-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: Treason's Peace Howard Watson Armbruster©1947 A Crossroads Press Book Beechurst Press New York 438 pps. -- First/Only Edition -- Out-of Print ----- --On July 5, 1945, under instructions contained in J. C. S. 1067, the U.S. Military Government in Germany (O.M.G.U.S.) promulgated General Order No. 2, which directed seizure of Farben for the purpose of making its plants available for reparations, and for destruction of all Farben arms or munitions of war or of any ingredients for same, which are not generally used in industries permitted in Germany. Special Order No. 1, of the same date, appointed a control office for Farben to prevent the production by and rehabilitation of these plants except as might be specifically determined in accordance with objectives of United States. However, within a few weeks of the promulgation of this order Brigadier General William H. Draper, formerly of the New York banking house of Dillon, Read & Co. (which floated the thirty million dollar bond issue of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Fritz Thyssen's Steel Trust, in the United States) was reported in a published dispatch from Berlin to have declared that a considerable portion of Germany"s pre-war industry must remain if Germany was to survive. General Draper was chief adviser to General Eisenhower on German industry. This apparent defiance of official military orders appeared strange, but no more so than the address delivered by the Honorable John J. McCloy before the Academy of Political Science in New York City on November 8th. Mr. McCloy, who bad just resigned as Assistant Secretary of War, argued that Germany could never be made into an exclusively agricultural or pastoral society. He belittled the capacity of the enemy's remaining industrial plants and indicated that their plants should be put to work as soon as possible to pay for food that was to be imported. Concluded Mr. McCloy, "For a long time to come there is no justifiable fear that Germany's war potential is being rebuilt." The Assistant Secretary of War, until 1940, was a member of the law firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, which firm as mentioned in earlier Chapters had been representing I.G. Farben or its affiliates in the United States. It may appear to be a coincidence that Mr. McCloy should have turned up in the War Department in 1941, in a position in which he could speak with authority on such matters as handling the destruction of that mainstay of Germany's war potential—I.G. Farben. The coincidence may also be recorded here that other members of the Cravath law firm also held responsible places in the War Department, including Alfred McCormack, and Howard C. Peterson, as assistants to the Secretary. Another former member of this firm, Col. Richard A. Wilmer, was commissioned after the war began and had to do with such problems.--- Om K --[20]-- CHAPTER XX Plans for Peace-In Time of War I. G. FARBEN, unlike the governments and the armies of Germany, never surrenders and never dies. Win, lose, or draw, the pattern of Farben goes on. When the first World War ended, Farben turned abruptly from the production of munitions no longer needed by a defeated army to rebuilding its international framework in preparation for the next attempt at world conquest. Again, this tenacity of purpose and flexibility of pattern are clearly discernible in the events which developed so speedily in those hectic weeks following the surrender of Germany on May 6, 1945. An important phase of this pattern of eternal life and perpetual war is found in numerous carry-over agreements or understandings already referred to between Farben and certain of its affiliates in the United States, all of which provided for, or promised, resumption of pre-war arrangements when the war should end. Aside from written agreements are the verbal understandings such as that described in Chapter II in the 1914 letter from the German Hoechst to Herman Metz: Our entire relationship is really a confidential relationship and it will be and must, without agreements, so continue in the future as in the past. A similar relationship may be observed in a report of the duPont Foreign Relations Department, dated February 9, 1940, in which reference was made to various current agreements with Farben relating to nylon and plastics, and to an arrangement made to return to Farben certain funds advanced to purchase shares in Duperial, the duPont-I. C. I. dye subsidiary in South America. The British I. C. I. had objected to Farben's purchase of the shares, so duPont was arranging to repay the money. The report went on to say: The duPont Company Wormed I.G.. that they intended to use their good offices after the war to have the I.G. participation (in Duperial) restored. Senator Bone was indignant at this and other evidence of an intended resumption of "business as usual" with Farben after the war. Said the Senator: Everything that has been revealed so far on the relationship between these big private outfits indicates clear-ly that as soon as this bloody war is over the gentlemen are going to get their feet under the table and restore their ante-bellum status as soon as that can be accomplished . . . I am wondering if the high officials of this government are aware of the fact that these gentlemen, who have parcelled out this world, have intended to make such adjustments of this prop-erty after the war. That is a picture which should be very clearly presented to Congress, and Congress should have something to say about it. I am disposed to think that it will. Senator Bone was mistaken. Congress had nothing to say about it On one other occasion before his Committee closed up shop, Senator Bone warned of the future, saying: You recall how we were caught up after the last war? We took over a lot of German patents in the pharmaceutical and chemical fields and our business entrepreneurs proceeded to fix things so that they were given back to the Germans . . . through finagling devices After this war, unless we are wiser or smarter than I think we may be, we will probably find that the block of patents that the Alien Property Custo-dian has will ultimately find their way back into the hands of smooth German operators, and we will go through this same wretched process again, in spite of the fact that there may be a million of our boys who have paid the price with their blood and broken bodies. As the events of the war progressed favorably, confusion increased at home and a new voice was raised in opposition to a future renewal of international cartels in general and that of Standard Oil-Farben in particular. On July 26, 1943, Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, smarting at having been removed as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, delivered a political comeback speech in Detroit in which he took a slap at cartels; a few weeks later, in Chicago, on September 11, he became more specific, referring to the "creators of secret supergovernments." Prior to the Chicago address the Vice-President had received a mass of data on the subject from William Floyd II, Chairman Of the Standard Oil Minority Stockholders Committee. His attack was so specific that the following day Standard's president, R. W. Gallagher, replied defending his company's tie-up with Farben and bitterly criticizing the Vice-President for the attack. In passing Mr. Gallagher mentioned his own opposition to cartels and a few days later, Standard's pugnacious public relations pacifier, Robert T. Haslam. permitted Sylvia Porter to quote him in the New York Post that the dispute between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Gallagher was all an unfortunate mistake because Standard was already in agreement with the Vice-President. Next, Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge, now returned to anti-trust as its chief, called Messrs. Gallagher and Wallace into conference and it appeared that a semblance of harmony was restored; both parties seemed to oppose international cartel agreements (with Farben) unless such agreements were to be registered with the State or justice Department. This quaint reservation hardly indicated much hope of action which would do away with cartels as such in the future, or to eradicate I.G. Farben and its pattern for all time as the primary essential for an enduring peace in the post-war era. A week later Mr. Berge published an article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "Can We End Monopoly," in which he first admitted that for the last forty years, "emotional promises to enforce the Sherman Act" by both political parties resulted in elected officials who "with equal consistency did nothing about it." Despite this painful admission, Mr. Berge also naively asserted that during the present war "the spirit of the anti-trust laws has not only been preserved, but much of the effect as well." Perhaps the new anti-trust enforcement official was thinking of the adage, "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak." Mr. Berge also paid unconscious tribute to the official Farben policies of hush-hush and immunity by saying that: The full story of our unintentional industrial contribution to the German war effort has not been told He finally concluded that. . .enforcement of the anti-trust laws . . .is being pressed as vigorously now as available manpower permits. It was hardly an optimistic forecast. It may appear that the outspoken opposition of Henry Wallace to cartels in general and to Farben in particular was not the least important of the reasons which cost him the re-nomination as Vice-President. The truth regarding President Roosevelt's health was even then known, or at least suspected, by the inner councils of his party leaders. They chose his successor. The foregoing brings this story, for a brief space, to France and North Africa, through which, when the Nazi doom became visible, the leaders of I.G. Farben established a bridgehead of escape to a financial bomb shelter in Algiers. It was then reported that certain Vichy French financial collaborators, hoping to salvage some of the Nazi loot by aiding in its concealment, had joined hands with Farben in a scheme to transfer the huge funds Farben had accumulated by absorbing four of the largest chemical and dye industries in France, to North African banks, where they might remain safe regardless of who won final victory in Europe. The United States appeared in this picture with the landing of its troops in North Africa in October 1942. Then, while thousands of American youths were dying—to end what Farben had started—there came the disquieting rumor that the on-the-spot representative of the State Department of the United States was in accord with the obviously German-inspired proposal to freeze the financial status quo in North Africa. Here the same old pattern reappeared, hazily perhaps, but nonetheless the outline of a modus operandi of survival—a bridgehead out of the war zone of beaten Germany by which Farben could emerge as a going concern, financially strong and ready to resume business. Meanwhile there appeared on the stage the obscure figure of Fritz Thyssen, whose steel trust had been tied in with Farben, since 1927. Thyssen, in a true-confession story, "I Paid Hitler," whined, repented his error, and proclaimed that the one way to insure the next peace would be for "Men of good will" to reestablish the new Germany as a corporate state. So Thyssen emerged at a propitious moment as a leader who might induce the thoughtful citizens of the Fatherland to throw out the vile Hitler and join hands with the Allies in a plan which would save Germany's industries and industrialists, and create a reformed Reich and a peaceful world. After the landing of the Allies in France and as the war speeded toward its inevitable end, discussions of how best to handle a defeated Germany centered around German industry in general and I.G. Farben in particular. So the struggle beneath the surface of official Washington continued, between those who favored Farben survival and those who did not. While the late Commander-in-Chief was under stem compulsion to devote time and energy to global war, the greatest of all time, be was forced to rely upon subordinates and upon Congress to defeat and destroy the pattern of Farben. And it may appear that already certain of those underlings and their legislative colleagues fell in step one by one, and blindly took places assigned to them in the nooks and crannies of a new Farben framework as it was to be revised to fit the new peace. Let it be said here, again, that there is no force which can restrain or turn such men from folly save only the lash of public indignation aroused by revelation of facts now hushed. They are not stupid men who reach through all the barriers of war or peace to seduce other men who are stupid to new betrayals -with specious arguments of a better' normal world, or potent draughts of suggestion, of power to come. The dispute raged—should professors, politicians or plutocratic leaders of industry direct the war and build the peace. As to which of these Farben does not care. Its pattern has always found places for all three and can do so again. For one more moment go back—go back-to Bayer's Schweitzer telling Ambassador von Bernstorff in 1916 not to worry about the future as it would be easy to choose a President with the "right politics" to respond favorably to a post-war comeback of I.G. Dyes in the United States. So does history repeat. Or go back again, not so far, to the aged Gerard still politically powerful, in June 1943, defending Standard refusal to abolish all ties with Farben because: Some of those who are thinking what is to happen after the war, are contemplating universal cartels. Officially there could be no doubt that, President Roosevelt favored a hard peace for Germany and the most vigorous handling of Farben. On September 8, 1944, Mr. Roosevelt made this clear in a letter to Secretary of State Hull, which he made public and in which he said: The history of the use of the I.G. Farben trust by the Nazi reads like a detective story. Defeat of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of those weapons of economic warfare ..... Prior to this blast by the President it was reported that the softpeace sentiments of certain members of the European Advisory Commission had produced a proposed handbook of directions for officers of the Allied Military Govermnent (A. M. G.) which so favored a survival of the I.G. Farben set-up that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. hit the ceiling, He protested to the President and, as a result, was summoned to the second Qu ebec conference which was held by the President and Prime Minister Churchill in September 1944. The so-called Morgenthau Plan was then revealed, calling for the elimination of German chemical and metallurgical industries and the conversion of that nation largely to an agricultural economy with no peacetime industries save those which could not contribute to a future war. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill initialed and approved a memorandum which outlined this plan and which concluded with: The program for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character. The Prime Minister and The President were in agreement upon this program. When the Morgenthau Plan was made public the storm broke over his head, and the same barrage of epithets was aimed in his direction that had previously been hurled at Englands leading advocate of a hard peace, Lord Vansittart. President Roosevelt thereupon, in December 1944, through United States Ambassador John G. Winant in London, outlined to the Allies his demand for a complete and ruthless abolition of German war industries, but as this outline allowed for some survival of chemical industries for civilian requirements, it appeared less severe than the Morgenthau plan. At Yalta, in February, 1945, Mr. Roosevelt, with Churchill and Stalin, stepped back a bit more from a program of total elimination of Farben by declaring merely an "inflexible purpose" to eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production." This was to be the last official pronouncement of policy on this subject by President Roosevelt. Those who were closest to him believed that he never wavered from his determination that As for Germany, that tragic nation . . . we and our Allies are entirely agreed that we shall not leave them a single element of military power or potential military power. However in April, after Harry S. Truman became President, there was issued and then withheld from public knowledge, a joint Chiefs-of-Staff order (J. C. S. 1067) instructing General Eisenhower for the governing of occupied Germany. This order required basic objectives "to the full extent necessary to achieve the industrial disarmament of Germany." It prohibited all research laboratories save those necessary to the protection of the public health, and stipulated abolition of all 'laboratories and related institutions whose work has been connected with the building of the German War Machine." Also it forbade all research that would in any way contribute to Germanys future war potential. These vigorous directives were softened however by a later reference to the "pending final Allied agreement on reparation, and on control or elimination of German industries that can be used for war production . . ." The Potsdam Agreement, arrived at in July and August by Prime Minister Attlee of England, Marshal Stalin of Russia, and President Truman, followed closely the earlier directives "to eliminate Germanys war potential" by control and restriction of industry "to Germany's approved postwar peacetime needs" and ordered that: In organizing the German economy primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. On July 5, 1945, under instructions contained in J. C. S. 1067, the U.S. Military Government in Germany (O.M.G.U.S.) promulgated General Order No. 2, which directed seizure of Farben for the purpose of making its plants available for reparations, and for destruction of all Farben arms or munitions of war or of any ingredients for same, which are not generally used in industries permitted in Germany. Special Order No. 1, of the same date, appointed a control office for Farben to prevent the production by and rehabilitation of these plants except as might be specifically determined in accordance with objectives of United States. However, within a few weeks of the promulgation of this order Brigadier General William H. Draper, formerly of the New York banking house of Dillon, Read & Co. (which floated the thirty million dollar bond issue of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Fritz Thyssen's Steel Trust, in the United States) was reported in a published dispatch from Berlin to have declared that a considerable portion of Germany"s pre-war industry must remain if Germany was to survive. General Draper was chief adviser to General Eisenhower on German industry. This apparent defiance of official military orders appeared strange, but no more so than the address delivered by the Honorable John J. McCloy before the Academy of Political Science in New York City on November 8th. Mr. McCloy, who bad just resigned as Assistant Secretary of War, argued that Germany could never be made into an exclusively agricultural or pastoral society. He belittled the capacity of the enemy's remaining industrial plants and indicated that their plants should be put to work as soon as possible to pay for food that was to be imported. Concluded Mr. McCloy, "For a long time to come there is no justifiable fear that Germany's war potential is being rebuilt." The Assistant Secretary of War, until 1940, was a member of the law firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, which firm as mentioned in earlier Chapters had been representing I.G. Farben or its affiliates in the United States. It may appear to be a coincidence that Mr. McCloy should have turned up in the War Department in 1941, in a position in which he could speak with authority on such matters as handling the destruction of that mainstay of Germany's war potential—I.G. Farben. The coincidence may also be recorded here that other members of the Cravath law firm also held responsible places in the War Department, including Alfred McCormack, and Howard C. Peterson, as assistants to the Secretary. Another former member of this firm, Col. Richard A. Wilmer, was commissioned after the war began and had to do with such problems. One fact is apparent-General Dwight D. Eisenhower was definitely not in a ccord with those who favored softness. While on a visit to Washington on October 20, 1945, the General publicly demanded the complete dissolution of I.G. Farben in order to assure future world peace. That this was his intention may not be doubted. But the General of the Armies in Europe, with all his powers as a combat soldier, did not make policy and did not select many of the men who were sent to Germany by the State and War Departments and the F. E. A. The retreat from the official policy of eliminating I.G. Farben continued with a statement by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in December 1945, in which he announced that German administrative agencies should be set up to control foreign trade and industry, and that German industrial production should be permitted to increase, and German exports permitted to finance necessary imports. In August of that same year President Truman had been persuaded to send the well-meaning former war censor, Byron Price, to Germany to survey conditions. Mr. Price's report, while highly informative, ignored completely the lessons of Farben's quick emergency after the first World War by stating that . . . . . There certainly is not the slightest evidence that Germany can become, within the forseeable future, sufficiently strong to permit diversions of production for German war purposes. In the Halls of Congress, Senators and Representatives were bombarded by the forgive-and-forget brigade and the advocates of immmediate[sic] restoration of German industry-so that the dear little baby Nazis would not starve. Some of this special pleading was sincere idealism, and some of it arrant hypocrisy all too similiar to the brazen demands for the restoration of the German dye trust after the first World War. History repeats. One very informative speech, which indicated the under cover struggle in official circles on the future of I.G. Farben, was delivered in the Senate on January 29, 1946 by Nebraska's distinguished funeral director, Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry. This mortician-turned-statesman referred to the bitter rivalry between Mr. Morgenthau's henchmen in the Treasury Department and representatives in the War and State Department as far back as 1942; and stated that: Mr. Morgenthau finally won his battle and forced the incorporation of his plan into the new infamous document J. C. S. 1067 despite the repeated warnings of Mr. Stimson and of many high officials in the State Department. Unfortunately, the speech was received with acclaim by all too many members of the Senate of the United States. As illustrative of the non-partisan pattern of all such legislative propaganda, Senator James Oliver Eastland, Democrat colleague Of Bilbo from Mississippi, contributed a fine appeal to passion and illogic on December 4, 1945, in a lengthy diatribe against Secretary Morgenthau for wanting to eliminate German war industry-and at Russian soldiers for, allegedly, raping German maidens. In associating these two varieties of injury to the German people as a single great humanitarian issue, the Senator propounded this disingenious query: Why blur the easily defined distinction between peacetime industry and wartime industry? . . . . . to de-industrialize German is not necessary to render Germans powerless again to wage war. We are concerned instead with the great issue of humanitarianism. However, it remained for that great Republican statesman from Indiana, the Honorable Homer E. Capehart, to win the Senatorial humanitarianism sweepstakes with an outburst on February 5, 1946, in which be denounced Mr. Morgenthau and the advocates of his plan, rather than the Nazis, as responsible for mass starvation of the German people and the deliberate destruction of the German state. Accusing them of "burning with an all-consuming determination to wreak their vengeance," the Senator stormed at his colleagues that their "technique of hate" had earned for Mr. Morgenthau, and Colonel Bernard Bernstein, the titles of "American Himmlers." The thesis that the eradication of Farben's war potential was all wrong because people were starving in Germany was also found in a November 1945 report of a House of Representatives Committee on post-war Planning, of which another Mississippi statesman, William M. Colmer, was chairman. Ibis report stressed the pre-war dependence of other European countries (Farben's victims) on Germany's industry. Ignoring the obvious fact that chemical and metallurgical industries could operate just as efficiently for peace if moved out of Germany into adjoining countries where! the lust for world conquest does not exist, Representative Colmer's report naively proclaimed that to strip Germany of its ordinary industries would injure industrial production in other, countries (those ravaged by Germany) and also would impose a heavy burden on the United States or widespread starvation and dangerous conditions all over Europe. Over the air and in the press the pleas to save Farben were heard in a great variety of argument. Among the gems of radio propaganda against the Morgenthau plan was the conclusion expressed by Saul K. Padover, biographer of emperors and former college professor, who is credited with effective work in the Army's Psychological Warfare Division. Professor Padover in a World Peaceways broadcast on December 16, 1945, ended his plea that we must re-make the German mind (he admitted that this would take decades) with a caution that there was an element of danger should we punish I.G. Farben or destroy its plants. "Destroying factories will achieve nothing" concluded the Professor. Then be left in a hurry to return to his official duties in Germany. Months later, after Professor Padover had re-examined the stealthy resuscitation of the German industrial war potential in the guise of a peace-time economy, he changed his views. On September 9, 1946 in the newspaper PM the Professor expounded ably on the necessity to deprive the Reich of its industrial might in order, as he said, to turn it into "a giant without weapons, and consequently not to be feared." However, as will appear later, the Professoes recognition of the menace of the Farben war potential did not appear until after our Secretary of State bad taken one more step away from the Roosevelt program of destruction for all time of the real menace to future peace. Meanwhile Raymond Moley, the kiss-and-tell hero of early New Deal days who had openly advocated a new era of German industrial cartelization to be directed by Americans, broadcast his conclusion that already the Morgenthau plan was gone, and that Farben, "one of the most unusual and important organizations in the world,' need not be destroyed as it could be properly controlled, now that Americans had taken over. Among the columnists, Dorothy Thompson, strangely changed from her earlier attitude, was probably the most vociferous and certainly the most hysterical opponent of Franklin Roosevelt's announced determination to eradicate the industrial war potential of I.G. Farben. As justifying her attacks on "de-industrialism," as she called it, Miss Thompson made the point that "Only a limited number of industrialists helped Hitler in any way to come to power," and stated that her criticisms were based upon: Unswerving allegiance to the principles of democracy, the rarely practiced ethics of Christendom, the long range interests of America, and an unflagging defense of humanism. Sylvia Porter, brilliant rival of Miss Thompson, replied in her column in the New York Post that the fundamental issue was to so direct Germany's post-war economy that she would never again be able to threaten world peace. Summed up Miss Porter on August 6, 1945: The Nazi party didn't make Hitler. Germany's industrialists made him and made his invasion possible. And Farben's friends did not have it all their own way in the United States Senate. In June 1945 a few weeks after the surrender, Democratic Senator Harley M. Kilgore returned from an early postwar trip to occupied Germany with the announcement that he had uncovered proof of the plot to revive I.G. Farben and other German war industries, and that German industrial leaders were already preparing for the next world war. Senator Kilgore, made Chairman of the Sub-Committee on War Mobilization of the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1943, had done excellent work in uncovering and recording evidence of Farben's prewar criminal conspiracies in the country and had also explored some aspects of the cartel problem in general. In fact, Senator Kilgore became the first member of the Congress to express written approval of my own earlier efforts to expose the influences which were protecting the Farben prewar conspiracy when he wrote me in February 1944 that: If Congress had only investigated this (Farben) lobby in 1931 as you recommended, we should have had a more healthy realism about Germany and cartels rather than the realism of war. On June 22, 1945 Senator Kilgore called the Honorable Bernard M. Baruch as a witness, and the latter, to his everlasting credit and to the dismay of many of his Wall Street friends, delivered a most devastating blast at Germany's industrial war potential which, he demanded, must be smashed for all time. Bluntly he described Farben's industrialists: War is their chief business and always has been . . . Her war-making potential must be eliminated; many of her plants shifted east and west to friendly countries; all other heavy industry destroyed The elder statesman's testimony constituted a substantial approval of Secretary Morgenthau's proposals and as such went further than the Yalta agreement of the three heads of state. Over and over Mr. Baruch denounced the German industrial leaders as equally guilty of murder as were the Nazis. "German industry is a war industry," he said. "You cannot industrialize Germany and keep her from being a war agency." Other witnesses who followed Mr. Baruch before the Kilgore Committee included Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clay-ton, who testified regarding evidence uncovered in Germany of the grandiose plot engaged in by I.G. Farben and other war in-dustries in concealing their capital assets and technicians in "safe havens," as be termed them, in foreign countries in order to prepare for the next war. Perhaps the most important testimony presented to the committee, in its significance as regards the postwar administrative policy on I.G. Farben, was a lengthy program outlined by Leo T. Crow'ley who, at the time, was still wielding his great powers and influence behind the scenes as Foreign Economic Administrator. In the outline of, his program of economic and industrial disarmament Mi. Crowley indulged in a series of contradictory allegations and proposals which, facing both ways, would appear to be merely aimless double-talk if it were not for its more serious aspects. Mr. Crowley's thesis at the start very ably pointed out that: It was not the amount of military material which Germany was able to save from destruction by the Allies nor the handful of military material which Germany was able to manufacture during the years which immediately followed the defeat of 1918. . . Rather it was the fact that Germany re-tained intact a vast aggregate of economic and industrial war potential and was able to continue to experiment, plan and prosecute its development in terms of future war production that was important . . . and "that later enabled the German nation to organize itself completely and entirely for war ..... The above- appears to be an extremely well expressed recognition by Mr. Crowley of German's real war potential. However, in concluding, Mr. Crowley openly advocated another era of control instead of eradication, saying that "economic security from future German aggression must," among other things, "recognize the differences between a powerful war economy and a healthy peacetime economy" and "be achieved by . affirmative industrial and economic controls as a first step." Among the gems in this list of "musts" relating to the control but not the elimination of Germany's war potential were requirements that the control be possessed of a maximum of administra-tive feasibility and simplicity. Complicated and detailed controls may be practical during the period of occupation . . . Be simple and understandable for the common people of the world . . ." With gibberish of this sort emanating from one of the highest ranking administrators in Washington, is it any wonder that minor 0. M. G. officials who wanted to do a job were discouraged and ineffective. It is appropriate to recite here statements of necessity for the disarmament of Germany which are set forth in the summary of the final program prepared under Mr. Crowley's direction and made public some months after his statement before the Kilgore Committee. One of these necessities is stated to be that "The achievement of security from future German aggression should be the primary and controlling element in our foreign policy toward Germany." Another admits the inadequacy of any program which merely stops the direct production of arms and munitions and states: Military potential in a total war is a combination of modem industrial, scientific, and institutional components of such a nature as to make them equally useful for war or civilian productions. Having thus ably stated the necessity to eliminate completely I.G. Farben and its allied metallurgical industries, the Crowley program and its appendix in some 660 closely printed pages of figures and discussion then recommends the continued operations of these same industries with the trained management and scientific research which must accompany them-all this to be "controlled" for an indefinite period. In other words a substantial repetition, step by step, of the control of German industry instituted by the Allies after the first World War which fumbled and foozled until it was abandoned, while the men of Farben went right along with their plans for the next war. With respect to Mr. Crowley's contradictory recommendations on German industry it is only fair to state that Henry H. Fowler, Director of the Enemy Branch of the F. E. A., who did much of the work on the problems, also presented numerous exhibits to the Kilgore Committee on June 26, 1945 which were notable contributions to the unmasking of Farben's war potential. Having contributed his final compendium of governmental policy which related to the survival of I.G. Farben, Mr. Crowley retired from his numerous and onerous government jobs to his duties as president and chairman of the Standard Gas & Electric Company and other public utilities in which he held office. However, criticism of Mr. Crowley did not cease with the end of his governmental duties, as the Federal Power Commission on June 18, 1946, issued an order forbidding him to continue as chairman of one electric light company and director in two other utilities, giving neglect of his duties as the reason for thus ousting him. pps,378-394 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html">Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A> ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om