-Caveat Lector-
Amnesty International, BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld
UNITED NATIONS 2001 CONFERENCE ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS - THIRD PREPARATORY CONFERENCE, NEW YORK, U.S.A
HOW GUNS GET TO WAR ZONES - TECHNIQUES OF
CLANDESTINE ARMS DELIVERY
A BRIEFING PACK
INTRODUCTION
The transport of weapons and ammunition by air always is an operation
carried out with discretion, even when the transfer is a legal one from one
sovereign Government to another and no international embargoes are being
breached; in the case of illicit arms transfers the degree of deceit which
may be involved is great - but so, of course, are the rewards.
Interviewed last year, Captain Brian 'Sport' Martin told Brian
Johnson-Thomas that UNITA rebels in Angola were willing to pay him and his
two colleagues 100,000 U.S dollars per trip to fly to UNITA's secret air
base, Alpha One. He described his meeting with a UNITA Colonel:
"That was in Kigali, in a little shack. There were tiny lights on. They put
the charts on the table and I had a look at it, and it's not a easy place to
get into at night, and they insisted on doing it at night..... and you have
to come in, into a valley and up onto the runway so (makes titling movement
with hands) ... come down into the valley and up and land so you lose some
of the runway because of the angle you are at ..... they have got low cloud
there and so on and the early hours of the morning and fog..... you're doing
it all on GPS .... Doing an approach on the GPS and nothing else".
This laconic account indicates clearly that aircrew who become involved in
this clandestine world are, whatever else one may think of them, consumate
aviators who are able to fly in conditions on, or beyond, normal aviation
limits.
Captain Martin again: " With the (Boeing) seven-oh (7) you would get in just
about anywhere... we landed on 1800 yards ... to me, It's proper flying, you
don't talk to anybody ... there is nobody to talk to. We do a lot of map
reading as well you know ... we follow the rivers and things like that.
It's nice flying, it really is..."
EXAMPLES
1. Concealment - Transfer of ammunition from Bratislava in the
Slovak Republic, to Khartoum in Sudan, diversion from flight plan.
(Documents A and B)
The simplest method used to conceal the true destination of an arms shipment
is for the aircraft to divert from it's approved flight plan. Documents A
and B show how this works in practice. Aircraft 9G-ROX (with Alan Maskell
as Loadmaster) is apparently flying, says document ammunition from
Bratislava in the Slovak Republic to N'Djamena in Chad. It's only when
Document B is scrutinised that we see that the aircraft actually landed at
Khartoum at a time when Sudan was under a European Union arms embargo.
Loadmaster 'Jim' and Flight Engineer 'John' had a similar experience with
nearly 5 tonnes of weapons and ammunition that was diverted from Israel to
Turkmenistan, and ultimately Afghanistan, some seven years ago. Jim starts
the conversation:
" The first sheet here is basically the weight control and the acceptance of
the 165 boxes weighing 4474 kilos into the security compound at Schipol
airport ....
Following that one there's the actual shippers declaration for dangerous
goods, which is from a shipper called Distraco S.A 1060 Brussels to Israel
Military Industries, Ashkamat Hasharon in Israel, P.O Box 1044 .... That is
supposedly where it was going... to Tel Aviv and the listing is cartridges,
small arms, 143 boxes - that's the dangerous part of the shipment although
there was a further 22 boxes weighing just over a tonne which were in fact
weapons themselves .... Automatic rifles, pistols, hand grenades. Certainly
we did take off (from Schipol) and go down towards the Mediterranean but at
some point we did turn left up towards the Black Sea and turned right to
somewhere".
John remembers that 'somewhere." "It was a military airfield in
Turkmenistan and we used to offload ammunition there for Afghanistan."
2. Bluff - Transfer of arms from Bratislava to Guayaquil in
Ecuador, cargo deceit. (Documents C, D, E and F)
Another favourite technique is simply to declare an arms cargo as an
innocuous one. On 8th March 1995 overflying and landing permits were sought
for a giant Antonov 124 cargo aircraft ostensibly flying a 'hospital truck
and special equipments' from Bratislava to Guayaquil in Ecuador. This was
at the time of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador when arms supplies to
both countries were notionally embargoed by the OAS. During a routine
refuelling stop in the Azores, a passing pilot was attracted by what was, to
him, a new type of aircraft and he went aboard. It was then discovered that
the cargo was military and not medical, thus prompting the Portuguese
authorities to impound the aircraft. Document C shows the original flight
plan, documents D and E show the internal Telex messages between shipping
agents and suppliers and document F shows the amended flight plan for '104
tonnes military trucks and its equipment'. What makes this particular
example interesting, of course, is that this particular shipment was
detected.
An even more common deception is for an unauthorised aircraft to use the
flight number of an authorised flight across the State. Since most aircraft
movements are scheduled, i.e. planned well in advance, it is possible to
know that, say, Flight XYZ 123 is due to transit the airspace of Country
Blank between 1310 and 1430 on Day X.
The 'rogue' aircraft presents itself to the air traffic controllers at the
right height and on the correct Airway and uses the approved call sign, but
is half an hour early, controllers will readily accept that the aircraft has
the right to be on that route. By the time that the properly shows up the
'rogue' aircraft (travelling, remember, at around 800 kph) has already
become somebody else's problem.
SOLUTIONS
These examples highlight the need for concrete action at the UN Conference
to ensure that the illicit delivery of arms is dealt with at international
and national levels.
Enforcement of arms embargoes
Transfers of small arms should be conducted in strict accordance with
states' existing obligations under international law. All UN member
states are required to adhere to UN resolutions by refraining from
transferring arms to an embargoed country, they are also required to take
steps to enforce the embargo against individuals within their jurisdiction.
The international community, in the form of the UN Conference, must now
address embargo enforcement, as a crucial element in the fight against the
illicit trade. States should treat any arms transfer in breach of a UN arms
embargo as a serious criminal offence and adapt their domestic laws
accordingly. To be effective such legislation must be matched with adequate
resources for police and customs officials to ensure compliance, for example
by follow up checks to track the end-use of exports. In addition, where
appropriate the international community should offer technical assistance
and resources, particularly in the region surrounding an embargoed county,
through which are likely transit routes, in order to enhance their national
controls and ensure stringent enforcement regimes. Targeted sanctions
should be applied against states that transfer arms in contravention of
embargoes.
Controlling legal transfers and enforcing the responsibilities of states
Many illicit arms transfers originate as Government licensed deals that then
get diverted. Therefore in order to tackle illicit trade of arms it is
crucial to look at controls on the "legal" trade. It is essential that
global criteria governing the transfer of small arms and light weapons are
developed at the UN Conference, based on existing commitments under
international law, as well as other areas of growing concern, for example
the need to avoid the destabilising accumulation of weapons in a region,
and the need to avoid undermining sustainable development.
Effective control over the end-use of small arms and light weapons when
exported
All states need to strengthen their mechanisms for assuring and monitoring
the end-use of small-arms and light weapons post-export to prevent diversion
from legal markets and end users. Many governments currently rely on paper
forms of end-use certificates that are easily forged and circumvented by
unscrupulous end users. The UN Conference is an opportunity to develop
international norms and standards governing end-use. This could include
states adopting a system whereby end-use undertakings take the form of
legally binding contract that, if broken, would result in targeting
sanctions against those responsible. Such sanctions could include the
refusal of further exports whether under existing or new contracts, or the
withholding of spare parts and servicing.
Regulating arms brokers and shipping agents
Unlike arms manufacturers and exporters, brokers and shipping agents are
entirely unregulated. Such lack of regulation makes it very difficult to
distinguish between legitimate operators and criminal dealers. An
international convention on arms brokering and shipping agents is under
discussion at the UN Conference. It is essential that this international
convention includes shipping agents as well. The UN conference should play
a central role in establishing agreed international definitions and
standards for addressing all aspects for the problem of arms brokers and
shipping agents. The UN agreement should commit states to establish
national laws, regulations and procedures to regulate arms brokering
activities that may take place within their area of jurisdiction,
criminalise breaches of such regulations and monitor and enforce their
implementation.
Cargo checks
Currently, air freight documents such as air waybills and cargo manifests,
do not require detailed descriptions or cross referencing of the goods
described in arms export and import licences. Arms have been described as
agricultural equipment, mining equipment, tents and second hand clothing.
Air freight documents should contain more detailed descriptions or cross
references of the goods described in arms export and import licences. In
addition, if the airport authorities at certain key transit points - such as
Cairo and Nairobi - where many freighter aircraft call for fuel, were more
assiduous at checking actual cargoes carried against manifests, then many
more such anomalies would be discovered.
Documentation checks of flight path
Rigorous checks are needed in an aircraft's flight plans. Where an aircraft
has diverted to another destination to offload cargo a close perusal of the
aircraft's own documentation would disclose discrepancies.
Aircraft registration checks
Under current systems, an aircraft registration number and the name of the
airline leasing or operating the plane can readily be switched to conceal an
operation. A cargo aircraft might typically be registered in one country,
then leased and chartered by companies registered an other. For example
Equatorial Guinea has acted as a "flag of convenience" by registering planes
that other countries operate. A national authority that registers an
aircraft to fly under its flag, may also fail to ensure the air-worthiness
and safety of that plane. A legal requirement for aircraft to be registered
in countries that are operating them should be established.
--------------
For a more detailed appreciation see: "Running Guns: The Global Black Market
in Small Arms" (edited by Lora Lumpe. London: Zed Books and New York: St
Martins Press 2000) Brian Johnson-Thomas
<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A>
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