[CTRL] Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming of the German Jews

[kl]

-Caveat Lector-

http://www.stephenhalbrook.com/article-nazilaw.html

Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming of the German Jews
Stephen P. Halbrook(1)
17 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, No. 3, 483-
535 (2000).
We are in danger of forgetting that the Bill of Rights reflects experience
with police excesses. It is not only under Nazi rule that police
excesses are inimical to freedom. It is easy to make light of insistence
on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked
on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that
by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at
first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.
--Justice Felix Frankfurter(2)
The most foolish mistake we could possibly make would be to allow
the subject races to possess arms. History shows that all conquerors
who have allowed their subject races to carry arms have prepared their
own downfall by so doing.
--Adolph Hitler(3)
Gun control laws are depicted as benign and historically
progressive.(4) However, German firearm laws and hysteria created
against Jewish firearm owners played a major role in laying the
groundwork for the eradication of German Jewry in the Holocaust.
Disarming political opponents was a categorical imperative of the Nazi
regime.(5) The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed."(6) This right, which reflects a universal and historical power
of the people in a republic to resist tyranny,(7) was not recognized in
the German Reich.
This article addresses German firearms laws and Nazi policies and
practices to disarm German citizens, particularly political opponents
and Jews. It begins with an account of post-World War I chaos, which
led to the enactment in 1928 by the liberal Weimar republic of
Germany's first comprehensive gun control law. Next, the Nazi seizure
of power in 1933 was consolidated by massive searches and seizures
of firearms from political opponents, who were invariably described as
"communists." After five years of repression and eradication of
dissidents, Hitler signed a new gun control law in 1938 which
benefitted Nazi party members and entities but denied firearm
ownership to enemies of the state. Later that year, in Kristallnacht (the
Night of the Broken Glass), in one fell swoop, the Nazi regime
disarmed Germany's Jews. Without any ability to defend themselves,
the Jewish population could easily be sent to concentration camps for
the Final Solution. After World War II began, Nazi authorities continued
to register and mistrust civilian firearm owners, and German resistence
to the Nazi regime was unsuccessful.(8)
The above topic has never been the subject of a comprehensive
account in the legal literature.(9) This article is based on never before
used sources from archives in Germany, German firearms laws and
regulations, German and American newspapers from the period, and
historical literature. It contributes to the debate concerning firearms
ownership in a democracy and presents the first scholarly analysis of
the use of gun control laws and policies to establish the Hitler regime
and to render political opponents and especially German Jews
defenseless.
I. A LIBERAL REPUBLIC ENACTS GUN CONTROL
Germany's defeat in World War I heralded the demise of the Second
Reich and the birth of the Weimar republic. For several years
thereafter, civil unrest and chaos ensued. Government forces,
buttressed by unofficial Freikorps (Free Corps), battled Communists in
the streets.(10) The most spectacular event was the crushing of the
Spartacist revolt in Berlin and other cities in January 1919, when
Freikorps members captured and murdered the Communist leaders
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.(11) This coincided with the
passage of the Verordnung des Rates der Volksbeauftragen über
Waffenbesitz (Regulations of the Council of the People's Delegates on
Weapons Possession), which provided: "All firearms, as well as all
kinds of firearms ammunition, are to be surrendered immediately."(12)
Whoever kept a firearm or ammunition was subject to imprisonment for
five years and a fine of 100,000 marks.(13) That decree would remain in
force until repealed in 1928.(14)
When Spartacists attacked a Berlin police station in March, Reich
Minister of Defense Gustav Noske declared that "any person who
bears arms against government troops will be shot on the spot."(15) A
Social Democrat, Noske was known as the "Bloodhound of the
Revolution."(16) Another order was issued that anyone in mere
possession of arms would be shot with no trial.(17) Under these
orders, hundreds of Berliners were killed.(18)
An inept April Communist uprising in Bavaria fared no better.(19) Lieutenant Rudolf 
Mann, a regimental adjutant in the Freikorps, was humored by the "mopping-up 
operations" against the Reds:
The supreme commander tacked proclamations to the walls: "Warning! All arms are to be 
surrendered immediately. Whoever is caught with arms in his possession will be shot on 
the spot!" What could the poor citizen of averag
e intelligence do? Surrender -- but how? If he took his rifle under his arm to take it 
to the place were arms were collected, he would be shot on the steps of his house by a 
passing patrol. If he came to the door and open
ed it, we all took shots at him because he was armed. If he got as far as the street, 
we would put him up against the wall. If he stuck his rifle under his coat it was 
still worse . . . I suggested that they tie their rif
les on a long string and drag them behind them. I would have laughed myself sick if I 
had seen them go down the street doing it.(20)
Armed conflict continued into 1920 when Communists called a general strike in the 
Ruhr, attacked the Freikorps, and then were defeated.(21) A young Freikorps member 
wrote about the counteroffensive:
Our battalion has had two deaths; the Reds 200-300. Anyone who falls into our hands 
first gets the rifle butt and then is finished off with a bullet . . . We even shot 10 
Red Cross nurses (Rote-Kreuz-Schwestern) on sight
because they were carrying pistols. We shot those little ladies with pleasure--how 
they cried and pleaded with us to save their lives. Nothing doing! Anybody with a gun 
is our enemy . . .(22)
While the government officially proclaimed that it would no longer rely on the 
services of the Freikorps, the latter continued obtaining financial support and arms 
from the government, often by theft or fraud.(23) Freikor
ps members would go on to become part of the backbone of National Socialism.(24)
The Gesetz über die Entwaffnung der Bevölkerung (Law on the Disarmament of the 
People), passed on August 7, 1920, provided for a Reichskommissar for Disarmament of 
the Civil Population.(25) He was empowered to define whic
h weapons were "military weapons" and thus subject to seizure.(26) The bolt action 
Mauser rifles Models 1888/98, which had 5-shot magazines, were put in the same class 
as hand grenades.(27) Persons with knowledge of unlaw
ful arms caches were required to inform the Disarmament Commission.(28)
Civil disorders would continue off and on, particularly the Hamburg uprising of 1923. 
This revolt was instigated by Communists who attacked a few police stations and seized 
arms, only to be suppressed.(29) Under Communist
 ideology, arms were to be obtained in the course of the revolution itself.(30) 
Whatever the support or lack of support of members of the "working class" for 
Communism, the lack of arms in their hands would in later years
 prevent them from creating armed resistance to the Nazi regime.
By 1928, the Weimar republic was ready to enact a comprehensive firearms law. The 
Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition (Law on Firearms and Ammunition)(31) required a 
license to manufacture, assemble, or repair firearms a
nd ammunition, or even to reload cartridges.(32) A license was also required to sell 
firearms as a trade.(33) Trade in firearms was prohibited at annual fairs, shooting 
competitions, and other events.(34)
Acquisition of a firearm or ammunition required a Waffen oder Munitionserwerbscheins 
(license to obtain a weapon or ammunition) from the police.(35) The requirement 
applied to both commercial sales and private transfers.
It did not apply to transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a shooting range licensed 
by the police for sole use at the range.(36) Exempt were "authorities of the Reich" 
and various government entities.(37)
Carrying a firearm required a Waffenschein (license to carry a weapon). The issuing 
authority
had complete discretion to limit its validity to a specific occasion or locality.(38) 
"Licenses to obtain or to carry firearms shall only be issued to persons whose 
reliability is not in doubt, and only after proving a ne
ed for them."(39) Licenses were automatically denied to "gypsies, and to persons 
wandering around like gypsies"; persons with convictions under various listed laws, 
including this law (i.e., the 1928 Gesetz) and the 1920
Law on the Disarming of the Population; and "persons for whom police surveillance has 
been declared admissible, or upon whom the loss of civil rights has been imposed, for 
the duration of the police surveillance or the lo
ss of civil rights."(40)
The above categories of persons who were disqualified from obtaining an acquisition or 
carry license were prohibited from possession of a firearm or ammunition. Persons not 
entitled to possess firearms were ordered to sur
render them immediately.(41) Further, a license was required to possess a firearms or 
ammunition "arsenal," which was defined as more than five firearms of the same type or 
more than 100 cartridges.(42) (These quantities
would have been very low for collectors or target competitors.) Also included in the 
definition was more than ten hunting arms or more than 1000 hunting cartridges.(43) 
Licenses were available only to "persons of unquesti
oned trustworthiness."(44)
It was forbidden to manufacture or possess firearms which are adapted for "rapid 
disassembly beyond the generally usual extent for hunting and sporting purposes."(45) 
Firearms with silencers or spotlights were prohibited.
(46)
The penalty for willfully or negligently violating the provisions of the law related 
to the carrying of a firearm was up to three-years imprisonment and a fine.(47) The 
same penalty applied to anyone who inherited a firea
rm or ammunition from a deceased person and failed to report it in a timely 
manner.(48) Three years imprisonment was also the penalty for whoever deliberately or 
negligently failed to prevent a violation of the law by a m
ember of his household under 20 years of age.(49) Other violations of the law or 
implementing regulations were punishable with fines and unspecified terms of 
imprisonment.(50)
The new law was passed on April 12, but did not take effect until October 1, 1928. On 
the effective date, the 1919 law requiring immediate surrender of all firearms and 
ammunition would be repealed.(51) That would allow o
ver six months for compliance with the new law while leaving the more draconian but 
widely ignored law on the books for the same period.
Reichskommissar Kuenzer published an explanation of the new firearms law in the 
newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.(52) He explained that, after preparations that 
lasted over three years, the law was submitted by the R
eich Ministry of the Interior to the Reichsrat in 1926. (53) "The law necessitated 
long consultations in the Reichsrat because it interferes strongly with the police 
authority of the Länder [states]."(54) As adopted, the
1928 law prohibited the governments of the Länder from ordering further restrictions, 
"insofar as the government of the Reich with consent of the Reichsrat excluded certain 
kinds of firearms or ammunition from the provisi
ons of the law."(55)
The bill was sent to the Reichstag in 1928, and "the parties unanimously considered 
the swift settlement of this matter as so urgent that the law passed immediately in 
the plenary session, without consultation in the comm
ittee . . . and was adopted in all three readings without a debate."(56)
The commentary of Kuenzer continued: "A matter that so far had been settled 
differently in each State, and in Prussia even differently in various districts, will 
now be regulated the same way in the whole Reich. The law o
n firearms and ammunition sets forth terms that are very important politically and 
economically."(57) The law, Kuenzer noted, only regulates firearms and ammunition. 
When first proposed and published, the press objected t
hat the law failed to regulate weapons for hitting or stabbing, truncheons, and brass 
knuckles, which were regulated by the Länder. Individual Länder were opposed to a 
regulation of weapons other than firearms by the Reic
h. The Reich Ministry of the Interior would now have to draft a uniform weapons law 
for the whole Reich.(58)
Kuenzer addressed the merits of the new law as follows:
The purpose and goal of the law at hand are to get firearms that have done so much 
damage from the hands of unauthorized persons and to do away with the instability and 
ambiguity of the law that previously existed in this
 area. The difficult task was to find the appropriate limits between this necessity of 
the state on the one hand and the important interests of the weapons industry that was 
employing a large number of workers and had bee
n heavily damaged through the peace treaty, the interests of the legal sporting 
industry, and the personal freedom of the individual.(59)
Thus, the law requires a permit for the manufacturing of firearms and ammunition, 
although "it is important to note that the permit may not be made contingent on an 
examination of the applicant."(60) Firearms sold commerc
ially must bear the name or stamp of the manufacturer or dealer "in the interest of 
solving criminal acts committed with firearms."(61) Kuenzer noted the following sphere 
that would not be subject to government control:
For the public the provision is of utmost importance that in the future the possession 
of firearms and ammunition will be allowed without police permit. Without doubt the 
sharpest and best control of weapons possession wo
uld have been given if the so-called possession permit had been introduced. But in my 
opinion it was correct not to do that because the danger of illegal weapons use exists 
mainly when someone is carrying his weapons outs
ide his house; but such a provision would also only then have been successful if there 
had been a punishment in the case of violations. Such a punishment would have opened 
the door to denunciations and would also have bee
n useless in practice like the still valid order of the regulation of January 13, 1919 
which carries such a prohibition and is still in effect. The legislature has the duty 
to adopt only laws that can be executed in pract
ice because nothing is more demoralizing for the population than laws that exist only 
on paper, but cannot be implemented.(62)
The reference was to the 1919 regulation which required immediate surrender of all 
firearms and ammunition and punished disobedience with five years imprisonment.(63) 
Thus, the 1928 law was seen as deregulatory to a point
 but enforceable, in contrast to a far more restrictive albeit unenforceable order. 
Less regulation meant fewer "denunciations," although it was unrealistic to anticipate 
that the odious practice of "denunciations" would
end. This would be seen when the Nazis came to power in 1933 and disarmed all 
political opponents. In any event, Kuenzer's following explanation illustrates the 
cautious and limited liberalization:
In one direction, however, there had to be prevention. Even if someone's possession of 
firearms in his own house in general is not a grave danger for the public security and 
order, the situation is very different when som
eone starts to build a weapons cache in his apartment. The possession of weapons and 
ammunition depots therefore has to be subject to a permit and a permit may only be 
given to persons who are reliable.(64)
Kuenzer explained the provision requiring the "arsenal" license for over five firearms 
of the same kind or over 100 cartridges, and increased quantities for hunting arms and 
ammunition. However, the Reich government had p
ower under the law to exempt weapons from its coverage, and such weapons would not be 
counted in an "arsenal."(65) An explanation of the law listed weapons expected to be 
declared exempt as muzzle loaders, old breech load
ers, weapons with unrifled barrels, small caliber air guns, harmless gas weapons and 
blank cartridge firearms, and similar weapons with limited penetrating power.(66)
The law prohibits possession of firearms by "adolescents, incapacitated persons, 
gypsies and persons traveling around like gypsies, as well as persons who are 
considered unreliable because of criminal convictions."(67) Ku
enzer added: "This will certainly be welcomed by the general public."(68)
Kuenzer pointed to § 33, "according to which the possession of military weapons made 
illegal by other laws is of course prohibited."(69) Section 33 provided that the 1928 
law had no effect on the 1919 Law on the Peace Bet
ween German and the Allied and Associated Powers and the implementing and 
regulations.(70) The effect of this was to continue the prohibition on possession of 
"military" arms, such as the bolt action Mauser rifles Models
1888 and 98, which had 5-shot magazines.(71)
Kuenzer continued: "If in principal the possession of a weapon at home has thus been 
allowed, the law on the acquisition and the carrying of firearms contains detailed 
provisions."(72) The carry license requirement "is me
ant to prevent persons who do not offer a guarantee that they will not misuse their 
weapons from walking around with a weapon without a police permit and [illegible] 
endanger the life of other persons."(73) Yet even this
license requirement meant liberalization: "Extraordinary progress was made because it 
is finally possible to issue weapons permits valid for the whole Reich. So far, the 
validity of a weapon's permit ended at the border o
f each State, or in Prussia at the border of each district, and it had not been 
possible to issue a permit to a person for the whole Reich."(74)
To "facilitate the shooting sport," the law did not require a license to acquire or 
use a firearm at a range with a police permit. Further, "special provisions were 
adopted for hunters":
When hunting, conducting game protection or practicing shooting, or on their way to or 
from those activities, owners of a hunting permit of a German State may carry hunting 
weapons and a handgun without needing a special
weapons permit. Whoever is in possession of a hunting permit for a whole year of a 
German State may acquire hunting weapons and hand firearms anywhere in the Reich to 
the extent provided by the hunting permit and may acqu
ire ammunition without an acquisition permit.(75)
Noting the effective date of October 1, 1928, Kuenzer noted: "In the meantime the 
Reich government with the consent of the Reichsrat will issue the provisions necessary 
for the implementation of the law and in particular
will decide which firearms should not be subject to the law at all. The governments of 
the Länder will make the necessary changes to the laws of their Länder and adopt the 
provisions left in their competence." He conclude
d:
The Reichstag which in order to adopt a law of such important content without 
extensive consultation in the committee probably had to disregard its misgivings, with 
the almost unanimous adoption of this encompassing law,
which is settling important economic and political questions, before its adjournment 
has shown that it is willing to neglect formalities and party doctrines when the 
public welfare asks it to do so.(76)
Implementing regulations adopted in 1928(77) provided that, unless otherwise 
specified, the firearms acquisition permit entitled one to acquire only one firearm, 
and the ammunition acquisition permit entitled the holder t
o acquire only 50 jacketed or ball cartridges.(78) When the firearm(s) authorized by 
the acquisition permit was obtained, the transferor (whether a dealer or a non-dealer) 
was required to submit the permit to the police.(
79) Dealers kept acquisition and disposition books which where subject to police 
inspection on demand.(80)
Within a decade, Germany had gone from a brutal firearms seizure policy which, in 
times of unrest, entailed selective yet immediate execution for mere possession of a 
firearm, to a modern, comprehensive gun control law. P
assed by a liberal republic, this law ensured that the police had records of all 
firearms acquisitions (or at least all lawful ones) and that the keeping and bearing 
of arms were subject to police approval. This firearms
control regime was quite useful to the new government that came to power a half decade 
later.
II. 1933: THE NAZIS SEIZE POWER
Adolph Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. The Nazi regime 
immediately began a campaign to disarm and obliterate all enemies of the state, who 
were invariably designated "Communists." The following
 describes this process from contemporaneous sources.
On February 1, in the Charlottenburg area of Berlin, a large police detachment arrived 
to investigate the alleged shooting deaths of two National Socialist officers by 
"Communists" the night before. "The police closed off
 the street to all traffic while at the same time criminal detectives conducted 
extensive raids in the houses. Each individual apartment was searched for weapons. The 
raid lasted several hours."(81) Countless reports of t
his type would appear in the coming months.
It took about a month for the Nazi party to consolidate its power over the central 
government. On February 28, the Hitler regime persuaded President Paul von Hindenburg 
to issue an emergency decree, based on Article XLVII
I of the Constitution (a provision passed by the Weimar republic), suspending 
constitutional guarantees and authorizing the Reich to seize executive power in any 
State which failed to take "the necessary measures for the
restoration of law and order."(82) The official explanation was that evidence of 
"imminent Communist terrorism" was discovered in a search of the Karl Liebnecht House, 
Berlin's Communist headquarters, and that Communists
were responsible for the Reichstag (German Parliament) fire of the night before. The 
decree was adopted after Hermann Göring, Minister without Portfolio and chief of the 
Prussian Interior Ministry, reported on the Reichst
ag fire and plans for Communist terror. It was claimed that, on the coming Sunday 
election day, the Communists intended to attack Nazi party members and "to disarm the 
police by force."(83) It is widely believed that the
Nazis themselves set the Reichstag fire in order to justify the repressive measures 
which followed.(84)
The decree authorized the government to suspend the constitutional guarantees of 
personal liberty, free expression of opinion, freedom of the press, and the rights to 
assemble and to form associations. Secrecy of postal a
nd telephonic communication was suspended, and the government was authorized to 
conduct search and seizure operations of homes.(85) It provided that whoever commits 
the offenses defined in the Penal Code as "severe riotin
g" or "severe breach of public peace" by "using weapons or in conscious and 
intentional cooperation with an armed person . . . shall be sentenced to death or, if 
the offense was not previously punishable more severely, to
 the penitentiary for life or to the penitentiary for up to 15 years."(86) Since the 
terms "riot" and "breach of peace" could be applied to a protest march by political 
opponents, the mere keeping or bearing of a weapon m
ight have become a capital offense.
It was reported that measures to suppress "subversive activities" took place 
throughout Germany. Hamburg, Dresden, Hanover, Stuttgart, and numerous other cities 
"reported bans on Communist activities and the searching of
houses for Communist literature and illegal weapons."(87) Police were put on constant 
alert until after the election.(88) As Communist members of the Reichstag fled, a 
government spokesman noted that votes for Communists
would not be counted because they were "non-German."(89)
Meanwhile, non-Nazis throughout Germany were disarmed as "Communists." "Party 
headquarters throughout the country were raided and subversive literature and weapons 
were seized."(90) At the same time, even more Nazis were
armed by the government. "Throughout Prussia some 60,000 Nazi storm troopers and 
members of the Stahlhelm have been enrolled as auxiliary police and have been armed 
with revolvers and truncheons."(91) The outcome of the "
election" could not be in doubt.
The Reich Minister of the Interior, on March 1, sent an urgent, secret memorandum to 
the governments of the German states regarding the KPD, the German Communist Party, 
which stated:
The Police Headquarters in Berlin has established that the KPD intends to conduct 
systematic attacks against members of the national units, especially the SA and the 
SS, and by doing so to recklessly neutralize any armed
members of those units by force of arms. The plan is to conduct the action in such a 
way that their authors will, if possible, not be recognized as Communists. The plan is 
also to compel patrolling policemen by force of a
rms to give up their weapons.
I am informing you of the above with the request to take further action.(92)
While Communists may have been capable of such attacks, this language is consistent 
with Nazi assaults on democrats and other opponents of the Nazis who might "not be 
recognized as Communists" and whose mere possession of
 firearms was evidence of the conspiracy.
The term "Communist Underground" took on a dual meaning in the following report: 
"Searches of houses of Kottbus Communists uncovered, among other things, numerous 
weapons and illegal flyers and also improved catacombs sim
ilar to those found in Berlin. The catacombs served as hiding places for the 
Communists and their weapons."(93)
Scores were being settled for anti-Nazi activity which took place before Hitler's 
ascension to power. The Völkische Beobachter (People's Observer), Hitler's newspaper, 
reported:
Following the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor I in Berlin has now filed charges against nine Communists for severe breach 
of peace of the land, attempted murder and offense
s against the Firearms Law committed during the assault conducted in the night of 
December 28, 1932 on the National Socialist meeting room at Landwehrstrasse which 
severely injured three National Socialists.(94)
The above reports indicate the use of the "Communist gun owner" bogeyman as a 
propaganda tool, the extensive searches and seizures being conducted by the police to 
confiscate firearms and arrest their owners, and the use
of the Firearms Law against Nazi opponents. It is clear that firearms were being 
seized from persons of all types, not just "Communists." For example, Wilhelm Willers, 
an apparently prominent citizen of Munich, complained
 to authorities that "the SA members took several things when they searched my 
apartment, such as several bottles of mineral water and from my living room a box of 
cigarettes. A flashlight was lent, but not returned. I as
k that my flashlight and the above-mentioned pistol which belongs to me personally be 
returned to me."(95)
Not surprisingly, the Nazis won the election, leaving the Hitler regime with executive 
power in all the German States.(96) The repression continued unabated. Anti-Semitic 
actions began to be reported. One account noted, "
The Produce Exchange in Breslau was entered today by Nazi storm troops, who searched 
the place for arms and ousted the occupants. Several Jewish-owned department stores 
there were forcibly closed, and the storm troopers e
jected Jewish judges and lawyers from the courts."(97)
In another incident, six Nazi storm troopers raided the apartment of the widow of 
former President Friedrich Ebert.(98) They demanded her "mustard flag," the Nazi term 
for the republican black, red, and gold emblem.(99) W
hen her son protested that they had no flag on the premises, they conferred among 
themselves on whether to search the apartment anyway.(100) "They decided finally to 
look for hidden arms, but found only a revolver belongi
ng to Herr Ebert, which he handed to them together with a permit that had expired. 
With these the Nazis marched off."(101)
By this point in time the Nazis had foisted a totalitarian regime over all of Germany. 
Not only had the Socialist and Communist presses been shut down, but also Centrist and 
neutral presses were subject to immediate suppr
ession should anything objectionable to the regime be published.(102) Germans were 
forbidden to reveal any information to foreigners. To enforce this repression, 
telephones were tapped and informants lingered in cafes.(10
3) The police and the courts were instruments of the dictatorship. Jews were fleeing 
persecution.(104)
Despite the repression, foreign presses continued to report the news. The following 
New York Times account demonstrates that the Nazi drive to seize arms was in part a 
ruse to conduct searches and seizures and to harass s
elected persons:
NAZIS HUNT ARMS IN EINSTEIN HOME
Only a Bread Knife Rewards Brown Shirts'
Search for Alleged Huge Cache
OUSTING OF JEWS GOES ON . . . .
BERLIN, March 20. - Charging that Professor Albert Einstein had a huge quantity of 
arms and ammunition stored in his secluded home in Caputh, the National Socialists 
sent Brown Shirt men and policemen to search it today,
but the nearest thing to arms they found was a bread knife.
Professor Einstein's home, which for the present is empty, the professor being on his 
way back to Europe from the United States, was surrounded on all sides and one of the 
most perfect raids of recent German history was c
arried out. The outcome was a disappointment to those who have always regarded 
Professor Einstein's pacifist utterances as a mere pose.(105)
If one could find humor in the above, the reality was not humorous. The above report 
also described the elimination of Jews from the professions. Jewish physicians were 
being dismissed from the hospitals, Jewish judges in
 criminal court were removed and placed in civil court, and Jewish prosecutors were 
terminated.(106)
On March 23, the Reichstag passed, by a vote of 441 to 94, the enabling act that 
permitted the Cabinet to make laws without consulting that body and without action by 
the President. The Reichstag then dissolved sine die.
The Cabinet of eleven members included three Nazis: Chancellor Hitler, Dr. Wilhelm F. 
Frick, and Hermann Göring.(107) The others were Nationalists and appointees of 
President von Hindenburg.(108)
The enabling act made the Hitler cabinet a dictatorship through three simple 
provisions. Article I provided: "Federal laws may be enacted by the government [the 
cabinet] outside of the procedure provided in the Constituti
on . . . ."(109) Article II stated: "The laws decreed by the government may deviate 
from the Constitution . . . ."(110) And Article III provided: "The laws decreed by the 
government are to be drafted by the Chancellor [Hi
tler] and announced in the Reichsgesetzblatt."(111)
The above accounts concern Nazi policy to seize all arms from political opponents. 
Nazi policy also mandated the prohibition of possession of "military" firearms by 
citizens at large. An SA Oberführer warned about an ordi
nance issued by the provisional Bavarian Minister of the Interior:
The deadline set by § 4 of the Ordinance for the Surrender of Weapons will expire on 
March 31, 1933. I therefore request the immediate surrender of all arms from former 
army stores to the local stations of the Gendarmie.
Pursuant to § 3 of the ordinance, individuals may be permitted to keep a handgun 
together with proper ammunition for the protection of house and farm. Well-founded 
requests in this regard may be submitted to the local Gen
darmerie stations by way of the mayor.
The units of the national revolution, SA, SS, and Stahlhelm, offer every German man 
with a good reputation the opportunity to join their ranks for the fight. Therefore, 
whoever does not belong to one of these named units
and nevertheless keeps his weapon without authorization or even hides it, must be 
viewed as an enemy of the national government and will be held responsible without 
hesitation and with the utmost severity.(112)
In other words, anyone who possessed a military rifle or handgun was a public enemy 
unless he or she was a member of a Nazi-approved organization. Of the three listed 
organizations, the SS (Schutzstaffeln) or Elite Guard
of the National Socialist Party, headed by Heinrich Himmler, emerged as the most 
powerful Nazi police organization.(113) The SA (Sturmabteilung) or storm troopers were 
appointed as an auxiliary police force which carried
out many of the excesses of the Nazi revolution until its leadership, headed by Ernst 
Roehm, were eliminated in the "night of the long knives" in 1934.(114) The Stahlhelm 
or Steel Helmets, a veterans' organization,(115) h
ad as its honorary commander President Hindenburg, whose death in 1934 would complete 
Hitler's consolidation of absolute power(116) and doubtlessly eliminated this 
organization's special privileges.
On March 28, the State Ministry of the Interior headed by Frick issued a secret 
directive to the government units, police, municipal commissars, and special 
commissioners of the highest SA leaders regarding the execution
of the ordinance on the surrender of military weapons. It began: "Despite all of the 
measures taken so far, parts of the population opposed to the national government and 
the national movement behind it are still in posse
ssion of military weapons and military ammunition."(117) It ordered the police 
"immediately to order the population to surrender any military weapons in a timely 
manner to the special commissars listed in the official gaz
ettes as well as in the local press."(118) Weapons to be surrendered included not just 
heavy weapons but also "military rifles" (which were bolt actions) and "army 
revolvers."(119) The directive continued:
Pursuant to § 4, paragraph 2, of the ordinance the Special Commissar of the Highest SA 
Leader may exempt members of the SA, SS, and Stahlhelm units as well as members of 
veterans' associations by confidential order to the
 pertinent leaders of those units/associations. Under no circumstances may the public, 
especially the press, be informed about this exemption, given the fact that the 
provisions on disarmament of the Versailles Treaty are
 still in effect. Further, upon request, the Special Commissar may allow reliable 
persons to keep a rifle together with the necessary ammunition for the protection of 
house and farm. The same applies to army revolvers tha
t are the personal property of the owner. Only such persons can be considered reliable 
from whom a loyal attitude toward the national government can be expected. These 
approved exceptions must also be treated as confident
ial.(120)
The surrendered arms were to be stored with the SA, SS, and Stahlhelm.(121) These 
groups in turn would assist the police "to conduct weapons searches in places where 
military weapons and military ammunition are still susp
ected."(122)
A terse newspaper announcement about the above began: "We would like to point out one 
more time that all military weapons and ammunition in private possession have to be 
surrendered by March 31, 1933 . . ."(123) It warned
: "If we find military weapons or ammunition after 31 March 1933, we will be forced to 
:proceed ruthlessly . . . ."(124)
Having disarmed and mopped up the "Communists," at times a euphemism for citizens who 
were not National Socialists, and having prohibited possession of "military" firearms 
to citizens who were not members of Nazi-approved
 organizations, the Nazis now turned their attention more toward the Jews. Apparently 
hoping to depict Jews as subversive by proving them to be in possession of illegal 
firearms, search and seizure operations were execute
d on April 4, 1933.(125) The New York Times reported:
Raid on Jewish Quarter
A large force of police assisted by Nazi auxiliaries raided a Jewish quarter in 
Eastern Berlin, searching everywhere for weapons and papers. Streets were closed and 
pedestrians were halted. Worshipers leaving synagogues w
ere searched and those not carrying double identification cards were arrested. Even 
flower boxes were overturned in the search through houses and some printed matter and 
a few weapons were seized.(126)
The Völkische Beobachter contained a revealing account of the raid on the Jewish 
quarter under the headline: "The Time of the Ghetto Has Come; Massive Raid in the 
Scheunenviertel;(127) Numerous Discoveries of Weapons--Con
fiscation of Subversive Material; Numerous Arrests of 'Immigrants' from East 
Galicia."(128) The article included a dramatic and lengthy description of how the 
police, supported by the SS and criminal detectives, approache
d the Scheunenviertel ("Barn District") of Berlin and searched the houses and 
basements of the Jewish inhabitants. It reported:
During the very extensive search, the search details found a whole range of weapons. 
Further, a large amount of subversive printed material was confiscated. 14 persons who 
did not have proper identification were detained.
 Most of them were Jews from Poland and Galicia who were staying in Berlin without 
being registered.(129)
Despite the headlines, the article does not state how many or what types of arms were 
seized or whether they were even unlicenced or otherwise illegal--as will be seen, no 
prohibition on Jewish possession of firearms was
enacted until 1938. The article does expand on the "subversive material" discovered. 
It includes two illustrations: first, the assemblage of SS and police on the street, 
and second, a pathetic picture of an elderly Jewish
 man in front of a microphone explaining to Nazi radio broadcasters on the scene that 
he did not know why he was being searched. Beobachter readers were apparently supposed 
to "get it," but the picture and statement evoke
s sympathy for the old man. Nazi repressive measures against Jewish firearms owners 
were facilitated by the 1928 Weimar gun control law, which banned firearms from 
"untrustworthy" persons and allowed the police to keep re
cords on who acquired or carried firearms.(130) As the New York Times reported:
Permission to Possess Arms Withdrawn From Breslau Jews
Breslau, April 21. The Police President of the city has decreed that "all persons now 
or formerly of the Jewish faith who hold permits to carry arms or shooting licenses 
must surrender them forthwith to the police authori
ties."
The order is justified officially on the grounds that Jewish citizens have allegedly 
used their weapons for unlawful attacks on member of the Nazi organization and the 
police.
Inasmuch as the Jewish population "cannot be regarded as trustworthy," it is stated, 
permits to carry arms will not in the future be issued to any member thereof.(131)
Meanwhile, Wilhelm Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, wrote to Hermann Göring, 
Minister of the Interior of Prussia and head of the police of that state, that pistol 
imports had increased tenfold, and that "for rea
sons of public security we cannot tolerate the unrestrained import of such huge 
amounts of weapons." While the 1928 law already restricted firearm acquisitions, "the 
rules will not be observed by all of the weapons dealer
s, [and] that unauthorized persons will obtain foreign weapons flowing into the 
country . . . ."(132) Accordingly, on June 12, Frick decreed a prohibition on the 
importation of handguns.(133) Handgun ownership by German c
itizens, including Jews and political opponents, was apparently subversive to the Nazi 
regime.
Historians of the period have shown little or no interest in the above phenomena, with 
the exception of William Allen, whose The Nazi Seizure of Power is based on the 
experiences of the town of Northeim in Lower Saxony. T
his work demonstrates the Nazi's manipulative hysteria about firearms owners in 
1933.(134) As Allen demonstrates, the town's citizens found "that it was extremely 
unhealthy to have any sort of weapon around the house."(13
5) Discovery of firearms by the police "was a first-class justification for the 
repeated police raids and arrests."(136)
Allen observes that the town's Reichsbanner (armed section of the Social Democratic 
party) awaited orders from party headquarters in Berlin to fight the Nazis, but the 
order never came. "Had it been given, Northeimer's Re
ichsbanner members would have carried out the tested plan they had worked on so 
long--to obtain and distribute weapons and to crush the Nazis."(137) Social Democrats 
were "the only defenders of democracy in Germany, the m
en who should have been gathering guns and calling the general strike," but instead 
their homes were being raided in midnight arms searches and they were being hauled off 
to concentration camps.(138)
In any event, the Nazi seizure of power was complete. It remained to consolidate this 
power for the aims of National Socialism.
III. HITLER'S GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1938
On seizing power, as the above demonstrates, the Nazis were well served by the 1928 
Firearms Law. However, leisurely discussions on possible amendments were held over a 
five-year period. The discussants included Wilhelm F
rick, the Reich Minister of the Interior; Hermann Göring, who as Minister of the 
Interior of Prussia controlled the police of that State; Heinrich Himmler, the 
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police; the Head Offi
ce of the Security Police (Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei); and other members of the Nazi 
hierarchy.(139)
The result was the Nazi Waffengesetz (Weapons Law) of March 18, 1938.(140) It was 
decreed and signed by Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister Frick under the Enabling Act 
passed in 1933, which stemmed from the provision of the
 Weimar Constitution allowing rule by decree during emergencies. Indeed, the 
Reichstag, the legislative body, passed only seven laws during Hitler's entire 
reign.(141)
Hitler and Himmler would commit suicide at the war's end, while Göring and Frick would 
be condemned to death at the postwar Nürnberg trials.(142) While Frick was less well 
known, Hitler had expressed admiration for Frick
as early as Mein Kampf.(143) On assuming office in 1933, Frick wrote police stations 
that Communists dressed like SA members were rioting and smashing Jewish shop 
windows.(144) He planned anti-Semitic policies from the be
ginning.(145)
In mid-1933, Frick wrote to the other members of the cabinet: "Following the victory 
of the national revolution I consider it necessary to undertake a basic examination of 
the Weapons Law . . . ."(146) By Fall a draft was
 circulated. It would have adopted a nominal amount of deregulation for some, subject 
to its ultimate postulate expressed in the title to Chapter 1: "Prohibition of 
Firearms by Enemies of the People and the State."(147) I
t provided: "The police authority may prohibit the acquisition, possession or carrying 
of firearms to any person who is an enemy of the people and the state or who is a 
danger to public security."(148)
An analysis of the proposal explained:
"The Reich Minister of the Interior is of the opinion that the Weapons Law should be 
amended in its entirety only after the German people has been permeated with the 
National Socialist ideas to the degree that we no longe
r have to fear extensive armed riots of enemies of the people and the state."(149)
Certain relaxations would be possible, however, as long as "enemies of the people and 
the state and other elements endangering public security shall not possess any 
firearms. To achieve that goal, the draft grants the pol
ice the authority to prohibit such persons from acquiring, possessing and carrying 
such firearms."(150)
So as to leave no mistake, a section-by-section analysis stated: "If these provisions 
guarantee that no enemies of the National Socialist state possess any weapons, then it 
is justifiable and appropriate to relax the curr
ent limiting provisions of the Weapons Law for the population faithful to the 
state."(151) In determining who may not possess firearms, "the perpetrator's prior 
conduct will have to be investigated thoroughly, in particul
ar also with regard to his political activity." Further, the law would be "aimed at 
professional criminals in addition to enemies of the National-socialist state."(152)
Purging society of enemies of Nazism apparently was taking longer than expected, for 
discussion of reform of the firearms law was dropped for the next two years. Then, in 
November 1935, Frick circulated a new draft.(153)
Besides similar language about enemies of the state, it introduced the following 
qualification for issuance of a permit to manufacture firearms: "No permit may be 
issued if the requestor or the person contemplated as tech
nical manager of a facility is Jewish."(154)
Once again, an analysis of the draft explained that the police would have absolute 
discretion to deny entitlement of firearm possession to enemies of the state, and thus 
"it will therefore be possible for any national com
rade faithful to the state to acquire firearms without a special permit."(155) Its 
discussion about licenses to be in the firearms business indicate in part a motive to 
suppress competition. It stated that "the weapons in
dustry has to be subject to strict control by the state," and that it was "the request 
of the weapons industry itself to keep the industry free of inappropriate 
elements."(156) It added that only citizens of the German Re
ich may obtain permits, and avowed that "there will be no room for Jews in the German 
weapons industry and trade."(157)
The above may be understood in the context of the Nürnberg Laws that Hitler announced 
on September 15, 1935. They included the Citizenship Law, which excluded Jews from 
civil rights, and the Law for the Defense of German
Blood and Honor, which forbade marriages between Jews and citizens of German 
blood.(158) A Jew was defined as a person who is or has been a member of the Jewish 
faith or who has more than two Jewish grandparents, who in t
urn were Jews if they had been members of the Jewish faith.(159)
Although Jews were to be explicitly excluded from the firearms industry, the draft did 
not propose that they be prohibited from firearm possession or acquisition.(160) 
However, the latter would be assumed, given that the
police could simply declare that a person was an enemy of the state and bar firearm 
possession.(161) Indeed, the 1928 Weimar firearms law which was still in place 
empowered the police the discretion to issue or refuse to
issue permits to acquire or carry firearms. As the following 1936 memorandum from the 
Bavarian Political Police to all subordinate police reveals, in late 1935 the Gestapo 
had ordered that no weapons permits would be issu
ed to Jews without Gestapo approval:
Pursuant to an order of the Political Police Commander of the States [Länder] of 
December 16, 1935, No. I G - 352/35, the police authorities always have to obtain the 
opinion of the Geheimen Staatspolizei [Gestapo or Secr
et State Police] authorities on the political reliability of the individual requestor, 
before any permits to carry weapons are issued to any Jews.
Requests by Jews for the issuance of weapons permits therefore have to be sent to the 
Bavarian Political Police, II/1 for special disposal, so that it can state its opinion 
about the political reliability of the requestor
.
In general, the following has to be taken into account with regard to the issuance of 
weapons permits to Jews:
In principle, there will be very few occasions where concerns will not be raised 
regarding the issuance of weapons permits to Jews. As a rule, we have to assume that 
firearms in the hands of the Jews represent a considera
ble danger for the German people. Therefore, in the future, an extreme measure of 
scrutiny will have to be applied to the question of political reliability of the 
requestor in all cases where an opinion needs to be given
about the issuance of weapons permits to Jews. Only this way will we be able to 
prevent numerous Jews from obtaining firearms and to cause danger to the German 
population.
Most likely, the forwarding of applications will come into consideration only in 
special cases.(162)
In short, the legal and police tools were already in place to disarm whatever group 
the Nazis disfavored. Indeed, Frick wrote to the other ministers in early 1936:
"Authoritative sources have expressed their concerns to me that this might not be the 
appropriate time to replace the acquisition permit requirement for firearms and 
ammunition with a police weapons prohibition. I have th
erefore decided to postpone for the time being the issue of amending the weapons law . 
. . ."(163)
However, one or more drafts continued to circulate, as the Reichsführer SS and Chief 
of the German Police Heinrich Himmler made written comments in November 1936, and 
Frick's office submitted a new draft and invited Himml
er and the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei (High Office of Security Police) to a meeting 
in February 1937 to resolve differences.(164)
In mid-1937, Frick again sent out a new draft, which would have maintained the 
requirement of a firearm acquisition permit.(165) However, Nazis would be exempt from 
permit requirements: "The position of the NSDAP in the G
erman state is taken into account in that those political leaders and leaders of the 
SA, SS, NSKK [National Socialist Motor Corps] and Hitler Youth with a certain rank who 
have been granted the right to carry firearms by
the competent party office do not in addition need a police permit to carry firearms 
or acquire small firearms."(166)
By year's end, Frick had feedback "from the Reich agencies and the Deputy of the 
Führer" and enclosed a semi-final draft. Unless objections were received within three 
weeks, noted Frick, "I will assume that all pertinent
agencies agree with this draft to the weapons law and will submit it to the Reich 
Cabinet for adoption by circulation, since I do not consider it necessary for the 
Cabinet to debate this draft."(167)
The Reich Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Wilhelm Keitel 
responded that "war material" may be acquired only by the permission of his 
agency.(168) This was to make sure that citizens could not obtai
n permits to acquire military firearms, such as ordinary Mauser bolt action rifles.
Final changes were made, and at last Frick could announce: "None of the Reich 
Ministers has filed an objection against the proposal submitted to the members of the 
Reich Government . . . by way of circulation. The Führer
and the Reich Chancellor has approved it and the following is herewith adopted . . . 
."(169)
As adopted, the Hitler-Frick weapons law combined many elements of the 1928 law with 
National Socialist innovations. A license was required to manufacture, assemble, or 
repair firearms and ammunition, or even to reload ca
rtridges. "A license shall not be granted if the applicant, or the persons intended to 
become the commercial or technical managers of the operation of the trade, or any one 
of them, is a Jew."(170) Firms with licenses und
er the 1928 law had to comply with this provision within a year or the license would 
be revoked.(171)
A license was also required to sell firearms as a trade. Again, Jews were 
excluded.(172) Trade in firearms was prohibited at annual fairs, shooting 
competitions, and other events.(173) This would have included traditional
ly-popular events as shooting festivals and gun shows.
Acquisition of a handgun required a Waffenerwerbschein (license to obtain a 
weapon).(174) That did not apply to transfer of a handgun to a shooting range licensed 
by the police for sole use at the range. Exempt were "auth
orities of the Reich," various government entities, and "departments and their 
subdivisions of the National Socialist German Workers' Party designated by the deputy 
of the Führer."(175)
Carrying a firearm required a Waffenschein (license to carry a weapon). The issuing 
authority had complete discretion to limit its validity to a specific occasion or 
locality.(176) The decree further provided:
(1) Licenses to obtain or to carry firearms shall only be issued to persons whose 
reliability is not in doubt, and only after proving a need for them.
(2) Issuance shall especially be denied to: . . .
3. gypsies, and to persons wandering around like gypsies;
4. persons for whom police surveillance has been declared admissible, or upon whom the 
loss of civil rights has been imposed, for the duration of the police surveillance or 
the loss of civil rights;
5. persons who have been convicted of treason or high treason, or against whom facts 
are under consideration which justify the assumption that they are acting in a manner 
inimical to the state . . . .
6. persons who have received final sentence to a punishment of deprivation of liberty 
for more than two weeks . . . for resistance to the authorities of the state . . . 
.(177)
It is noteworthy that, on the face of the law, Jews were not named as automatically 
disqualified. Gypsies were the only ethnic group which did not qualify. It could be 
that the Nazi leadership did not feel confident of th
e support of enough Germans to disarm Jews at this time. Many Jewish men had fought in 
the Great War and retained their side arms.(178) This reluctance would change later 
that year.
For officially-supplied firearms, a license to acquire or carry firearms was not 
required of members of the armed forces, the police, "members of the SS reserve groups 
and the SS skull and cross-bones units [Totenkopfverb
ände],"(179) and the following:
lower echelon leaders of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, from local 
group leaders upwards; of the SA, the SS, and the National Socialist Motor Corps from 
Sturmführer upwards as well as the Hitlerjugend [Hitl
er Youth] from Bannführer upwards, to whom the Deputy of the Führer or an office 
designated by him, granted the right to carry firearms . . . .(180)
Possession of any kind of weapon could be prohibited where "in individual cases a 
person who has acted in an inimical manner toward the state, or it is to be feared 
that he will endanger the public security."(181) This co
uld include any opponent of Nazism or simply any disfavored person.
It was forbidden to manufacture or possess "firearms which are adapted for folding or 
telescoping, shortening, or rapid disassembly beyond the generally usual extent for 
hunting and sporting purposes."(182) Firearms with
silencers or spotlights were prohibited.(183) Finally, .22 caliber rimfire cartridges 
with hollow point bullets were outlawed.(184)
The penalty for willfully or negligently violating the provisions of the law related 
to the carrying of a firearm was up to three-years imprisonment and a fine.(185) A 
fine and indeterminate imprisonment were imposed on a
nyone who violated other provisions of the law or implementing regulations.(186)
The primary Hitler-Frick innovations to the 1928 Weimar law were the exclusion of Jews 
from firearms businesses and the extension of the exceptions to the requirements for 
licenses to obtain and to carry firearms to inclu
de various National Socialist entities, including party members and military and 
police organizations. Although the 1938 law no longer required an acquisition license 
for rifles and shotguns, but only for handguns, any pe
rson could be prohibited from possession of any firearm based on the broad discretion 
of authorities to determine that a person was "acting in a manner inimical to the 
state," had been sentenced "for resistance to the aut
horities of the state,"(187) or "it is to be feared that he will endanger the public 
security."(188) An innovation of the 1938 law was to ban .22 caliber rimfire 
cartridges with hollow point bullets, which were mostly use
d for small game hunting but which can be lethal to humans.
The major features of the Weimar law were retained as particularly suitable for 
Nazism's goals: the requirement of licenses to make and sell firearms, including 
recordkeeping on transferees and police powers to inspect su
ch records; the requirements of licenses to obtain and to carry weapons, and the 
retention by police of the identities of and information on such licensees; the 
provision that "licenses to obtain or to carry firearms shal
l only be issued to persons whose reliability is not in doubt, and only after proving 
a need for them"; the denial of licenses to "persons for whom police surveillance has 
been declared admissible," or who presumably "are
 acting in a manner inimical to the state"; the prohibition on possession of any 
weapon by a person "who has acted in an inimical manner toward the state, or it is to 
be feared that he will endanger the public security";
and the prohibition on firearms with certain features not generally used "for hunting 
and sporting purposes."
Again following the Weimar law, the Hitler-Frick law directed that the Reich Minister 
of the Interior shall issue implementing regulations.(189) Pursuant to that power, on 
March 19, 1938, Frick promulgated extensive regul
ations governing the manufacture, sale, acquisition, and carrying of firearms.(190) 
The regulations began by entrusting the higher administrative authority in the hands 
of the presidents of the governments or highest offi
cials in the various States, except that in Berlin the power was in the hands of the 
Police Chief.(191)
Extensive recordkeeping was required. A manufacturer, which included not only the 
original producer but also a person who assembled firearms in his shop from parts made 
by others, was required to keep a book with each fir
earm identified and its disposition. A handgun seller was obliged to keep books on the 
acquisition and disposition of each handgun. Once a year, the book for the previous 
year was submitted to the police authorities for c
ertification. All records were subject to police inspection on demand. The records 
were to be kept for ten years except that, on discontinuance of business, were 
required to be turned over to the police.(192)
Licenses to obtain or carry firearms, the form of which was prescribed, were issued by 
the district police authority of the residence of the applicant. A firearm acquisition 
permit was valid for one year, and a license to
 carry a specific firearm was valid for three years.(193) When a person obtained the 
handgun authorized by an acquisition permit, the transferor, whether dealer or private 
person, submitted the permit showing the acquisit
ion to the police.(194) Muzzle loading pistols and revolvers, and blank and gas 
firearms were exempt.(195) "Individual exceptions" were now permitted to the 1933 ban 
on importation of handguns.(196) Apparently because the
 law itself covered the subject in detail, the regulations did not mention the 
prohibition on Jews being licensed as manufacturers or sellers or the numerous 
exceptions for government and National Socialist party members.

The Völkische Beobachter, Hitler's newspaper, had this to say about the revised 
weapons law:
The new law is the result of a review of the weapons laws under the aspect of easing 
the previous legal situation in the interest of the German weapons industry without 
creating a danger for the maintenance of public secu
rity.
In the future, the acquisition of weapons will in principle require a police permit 
only when the weapons are pistols or revolvers. No permit will be required for the 
acquisition of ammunition.
The restrictions on the use of stabbing and hitting weapons, restrictions that 
originated at the time of emergency decrees, have basically been revoked. Compared to 
the previous law, the statute also contains a series of
other alleviations. From the remaining numerous new provisions, the basic prohibition 
to sell weapons and ammunition to adolescents below the age of 18 should be 
emphasized. Further, the issuing of permits for the product
ion or commerce with weapons is linked to the possession of German citizenship and to 
the personal reliability and technical fitness [of the applicant]. No permits may be 
given to Jews.(197)
While the above sounds like the new law was deregulatory, the Nazis were masters of 
propaganda. The Berliner Börsenzeitung produced identical commentary, adding the 
following rather ominous language:
The prerequisite for any easing of the applicable weapons law had to be that the 
police authorities would remain able ruthlessly to prevent any unreliable persons from 
acquiring or possessing any weapons. The new law is m
eant to enforce the obvious principle that enemies of the people and the state and 
other elements endangering public security may not possess any weapons. It does so by 
authorizing the police to prohibit such persons from
 acquiring, possessing or carrying weapons of any kind. Since it is possible in this 
way to prevent any weapons possession that the police considers undesirable, the 
authorities were justified to ease the previous restric
tions.(198)
In short, the police determined who could and who could not possess firearms. Aryans 
who were good Nazis could acquire firearms with relative ease. Any possession of 
firearms by a person considered "undesirable" by the po
lice was prohibited. The Nazis thereby imposed on the German people a firearms law 
based on totalitarianism and police-state principles.
IV. KRISTALLNACHT: THE DISARMING OF THE JEWS
On November 7, 1938, Herschel Grynszpan, a 17-year old German Jewish refugee whose 
father had been deported to Poland, went to the German Embassy in Paris intending to 
shoot the ambassador. Instead he shot and mortally wo
unded Ernst vom Rath, the third secretary in the Embassy, who ironically was being 
watched by the Gestapo because he opposed anti-Semitism and Nazism.(199) As the 
following demonstrates, the Nazi hierarchy recognized the
incident as creating a favorable opportunity to disarm Germany's Jewish population.
On the morning of November 9, German newspaper headlines reported variously "Police 
Raid on Jewish Weapons,"(200) "Armed Jews,"(201) "Berlin's Jews were disarmed,"(202) 
"Disarming the Berlin Jews,"(203) and "Surrender of
Weapons by Jews in Berlin, A Measure by the Police President."(204) The articles all 
contained substantially the same text as follows:
In view of the Jewish assassination attempt in the German Embassy in Paris, Berlin's 
Police President made known publicly the provisional results so far achieved, of a 
general disarming of Berlin's Jews by the police, whi
ch has been carried out in recent weeks.
The Police President, in order to maintain public security and order in the national 
capital, and prompted by a few individual incidents, felt compelled to disarm Berlin's 
Jewish population. This measure was recently made
 known to Jews by police stations, whereupon--apart from a few exceptions, in which 
the explicit nature of the ban on possession of weapons had to be articulated-- 
weapons until now found by the police to be in the posses
sion of Jews who have no weapons permit were voluntarily surrendered.
The provisional results clearly show what a large amount of weapons have been found 
with Berlin's Jews and are still to be found with them. To date, the campaign led to 
the taking into custody of 2,569 stabbing and cuttin
g weapons, 1,702 firearms, and about 20,000 rounds of ammunition.
Upon completion of the weapons campaign, if a Jew in Berlin is found still to possess 
a weapon without having a valid weapons permit, the Police President will, in every 
single case, proceed with the greatest severity.(20
5)
The Berlin Police President, Count Wolf Heinrich von Helldorf, apparently announced 
the above results the day before.(206) As noted, the disarming had been carried out in 
"recent weeks" and had been "prompted by a few ind
ividual incidents" which were not specified. Was the disarming an attempt to control 
any resistance to the repressive measures currently underway which motivated 
Grynszpan? Or were they in anticipation of a major pogrom a
gainst Jews just waiting for the proper incident to exploit, which now existed from 
the shooting at the Paris embassy? The disarming meant that Jews could not protect 
themselves from attacks.(207)
The New York Times reported from Berlin that "Nazis Ask Reprisal in Attack on Envoy," 
and that "Berlin Police Head Announces 'Disarming' of Jews--Victim of Shots in 
Critical State."(208) Its account repeated the above sta
tistics from Police President von Helldorf of weapons seized and the announcement that 
"any Jews still found in possession of weapons without valid licenses are threatened 
with the severest punishment."(209)
The attempted assassination was called "a new plot of the Jewish world conspiracy 
against National Socialist Germany," and the German press called for retaliation. 
Recalling David Frankfurter's shooting in 1936 of Nazi le
ader Wilhelm Gustloff in Switzerland, the Börsen Zeitung declared: "International 
Jewry and foreign Jews living in Germany as well will soon feel the consequences that 
the Reich will draw from the fact that for the second
 time in three years 'a Jew has shot.'" The Angriff asked for "the sharpest measures 
against Jews."(210)
Vom Rath died on the 9th, which by coincidence was the "Tag der Bewegung" (Day of the 
Movement), the anniversary of the 1923 Hitler's failed Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. 
Hitler gave his annual speech in the Bürgerbräukelle
r to commemorate and remember the "fallen heroes" who died in the shootout with the 
police.(211) Vom Rath's death was reported to Hitler early that evening while dining 
at Munich's town hall chamber. Hitler turned and spo
ke quietly to Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels.(212) Mentioning localized 
anti-Jewish riots the night before, the Führer stated that the Nazi party was not to 
initiate such demonstrations, but would not intervene to ha
lt "spontaneous" pogroms.(213) Hitler was also overheard to say that "the SA should be 
allowed to have a fling."(214) Goebbels gave a speech calling for revenge with such 
vehemence that the party and police leaders would
discern that they should take an active role.(215)
The telephone orders between chief of staff of the SA Group Nordsee, Roempagel, and 
his superior, were included in a secret SS report prepared the following year.(216) 
Among the instructions Roempagel received were: "All
Jewish stores are to be destroyed immediately by SA men in uniform"; "Jewish 
synagogues are to be set on fire immediately, Jewish symbols are to be safeguarded"; 
"the police must not intervene. The Führer wishes that the
police does not intervene." The following instruction would ensure the success of the 
attacks as well as achieve an ultimate goal: "All Jews are to be disarmed. In the 
event of resistance they are to be shot immediately."
(217)
After 11:55 p.m. on November 9, SS Standartenführer (Colonel) Heinrich Müller sent an 
urgent teleprinter message from Gestapo Headquarters in Berlin to every state police 
bureau in the Reich, alerting them that "demonstra
tions against the Jews, and particularly their synagogues, will take place very 
shortly." The Gestapo was not to interfere, but was to cooperate with the regular 
police to prevent looting and other excesses.(218) The last
 paragraph of Müller's message read:
If, during the actions about to take place, Jews are found in possession of weapons 
the most severe measures are to be applied. The special task units of the SS as well 
as the general SS may be employed for all phases of
the operation. Suitable measures are to be taken to ensure that the Gestapo remains in 
control of the actions under all circumstances.(219)
While Müller ordered "severe measures" against Jews who possessed arms, the SA ordered 
them to be shot.(220) Müller also ordered the arrest of twenty to thirty thousand 
German Jews, which was not mentioned in the SA instr
uctions(221)
As an example of an official communique, the Mayor of Nauen, which is near Berlin, 
reported that at 6:00 a.m. on November 10, the Staatspolizei (Gestapo) communicated 
the following by telephone:
Secret: in consequence of the assassination in the German Embassy in Paris, actions 
against Jews are shortly expected to take place throughout Germany. These actions are 
not to be interfered with. However, looting and the
ft are not to take place. If Jews are found to be in possession of weapons during 
these actions, these Jews should be arrested. I request that the chief administrative 
officers of the States and the majors contact the dis
trict committees in order to agree on the implementation of the demonstrations. Only 
such measures as will not endanger German lives or property are permissible. Arson is 
not permitted on any account. Jewish businesses an
d apartments may be destroyed but not looted. The police should be instructed to 
monitor the implementation of this disorder and to arrest any looters. Jews of foreign 
nationality should not be affected by the actions. Al
l existing archive material should be confiscated from synagogues and business 
premises belonging to the Jewish religious community. Male Jews in possession of 
assets who are of a fairly young age should be arrested. Arre
sted persons should not be mistreated. The actions are to begin immediately. I expect 
an immediate report by telephone.(222)
On the morning of November 10, the following decree appeared in newspapers throughout 
Germany:
Jews Forbidden to Possess Weapons
By Order of SS Reichsführer Himmler
Munich, November 10 [1938]
The SS Reichsführer and German Police Chief has issued the following Order:
Persons who, according to the Nürnberg law, are regarded as Jews, are forbidden to 
possess any weapon. Violaters will be condemned to a concentration camp and imprisoned 
for a period of up to 20 years.(223)
All hell broke loose. The New York Times reported: "Nazis Smash, Loot and Burn Jewish 
Shops and Temples Until Goebbels Calls Halt."(224) In Berlin and throughout Germany, 
thousands of Jewish men, particularly prominent le
aders, were taken from their homes and arrested.(225) The Angriff, Goebbel's organ, 
implored that, "For every suffering, every crime and every injury that this criminal 
[the Jewish community] inflicts on a German anywhere
, every individual Jew will be held responsible."(226) The Times account reported the 
arms prohibition as follows:
Possession of Weapons Barred
One of the first legal measures issued was an order by Heinrich Himmler, commander of 
all German police, forbidding Jews to possess any weapons whatever and imposing a 
penalty of twenty years confinement in a concentratio
n camp upon every Jew found in possession of a weapon hereafter.(227)
The destruction was carried out by Rollkommandos (wrecking crews) under the protection 
of uniformed Nazis or police.(228) However, the people at large generally did not 
participate, and most appeared to be gravely disturb
ed by the attacks.(229) Some members of the public helped Jews leave their stores 
unmolested, but citizens who protested against the attacks on Jews were threatened and 
silenced by the Rollkommandos.(230)
Some personal reminiscences relate experiences on November 10. Yitzhak Herz was in 
charge of the children at the Orphanage in Dinslaken. Early in the morning Herz opened 
the door to two Gestapo officers and a policeman, w
ho announced: "This is a police raid! We are looking for arms in all Jewish homes and 
apartments and so we shall search the orphanage too!" They also searched for money, 
but found nothing, and departed with the order: "No
body is to leave the house before 10 a.m.! All the blinds of the building which face 
the street must be drawn! Shortly after 10 a.m. everything will be over."(231)
Living in a large apartment in Uhlandstrasse in Berlin were the Sinzheimers, a Jewish 
family with two children. The pogrom began while Mr. Sinzheimer was in Paris on 
business. On the evening of November 10, Mrs. Sinzheime
r heard shouting, glass being smashed, and shooting.(232) At around 6:00 a.m., she 
heard over the radio an announcement that any Jew found in possession of a firearm 
would be shot at once. Mrs. Sinzheimer recalled that he
r husband had a handgun, but the fact that he also had a license for it would not 
placate the SA if they found it. She called a friendly repairman to break open the 
secret drawer where the firearm and license were hidden.
 She then placed the handgun and license in a box of cigars and carried it to the 
local police station on the Kurfüstendamm. She asked to see a sergeant who she knew 
well and presented him with the box of cigars. When he
discovered the contents, he exclaimed: "Hurry home, Frau Sinzheimer, before you give 
me a heart attack!"(233)
Victor Klemperer served honorably in Germany's armed forces during World War I and 
retired as a university professor in 1935.(234) A resident of Dresden, his acclaimed 
diary includes the following entry concerning Kristal
lnacht:
On the morning of the eleventh two policemen accompanied by a "resident of Dölzschen." 
Did I have any weapons?-- Certainly my saber, perhaps even my bayonet as a war 
memento, but I wouldn't know where.-- We have to help y
ou find it. -- The house was searched for hours. . . . They rummaged through 
everything, chests and wooden constructions Eva had made were broken open with an ax. 
The saber was found in a suitcase in the attic, the bayone
t was not found. Among the books they found a copy of the Sozialistische Monatshefte 
(Socialist Monthly Magazine--an SPD theoretical journal) [ . . .] this was also 
confiscated.(235)
A "good natured and courteous" young policeman took Klemperer's statement and stated 
that they would have to go to the court building, adding: "There's nothing to fear, 
you will probably (!) be back by evening."(236) Klem
perer asked if he was under arrest. "His reply was good-natured and noncommittal, it 
was only a war memento after all, I would probably be released right away." At the 
court building, a policeman copied Klemperer's statem
ent. After some waiting, a magistrate with a Party badge made out a certificate of 
discharge, without which Klemperer would be arrested again. "At four o'clock I was on 
the street again with the curious feeling, free-but
for how long?"(237)
Some of the Jews whose homes were searched for arms and ransacked were foreign 
nationals, leading to diplomatic protests. The following Gestapo report concerning the 
complaint of Mrs. Gertrude Dawson, a British citizen re
siding in Döbling, did not deny the systematic vandalism:
Given the sometimes high degree of agitation of the national comrades during the 
action against the Jews it is no longer possible to determine which persons 
participated in the riots. That also explains why there was litt
le success in the clarification of the facts, even though the investigations were 
conducted with vigor.
Several persons who were in Mrs. Dawson's apartment explained that they had orders to 
search for weapons. But it is impossible to determine the details about the damage to 
the furniture, etc.(238)
The anti-Jewish pogrom extended into Austria, which Germany had annexed earlier that 
year. Arson was committed against Vienna's temples, and Nazis attacked Jewish 
businesses. The New York Times reported: "Thousands of Jew
s had their dwellings searched for concealed arms, documents and money. The police 
claim to have found quantities of them . . . ."(239)
An incident in Vienna became the subject of a Gestapo report, which alleged the 
following about, Henry Coren, a British citizen:
During the action of 10 November 1938 against Jews, the apartment of stateless retiree 
Hermann . . . was searched and a loaded revolver belonging to his son in law, Henry 
Coren, who was living with him was found. The weap
on was hidden in a suitcase belonging to Coren. Based on these facts, three SA men 
belonging to the local group Fuchsröhren of the NSDAP took Mr. and Mrs. Coren, as well 
as Hermann, to a collection point at Rinnböckstrass
e. There, their personal information, etc. was written down. When it was determined 
that Mr. and Mrs. Coren had British citizenship, they were released immediately.
After the SA men had taken Mr. and Mrs. Coren and Hermann to the collection point, the 
local group asked them to also fetch Mrs. Hermann who had stayed back in the 
apartment. The men therefore returned to the Coren apartm
ent and asked Mrs. Hermann to get dressed to go out and be interrogated. Mrs. Hermann 
then went to a room on the side for about 2 minutes and changed.(240)
Coren claimed that SA men stole 3,400 Reichsmark from the apartment, and the British 
Consulate General filed a protest. The Gestapo found the suspicion unfounded because 
the SA men "adamantly deny the allegation" and beca
use "it was not possible to interrogate Coren about the matter because he fled the 
Reich on 30 November 1938. This fact also is an indication that Coren was not saying 
the truth."(241) For Coren, however, discretion must
have been the better part of valor.
On November 11, Interior Minister Frick promulgated the Verordnung gegen der 
Waffenbesitz der Juden (Regulation Against Jews' Possession of Weapons).(242) Its 
preamble recites that it was issued pursuant to § 31 of the 19
38 Weapons Law, which in turn empowered the Interior Minister to issue "the necessary 
legal and administrative regulations for the implementation and fulfillment of this 
Law." § 1 of the new regulation provided:
Jews (§ 5 of the First Regulations of the German Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935 
. . .) are prohibited from acquiring, possessing, and carrying firearms and 
ammunition, as well as cutting or stabbing weapons. Those n
ow having in their possession weapons and ammunition must at once surrender them to 
the local police authority.(243)
Foreign Jews could be exempted by the Interior Minister or delegate.(244)
As to the property, § 2 stated: "Weapons and ammunition found in a Jew's possession 
will be forfeited to the Reich without compensation." As to the person in violation, § 
4 provided: "Whoever willfully or negligently viol
ates the provisions of § 1 shall be punished with imprisonment and a fine. In 
especially severe cases of deliberate violations, the punishment is imprisonment in a 
penitentiary for up to five years." The regulation was ap
plicable in Germany, Austria, and the Sudentenland.(245)
There were about 550,000 Jews in those jurisdictions. The number of Jews arrested 
during the rampage was approximately 30,000 males aged 16-80.(246)
The Berliner Börsen Zeitung published the regulation under the headline: "The Weapons 
Ban for the Jews: A National Law--Imprisonment and Penitentiary compared with 
Protective Custody."(247) Referring respectively to Himml
er's earlier decree and to Frick's new regulation, it stated: "According to the SS 
Reichsführer and Chief of the German Police in the National Ministry of the Interior, 
Jewish possession of Weapons, already ended abruptly
 by police regulations, is now immediately followed by a legal ban. The National 
Minister of the Interior yesterday issued the following Regulations against weapons 
possession by the Jews . . . ."(248) Following the text
of the regulation, the article noted:
"National Minister Dr. Goebbels has made known, as we already reported, that the final 
answer to the Jewish assassination attempt in Paris would be given to Jewry in the 
form of legislation or in the form of regulations.
For the first of these replies it has not been necessary to wait long!"(249)
The Völkische Beobachter published a lengthy official commentary on the new 
prohibition against firearm possession by Jews and its relation to the 1938 Weapons 
Law. The author was a Dr. Ehaus, a Senior Executive Officer (
Regierungsrat). It is reproduced in full below.(250)
Explanation of the Ordinance against the Possession of Weapons
The preliminary police decree issued by the Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the 
German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, which immediately after the 
assassination in Paris had prohibited persons considered Je
ws under the Nürnberg laws to possess any weapons, has been followed within a very 
short period of time by an ordinance which settles the prohibition of weapons for Jews 
for good. In order to make those concerned understa
nd the extent of this law, it is necessary to explain the few paragraphs of the 
ordinance of November 11, 1938 in more detail.
To begin with, we need to note that the preventive activity of the Security Police 
will not be limited by the rules prohibiting Jews from possessing weapons. The 
security measures ordered by the Reichsführer SS and the Ch
ief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry for the Interior will remain in force. 
§ 1 prohibits any and all Jews from acquiring, possessing or carrying firearms or 
ammunition, as well as weapons for hitting or stabbin
g. § 5 of the First Ordinance to the Reich Citizen Law of November 14, 1935 is 
mentioned in parentheses. That is only meant to point out that the issue of who is 
Jewish should be settled by using the standard of the Nürnb
erg law. Of course, not only German Jews of the Reich, but also all foreign Jews (Jews 
with foreign citizenship and Jews without citizenship) are subject to the ordinance.
The new ordinance makes reference to § 31 of the Weapons Law of March 18, 1938. From 
that it can be concluded that the definitions for firearms, ammunition, and weapons 
for stabbing or hitting of § 1 of the Weapons Law ap
ply. According to that, firearms are weapons that allow a projectile to travel through 
a barrel propelled by gas or air pressure; weapons for hitting or stabbing are weapons 
that by their nature are meant to inflict injur
ies by hitting or stabbing.
It is remarkable is that muzzle loaders, rifle models of antique design, blank 
cartridge firearms, gas, stun and dummy weapons [Scheintodwaffen], gallery rifles, 
parlor rifles, small caliber rifles, small caliber sports r
ifles and spring guns fall under the term "firearm." Ammunition means not only 
finished ammunition for firearms, but also gunpowder of any kind. In order to prevent 
any circumvention of the Weapons Law, finished or pre-fa
bricated essential parts of firearms or ammunition are given the same status as 
finished firearms or finished ammunition (§ 1, paragraph 3 of the Weapons Law).
We have already mentioned what the term "weapons for hitting or stabbing" means. Even 
though the legal provisions are clear enough, we shall list such individual weapons 
one more time: daggers and stilettoes; swords, sabe
rs, bayonets, fencing foils and students' rapiers; sword canes and defense canes 
(canes with metal spirals, wire cable or truncheon); clubs, steel rods and horsewhips; 
brass knuckles, iron rods and fighting rings; weapon
rings, deer knives, and hunting knives. It will depend on each individual case whether 
lockable folding knives or fixed knives that cannot be folded have to be considered 
weapons. Knives with a handle will then have the n
ature of a weapon when their size and design show that they were meant to serve the 
purpose of a dagger.
The Jews must be warned that they should interpret the new ordinance and the already 
existing Weapons Law strictly. Otherwise they will have to expect severe penalties 
pursuant to § 4 and, if applicable, protective custod
y. When following the order spelled out in § 1 of the new ordinance to immediately 
turn over all of the weapons and ammunition to the local police authority, the Jews 
must make sure that no weapons whatsoever are left beh
ind with them.
One thing in particular should be pointed out: Any Jew who, after this ordinance 
forbidding the possession of weapons by Jews has become effective, destroys, gives 
away or otherwise disposes of a weapon, that action viola
tes § 1, sentence 2, and § 4 of the ordinance. He should have turned in the weapon 
immediately. As for the rest, he did not have the right to dispose of the weapon 
anymore because pursuant to § 2 weapons and ammunition in
 the possession of a Jew become the property of the Reich, without compensation. That 
means that with the entering into force of this ordinance all of the weapons in the 
possession of Jews have become the property of the
German Reich.
§ 3 of the aforesaid ordinance provides exceptions for Jews with foreign citizenship. 
Of course, those Jews too must immediately fulfill their duty to turn in their 
weapons. Their weapons too have become the property of t
he Reich. Should their request to be exempt from the prohibition be granted, the 
property they lost will be returned to them.
The punishment provided by the ordinance against weapons possession by the Jews goes 
beyond that provided by the Weapons Law. As the assassination in Paris shows, the 
German ethnic community has a strong interest in disar
ming all Jews living within the boundaries of the Reich. By providing for severe 
prison and penitentiary terms, the State will discourage all Jews from violating its 
laws enacted to protect the German people. Where even s
uch punishment has no effect, the authorities of the Security Police will ensure full 
compliance with the authority of the Reich.
It is particularly encouraging that today, when we are reaching the end of the year 
1938, we were able to extend the prohibition of weapons possession by the Jews to the 
Ostmark and the Sudetenland regions. The protection
 that we are able to offer to our German brothers in the regained regions becomes 
particularly clear in § 6 of the ordinance of November 11, 1938.
Dr. Ehaus, Senior Executive Officer
A Berlin Jewish scientist told a reporter how at 6:00 a.m. on November 12, a Nazi 
official in a brown uniform and four assistants in mufti took him from his home, only 
to order him back home.(251) Many of his friends who
were arrested were not so lucky. The home of one friend was searched for weapons by 
six men, who broke the china and smashed furniture. The scientist related: "Only one 
thing they had missed--an old army revolver which wa
s lying in a drawer of a table in my friend's bedroom. That rusted weapon, probably 
fired for the last time in 1918, might have gotten him twenty years in a concentration 
camp."(252)
The American Consulate in Stuttgart reported to U.S. Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson in 
Berlin on November 12 that "the Jews of Southwest Germany have suffered vicissitudes 
during the last three days which would seem unreal to
one living in an enlightened country during the twentieth century . . . ." The 
Consulate's office was flooded with Jews begging for visas or immigration assistance 
for themselves and families. He wrote: "Men in whose home
s old, rusty revolvers had been found during the last few days cried aloud that they 
did not dare ever again return to their places of residence or business. In fact, it 
was a mass of seething, panic-stricken humanity."(2
53)
Searches for weapons in Jewish homes and arrests generally continued. Jews who still 
had wealth, despite the recent campaigns to deprive them of their property, were 
pinpointed.(254)
The Decree on an Atonement Fine for Jews with German Citizenship (November 12, 1938) 
levied Jews with one billion reichsmarks as payment to the German Reich for the 
destruction caused by the Nazis.(255) Ordered by Field M
arshal Göring in his capacity as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, this was 
enforceable because a registry of all Jewish property had been compiled six months 
previously.(256) (Similarly, the order prohibiting Jews fro
m possession of arms under penalty of imprisonment and "protective custody" was more 
enforceable because of the firearms registry laws.)(257) Jews were ordered to repair 
all damage that had been done to businesses and hom
es on November 8-10, and the Reich confiscated Jewish insurance claims. Jews were 
excluded from economic activity in the Reich by the year's end.(258)
A Swiss newspaper reported from Berlin on November 11 under the headline "Numerous 
Arrests?" the following:
Last night the Gestapo started to arrest Jews in Berlin and in other German cities. 
Most of those arrested were respected Jewish personalities. At a reception for the 
press, the Reich Minister for Propaganda [Goebbels] de
nied that there had been any arrests; when asked again later, however, [his office] 
said that the arrests had been made in connection with Himmler's decree prohibiting 
Jews from owning arms. The explanation given was that
 the Jews had retained weapons even though the Chief of the German police in his 
latest decree had threatened to punish them with protective detention of 20 years.(259)
Reporting from Frankfurt, the British Counsel observed that for several days beginning 
on the evening of November 10, SS troopers and Gestapo agents intruded into Jewish 
homes to conduct searches and seizures. If any arms
 or a large sum of money were found, the occupants were arrested for illegal 
possession of arms or for hoarding funds.(260)
French and Swiss newspapers saw Kristallnacht as the culmination of earlier 
anti-Semitic measures of the Reich and as "premeditated destruction":
To illuminate the recent events one now better understands the special liabilities 
imposed on the Jews in recent times. Events since last June make clear the obvious 
methods of their measures. They have simplified the des
truction. One method was to confiscate their arms from them, rendering the operation 
without danger. The other demanded from them a formal declaration of assets (currency, 
jewelry, pieces of furniture, carpets), which fac
ilitated the confiscation thereof. All was ready.(261)
As for the shooting in the German Embassy in Paris which was the excuse for the 
rampage and the disarming of the Jews, the father of vom Rath, the deceased diplomat, 
said to his Jewish neighbor: "My dear Reverend, neither
 you nor any other Jew is responsible for this. I think my son was assassinated on 
orders. He spoke too much and a hired assassin killed him."(262)
A month after the pogrom, the Gestapo in Munich issued a memorandum to the police, 
commissars, and mayors concerning the regulation requiring Jews to surrender all 
weapons. It also explained how the regulation was to be i
mplemented:
All weapons of all kinds in the possession of Jews are forfeited to the Reich without 
payment of compensation and must be surrendered.
This includes all firearms including alarm (starter) pistols and all cutting and 
stabbing weapons including the fixed blade if like a dagger.
Requests by emigrating Jews to have their weapons returned to them shall not be 
granted.
A list shall be made of all weapons that belonged to Jews and the list shall be sent 
to this office by January 5, 1939. The weapons shall be well packaged and, if in small 
numbers, sent as parcel, and if in larger numbers
, by freight.
Because this will have to be reported to the Gestapo office in Berlin, this deadline 
will absolutely have to be observed.(263)
Thus, over a period of several weeks, Germany's Jews had been disarmed. The process 
was carried out both by following a combination of legal forms and by sheer lawless 
violence. The Nazi hierarchy could now more comfortab
ly deal with the Jewish question without fear of resistance.
V. AFTERWORD: PRECLUDING ARMED GERMAN RESISTANCE TO NAZISM
The disarming of the Jews made any possible individual or collective resistance in the 
future impossible. After Kristallnacht, the historical record does not reflect that 
German Jews unlawfully obtained or used arms as to
ols of resistance. In fact, the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland (National 
Representative Organization of Jews in Germany), the German-Jewish leadership, 
insisted that Jewish activities be legal. Militant resista
nce was rejected as futile and provocative of reprisals.(264) The Reichsvertretung did 
sanction the financing of escapes by opening illegal bank accounts,(265) but it also 
helped to register Jews selected for deportation
and to ensure transportation arrangements for deportees.(266)
Yet it is a myth, observes Arnold Paucker, that Jews did not resist Nazism. Most Jews 
capable of bearing arms came forward, wherever possible, to fight either in regular 
armies or as partisans in every European country.(2
67) The exception was in Germany, where "there was virtually no armed resistance of 
any sort, and thus no armed Jewish resistance either."(268) German Jews could not be 
faulted for not instigating military adventurism.(26
9) Paucker does not speculate on how the course of history could have been altered had 
German opponents of Nazism, including both Jews and non-Jews, been better armed, more 
unified, and ideologically more inclined to resi
stance.
After Hitler launched World War II by attacking Poland in 1939, many Germans blamed 
him for failing to spare Germany an armed conflict. Anti-Nazi sentiment existed. 
Opined the London Times: "All this does not imply that G
ermany is ready for a revolution. Civilians are disarmed, and so powerless . . . 
."(270) Germans generally longed for, it was asserted, the return of legality, 
freedom, and human dignity.(271)
When the Nazis conquered France (as in other countries), they proclaimed that failure 
of civilians to surrender all firearms within 24 hours would be punishable with the 
death penalty, and they executed many who failed to
 comply.(272) The New York Times observed:
The best way to sum up the disciplinary laws imposed upon France by the German 
conqueror is to say that the Nazi decrees reduce the French people to as low a 
condition as that occupied by the German people. Military order
s now forbid the French to do things which the German people have not been allowed to 
do since Hitler came to power. To own radio senders or to listen to foreign 
broadcasts, to organize public meetings and distribute pamp
hlets. to disseminate anti-German news in any form, to retain possession of 
firearms--all these things are prohibited for the subjugated people of France, as they 
have been verboten these half dozen years to the people of
 Germany.(273)
Even with the glorious victory over France, it could not be that the German people 
were fully behind the Führer, as the negative answer to the following rhetorical 
question made clear: "will Hitler now abolish the Gestapo
 and set up a free press?"(274)
Nor would the Nazis trust ordinary German firearm owners. In addition to the law and 
regulations already in place, a secret Gestapo order in 1941 established a system of 
central registration of persons obtaining firearms
other than military officers, police, and political leaders. An implementing directive 
stated:
On order of the Reich Security Main Office, Berlin, the Head Office of the State 
Police in Munich is in charge of the supervision and control of the sale of weapons 
and ammunition in your district.
The Rural District Administrators, as well as the Mayors and Mayors of former primary 
district towns in Upper Bavaria shall therefore record
Monthly (beginning on February 10, 1941), all persons who have acquired firearms from 
arms dealers requiring a permit or who have submitted a request for a permit to 
acquire firearms if the request was granted by the resp
onsible authority. This also applies to cases where the firearm was not acquired from 
an arms dealer. The record shall contain first and last names (for women also their 
maiden name), occupation, date and place of birth,
as well as exact street address; further, the type and serial number of the weapon.
All persons who purchased ammunition for firearms from weapons dealers requiring a 
permit. Besides the personal information required, the type of the ammunition shall be 
listed.
Exempt from the compulsory registration are persons acquiring firearms or ammunition 
or submitting requests for weapons permits, if they are members of the military with 
the rank of officer, leaders of SS Verfügungstruppe
 [SS Special Assignment Troops], police officers, or political leaders beginning with 
the rank of Ortsgruppenführer [community group leader] and up; likewise, persons who 
acquire hunting weapons or ammunition are not subj
ect to compulsory registration.
It appears advisable to have the weapons dealers monitored and checked by the 
executing police. Separate records shall be kept for each kind of weapons 
transaction.(275)
The existence of firearms regulations providing for records on all individuals 
lawfully possessing firearms, coupled with searches and seizures of firearms from the 
houses of potential dissidents, guaranteed that firearms
 would be possessed only by supporters of Nazism. These firearms policies made it far 
easier to exterminate any opposition, Jews, and unpopular groups.
German resistors were different than their European counterparts in that there was no 
maquis or partisan force.(276) The German resistance to Hitler was not characterized 
by any armed popular movements or uprisings agains
t the Nazi regime. Lone individuals or small military cliques with firearms or bombs 
sought to kill Hitler himself.(277) Heroic as these attempts were, how might the 
course of history been different had Germany (not to me
ntion the countries Germany would occupy) been a country where large numbers of 
citizens owned firearms without intrusive legal restrictions and where the right to 
keep and bear arms was a constitutional guarantee?(278)
Instead of an armed partisan opposition, there were only individual attempts on 
Hitler's life, three of them in 1939. Colonel-General Franz Halder of the Chief of 
Staff repeatedly visited Hitler with a pistol in his pocke
t to shoot the dictator, but Halder could not bring himself to do it.(279) Georg 
Elser, a private citizen, set off a bomb at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich, but Hitler 
finished his speech and left before the explosion, an
d Elser was apprehended while attempting to escape over the Swiss border.(280) Swiss 
theology student Maurice Bavaud got almost close enough to shoot Hitler with a 
handgun, but was caught and executed.(281)
Then there was the White Rose, a student resistance group which had no ambition to 
take arms. However, member Sophie Scholl told a school friend in 1942 that, "If I had 
a pistol and I were to meet Hitler in the street, I'
d shoot him down. If men can't manage it, then a woman should."(282) The friend 
replied, "But then he'd be replaced by Himmler, and after Himmler, another."(283) 
Scholl rejoined, "One's got to do something to get rid of t
he guilt."(284) Before long, the White Rose students were rounded up by the Gestapo 
and guillotined.(285)
On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg set off a bomb to kill Hitler at 
Wolf's Lair. The plan was to mobilize the Reserve Army and stage a coup in Berlin 
against the Nazi regime. Hitler survived the blast and th
e plotters were executed.(286) Thousands more would be rounded up and killed.(287)
In May 1944, Nazi radio broadcast that 1,400,000 German civilians had been trained in 
the use of rifles and revolvers to defend the Reich. The New York Times quipped: "It 
is significant that the guarded statement by the G
erman radio does not admit that civilians have been armed, but merely that they have 
been instructed in marksmanship and the handling of small arms."(288) A totalitarian 
police state would never trust the people with arms
.
Three million Germans were imprisoned for political reasons in the years 1933 to 1945, 
and tens of thousands were executed. "These numbers reveal the potential for popular 
resistance in German society--and what happened t
o it."(289) The same could be said about the far larger numbers of victims of the 
Holocaust and the mass killings of unarmed peoples of the countries occupied by the 
Nazis. Once again, what might have been the course of h
istory had firearm ownership been more prevalent and protected as a constitutional 
right?
Such questions have never been discussed in scholarly publications because the Nazi 
laws, policies, and practices have never been adequately documented. The record 
establishes that a well-meaning liberal republic would en
act a gun control act that would later be highly useful to a dictatorship. That 
dictatorship could then consolidate its power by massive search and seizure operations 
against political opponents, under the hysterical ruse
 that such persons were "Communist" firearm owners. It could enact its own new 
firearms law, disarming anyone the police deemed "dangerous" and exempting members of 
the party that controlled the state. It could exploit a
tragic shooting of a government official to launch a pogrom, under the guise that 
Jewish firearm owners were dangerous and must be disarmed. This dictatorship could, 
generally, disarm the people of the nation it governed
and then disarm those of every nation it conquered.
The above experiences influenced perceptions of fundamental rights in both the United 
States and Germany. Before entering the war, America reacted to the events in Europe 
in a characteristic manner. Seeing the Nazi threat
 and its policies, Congress passed the Property Requisition Act of 1941 authorizing 
the President to requisition certain property for defense, but prohibiting any 
construction of the act to "require the registration of an
y firearms possessed by any individual for his personal protection or sport" or "to 
impair or infringe in any manner the right of any individual to keep and bear 
arms."(290)
Today, Germany's Grundgesetz (Basic Law) includes the following provision: "When other 
avenues are not open, all Germans have the right to resist attempts to impose 
unconstitutional authority."(291) If the Nazi experience
 teaches anything, it teaches that totalitarian governments will attempt to disarm 
their subjects so as to extinguish any ability to resist crimes against humanity.
1. © Copyright 2000 by Stephen P. Halbrook. All rights reserved. The author holds a 
Ph.D. from Florida State University and a J.D. from Georgetown University. Located in 
Fairfax, Virginia, he litigates constitutional law
issues in the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. His recent books include 
Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876 (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Target Switzerland: Swiss Arm
ed Neutrality in World War II (New York: Sarpedon, 1998); Die Schweiz im Visier 
(Verlage Novalis Schaffhausen/Rothenhäusler Stäfa, CH, 1999); and La Suisse encerclée 
(Geneva: Editions Slatkine, 2000). The author wishes to
 acknowledge Therese Klee Hathaway for her assistance in German translations and the 
following for their research assistance: Katya Andrusz, Jay Simkin, Lisa 
Halbrook-Stevenson, Heather Barry, and Dave Fischer.
2. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
3. Hitler's Secret Conversations, trans. Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (New York: 
Signet Books, 1961), 403.
4. "But if watering down is the mode of the day, I would prefer to water down the 
Second Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
152 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "There is no rea
son why all pistols should not be barred to everyone but the police." Id. at 150-51.
5. Besides gun control, the Nazis were supposedly ahead of their time in such 
socially-responsible causes as the eradication of tobacco use. Robert N. Proctor, The 
Nazi War on Cancer (Princeton University Press, 1999).
6. U.S. Const., Amend. II.
7. On the history of this right, see this author's That Every Man Be Armed: The 
Evolution of a Constitutional Right (University of New Mexico Press 1984; reprint 
Independent Institute 1994); A Right to Bear Arms: State an
d Federal Bills of Rights and Constitutional Guarantees (Greenwood Press 1989).
8. Infra, passim.
9. See David B. Kopel, "Lethal Laws," N.Y. Law School Jour. of International & 
Comparative Law 15 (1995); Don B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby, "Of Genocide and 
Disarmament," 86 Criminal Law & Criminology 297 (1995). Although
the disarming of the Jews as a prelude to and in the course of the Holocaust does not 
appear to be the subject of any historical study, numerous excellent studies have been 
published on armed Jewish resistance in the Nazi
-occupied countries. E.g., Simha Rotem (Kazik), Memoirs of a Warsaw Ghetto Fighter and 
the Past Within Me (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Anny Latour, The Jewish 
Resistance in France, 1940-1944 (New York: Holoca
ust Library, 1970).
10. Robert G.L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 
1918-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), passim.
11. Id. at 59-71.
12. Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, Nr. 7, 31, § 1.
13. Id. § 3.
14. Reichsgesetzblatt 1928, I, 143, 147, § 34(1).
15. Waite, supra note 10, at 72-3, citing Vorwärts, March 10, 1919 (morning edition).
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id. at 73 & n. 42, citing Freiheit, March 18, 1919.
18. Id. at 73.
19. Id. at 84-87.
20. Id. at 91-92, quoting Rudolf Mann, Mit Ehrhardt durch Deutschland, Erinnerungen 
eines Mitkämpfers von der 2. Marinebrigade (Berlin, 1921), 71-72.
21. Id. at 172-81.
22. Id. at 182, quoting Maximilian Scheer ed., Blut und Ehre (Paris 1937), 43.
23. Id. at 182, 194-95, 200-01.
24. Id. at 268, 281.
25. Reichsgesetzblatt 1920, Nr. 169, I, pp. 1553-57, §§ 1, 7.
26. Id. § 2.
27. Id. § 6.
28. Id. § 4.
29. A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), 81-104. This 
work was originally published under a pen name as Der bewaffnete Aufstand (1928).
30. Id. At 194-95.
31. Reichsgesetzblatt 1928, I, 143. A reprint of the German text with English 
translation is available in Jay Simkin and Aaron Zelman, "Gun Control": Gateway to 
Tyranny (Milwaukee, WI: Jews for the Preservation of Firearm
s Ownership, 1992), 15-25.
32. Id. § 2(1).
33. Id. § 5.
34. Id. § 7.
35. Id. § 10(1).
36. Id. § 10(3)1.
37. Id. § 11.
38. Id. § 15.
39. Id. § 16(1).
40. Id. § 16(2).
41. Id. § 17.
42. Id. § 23.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 24.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 25.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 26.
50. Id. § 27.
51. Id. § 34(1), citing Reichsgesetzblatt, 1919, Nr. 7, 31.
52. Reichskommissar Kuenzer, "Das Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition," Deutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, April 13, 1928, 1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (referring to Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, Nr. 7, 31).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Reichsgesetzblatt 1928, I, 143, § 33.
71. For descriptions of these rifle models, see Edward Clinton Ezell, Small Arms of 
the World (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983), 501-503.
72. Id. (referring to Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, Nr. 7, 31).
73. Id.
74. Reichskommissar Kuenzer, "Das Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition," Deutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, April 13, 1928, 1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Ausführungsverordnung zu dem Gesetz über Schusswaffen und Munition, 14 Juli 1928, 
Reichsgesetzblatt 1928, I, 197. Reprinted in Jay Simkin and Aaron Zelman, supra note , 
at 27.
78. Id. § 12.
79. Id. § 14(3).
80. Id. § 10.
81. "Razzia in Charlottenburg," Der Bund (Bern), Feb. 2, 1933 (evening edition).
82. New York Times, Mar. 1, 1933, 11.
83. Id.
84. Hans B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill 
Hitler (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 3-36.
85. "Reichsverordnung zum Schutz von Volk und Staat" (Ordinance of the Reich President 
for the Protection of the People and the State), Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, I, 83, § 1.
86. Id. § 5.
87. New York Times, Mar. 1, 1933, 11.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Der Reichsminister Des Innern, An die Landesregierungen, I A 2130/1.3, 1 March 
1933. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, München [hereafter "BHStA"], MA 106312.
93. Der Bund (Bern), Mar. 3, 1933, 3.
94. "Anflage gegen 9 Kommunisten," Völkische Beobachter, Mar. 4, 1933.
95. Wilhelm Willers, 12 March 1933. BHStA, MA 105475.
96. New York Times, Mar. 13, 1933, 6.
97. New York Times, Mar. 12, 1933, 19.
98. New York Times, Mar. 15, 1933, 11.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. New York Times, Mar. 20, 1933, 1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. New York Times, Mar. 21, 1933, 10.
106. Id.
107. New York Times, Mar. 24, 1933, 1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Zur Verordnung des kommisarischen bayer. Innenministers vom 24.3.33. über 
Wehrverbände. BHStA, LRA Bad Tölz 133992, No2501c51.
113. Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 15-16.
114. Hans B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill 
Hitler (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 103, 148-49.
115. Id. at 608.
116. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1990), 157, 226.
117. Staätsministerium des Innern. An 1. die Regierungen, KdJ. [et al.], Betreff: 
Vollzug der Verordnung über die Ablieferung der Militärwaffen, 28 March 1933. BHStA, 
LRA Bad Tölz 133992, No. 2501c51.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Betraff: Ablieferung der Militärwaffen, 29 March 1933. BHStA, LRA Bad Tölz 
133992, No. 572.
124. Id.
125. New York Times, Apr. 5, 1933, 10.
126. Id.
127. Since it was Berlin's Jewish quarter, the Scheunenviertel would become the site 
of the 1938 anti-Jewish pogrom which changed the "Communist weapon" scare to the 
"Jewish weapon" scare described below. Time Out Berlin
(London: Penguin Group, 1998), 53-54. This area of Berlin has been renovated and the 
Neue Synagogue on Oranienburger Street rebuilt since the reunification of Germany in 
1989. Id.
128. "Gross Razzia im Scheunenviertel," Völkische Beobachter, Apr. 5, 1933.
129. Id.
130. Reichsgesetzblatt 1928, I, 143, § 23.
131. New York Times, Apr. 23, 1933, 1.
132. Der Reichsminister des Innern, Betrifft: Einfuhr von Schusswaffen, I A 8310/24.4, 
31 May 1933. Bundesarchiv Berlin [hereafter "BA Berlin"], R 43 II/399, Fiche 1, Row 1.
133. Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, I, 367.
134. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single 
German Town 1922-1945 (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1984), 184-86.
135. Id. at 186.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 191.
138. Id. at 192.
139. The Security Police comprised the criminal police and the Gestapo (State Secret 
Police). Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 15-16.
140. Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, I, 265.
141. Anton Gill, An Honourable Defeat: A History of German Resistance to Hitler, 
1933-1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 19-20.
142. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1988), 1133, 1141-43.
143. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 367-68.
144. Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: Vol. 1 The Years of Persecution, 
1933-1939 (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1997), 18.
145. Id. at 26-27, 119.
146. Des Reichsminister des innern, Betrifft: Schußwaffengesetz, I A 6310/19.6, 7 July 
1933. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 1, Row 2.
147. Ch. 1, § 3(1). Der Reichskanzler; Der Reichsminister des Innern, Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Aenderung des Schußwaffenrechts, Re: I A 6310/4, 11 November 1933. BA 
Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 1, Row 3.
148. Id.
149. Zu Reichsministerialsache, Betriff: Reichsminister des Innern: Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Anderung des Schußwaffenrechts, 1 December 1933. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, 
Fiche 1, Row 4.
150. Id.
151. Zu Reichsministerialsache, Betriff: Reichsminister des Innern: Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Anderung des Schußwaffenrechts, [1 December 1933?]. BA Berlin, R 43 
II/399, Fiche 1, Row 4.
152. Id.
153. Ch. II, § 3(3). Der Reichs- und Preußische Minister des Innern, An a) die Herren 
Reichsminister [et al.], I A 13258/6310, 12 November 1935. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, 
Fiche 1, Row 6.
154. Id.
155. Id., Row 7, p. 3.
156. Id., p. 4-5.
157. Id.
158. Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: Vol. 1 The Years of Persecution, 
1933-1939 (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1997), 141-42.
159. Reichsgesetzblatt 1935, I, 1333, § 5 (Nov. 14, 1935).
160. Der Reichs- und Preußische Minister des Innern, An a) die Herren Reichsminister 
[et al.], I A 13258/6310, 12 November 1935. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 1, Row 6, at 
4-5.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Bayerische Politische Polizei, Waffenscheinen an Juden, 5 February 1936. BHStA, 
B.Nr.51722.
163. Der Reichs- und Preußiscsche Minister des Innern, Betrifft: Entwurf des 
Waffengesetzes, 7 January 1936. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 2, Row 3.
164. Abschrift.Der Reichs- und Preuszische Minister des Innern, Betrifft: 
Waffengesetz, Nr. I A 13480/6310, 16 January 1937. BA Berlin, Aktenbandes 0056, S. 145.
165. Der Reichs- und Preußiscsche Minister des Innern, Mit Beziehung auf mein 
Schreiben vom 7. Januar 1936. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 2, Row 3.
166. Begründung, No. I A 13258/6310, [5 May 1937?]. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 1, 
Row 7 - R 43 II/399, Fiche 2, Row 1.
167. Der Reichs und Breußisch Minister des Innern, An a) die Herren Reichsminister [et 
al.], 18 December 1937. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 2, Row 7.
168. Der Reichskriegsminister und Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Betrifft: Entwurf 
des Waffengesetzes, 15 January 1938. BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 3, Row 3.
169. Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei, An der Herrn Reichs, 4 March 1938. 
BA Berlin, R 43 II/399, Fiche 3, Row 6.
170. Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, I, 265, § 3. This relies on the English translation in 
Federal Firearms Legislation, Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile 
Delinquency, Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong
., 2d Sess., 489 (1968). Another translation is in Jay Simkin and Aaron Zelman, "Gun 
Control": Gateway to Tyranny (Milwaukee, Wis.: Jews for the Preservation of Firearms 
Ownership, 1992), 53.
171. Id. § 29(1).
172. Id. § 7.
173. Id. § 9.
174. Id. § 11.
175. Id. § 12.
176. Id. § 14.
177. Id. § 15.
178. E.g., Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness 1933-1941, trans. Martin Chalmers 
(New York: The Modern Library, 1999), xi, xiv, 275. In 1933, the head of the Reich 
Association of Jewish War Veterans actually sent a copy
 of a memorial book with the names of 12,000 Jewish German soldiers killed in World 
War I to Hitler, who acknowledged receipt with "sincerest feelings." Saul Friedländer, 
Nazi Germany and the Jews: Vol. 1 The Years of Per
secution, 1933-1939 (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1997), 15. In fact, 
Jewish participation was in proportion to the rest of the German population. Id. at 
75. Jewish service in the armed forces was not banned
 until 1935. Id. at 117.
179. Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, I, 265, § 18.
180. Id. § 19.
181. Id. § 23.
182. Id. § 25.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. § 26.
186. Id. § 27.
187. Id. § 16.
188. Id. § 23.
189. Id. § 31.
190. 0 Verordnung zur Durchführung des Waffengesetz, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, I, 270. 
For a side-by-side comparison of the Nazi law and regulations and the United States 
Gun Control Act of 1968 and regulations, see Simkin
and Zelman, supra note , at 83-107.
191. Id. § 1. An English translation is available in Federal Firearms Legislation, 
Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Senate Judiciary 
Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 496-503 (1968), an
d the German text and English translation are in Simkin and Zelman, supra note , at 
64-75.
192. Id. §§ 15-19.
193. Id. at Anlage (Appendix) I & II.
194. Id. § 25.
195. Id. § 20.
196. Verordnung zur Durchführung des Waffengesetz, Abschnitt III
197. "Ein neues Waffengesetz," Völkische Beobachter, Mar. 22, 1938.
198. Berliner Börsenzeitung, March 22, 1938, 1. In addition to such newspaper 
explanations, the Weapons Law was the subject of two legal commentaries: Fritz Kunze, 
Das Waffenrecht im Deutschen Reiche (Berlin: Paul Parey,
1938); Werner Hoche, Waffengesetz (Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1938).
199. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of the Holocaust 
(New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 60; Shirer, Rise and Fall, 430.
200. "Razzia auf Judenwaffen", Der Angriff, Nov. 9, 1938, 14.
201. "Bewaffnete Juden," Frankische Tageszeitung, Nov. 9, 1938, 2.
202. "Berlins Juden wurden entwaffnet," Berliner Morgenpost, Nov. 9, 1938.
203. "Entwaffnung der Berliner Juden," Der Völkische Beobachter, Nov. 9, 1938.
204. "Waffenabgabe der Juden in Berlin," Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Nov. 9, 1938, 1.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of the Holocaust 
(New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 64.
208. New York Times, Nov. 9, 1938, 24.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of the Holocaust 
(New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 59, 60.
212. Id. at 62.
213. Id.
214. Id.; Gerald Schawb, The Day the Holocaust Began: The Odyssey of Herschel 
Grynszpan (New York: Praeger, 1990), 20.
215. Id.
216. Gerald Schawb, The Day the Holocaust Began: The Odyssey of Herschel Grynszpan 
(New York: Praeger, 1990), 22.
217. Id. Also quoted in Lionel Kochan, Pogrom: 10 November 1938 (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1957), 63-64. Source cited: Urteil des obersten Parteigerichts in dem 
Verfahren gegen Frühlnig u.a.
218. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of the Holocaust 
(New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 63.
219. Id. at 63-64. See also Rita Thalmann and Emmanuel Feinermann, Crystal Night: 9-10 
November 1938, trans. Gilles Cremonesi (New York: Holocaust Library, 1974), 59. For 
the German version and source of this document, se
e An alle Stapo Stellen und Stapoleitstellen, Berlin Nr.234 404 9.11.2355, in Trial of 
the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, 
November, 14, 1945 - October 1, 1946, Vol. 25 (Buffalo,
 NY: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1995), 377.
220. Rita Thalmann and Emmanuel Feinermann, Crystal Night: 9-10 November 1938, trans. 
Gilles Cremonesi (New York: Holocaust Library, 1974), 59. Source cited: Orders of the 
SA Commander of the "Baltic Group" in Scheffler-S
chwarze, "Broadcast for Brotherhood Week in R.F.A.," Wiener Library, London.
221. Id.
222. Der Bürgermeister Nauen bei Berlin, Ulten betreffend Aktion gegan Juden 
(10.11.1938). Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv, Potsdam, Rep. 8 Nauen, Nr. 101.
223. Völkische Beobachter, Nov. 10, 1938; Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Nov. 10, 1938, 1; 
Der Angriff, Nov. 10, 1938, 7. See Joseph Walk, Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im 
NS-Staat (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag,
1981).
224. New York Times, Nov. 11, 1938, 1.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Night of Pogroms: "Kristallnacht" November 9-10, 1938
(Washington, DC: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, 1988), 39-40.
232. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of
the Holocaust (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 75.
233. Id. at 76.
234. Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness 1933-1941, trans. Martin
Chalmers (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), xi, xiv.
235. Id. at 275.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 275-76.
238. Geheime Staatspolizei, Betr.:Beschwerde der britischen
Staatsangehörigen Mrs. Gertrude Dawson, Copy, 84-60 - Sdh. 7/2, 7
February 1939. BA Berlin, R 43 II/599, Fiche 3, Row 5.
239. New York Times, Nov. 11, 1938, 2.
240. Geheime Staatspolizei, Betrifft: Den britischen Staatsangehörigen
Henry Coren, Copy 84-50 Sdh. 28/12, 28 December 1938. BA Berlin, R
43 II/599, Fiche 3, Row 5.
241. Id.
242. Reichsgesetblatt 1938, I, 1571, reprinted in Simkin and Zelman,
supra note , at 80-81.
243. Id. § 1.
244. Id. § 3.
245. The regulation was widely noticed in the English-speaking press.
E.g., The Times (London), Nov. 14, 1938, at 12a; Boston Globe, Nov.
12, 1938.
246. Gerald Schawb, The Day the Holocaust Began: The Odyssey of
Herschel Grynszpan (New York: Praeger, 1990), 25.
247. "Das Waffenverbot für die Juden," Berliner Börsen Zeitung, 12
Nov. 1938, p. 12.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. "Erläuterungen zu der Berordnung gegen den Waffenbesitz,"
Völkische Beobachter, Nov. 13, 1938.
251. Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 13, 1938, 2b.
252. Id.
253. The Holocaust, Vol. 3, The Crystal Night Pogrom, John
Mendelsohn, ed. (New York: Garland, 1982), 183-84.
254. Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 13, 1938, 1g.
255. November 1938: From "Reichskristallnacht" to Genocide, Walter
H. Pehle, ed., William Templer, trans., (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991), 127.
256. The Times (London), Nov. 14, 1938, 12a.
257. See supra discussion concerning firearms laws of 1928 and 1938.
258. Reichsgesetblatt 1938, I, 1579. See The Times (London), Nov. 14,
1938, 12a.
259. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nov. 13, 1938, 2:1.
260. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht: The Unleashing of
the Holocaust (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1989), 95, citing
British Acting Counsel General A.E. Dowden's reports from Frankdurt-
am-Main: F0371/21638.
261. Journal de Genève, Nov. 16, 1938, 8, quoting Jour-Echo de Paris.
The Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nov. 15, 1938, 1, under the headline
"The Annihilation Campaign Against the German Jews," reported the
following:
As with the action of last summer, the wave of persecution of Jews has
spread to Gdansk [Danzig]. There were attacks on shops and raids for
weapons. Gauleiter [Nazi Party Provincial Chief] declared yesterday
that Gdansk wanted to get rid of all Jews, even of those with Polish
citizenship.
262. Rita Thalmann and Emmanuel Feinermann, Crystal Night: 9-10
November 1938, trans. Gilles Cremonesi (New York: Holocaust Library,
1974), 57.
263. Geheime Staatspolizei Staatspolizeileitstelle München, An
Polizeipräsidium München et al., Betreff: Waffenablieferung durch
Juden. 19 December 1938. BHStA, B.Nr. 39859/38 II G Ma.
264. Konrad Kwiet, "Resistance and Opposition: The Example of the
German Jews," in David Clay Large ed., Contending With Hitler:
Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich, (Washington, D.C.:
German Historical Institute, 1991), 65-66.
265. Id. at 67.
266. Id. at 72-73.
267. Arnold Paucker, Jewish Resistance in Germany: The Facts and
the Problems (Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1988), 3.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. The Times (London), Feb. 10, 1940, 5e.
271. Id.
272. E.g., Le Matin (Paris), June 27 1940, 1 (proclamation); id., Sept.
22, 1941, 1 (execution of persons for "illegal possession of arms").
This is the subject of a forthcoming study by this author.
273. New York Times, July 2, 1940, 4.
274. Id.
275. Geheime Staatspolizei, Staatspolizeileitstelle München, An die
Landräte in Oberbayern et al., Betreff: Überwachung und Kontrolle der
Waffen- und Munitionsverkäufe, 21 January 1941. BHStA, B.Nr.
28115/41, II Schd./Roh.
276. Claudia Koonz, "Choice and Courage," in David Clay Large ed.,
Contending With Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third
Reich, 60.
277. See Anton Gill, An Honourable Defeat: A History of German
Resistance to Hitler, 1933-1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 1994).
278. See David I. Caplan, "Weapons Control Laws: Gateways to
Victim Oppression and Genocide," in To Be a Victim: Encounters with
Crime and Injustice, eds. Diane Sank and David I. Caplan (New York:
Plenum Press, 1991), 308-11.
279. Anton Gill, An Honourable Defeat: A History of German
Resistance to Hitler, 1933-1945 (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 122.
280. Id. at 129-30.
281. Id. at 149.
282. Id. at 189-190.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 193-94.
286. Id. at 229-50.
287. Id. at 253.
288. New York Times, May 11, 1944, 1.
289. Peter Hoffman, "The Second World War, German Society, and
Internal Resistance to Hitler," in David Clay Large ed., Contending With
Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich, 122.
290. P.L. 274, 55 Stat. 742 (1941). This was passed "in view of the fact
that certain totalitarian and dictatorial nations are now engaged in the
willful and wholesale destruction of personal rights and liberties." Rept.
No. 1120 [to accompany S. 1579], House Committee on Military
Affairs, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (Aug. 4, 1941). Rep. Paul Kilday,
the sponsor, explained: "Remember that registration of firearms is only
the first step. It will be followed by other infringements of the right to
keep and bear arms until finally the right is gone." 87 Cong.Rec. 7101
(1941). See S. Halbrook, "Congress Interprets the Second
Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual
Right to Keep and Bear Arms," 62 Tennessee Law Review 597, 618-31
(Spring 1995).
291. Basic Law, Art. 20, § 4, quoted in Large, "Uses of the Past: The
Anti-Nazi Resistance Legacy in the Federal Republic of Germany," in
David Clay Large ed., Contending With Hitler: Varieties of German
Resistance in the Third Reich, 180.



--

Democracy is the worship of Jackals by Jackasses.  -- H. L. Mencken

<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A>
DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic
screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please!  These are
sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis-
directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with
major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought.
That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and
always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no
credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply.

Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html
 <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html">Archives of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]</A>

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
 <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A>
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Om