-Caveat Lector- The War of Nerves 2130 GMT, 011001 stratfor.com
Summary Having resisted the temptation of precipitous retaliatory strikes on al-Qa'ida and Afghanistan's Taliban regime, the United States has entered a period of classic psychological warfare. Just as Americans have no way of knowing when, where or how suspected Islamic radicals might strike again, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida also must live in a state of constant tension. Both sides must diffuse their forces to protect possible targets, creating defensive weak spots -- and both sides hope to wear the other down to a point of capitulation. Analysis The key to victory is surprise. Surprise, like war, exists on three levels: strategic (whether there will be an attack), operational (how the attack will be carried out) and tactical (where and when the attack will occur). On Sept. 11 al-Qa'ida achieved tactical and operational surprise, even though it lost strategic surprise long ago. On that day, the United States lost strategic surprise as well. There was and has been no question that the United States intends to make war on al-Qa'ida, and by now, it is clear that some sort of war also will be waged against the Taliban government of Afghanistan. What the United States has fought hard during the past two weeks to develop and retain is operational and tactical surprise. Both al-Qa'ida and the United States are carefully cloaking the operational and tactical levels. It is likely that al-Qa'ida will strike again, though it is not known how, when or where that attack will be carried out. The United States was in danger of losing operational surprise early in the new war on terrorism, when the desire to act immediately was strong and the assumption was the United States would respond as it had in the past, with cruise missile attacks aimed at a variety of targets. Washington resisted the temptation of precipitous action, creating increasing uncertainty on the strategic and tactical levels. The resistance is more than simply regaining the element of surprise and initiative. The period we are now in is a war of nerves. Al-Qa'ida has created a profound uncertainty within the United States as to whether it will strike again and if so, how, where and when. It is of course unknown whether al-Qa'ida is capable of another attack now or in the future. This very uncertainty creates the foundation for follow-on attacks. This is a form of psychological warfare that achieves several things. First, because there is no good operational and tactical intelligence as to al-Qa'ida's next move, the United States must defend many possible targets against many types of possible attack. Because everything cannot be equally defended, al-Qa'ida can wait, observe the defensive system and attack the weakest point. Second, uncertainty raises tensions, increases the likelihood of response to imagined threats and exhausts the defenders physically and psychologically. Third, al-Qa'ida can choose to transmit false information about impending attacks to raise tensions and trigger unwarranted offensive operations. Finally, within this atmosphere, the probability that false alarms will lead to a lessened state of alertness opens the door to more opportunities. The United States is now establishing the same dynamic within the Afghan theater of operations. There is no question that an attack is coming. The United States has, however, created a profound sense of uncertainty as to the timing, nature and targets of the attack. Washington has carefully released information that U.S. and British Special Forces are already in Afghanistan. It made certain the Taliban and al-Qa'ida knew four carrier battle groups were stationed offshore. Using local and international news channels, it very publicly made clear that the United States has deployed some forces in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It has stated that U.S. forces are "hot on the trail" of Osama bin Laden. Washington is capable of launching air strikes at any time. It is constantly releasing information that various facilities might be attacked in a matter of days or that certain people might be captured at any hour. This campaign, like al-Qa'ida's, works because it is quite possibly true -- but not certainly true. Therefore al-Qa'ida and the Taliban must live in a state of constant tension, unsure when, where or how the strikes will come. Like the United States, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida must now defend all assets against operational and tactical uncertainty. In being forced to diffuse defenses, they create opportunities that U.S. intelligence can observe and exploit. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida must expend tremendous energy in unceasing alerts triggered by imagination, deliberate disinformation and genuine threats. Very soon, their intelligence and other forces will not be able to distinguish between imagination, lies and truth. The fact that the United States must build up its capabilities in and around Afghanistan under ideal circumstances creates the perfect opportunity for psychological warfare. The Taliban regime can't be sure the United States won't attack with forces already in theater, nor can it be sure it will. An essential weakness for the United States -- the time needed to build up forces in theater -- becomes an advantage. All effective psywar is built on something that is very true (America could strike) but which supports a broader strategic interest (America needs more time). This buys time while sapping the strength of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. We are therefore in a period of classic psychological warfare -- the war of nerves. Both sides are deploying, regrouping and taking each other's measure. Neither side knows when the other will strike. No one knows where. Each side must assume the other will strike very soon, yet each side knows the other may not strike for a long time. It is the ultimate goal of psychological warfare to so effectively shatter the enemy's will to resist that a strike is unnecessary. On Sept. 11, al-Qa'ida hoped to smash American nerve to the point of paralysis or, just as good, to trigger an uncontrolled attack throughout the Islamic world. It is still hoping to exhaust America. The United States is hoping the fear of impending retaliation will destabilize the Taliban government so completely that it splits and falls as dread builds, allowing a new government to be installed -- one that hands bin Laden over to the United States. Neither dream is likely to come true. Radically effective psywar, particularly over the course of weeks or months, is rare. But the opportunities psychological warfare provides are not trivial. 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