> Group, a nine-month long collaboration of faculty from Harvard
> University, the
> Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and
> the University of Virginia. The Group involves experts on
> national security,
> terrorism, intelligence, law enforcement, constitutional law,
> technologies of Catastrophic Terrorism and defenses against them,
> and government
> organization and management. The Group is co-chaired by Ashton B.
> Carter and John M. Deutch, and the project director is Philip D. Zelikow.
> Organized by the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, the
> work of the Study Group is part of the Kennedy School of Government�s
> "Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century" project,
> directed by Dean Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Elaine Kamarck.
>
> While the danger of Catastrophic Terrorism is new and grave,
> there is much that the United States can do to prevent it and to
> mitigate its
> consequences if it occurs. The objective of the Catastrophic
> Terrorism Study Group is to suggest program and policy changes
> that can be taken by
> the United States government in the near term, including the
> reallocation of agency responsibilities, to prepare the nation
> better for the emerging
> threat of Catastrophic Terrorism.
>
> An article based on this report will be published in the journal
> Foreign Affairs in the November/December 1998 issue.
>
> The authors would like to thank the members of the Catastrophic
> Terrorism Study Group:
>
>      Graham T. Allison, Jr.
>
>      Zoe Baird
>
>      Vic DeMarines
>
>      Robert Gates
>
>      Jamie Gorelick
>
>      Robert Hermann
>
>      Philip Heyman
>
>      Fred Ikle
>
>      Elaine Kamarck
>
>      Ernest May
>
>      Matthew Meselson
>
>      Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
>
>      William J. Perry
>
>      Larry Potts
>
>      Fred Schauer
>
>      J. Terry Scott
>
>      Jack Sheehan
>
>      Malcom Sparrow
>
>      Herbert Winokur
>
>      Robert Zoellick
>
> Though practically all of these group members are sympathetic to
> the conclusions in this report, and some enthusiastically endorse
> them, none is
> responsible either for particular opinions expressed here or for
> the way we have written this report and expressed those judgments.
>
> We would also like to thank the staff who was responsible for
> organizing the Study Group in addition to assisting in the
> preparation of this report:
> Gretchen Bartlett, Lainie Dillon, Hilary Driscoll, Sarah
> Peterson, and Kristin Schneeman.
>
> Finally, the Study Group is grateful for the support of the
> Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T.
> MacArthur Foundation,
> and the Herbert S. Winokur Public Policy Fund at Harvard University.
>
>
>
> CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL POLICY
>
> Imagining the Transforming Event
>
> We find terrorism when individuals or groups, rather than
> governments, seek to attain their objectives by means of the
> terror induced by violent
> attacks upon civilians. When governments openly attack others, we
> call it war, to be judged or dealt with according to the laws of war. When
> governments act in concert with private individuals or groups,
> the United States government may call it war, or state-sponsored
> terrorism, and
> retaliate against both the individuals and the governments.
> Whatever the label, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in national
> or international life,
> although terrorists may be animated by a greater variety of
> motives than ever before, from international cults like Aum
> Shinrikyo to the individual
> nihilism of the Unabomber.
>
> What is certainly new is that terrorists may today gain access to
> weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These can come in a variety of
> forms: nuclear
> explosive devices, germ dispensers, poison gas weapons, or even
> the novel destructive power of computers turned against the
> societies that rely on
> them. What is also new is an unprecedented level of national and
> global interdependence on an invisible infrastructure of energy
> and information
> distribution.
>
> Americans were shocked by the tragic results of the August 1998
> terrorist attacks against their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
> By comparison
> with the threat of catastrophic terrorism, we believe that the
> threat of ordinary terrorism of the kind we have known over the
> last generation is being
> taken seriously. The United States government�s commitment to
> address that danger is fundamentally sound. We are not as
> confident that the
> United States government is suitably prepared to address the new
> threat of catastrophic terrorism that utilizes weapons of mass
> destruction or
> intensive cyber-assault.
>
> Long part of Hollywood�s and Tom Clancy�s repertory of
> nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism is a real
> possibility. In theory, the enemies of
> the United States have motive, means, and opportunity. The U.S.
> government has publicly announced that terrorist groups are attempting to
> manufacture chemical weapons and destroyed one such facility
> operating in the Sudan. As India and Pakistan build up their
> nuclear arsenals and
> Russia, storehouse for tens of thousands of weapons and the
> material to make tens of thousands more, descends toward a future
> none can foresee, it
> is not hard to imagine the possibilities. The combination of
> available technology and lethality has made biological weapons at
> least as deadly a
> danger as the better known chemical and nuclear threats. The
> bombings in East Africa killed hundreds. A successful attack with
> weapons of mass
> destruction could certainly kill thousands, or tens of thousands.
> If the device that exploded in 1993 under the World Trade Center
> had been nuclear,
> or the distribution of a deadly pathogen, the chaos and
> devastation would have gone far beyond our meager ability to
> describe it.1
>
> Experts combining experience in every quadrant of the national
> security and law enforcement community all consider this
> catastrophic threat
> perfectly plausible today. Technology is more accessible, society
> is more vulnerable, and much more elaborate international
> networks have developed
> among organized criminals, drug traffickers, arms dealers, and
> money launderers: the necessary infrastructure for catastrophic
> terrorism. Practically
> unchallengeable American military superiority on the conventional
> battlefield pushes this country�s enemies toward the
> unconventional alternatives.2
>
> Readers should imagine the possibilities for themselves, because
> the most serious constraint on current policy is lack of
> imagination. An act of
> catastrophic terrorism that killed thousands or tens of thousands
> of people and/or disrupted the necessities of life for hundreds
> of thousands, or
> even millions, would be a watershed event in America�s history.
> It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented for peacetime and
> undermine Americans� fundamental sense of security within their
> own borders in a manner akin to the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb test,
> or perhaps
> even worse. Constitutional liberties would be challenged as the
> United States sought to protect itself from further attacks by
> pressing against
> allowable limits in surveillance of citizens, detention of
> suspects, and the use of deadly force. More violence would
> follow, either as other terrorists
> seek to imitate this great "success" or as the United States
> strikes out at those considered responsible. Like Pearl Harbor,
> such an event would
> divide our past and future into a "before" and "after." The
> effort and resources we devote to averting or containing this
> threat now, in the "before"
> period, will seem woeful, even pathetic, when compared to what
> will happen "after." Our leaders will be judged negligent for not
> addressing
> catastrophic terrorism more urgently.
>
> Using imagination, we hope now to find some of the political will
> that we know would be there later, "after," because this nation
> prefers prevention
> to funereal reconstruction. When this threat becomes clear the
> President must be in a position to activate extraordinary
> capabilities. The danger of
> the use of a weapon of mass destruction against the United States
> or one of its allies is greater at this moment than it was during
> the Cold War, or at
> least since 1962. The threat of catastrophic terrorism is
> therefore a priority national security problem, as well as a
> major law enforcement concern.
> The threat thus deserves the kind of attention we now devote to
> threats of military nuclear attack or of regional aggression, as
> in the Defense
> Department�s major regional contingencies that drive our force
> planning and the resources we devote to defense.
>
> The first enemy of imagination is resignation. Some who
> contemplate this threat find the prospects so dreadful and
> various that they despair of doing
> anything useful and switch off their troubling imagination. They
> are fatalistic, like someone contemplating the possibility of a
> solar supernova, and
> turn their eyes away from the threat. Some thinkers reacted the
> same way at the dawn of the nuclear age, expecting doom to strike
> at any hour and
> disavowing any further interest in the details of deterrence as a
> hopeless venture. But as in the case of nuclear deterrence, the
> good news is that more
> can be done.
>
> We formed a Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group to move beyond a
> realization of the threat to consider just what can be done about
> it. This group
> began meeting in November 1997. We examined other studies that
> consider this problem. We received information and advice from
> some current
> government officials as well as from those who had considered the
> problem from the perspectives of governments in Great Britain,
> Israel, Germany,
> and Russia. We now advance practical proposals for consideration
> and debate. We avoid a grand solution, preferring to shape
> "bricks" that strengthen
> existing structures, consider the very different technical
> challenges presented by nuclear, biological, chemical, and cyber
> threats, and provide a
> foundation for future adaptation and future building.
>
>
>
> Organizing for Success
>
> The threat of catastrophic terrorism typifies the new sort of
> security problem the United States must confront in the post Cold
> War world. It is
> transnational, defying ready classification as foreign or
> domestic, either in origin, participants, or materials. As the
> World Trade Center incident
> demonstrated, one group can combine U.S. citizens with resident
> aliens and foreign nationals, operating in and out of American
> territory over long
> periods of time.
>
> The greatest danger may arise if the threat falls into one of the
> crevasses in our government�s field of overlapping jurisdictions,
> such as the divide
> between terrorism that is "foreign" or "domestic;" or terrorism
> that has "state" or "non-state" sponsors; or terrorism that is
> classified as a problem
> for "law enforcement" or one of "national security." The law
> enforcement/national security divide is especially significant,
> carved deeply into the
> topography of American government.
>
> The national security paradigm fosters aggressive, proactive
> intelligence gathering, presuming the threat before it arises,
> planning preventive action
> against suspected targets, and taking anticipatory action. The
> law enforcement paradigm fosters reactions to information
> voluntarily provided,
> post-facto arrests, trials governed by rules of evidence, and
> general protection for the rights of citizens.
>
> We start with a concept for an overall end-to-end strategy. This
> has at least four elements: (1) intelligence and warning; (2)
> prevention and
> deterrence; (3) crisis and consequence management; and (4) a
> process for coordinated acquisition of needed materials,
> equipment, and technology.
> Throughout, there must be clear guidance about what our
> institutions should be able to do and definition of the roles and
> missions of involved
> agencies at all levels of government.
>
> In an address at the U.S. Naval Academy, President Clinton
> announced on May 22, 1998, that we must approach the new
> terrorist challenges of the
> 21st century "with the same rigor and determination we applied to
> the toughest security challenges of this century." To that end he signed
> Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 and appointed a National
> Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
> Counterterrorism to
> "bring the full force of all our resources to bear swiftly and
> effectively." The National Coordinator and PDD-62, like the
> predecessor PDD-39, look
> to "lead agencies" on one or another issue to "identify a program
> plan with goals and specific milestones." The National
> Coordinator will produce an
> annual "Security Preparedness Report," offer budget advice, and
> lead in the development of guidelines for crisis management.3
>
> We welcome the presidential determination to address the danger
> of catastrophic terrorism and see no harm in the designation of a
> responsible White
> House aide. But we suggest a different emphasis when it comes to
> solving the difficult problems of shared powers and overlapping
> authorities.
>
> We place no faith in czars. An unidentified, incautious
> administration official explained to reporters that "when money
> was going to the war on
> drugs, we created a drug czar. Now money is going to
> counterterrorism, and so we�ll have a czar for that, except this
> one will have real power."4 A
> national coordinator may be necessary, but is certainly not
> sufficient. For better or worse, however, "real power" resides in
> the executive
> departments and companies that actually have people, equipment,
> money, and the capacity to do things. This report thus focuses on
> building such
> capabilities, rather than dwelling on coordination at the apex.
>
> "In form," Richard Neustadt explained long ago, "all Presidents
> are leaders nowadays. In fact this guarantees no more than that
> they will be clerks.
> Everybody now expects the man inside the White House to do
> something about everything. ... But such acceptance ... merely
> signifies that other
> men have found it practically impossible to do their jobs without
> assurance of initiatives from him. ... They find his actions
> useful in their business.
> ... A President, these days, is an invaluable clerk. His services
> are in demand all over Washington. His influence, however, is a
> very different
> matter."5
>
> Well before the idea of a terrorism czar had been conceived,
> James Q. Wilson had noticed that "whenever a political crisis
> draws attention to the
> fact that authority in our government is widely shared, the cry
> is heard for a �czar� to �knock heads together� and �lead� the
> assault on AIDS, drug
> abuse, pollution, or defense procurement abuses. Our form of
> government, to say nothing of our political culture, does not
> lend itself to czars...."6
>
> Also, most of the expensive functional capabilities that must be
> brought together to cope with the danger of catastrophic
> terrorism are capabilities
> that are needed for other purposes, too, from reconnaissance
> satellites to National Guardsmen. Unifying these capabilities
> exclusively for one
> challenge will not work in practice. The people making decisions
> about using these capabilities against terrorists should be the
> same people who
> must consider the other missions and who can weigh and reconcile
> competing demands.
>
> Experience from World War II (such as that of the British Chiefs
> of Staff Committee or the U.S. Office of War Mobilization)
> through the Cold War
> to the present, including the current system of security
> policymaking the British have devised (after long trial and
> error) for Northern Ireland, instead
> counsels us toward a different approach.7 One or another
> executive agency may be in the lead, but the key is to give
> responsibility (and
> accountability) to the people who are in charge of the relevant
> people and machines; create unglamorous but effective systems for shared
> decision-making that combine civil, military, and intelligence
> judgments up and down the chain of command; fashion entities that
> integrate planning
> and operational activity at the working level; and focus on the
> tasks of building up the institutional capacities to do new
> things. There must be
> exercises of the entire system to highlight defensive needs,
> before an incident happens. We turn now to the first crucial
> task: intelligence and
> warning.
>
>
>
> Intelligence and Warning
>
> Since 1945 the United States has given intense attention to any
> potentially hostile entity that might deliver weapons of mass
> destruction against its
> territory or its allies. The intelligence objectives were
> straightforward: orientation toward governments and monitoring of
> weapons development,
> testing, and deployment. The intelligence task for catastrophic
> terrorism is complicated by non-state actors, concealed weapons
> development, and
> unconventional deployments. In cyber attacks, the delivery of
> weapons can be entirely electronic.
>
> So the intelligence job is much harder. It is not impossible. The
> would-be terrorists have problems, too. If states are involved,
> the organizations tend
> either to be large and leaky, or small and feckless. If no state
> is involved, the group may be small, feckless, and pathological,
> too. These realities
> form the opportunities for intelligence successes. Even the most
> formidable Irish terrorist groups took years of experience to
> acquire their level of
> professionalism and, for all their skills and training, suffered
> frequent setbacks in their underground war against British
> intelligence. Perhaps the most
> serious recent attempt to carry out an act of catastrophic
> terrorism was an expertly planned effort to destroy, with a
> series of simultaneous bomb
> explosions, the entire electrical power supply for metropolitan
> London. The attempt was thwarted and British security forces
> arrested the terrorists.
>
> The U.S. government should seek to have the legal authorities and
> the capability to monitor�physically and electronically�any group
> and their
> potential state sponsors that might justifiably be considered to
> have a motive and capability to use weapons of mass destruction. The U.S.
> government should be able to do all that can reasonably be done
> to detect any use or deployment of such weapons anywhere in the world, by
> utilizing remote sensing technology and by strengthening and
> evaluating worldwide sources of information. These would include
> clandestine
> collection, open sources such as foreign newspapers and journals
> or the Internet, and would include better-organized exchanges
> with key allies and
> other like-minded states.
>
> Nearly a year before its attack on the Tokyo subway system, the
> Aum Shinrikyo group had already used the nerve gas, Sarin, in
> attacks on civilians.
> Although known to the Japanese news media, the U.S. government
> did not know. Not only did Washington not know what Japanese law
> enforcement agencies knew, it is likely that centralized Japanese
> law enforcement agencies did not know what other local
> organizations in Japan
> knew about this prior and well documented use of chemical weapons.
>
> Today the U.S. intelligence community lacks a place to perform
> "all-source" planning for collecting information, where the
> possible yields from
> efforts in overhead reconnaissance, electronic surveillance,
> clandestine agents, law enforcement databases and informants, and
> reports from foreign
> governments, can be sifted and organized for maximum
> complementary effect. The national security agencies can be
> proactive. Domestic law
> enforcement officials understandably are not proactive about
> intelligence collection but focus their efforts from informants
> or other collection to
> investigate suspected criminal actions with the objective of
> criminal prosecution. Civil liberties properly discourage them
> from going out and looking
> for criminals before they have evidence of crime.
>
> On the other hand, domestic law enforcement has many techniques
> for gathering data, including lawful wiretaps and grand jury
> investigations. Much
> of the yield from these efforts is, in turn, closed off to the
> national security community by law or regulation, to safeguard
> constitutional rights.8
>
> We believe the U.S. needs a new institution to gather
> intelligence on terrorism, with particular attention to the
> threat of catastrophic terrorism. We
> call this new institution a National Terrorism Intelligence
> Center. This Center would be responsible for collection
> management, analysis, dissemination of
> information, and warning of suspected catastrophic terrorist
> acts. The Center would need the statutory authority to:
>
>           � monitor and provide warning of terrorist threats to
> relevant agencies of the U.S. government, supporting defense or
>           intelligence operations, as well as law enforcement;
>
>           � set integrated collection requirements for gathering
> information for all the intelligence agencies or bureaus of the U.S.
>           government;
>
>           � receive and store all lawfully collected, relevant
> information from any government agency, including law enforcement
>           wiretaps and grand jury information;
>
>           � analyze all forms of relevant information to produce
> integrated reports that could be disseminated to any agency that
>           needed them, while restricting dissemination of
> underlying domestic wiretap and grand jury information;
>
>           � review planned collection and intelligence programs
> of all agencies directed toward terrorist targets to determine the
>           adequacy and balance among these efforts in preparation
> of the President�s proposed budget;
>
>           � facilitate international cooperation in
> counterterrorism intelligence, including the bilateral efforts of
> individual agencies;
>
>           � not manage operational activities or take on the task
> of general intelligence about the proliferation of weapons of mass
>           destruction (now coordinated in the Director of Central
> Intelligence Nonproliferation Center);
>
>           � be exempt from motions for pretrial discovery in the
> trials of indicted criminals.9
>
> Since this Center would have constant access to considerable
> domestic law enforcement information, we believe it should not be
> located at the
> Central Intelligence Agency. The highly successful Director of
> Central Intelligence Counterterrorism Center established in the
> mid-1980s has a
> narrower mandate than the National Center that we propose and it
> would be incorporated into the new National Center. Instead we
> recommend the
> National Center be located in the FBI. However, the Center, in
> our conception, would be responsible to an operating committee,
> chaired by the
> Director of Central Intelligence and including the Director of
> the FBI, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Attorney
> General, the Deputy
> Secretary of State, and the Deputy National Security Adviser. The
> budget would be included within the National Foreign Intelligence Program,
> which already provides support for the FBI�s National Security
> Division. Unresolved disputes would go to the National Security
> Council. The
> director of the Center would come alternately from FBI and CIA.
> The major intelligence organizations would all be required to
> provide a specified
> number of professionals to the Center, and this number would be
> exempt from agency personnel ceilings.
>
> The concept of this Center attempts to combine the proactive
> intelligence gathering approach of the national security
> agencies, which are not legally
> constrained in deciding when they may investigate a possible
> crime, with the investigative resources of law enforcement
> agencies. We must have an
> entity that can utilize our formidable but disparate national
> security and law enforcement resources to analyze transnational
> problems. This
> combination should be permitted, consistent with public trust,
> only in a National Center that has no powers of arrest and
> prosecution and that
> establishes a certain distance from the traditional defense and
> intelligence agencies. The Center would also be subject to
> oversight from existing
> institutions, like the federal judiciary, the President�s Foreign
> Intelligence Advisory Board and the select intelligence
> committees of the Congress.
>
> There are precedents for creating novel interagency operating
> institutions that work�the National Reconnaissance Office and the reformed
> Counterintelligence Center offer relevant illustrations. We are
> not anxious to create new government institutions. But the
> problems in information
> sharing about terrorism are not just products of petty
> bureaucratic jealousy. They stem from a real question: how do we
> reconcile the practices of
> foreign intelligence work with the restrictions that properly
> limit domestic law enforcement? We believe our proposal offers a
> possible answer.
>
>
>
> Prevention and Deterrence
>
> There are several measures that we believe will contribute to
> prevention and deterrence of catastrophic terrorism. We suggest
> three measures
> here�an international legal initiative to make any development or
> possession of weapons of mass destruction a universal crime, a National
> Information Assurance Institute, and stronger federal support to
> strategic risk analysis of the catastrophic terrorism problem.
>
> Outlawing Terror Weapons
>
> Prevention is intertwined with the concept of deterrence. The
> U.S. has finally developed a sound, firm, and increasingly
> credible declaratory policy
> that criminalizes terrorist activity and supports sanctions, or
> even the use of force, to thwart an attack or respond. We also
> believe that the United
> States must work with other countries to extend the prohibitions
> against development or possession of weapons of mass destruction. Matthew
> Meselson and others have recently proposed a convention that
> would make any individual intentionally involved in biological
> weapons work liable
> as an international criminal, prosecutable anywhere, as is the
> case for pirates or airplane hijackers.10 Defensive work against
> biological warfare agents
> would of course be permitted.
>
> There are already international treaties in which governments
> promise to restrain their weapons developments�the nuclear
> Non-Proliferation
> Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical
> Weapons Convention are the most notable examples. Governments
> breaking such a
> treaty violate international law. We are pressing a different
> idea. Prohibited weapon development would become a universal
> crime, opening the way
> to prosecution and extradition of individual offenders wherever
> they may be found, around the world. This idea utilizes the power
> of national
> criminal law against people, not the power of international law
> against governments. It builds on analogous developments in the
> law of piracy,
> treaties declaring the criminality of airplane hijacking, crimes
> of maritime navigation, theft of nuclear materials, and crimes
> against diplomats.
>
> We are concerned about the actions of governments, too. Over
> time, we hope the burden of proof in demonstrating compliance
> with international
> conventions must also shift away from those alleging
> noncompliance to those states or groups whose compliance is in
> doubt. International norms
> should adapt so that such states are obliged to reassure those
> who are worried and to take reasonable measures to prove they are
> not secretly
> developing weapons of mass destruction. Failure to supply such
> proof, or prosecute the criminals living in their borders, should
> entitle worried
> nations to take all necessary actions for their self-defense.
>
> National Information Assurance Institute
>
> Cyber-terrorism is a special problem, where private sector
> cooperation is vital, but elusive. The President�s Commission on
> Critical Infrastructure
> Protection (often called the Marsh Commission) stressed that
> industry was reluctant to deal with these problems on its own
> because the solutions
> cost money, the risk is unclear, and they fear heavy-handed
> government action. On the other hand, although the FBI has
> created a National
> Infrastructure Protection Center, which can help identify sites
> that need help, we do not think FBI, with all its operational
> duties, is the place to
> build a bridge with the private sector or harness the significant
> resources and expertise found on the cyber problem within the
> Department of
> Defense. So we propose a National Information Assurance
> Institute, based within the private, nonprofit sector, that could
> serve as a kind of industry
> laboratory with a central focus on cyber protection. Placed in
> the private sector, the institute would not itself own the
> infrastructure or be part of the
> government, but it could deal with both sides. It implements the
> Marsh Commission�s recommendation, seeking a way for industry to
> organize itself
> better to deal with this problem as part of a public-private partnership.
>
> For industry, this institute could become:
>
>           � a clearinghouse for sharing information assurance
> techniques and technology;
>
>           � a developer of common techniques and technology for
> information assurance;
>
>           � a trusted repository of proprietary information that
> poses no competitive threat;
>
>           � a single point of contact with the law enforcement,
> national security, and other agencies of the federal government;
>
>           � a resource for training and familiarization of
> industry personnel with technical best practice and government concerns,
>           policies, and regulations.
>
> For government, this institute could become:
>
>           � a channel for sharing sensitive intelligence about
> threats to information infrastructure;
>
>           � a center of technical excellence for developing and
> improving technology and techniques for protecting critical
>           infrastructure;
>
>           � a unified government-industry forum for coordinating
> federal policy, regulation, and other actions affecting infrastructure
>           providers.
>
> We envision that the institute would be established as a
> not-for-profit research organization by a group of concerned
> private companies, universities,
> and existing not-for-profit laboratories. The institute would be
> governed by a board of directors drawn from the private sector
> and academia.
>
> The institute staff could be supplemented by detailees drawn from
> both industry and government. Industry affiliates would not only
> include the
> manufacturers and maintainers of information systems, but also
> service vendors, their trade associations, and the major
> companies and trade
> associations from the power, telecommunications, banking,
> transportation, oil and gas, water and sewer, and emergency
> service sectors (including
> multinational companies, with appropriate protection for
> circulation of U.S.-only classified information).
>
> This new institute could perform information assurance
> assessments for industry on a confidential basis. Industry
> representatives would be educated
> and trained on technical best practice, threats, and government
> policies. The institute would receive contracts from government.
> The institute could
> sponsor and conduct research on security assessment tools,
> intrusion detection, recovery, and restoration. As it identifies
> and develops industry
> standard best practices, and evaluates the vulnerability of
> commercial products, we prefer to rely where possible on informal
> private sector
> enforcement of these ideas in the marketplace (through insurance
> rating, for example), rather than formal government regulation.
> The institute could
> also perform incident evaluations, create a monitoring center for
> information assurance, provide on-call assistance, and help
> industry develop
> contingency plans for failure.
>
> Risk Analysis
>
> Other than more general policies to keep America�s enemies to a
> minimum and to prevent anyone from acquiring weapons of mass
> destruction who
> does not already possess them, efforts to prevent catastrophic
> terrorism turn on the interdiction of people and materials and on
> deterring attacks. A
> serious U.S. government effort would include development of the
> capacity to use remote sensing technology to detect, at least
> from close range, any
> distinctive and measurable physical properties of nuclear,
> biological, and chemical weapons or their less commonplace
> precursor materials and the
> distribution of this technology in a form that can be used in the
> field. Aided by international agreements among supplier nations,
> materials that can
> be used in weapons of mass destruction would be marked or tagged
> wherever possible, to enhance detection or post facto identification.
>
> Moreover, the United States should seek to ascertain the identity
> of every person and the contents of all freight entering its
> territory or its
> installations overseas. Though we know this goal obviously cannot
> be attained in the immediate future, it is a legitimate objective
> for the long-term.
> Even imperfect measures can still create the perception, among
> would-be terrorists, that they or their precious weapon material
> might run a
> significant risk of being intercepted. But systematic
> interdiction efforts require shrewder analysis of where more
> resources can make a difference.
>
> The allocation of inspection and protective instruments by the
> government should be guided by risk analysis. This form of
> analysis is well known to
> engineers who may analyze a dangerous system to find the key
> sequences of errors that can lead not just to failure, but to
> catastrophic failure. Those
> are the sequences that then command disproportionate engineering
> attention (to add redundant switches, for example). Not all
> worries merit equal
> concern. Engineers refer to a "balanced" design as one where all
> the components have been designed to be as good as the whole system needs,
> neither better nor worse.
>
> The role of risk analysis, or strategic analysis for risk
> control, is to analyze threats and define risks in a natural way
> (avoiding the temptation to define
> them in terms of existing agency boundaries or capabilities), to
> commission further data gathering and analysis to assess relative
> significance, and
> then to subdivide acute risks into actionable components where
> resources can make a difference.11 A systemic approach is needed
> that encompasses
> broad area surveillance; specific threat identification; targeted
> surveillance and warning; prevention, protection, deterrence,
> interdiction and covert
> action; consequence management; forensic analysis of a site to
> determine responsibility, punitive action, and learning lessons.
>
> Analysis, for instance, shows that international border crossings
> are an important bottleneck in the worldwide movement of
> criminals. The United
> States, rather than just looking after the verifiability of its
> own passports, should organize resources focused on such
> bottlenecks throughout the
> world. We can imagine, for instance, a system created, with
> American funding, to insure that every country�s passports are
> computer readable, that
> every passport control officer has such a reader, and that every
> reader is linked to a database that can validate the status of
> the document, or indicate
> the need for further inquiries. The database need not invade the
> internal files of any government. As is already the case in the
> private sector, third
> entities can be created to perform the clearinghouse role, using
> data supplied by participating governments. Naturally, terrorists
> could still use
> documents of non-participating countries, but those would attract
> just the suspicion such travelers seek to avoid.
>
> Government agencies can do many things reasonably well, but
> strategic risk analysis is not one of them. We recommend
> establishing a center for
> catastrophic terrorism risk analysis, offering a substantial
> multi-year contract, executed by the FBI, to a not-for-profit
> research center to perform this
> sort of analysis, devise and evaluate exercises and tests, and
> develop concepts of operations for countering catastrophic
> terrorism. Early in the
> nuclear era the RAND Corporation played an important part in
> helping the government think about a new set of security
> concerns. The Department
> of Defense has made a start by establishing an advanced concepts
> office in the newly formed Defense Threat Reduction Agency. But
> risk analysis
> will require a national, not just a DOD, focus.
>
>
>
> Crisis and Consequence Management
>
> Crisis management for catastrophic terrorism should include the
> capacity to employ appropriate force and specialized capabilities
> in any part of the
> world, endeavoring to minimize collateral damage, and to thwart a
> possible attack using weapons of mass destruction. Crisis management would
> include urgent protective efforts, employing every resource at
> the disposal of federal, state, and local governments. The U.S.
> government should also
> acquire capacities and plans for forensic investigation of the
> site of an attack in order to collect evidence and identify those
> responsible for further
> action.
>
> Consequence management is a capacity to deal with the aftermath
> of an attack. The United States, at all levels of government,
> must develop the
> ability to respond effectively within hours, if not minutes, to
> any use of a weapon of mass destruction�nuclear, biological, chemical, or
> cyber�against American targets with appropriate and specific
> measures to mitigate casualties and damage. This is a large
> order. The needed
> capabilities include emergency medical care, distributions of
> protective gear or medications (including vaccines for those not
> yet exposed to the
> pathogen12), evacuations, and area quarantines, among other
> measures. Since these capabilities would need to be on a large
> scale, extensive
> preparations are needed to ready them in central locations, be
> able to mobilize them on sudden notice, be able to transport them
> where needed, and
> expect local authorities and caregivers to be ready to receive
> and use them. The United States must also have emergency plans
> readied, including
> redundant or alternative control systems, for sustaining the
> operation of infrastructure that provides the necessities of
> life, if this infrastructure
> comes under attack.
>
> The present system for handling terrorist emergencies is based on
> the FBI or�if overseas�on initiatives by State Department
> representatives or
> local military commanders. If an acute threat emerges in the
> United States, local authorities are expected to alert the local
> FBI office. The FBI�s
> special agent in charge would then organize intergovernmental
> response through activation of a strategic intelligence center in
> Washington, and a
> joint operations center and joint public affairs effort in the
> local area. If there were a WMD threat, the FBI could call on its
> Weapons of Mass
> Destruction Operations Unit, which has "Domestic Guidelines" to
> coordinate with other agencies and, in particular, seek Pentagon
> assistance.
>
> There is ample legal authority to seek military aid in dealing
> with such a crisis on U.S. soil. FBI can call upon an existing,
> though rather small-scale,
> interdepartmental Domestic Emergency Support Team (or, overseas,
> a Foreign Emergency Support Team). FBI has its own Hazardous Materials
> Response Unit. More military assistance would likely come, not
> from a joint interservice command, but from the Army�s Chemical
> and Biological
> Defense Command. If the attack occurred, consequence management
> would be organized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
> under what is called the "Federal Response Plan."
>
> This structure is adequate for responding to ordinary terrorist
> threats or attacks, or perhaps even small scares related to
> weapons of mass destruction,
> as in February 1998 when FBI learned that two suspects in Las
> Vegas, one of whom had earlier been convicted for fraudulently
> obtaining bubonic
> plague virus, might be in possession of some anthrax. The crisis
> response went well, including coordination with limited Defense Department
> resources. The suspects turned out not to have any anthrax.
>
> However, if some agency of the U.S. government learned that a
> large scale WMD attack might actually be imminent, threatening
> tens of thousands
> of lives, we expect that this structure for responding would
> almost instantly be pushed aside. The White House would
> immediately become involved
> and would seek to use every bit of power at America�s disposal in
> order to avert or contain the attack. The operational command
> structure would
> need to be capable of directing everything from CIA covert
> actions to strikes by bombers or missiles, be able to set up
> interdiction involving ground,
> sea, and air forces, and be able to mobilize and move thousands
> of soldiers (active duty, ready reserve, and National Guard) and
> thousands of tons
> of freight (in various emergency supplies and support for
> deployed units). Nor can any of these actions happen quickly
> unless plans have already
> been drawn up and units designated to carry them out, with
> repeated training and exercises to create a readiness to bring
> the plans to life. In this
> situation, the Defense Department�s capabilities would
> immediately become paramount. The FBI does not command such
> resources and does not
> plan to command them.
>
> So what is needed is a two-tier structure for response, one for
> ordinary terrorist incidents that can be managed by federal law
> enforcement with
> interagency help, and a second structure readied for the
> contingency of truly catastrophic terrorist attack. The United
> States has set up unified
> combatant commands to prepare for remote but extremely serious
> contingencies of regional aggression, like U.S. Central Command�s
> response to
> Iraq�s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The United States must also
> develop a structure that is ready to respond to this new, perhaps
> even more likely,
> contingency of the future.
>
> Rather than create a new combatant command, we suggest instead
> two new offices, one set up within the Office of the Secretary of
> Defense, and
> the other created within the existing combatant command, U.S.
> Atlantic Command, that is already responsible for the security of
> the American
> homeland with operational responsibility for the majority of the
> U.S. armed forces. Our working titles for these offices are
> Catastrophic Terrorism
> Response Offices, or CTROs. The new offices would build a
> capability centered in the federal government but including state
> and local authorities
> along with relevant parts of the private sector to respond, once
> authorized to act by the President and the Secretary of Defense,
> to validated terrorist
> threats that would cause massive loss of life (measured in the
> thousands, i.e., significantly larger than the attack on the
> federal building in Oklahoma
> City) or otherwise jeopardize the operation of American
> government or critical infrastructure necessary to public health
> or the functioning of the
> economy. Obviously, the President and his advisors would face a
> difficult judgment to determine when this threshold has been met, but such
> judgments are required in other areas of national security policy
> and they can be made here.
>
> The CTROs would plan and organize for a U.S. response to
> catastrophic terrorism by all elements of the U.S. government.
>
> They would:
>
>           � assess intelligence and warning information in order
> to alert the National Command Authority of catastrophic terrorist
>           threats;
>
>           � set requirements for, among other things, the
> collection and analysis of intelligence carried out by the
> proposed National
>           Counterterrorism Intelligence Center;
>
>           � define needed resources and assure that resources,
> procedures, and trained personnel are available at the federal, state,
>           and local level to respond to validated catastrophic threats;
>
>           � sponsor training and exercises involving federal,
> state, and local authorities for responding to catastrophic terrorist
>           attacks;
>
>           � task operations by other organizations once activated
> by the President through the Secretary of Defense (with actual
>           operations being undertaken by line organizations,
> whether covert actions by the CIA or military operations through the
>           Joint Chiefs of Staff or law enforcement actions by the FBI);
>
>           � coordinate international preparedness to join in a
> multinational response against catastrophic terrorist threats.
>
> The two CTROs should have the legal responsibility to achieve
> overall U.S. government readiness to respond to catastrophic
> terrorist threats when
> asked to do so by the President, acting through the Secretary of
> Defense. The defense secretary would be the executive agent for
> both offices and for
> their budget program, so that the CTROs can program elements in
> the DOD program budgeting system and have the job of submitting a
> consolidated catastrophic terrorism response program to the White
> House for inclusion in the President�s proposed budget. The
> Congress pointed
> toward such a goal in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
> Destruction Act of 1996 (more commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
> Amendment, or Nunn-Lugar II) which mandated that DOD train
> civilian emergency personnel at all levels of government and
> establish rapid
> terrorism response teams. Our idea broadens the scope of the
> initiative and suggests a way to give it a stronger, and more
> operational, institutional
> base.13
>
> The Department of Defense would play a strong, supporting role,
> not the leading one. It has resources and capabilities in dealing
> with biological and
> chemical weapons. Its resources would be needed either for crisis
> or for consequence management, but only as part of a larger
> national effort.
>
> Why two offices, rather than one? The CTRO centered in the Office
> of the Secretary of Defense should concentrate on planning and
> preparedness
> for preemptive and/or retaliatory strikes, utilizing covert
> action or the uniformed armed forces. It should draw additional
> staff from and involve a
> relatively narrow set of agencies: the Joint Staff, CIA, and FBI.
> This is a highly secret, delicate activity now done only in an ad
> hoc manner between
> CIA and JCS and never with the FBI. But the second office must be
> prepared to handle a much broader range of activities that affect
> prevention,
> containment, and management of the consequences of a catastrophic
> attack. The number of agencies involved must also be inclusive. This
> consequence management function must draw on the resources of the
> National Guard, FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and
> other federal, state and local agencies. This is a much larger
> orchestra that we think can be well prepared and conducted, if
> activated in an
> emergency, by an integrated structure like U.S. Atlantic Command.
>
> Neither of these new offices need be very large. Their jobs are
> planning and preparation, not day-to-day intelligence gathering,
> law enforcement, or
> combat operations. Yet the work they do will be invaluable,
> should the crisis ever come.
>
>
>
> Acquisition
>
> A national policy must include a concept for buying what is
> needed. The government is already ordering everything from
> vaccines to new research,
> but nearly two dozen agencies have their own separate shopping
> lists and ways of doing business. All these budget requests
> eventually arrive in
> Congress, where the lack of overall acquisition planning creates
> new difficult choices for the affected committees and budget
> competition on the
> Hill. In November 1997 a conference report accompanying
> appropriations for the Department of Justice correctly warned
> that "additional emphasis
> is needed to coordinate efforts among the many participating
> departments and agencies that have personnel, resources, and
> expertise to contribute"
> to the counterterrorism mission.14
>
> We urge the creation of a coordinated, broadly focused, budget
> program that will plan, coordinate, and track all R & D and
> acquisition projects
> intended to improve counterterrorism capabilities, both
> conventional and unconventional, defensive and offensive,
> domestic and foreign, including
> field testing of new operational capabilities. This national
> counterterrorism acquisition program would be based on a
> government-wide five-year plan
> to develop and acquire the needed technology and operational
> skills. Examples include improved detectors of special materials
> (like radioactive
> substances), forensic investigation tools, automated tracking and
> analysis systems, and improved protective clothing or equipment.
>
> The Clinton administration has already started a significant
> effort to acquire stockpiles of vaccines, antidotes, and
> antibiotics, adding to such a
> program already underway for the U.S. armed forces. Resources are
> needed for storage, transportation, and shipment of such
> medications. There is a
> further need for renewed research into defense against biological
> weapons, including adaptation to genetic alteration of deadly
> pathogens in order to
> defy available vaccines or antidotes. Improved detection devices
> need to be complemented by specialized laboratories, set up
> around the country,
> that can rapidly analyze substances or validate field identifications.
>
> Attorney General Janet Reno warned Congress of the extraordinary
> acquisition requirements that would be created by a serious
> policy to cope with
> the threat of catastrophic terrorism. In April 1998 she explained
> that "we may need to develop an approach which will permit the
> government to
> accelerate the normal procurement procedures to quickly identify
> and deploy new technologies and substances needed to thwart
> terrorist threats and
> respond to terrorist acts. These procedures would be used not
> only to purchase medications and other needed tools, but also, in
> some instances, to
> borrow medications or tools from, or to enter into effective
> partnerships with, both academia and industry."15 To us, this
> statement is a call for an
> interdepartmental acquisition program that draws on Defense
> Department expertise. Despite its limitations, the Defense
> Department still has the
> best track record in the government for successful sponsorship of
> technological development and rapid, large-scale procurement.
>
> This proposed acquisition program would be quite separate from
> other, also worthwhile, acquisition programs for cooperative
> threat reduction (like
> the Nunn-Lugar programs for the former Soviet Union), efforts to
> counter narcotics trafficking or organized crime, and
> nonproliferation activities; its
> focus would be counterterrorism. An effective interdepartmental
> committee system is needed for this acquisition program to be successful.
>
> We suggest a National Counter-Terrorism Acquisition Council that
> would be chaired by the undersecretary of defense for acquisition
> and technology.
> Such an acquisition council should include representatives from
> other departments, including top subcabinet officials from
> Justice, Energy, Treasury,
> State, and Health and Human Services, as well as the deputy
> director of FBI, the deputy director of CIA for science and
> technology, and the director
> of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
>
> This acquisition council would need to oversee the field-testing
> and evaluation of new capabilities with participation of several
> concerned agencies.
> Some agencies might worry about Defense usurpation of their
> procurement decisions. Instead we think it is just these agencies
> that should want a
> national program. Defense will already be acquiring vast
> quantities of equipment for its own needs. Suppliers will
> naturally configure themselves
> around this demand. Civilian agencies need a way to be sure that
> their particular requirements are also taken into account.
>
> We suggest that the Defense Department establish an initial
> program with more than $100 million to fund the development of
> some technology
> ideas that would offer benefits across the government. Where
> appropriate, the acquisition council would designate lead agency
> responsibilities. The
> acquisition council can also facilitate easier sharing of
> technology, tactics, and material from one agency to another.
> Further, this council can provide
> a point of contact for international program and technology
> sharing with other nations. It can provide government-wide
> procedures controlling
> access to especially sensitive projects within the national
> counterterrorism program. Although the program would be executed
> by various
> departments, the acquisition council would still be held
> responsible for monitoring the progress of each program element
> and should be expected to
> report annually on progress to both the President and to the Congress.16
>
>
>
> Conclusion
>
> Our group�s deliberations started from the premise that
> catastrophic terrorism poses a first-order threat to our nation�s
> future. We then asked, in
> effect: if we had a serious national policy to deal with this
> threat, what would our government be organized and able to do? In
> 1940 and 1941 the
> U.S. government imagined what kind of forces it would have in
> order to wage a global war. The answers were so far beyond
> existing reality that we
> can imagine all the wry smiles and shaking heads that must have
> been seen in Washington offices as the planning papers made their
> rounds. Similar
> cycles occurred in the Cold War. For example, the notion of an
> intelligence system founded on photographic surveillance from the upper
> atmosphere, or outer space, seemed outrageously far-fetched in
> 1954, when the U-2 program was born. The films and cameras alone
> seemed to be an
> overwhelming hurdle. A few years later the U-2s were flying; six
> years later satellites were doing the job. Similar stories can be
> told about the strange
> and remarkable history of intercontinental missile guidance or
> about how the U.S. and its allies developed the capability to
> move more than a
> half-million troops and thousands of armored fighting vehicles
> and their supporting infrastructure to the Persian Gulf within a
> few months, from
> both Europe and North America.
>
> Our government can deal with new challenges. But first we must
> imagine success. Then we must organize ourselves to attain it.
>
>
>
> Notes
>
> 1. For a careful, dispassionate evaluation, see Richard A.
> Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman & Bradley Thayer, America�s Achilles
> Heel: Nuclear, Biological,
> Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge: MIT Press,
> 1998). On the increasingly fragile and interconnected
> infrastructure and on the cyber
> threat, see also the Report of the President�s Commission on
> Critical Infrastructure Protection (also known as the Marsh
> Commission, for its
> chairman), Critical Foundations: Protecting America�s
> Infrastructures, Washington, DC, October 1997.
>
> 2. The most detailed and credible threat scenarios, based on
> close analysis of specific vulnerabilities, should not be
> published at all. These would be
> indispensable but quite sensitive documents to be prepared by
> relatively small groups of knowledgeable officials and expert consultants.
>
> 3. Address by President Clinton, May 22, 1998; White House Fact
> Sheet on PDD-62; all distributed by the White House Press Office.
>
> 4. Roberto Suro & Dana Priest, "Plan to Overhaul Anti-Terrorism
> Strategy Would Boost NSC�s Role," Washington Post, March 24,
> 1998, p. A7; see
> also M.J. Zuckerman, "Anti-terror �czar� to coordinate $7B
> effort," USA Today, May 4, 1998, p. 1A.
>
> 5. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern
> Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan
> (New York: Free Press, 5th ed.,
> 1990), p. 7.
>
> 6. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and
> Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 271-72.
>
> 7. See Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
> 1943-1944 (Washington: U.S. Army, 1959); John Ehrman, Grand
> Strategy: August
> 1943-September 1944 (London: HMSO, 1956); Herman M. Somers,
> Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and
> Reconversion (Cambridge:
> Harvard University Press, 1950). On the Northern Ireland example,
> see Philip Zelikow, "Policing Northern Ireland (A): A Question of
> Primacy,"
> and "Policing Northern Ireland (B): A Question of Balance,"
> Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University, 1994.
>
> 8. Philip Heymann has been especially helpful to us in
> understanding the legal capabilities and limits affecting
> counterterrorist investigations. For his
> survey of the legal and policy dilemmas associated with
> countering terrorism, see Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and
> America: A Commonsense Strategy for
> a Democratic Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
>
> 9. These motions seek to find whether the police or prosecutors
> have any information, not already disclosed, that may tend to
> show the innocence of
> the defendant. Even if statutes are amended, under our proposal
> the arresting agency and prosecutor�s office would remain subject
> to such discovery
> motions, which the Supreme Court considers an aspect of
> constitutionally mandated due process of law. Since the Center
> would not itself carry out
> law enforcement operations or make prosecutorial decisions, it
> should be exempted from such discovery, although any information
> it chooses to
> provide to police or prosecutors would then be discoverable under
> the procedures specified in the current Classified Information
> Protection Act.
>
> 10. For a summary, see Philip Heymann, Matthew Meselson & Richard
> Zeckhauser, "Criminalize the Traffic in Terror Weapons," Washington Post,
> April 15, 1998, p. A19; a detailed copy of the proposal is
> available from Meselson. Development of biological weapons is
> distinguishable from the
> necessary work to develop defenses against such weapons.
>
> 11. We are especially indebted to Malcolm Sparrow for his
> thinking on this subject, which we have abridged.
>
> 12. Vaccines may be useful after exposure to anthrax, however,
> and smallpox (for different reasons).
>
> 13. The FBI has also been given funds for training local "first
> responders" to an emergency. FBI must be involved in the effort,
> but based on training
> plans that fully integrate what Defense and other federal
> agencies can and are doing. These useful but fragmentary efforts
> indicate the case for an
> office like the one we suggest.
>
> 14. Conference Report 105-405 for FY 1998 Appropriations to the
> Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and
> Related Agencies,
> November 13, 1997.
>
> 15. Statement of Attorney General Reno, Hearings of the Senate
> Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information
> and the Select Committee on Intelligence, "The Threat of Chemical
> and Biological Weapons," April 22, 1998.
>
> 16. A useful analogy for such an acquisition program, on a
> smaller scale, is the Technical Support Working Group, which
> develops counterterrorism
> equipment for use by all agencies of the federal government and
> for state and local law enforcement, principally with DOD
> funding. This program
> concentrates on traditional counterterrorism acquisition, as in
> robots for municipal bomb disposal squads. One person we talked
> to told us: "This
> thing works because it is so small that it flies under the radar
> of Congress. If you grow it larger, you�re going to need a policy
> to go with it."
>
>
>
> About the Authors
>
> The Honorable Ashton B. Carter
>
> Ash Carter is Ford Foundation Professor of Science and
> International Affairs at Harvard University�s John F. Kennedy
> School of Government and
> Co-Director, with William J. Perry, of the Stanford-Harvard
> Preventive Defense Project.
>
> From 1993-1996 Carter served as Assistant Secretary of Defense
> for International Security Policy, where he was responsible for
> national security
> policy concerning the states of the former Soviet Union
> (including their nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
> destruction), arms control,
> countering proliferation worldwide, and oversight of the U.S.
> nuclear arsenal and missile defense programs; he also chaired
> NATO�s High Level
> Group. He was twice awarded the Department of Defense
> Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award given by the
> Pentagon. Carter continues
> to serve DOD as an adviser to the Secretary of Defense and as a
> member of both DOD�s Defense Policy Board and Defense Science Board, and
> DOD�s Threat Reduction Advisory Council.
>
> Before his government service, Carter was director of the Center
> for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of
> Government at
> Harvard University and chairman of the editorial board of
> International Security. Carter received bachelor�s degrees in
> physics and in medieval history
> from Yale University and a doctorate in theoretical physics from
> Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.
>
> In addition to authoring numerous scientific publications and
> government studies, Carter was an author and editor of a number
> of books, most
> recently Preventive Defense: An American Security Strategy for
> the 21st Century (with William J. Perry). Carter�s current
> research focuses on the Preventive
> Defense Project, which designs and promotes security policies
> aimed at preventing the emergence of major new threats to the
> United States.
>
> Carter is a Senior Partner of Global Technology Partners, LLC,
> and a member of the Advisory Board of MIT Lincoln Laboratories, the Draper
> Laboratory Corporation, and the Board of Directors of Mitretek
> Systems, Inc. He is a consultant to Goldman Sachs and the MITRE
> Corporation on
> international affairs and technology matters, a Member of the
> Council on Foreign Relations, and a Fellow of the American
> Academy of Arts and
> Sciences.
>
>
>
> The Honorable John M. Deutch
>
> Dr. John Deutch has served in significant government and academic
> posts throughout his career. In May 1995, he was sworn in as Director of
> Central Intelligence following a unanimous vote in the Senate,
> and he served as DCI until December 1996. In this position, he
> was head of the
> Intelligence Community (all foreign intelligence agencies of the
> United States) and directed the Central Intelligence Agency. From
> March 1994 to
> May 1995, he served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense. From
> March 1993 to March 1994, Dr. Deutch served as Under Secretary of
> Defense for
> Acquisitions and Technology. From 1977 to 1980, Dr. Deutch served
> in a number of positions for the U.S. Department of Energy: Director of
> Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy
> Technology, and Undersecretary of the Department.
>
> Dr. Deutch has served on many commissions during several
> presidential administrations, and he has received fellowships and
> honors from the
> American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1978), Alfred P. Sloan
> (Research Fellow 1967-69), and John Simon Guggenheim (Memorial Fellow
> 1974-1975). Public Service Medals have been awarded him from the
> Department of Energy (1980), the Department of State (1980), the
> Department
> of Defense (1994), the Department of the Army (1995), the
> Department of the Navy (1995), the Department of the Air Force
> (1995), and the Coast
> Guard (1995). He also received the Central Intelligence
> Distinguished Intelligence Medal (1996) and the Intelligence
> Community Distinguished
> Intelligence Medal (1996).
>
> Dr. Deutch has been a member of the faculty of the Massachusetts
> Institute of Technology from 1970 to present, where he has served
> as Chairman
> of the Department of Chemistry, Dean of Science and Provost.
> Currently, Dr. Deutch is an MIT Institute Professor.
>
> Dr. Deutch earned a BA in history and economics from Amherst
> College, and both a BS in chemical engineering and a Ph.D. in
> physical chemistry
> from MIT. He holds honorary degrees from Amherst College,
> University of Lowell and Northeastern University. Dr. Deutch
> serves as director for
> the following publicly held companies: Ariad Pharmaceutical,
> Citicorp, CMS Energy, Cummins, Raytheon, and Schlumberger Ltd.
>
>
>
> Philip D. Zelikow
>
> Philip Zelikow is Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs
> and White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University
> of Virginia. He has
> taught at Harvard University, and he served as a career diplomat
> in the Department of State and on the staff of the National
> Security Council.
>
> His books include The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House
> During the Cuban Missile Crisis (with Ernest May, Harvard UP),
> Germany Unified and Europe
> Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (with Condoleezza Rice,
> Harvard UP), and the forthcoming rewritten edition of Essence of
> Decision: Explaining the
> Cuban Missile Crisis (with Graham Allison, Longman). He has also
> written a study of intelligence policy for the Twentieth Century
> Fund, published as
> In From the Cold.
>
> A member of the Department of State�s Historical Advisory
> Committee, a former consultant to the Office of the Secretary of
> Defense, and a
> participant in Harvard�s Intelligence and Policy Project, Zelikow
> is also the deputy director of the Aspen Strategy Group, a
> program of the Aspen
> Institute. He holds a doctorate from the Fletcher School and a
> law degree from the University of Houston.
>
>
>
> About Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century
>
> The Imperative for Change
>
> Momentous social and economic forces are reshaping democratic
> governance around the world. Current political rhetoric insists
> that the era of big
> government is over�but what will take its place?
>
> The answer is not at all obvious. While some national governments
> are getting smaller, they are not necessarily getting less
> powerful. Information
> technology, which has allowed industry to do more with less, is
> opening up the same opportunities for governments, while bringing
> with it new
> threats to their traditional roles and functions. The increasing
> number and authority of supranational organizations is countered
> by trends toward
> devolution in the United States and Europe. Non-profit and even
> for-profit entities are taking on tasks once thought of as the
> sole province of
> government. Markets are being created and used to produce public
> as well as private goods.
>
> All of this is taking place amidst a loss of confidence on the
> part of citizens with their governments. This unhappiness
> transcends partisanship and
> economic well-being. It is as if, on some level, the public knows
> that its government is simply out of step with the times.
>
> Dean Joseph Nye believes it is a critical part of the Kennedy
> School�s mission to address the precipitous decline in confidence
> in public institutions,
> by identifying and illuminating some of the most important trends
> affecting governments, and by creating a public conversation with
> citizens and
> policy makers about appropriate responses to changing realities
> and expectations of government. This imperative is not an
> artifact of the millennium.
> In fact, were public trust in government high, change could be
> incremental. What is needed now, however, is new ways of thinking about
> governance.
>
> Growing Mistrust in Government
>
> The first year of the Visions Project focused on generating a
> critical mass of intellectual activity among a core group of
> Harvard faculty around the
> issue of trust in government, which resulted in the publication
> in October 1997 of Why People Don�t Trust Government. The book was the
> culmination of over a year of inquiry into the scope and
> performance of government (actual and perceived) and the possible
> causes of citizens�
> dissatisfaction with it.
>
> The Project is continuing this investigation of declining trust
> in government with both a study of anomalies in the evidence,
> such as high levels of
> confidence in the military, and an international comparative
> study of public trust in government (Critical Citizens,
> forthcoming in the spring of
> 1999).
>
> New Ways of Thinking about Governance
>
> The Project is focusing its attentions on several new areas of inquiry:
>
>      � New paradigms for national security policy. The
> Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group will recommend a comprehensive program
>      of responses by the U.S. government to the danger of
> large-scale, catastrophic terrorism.
>
>      � The future direction of social policy. Is it possible to
> bring the productive and innovative power of markets to
> traditional questions
>      of social welfare? "Who�s Responsible? Renegotiating the
> Social Contract" will evaluate the central question of alternatives to
>      traditional government activism in various areas of social policy.
>
>      � How governments can manage and measure their performance
> to better serve their citizens. A series of Executive Session
>      and Practitioner Forums on Performance Management will seek
> to engage and invest political decision makers in a management
>      movement which offers the possibility of a new kind of
> democratic accountability.
>
>      � How information technologies are changing the realities
> and expectations of governments. The explosive growth of
>      information as a resource and of computer networks as a
> medium is at once evident everywhere and yet very little understood. The
>      Visions Project has begun a continuing effort to understand
> the multiplicitous changes being wrought by information technologies in
>      order to focus attention on maximizing their benefits and
> minimizing their costs to society.
>
> Visions Project Director Elaine Kamarck will weave these themes
> together in a book which will raise significant questions that
> are central to
> democratic governments. Will a more effective capacity to fight
> global crime and global terrorism be compatible with our deeply
> held beliefs that we
> should protect the privacy of our citizens from internal spying?
> Can a system which attempts to meet a variety of social needs
> through market
> mechanisms and via non-governmental organizations really
> guarantee equality of treatment? Can innovative governmental
> organizations also be
> accountable to elected officials and to the public?
>
> These are momentous questions, and they illustrate why
> large-scale social and governmental change does not happen
> overnight. Our challenge is to
> find the value in change, and that will require new visions of
> governance for the 21st century.
>
>
>
> About the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project
>
> The Preventive Defense Project is a joint venture between
> Stanford University and Harvard University. Preventive Defense is
> a concept of defense
> strategy for America in the post-Cold War era. The premise of
> Preventive Defense is that the absence of an imminent, major,
> traditional military
> threat to American security presents today�s national security
> leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity: to
> prevent new Cold
> War-scale threats to U.S. security from emerging in the future.
> While the United States defense establishment must continue to
> deter regional
> conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula, as well
> as keep the peace and provide humanitarian relief in selected
> instances, its highest
> priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could
> directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens.
>
> The Preventive Defense Project will initially concentrate on
> forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its
> neighbors, dealing with the
> lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction, engaging
> an awakening China, and countering proliferation of weapons of
> mass destruction
> and catastrophic terrorism. The Project seeks to contribute to
> these objectives through the invention of new policy approaches
> reflecting Preventive
> Defense, intensive personal interaction with defense and military
> leaders around the world, and through the establishment of highly
> informed,
> non-governmental track two initiatives that explore new
> possibilities for international agreement.
>
> Current Preventive Defense Project initiatives include:
>
>      � Describing Preventive Defense. In a forthcoming book, the
> Project�s leaders will explain the concept to a wider audience, drawing
>      on their experience in the Pentagon and making
> recommendations for the future of American security policy.
>
>      � Russia. The Project is pursuing a number of activities
> designed to support Russian foreign and defense policy leaders in
> developing a
>      post-Soviet security identity that matches Russia�s
> interests to the interests of international stability. These
> initiatives include assisting
>      Russian military reform and the development of national
> security decision-making processes, furthering NATO-Russia relations,
>      encouraging the development of mutually beneficial relations
> with the other Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and
>      charting a course for nuclear arms reduction after START II
> ratification.
>
>      � Other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet
> Union. Expanded military-to-military contacts and economic
>      opportunities are key to the continued security and
> stability of the NIS. The Project is pursuing initiatives with
> Ukraine, the Central
>      Asian states, and the Caucasus countries, including the
> Caspian Sea region.
>
>      � Eliminating the lethal legacy of the Cold War. Through
> such innovations as the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States
>      intervened to promote nuclear safety and non-proliferation
> in the early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Much was
>      accomplished in the first post-Cold War era, but changing
> politics in Russia and the United States have caused their cooperation in
>      controlling "loose nukes" to bog down and progress in
> chemical and biological weapons dismantlement to falter.
> Nunn-Lugar and arms
>      control require "reinvention" if they are to continue in the
> second post-Cold War era. The Project seeks to contribute fundamental new
>      ideas to that reinvention.
>
>      � China. Through research and intensive track two dialogue
> with Chinese defense and military leaders, the Project will concentrate on
>      defining the specific content of the U.S. policy of
> engagement with China.
>
>      � Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
> destruction (WMD). The glimmers of trouble to come provided by Iraq�s WMD
>      programs during and since the Gulf War show that
> proliferation has moved from a diplomatic problem to a direct
> military threat. DOD,
>      therefore, needs to strengthen its Counter-proliferation
> Initiative, which is designed to contribute both to proliferation
> prevention and to
>      the capabilities of U.S. forces to counter WMD in regional
> conflict. The Project seeks to define organizational and
> technical responses
>      by DOD to this growing threat.
>
>      � Organizing to combat catastrophic terrorism. The Project
> convened the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group, which is a
>      collaboration of faculty from Harvard University, the
> Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and
> the University of
>      Virginia and is co-chaired by Ashton B. Carter and John M.
> Deutch. The Study Group is identifying appropriate responses by the United
>      States government to the dangers of catastrophic terrorism.
>
> The Preventive Defense Project is a multi-year effort supported
> by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and
> Catherine T. MacArthur
> Foundation, and private sources. The Project�s Co-Directors are
> former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant
> Secretary of
> Defense for International Security Policy Ashton B. Carter.
> Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General (ret.) John
> M. Shalikashvili and
> former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine
> and Eurasia Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall serve as Senior Advisors.
> Additional
> contributors to the Project include: member of President
> Clinton�s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Robert J. Hermann
> and former Deputy
> Secretary of Defense John P. White.
>
> Institute for International Studies
>
> Stanford University
>
> The Institute for International Studies (IIS) seeks solutions to
> real-world, international problems that affect international
> security, the global
> environment, and international political economy. IIS creates a
> dynamic environment in which to address these critical issues by
> bringing experts
> from a variety of disciplines within Stanford University together
> with long- and short-term visitors from other academic,
> government, and corporate
> institutions. At any given time, over 150 scholars are engaged in
> policy studies within the Institute�s federation of research centers.
>
> Center for International Security and Cooperation
>
> Stanford University
>
> The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),
> part of Stanford University�s Institute for International
> Studies, is a multidisciplinary
> community dedicated to research and training in the field of
> international security. The center brings together scholars,
> policymakers, scientists, area
> specialists, members of the business community and other experts
> to examine a wide range of international security issues.
>
> Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
>
> Harvard University
>
> The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA)
> is the hub of the John F. Kennedy School of Government�s
> research, teaching, and
> training in international security affairs, environmental and
> resource issues, and science and technology policy. The center�s
> mission is to provide
> leadership in advancing policy-relevant knowledge about the most
> important challenges of international security and other critical
> issues where
> science, technology, and international affairs intersect. BCSIA�s
> leadership begins with the recognition of science and technology
> as driving forces
> transforming threats and opportunities in international affairs.
> The center integrates insights of social scientists, natural
> scientists, technologists, and
> practitioners with experience in government, diplomacy, the
> military, and business to address critical issues.
>
> Publications of the Preventive Defense Project
>
>      NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future
>
>      The Content of U.S. Engagement with China
>
>      Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security
> Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO
>
>      Reforming the Department of Defense: The Revolution in
> Business Affairs
>
>      The NATO-Russia Relationship
>
>      Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy
>
>
>
> Stanford University
>
> Center for International Security and Cooperation
>
> Encina Hall
>
> Stanford, CA 94305-6165
>
> (650) 725-6501
>
>
>
> Harvard University
>
> Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
>
> John F. Kennedy School of Government
>
> 79 John F. Kennedy Street
>
> Cambridge, MA 02138
>
> (617) 495-1405
>
>
>
>

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